Another example of what the Liberals, Socialists & Democrats plan for MAGA & its supporters, if they can pull off another fraudulent election successful Coup.
They’re Jacobins, looking forward to the time of Robespierre and Madam la Guillotine. In aid of which they’re making ToDo lists.
#1
DC SWAMP SIDE NOTE:
A newly uncovered FDA data mining report, shows the FDA, Biden Admin & Fauci knew the Covid vaccine had 25 major side effects and it seems that they may have all conspired to hide it from the public.
#2
Perhaps, they are nothing if not overheated. Even so if it must be it would be my great pleasure to introduce Madame la Guillotine to MAJ M1A1 and a couple of thousand of his 7.62 friends.
What the hey! Bring Ahmed along for the fun for a one and done.
Commentary by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin
[ColonelCassad] The Pentagon is preparing for the next PSYOP modernization. The following is an excerpt from a policy publication on the US military's specialized portal:
The Army must make information the core combat function in multi-domain operations. Merging information and space operations units is, at best, an administrative exercise in establishing order. The merger does not create new capabilities or improve the existing capabilities of the Army's combat forces.
To implement a truly transformational approach, the Army must make information technology the seventh combat function, create capable information units at combat headquarters, equip conventional forces with their own information formations, and conduct information technology training at the echelon, both within professional military education and at combat training centers.
The war in Ukraine continues to demonstrate the need to elevate information to a central position in operations and planning. The most important battlefield variable that enables commanders to translate information capabilities into results is not technology, but organization. Information and space capabilities are only useful when the force has the structure to utilize them in combined arms maneuvers. Russia is demonstrating how a disjointed military staff is unable to translate its advantages in information warfare into tangible results on the battlefield.
WHY IO AND PSO MUST BE UNIFIED :
First, the army's information capabilities are currently scattered "across various commands, branches of the armed forces, and centers of excellence," and a single branch of the armed forces ensures unity where fragmentation previously existed.
Second, the training of psychological operations specialists must be modernized, abandoning the focus on countering radicalization necessary to support the global war on terrorism in favor of large-scale combat operations.
Third, by integrating the areas of information operations and psychological operations, the army will produce officers capable of both planning and conducting psychological operations and integrating information into operational processes.
Ultimately, such officers and such information structures should become an integral part of multi-domain commands that are capable of independently conducting multi-domain operations, including in information and cyberspace.
#2
NATO began releasing their multi-domain cognitive warfare whitepapers last decade. Here's the genesis of the cognitive warfare model lifted from one of their white papers:
tl;dr - dont care!
On August 21, 2013, the world awoke to haunting images from Ghouta, a suburb of Damascus. Civilians — many of them children — were gasping for air, convulsing, and dying in the streets. The evidence pointed to a massive chemical weapons attack by the Assad regime, crossing the "red line" set by U.S. President Barack Obama only a year before.
Almost immediately, the information space was filled with competing narratives. Russian media outlets, diplomats, and proxy influencers, supported by botnets and troll farms, cast doubt on what had happened. Was it a false flag? Could the footage have been staged? In days, what appeared to be a clear-cut atrocity dissolved into ambiguity. These narratives, carried across RT, Sputnik, fringe West-ern outlets, and social media platforms, tapped into an old wound rooted in public mistrust aer the false weapons of mass destruction claims preceding the Iraq War.
This was more than propaganda. It was a deliberate campaign to muddy intelligence, inject doubt into Allied debates, and stall action. Washington hesitated, then backed away from strikes, accepting instead a Russian-brokered deal. Russia's approach in Syria remains one of the clearest examples of how cognitive war-fare can target military command and control (C2) at both tactical and strategic levels. By 2015, Russia had paired these narrative operations with electronic and cyber tools — spoofing communications, jamming UAV feeds, and disrupting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) — to erode commanders' ability to act decisively. ese were not incidental effects but the intended outcomes of an integrated cognitive campaign: victory achieved not through combat, but through paralysed decision-making before the night began.
The lessons of Ghouta echo today. At the 2025 NATO Communicators Conference in September, participants underscored that adversaries are no longer simply contesting the information space; they are deliberately targeting the Alliance's ability to think, decide, and act. e message was clear: NATO must start taking the cognitive threat seriously, treating it as a contested domain in its own right.
However, this requires more than words. It requires investment in people, training, and capabilities on a scale reflecting the priority adversaries place on cognitive effects. Until NATO develops the ability not just to defend but to contest in this space, it risks repeating the same paralysis that followed Ghouta. That danger captures the essence of cognitive warfare...
#3
The US Army has a psyop org that is operational. They do not need modernization. What is needed is combatant commander understanding the value of psyops. Most commander use psyop troops as door guards because they think its a waste of time. The ghost of Kieve was a psyop that was brought about by US teams, it did well as did other information management efforts. Commanders need the training.
Posted by: 49 Pan ||
08/10/2026 20:32 Comments ||
Top||
#4
^Maybe, they also need to understand the culture of these they're trying to influence?
Text taken from the Telegram channel of @china3army
[ColonelCassad] Japan has released a new Defense White Paper: China is officially recognized as the main strategic threat. The Japanese Ministry of Defense has presented (pfd in Japanese ) the 2026 Defense White Paper.
The 610-page document pays special attention to China, Taiwan, and the future nature of war.
Key findings: China is called the largest and unprecedented strategic challenge to Japan's security. Tokyo believes that Beijing is deliberately turning military activity around Taiwan into a permanent norm. Military pressure on Taiwan has increased sharply. According to Tokyo, more than 3,700 sorties by Chinese aircraft and about 2,600 passages by PLA Navy ships have been recorded near the island in 2025. Large-scale exercises are seen as preparation for a blockade, precision strikes, and a joint operation of all branches of the armed forces.
The "gray blockade" scenario is considered the most likely. Japan believes that Beijing could initially use its coast guard and civilian forces to conduct inspections, restrict shipping, and isolate Taiwan, and then, if necessary, quickly escalate to a full-fledged military operation. Cooperation between China and Russia is also key. The Japanese government believes that joint actions by China and Russia, in addition to a clear demonstrative intent toward Tokyo, could also be linked to the situation in the Taiwan Strait and the Western Pacific.
If China takes military action in the Taiwan Strait, Russia could simultaneously increase military pressure in the airspace and waters north of Japan or in adjacent areas, potentially forcing Japan and the United States to divert resources and increasing risks to regional security.
China is actively expanding its naval capabilities beyond the First Island Chain. The document notes the joint operations of the aircraft carriers Liaoning and Shandong in the Pacific Ocean, as well as the commissioning of a third aircraft carrier, Fujian. Tokyo assesses that these forces could be used to deter US and Japanese intervention in the event of a crisis over Taiwan.
For the first time, a separate section on new-generation warfare has been added. Japan draws lessons from the conflict in Ukraine and believes that future wars will be built on a combination of UAVs, artificial intelligence, satellite systems, cyber operations, electronic warfare, and psychological operations. Regarding the Taiwan Strait and the southwestern islands, unmanned aerial vehicles could be used to monitor the Miyako Strait, eastern Taiwan, and the Bashi Channel, track Chinese aircraft carriers, and conduct anti-submarine operations, mine laying, creating decoys, and suppressing maritime operations.
Particular attention is given to the widespread use of inexpensive drones. The Japanese military acknowledges that expensive air defense missiles are incapable of repelling drone swarms for long, requiring a multilayered air and counter-drone defense system.
The threat also extends to space and the information domain. The document examines scenarios of attacks on satellites, cyberattacks, electronic countermeasures, sabotage of undersea communication cables, and large-scale disinformation campaigns.
Japan is accelerating its preparations for a potential crisis. The deployment of long-range anti-ship missiles (in Kumamoto), Tomahawk cruise missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicles (in Shizuoka) continues, as does the development of intelligence and information systems and the expansion of cooperation with the United States and its allies.
"Protracted War." The large-scale consumption of weapons and ammunition by Russia and Ukraine underscores the importance for Tokyo of building up peacetime weapons stockpiles and strengthening its production capacity.
Underwater infrastructure can be deliberately destroyed to disrupt communications and create panic in the early stages of a war. Examples include incidents involving damage to communication cables between Taiwan and Matsu, Penghu, and the northern islands.
The US-Japan alliance remains the foundation of Japan's security. Tokyo will continue extended deterrence, joint command and training, with US support, and will deepen military cooperation with Australia, India, the Philippines, and European countries to "prevent" the escalation of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait or the East China Sea into a direct confrontation between Japan and China.
It might be wise to pay attention to Australia’s response to the Moslem colonists in their midst as well as their response to moves by China. Ditto for Europe — it’s important to be clear about the sturdiness of those one hopes to lean on when things go pear shaped.
#1
"Beijing is deliberately turning military activity around Taiwan into a permanent norm."
The Chinese have a naval-military map of that part of the world, and the years it will take to project military power throughout the regions. China sees Australia as its backyard and it is only a matter of time the Aussies learn the same lesson Japan is figuring out.
[FoxNews] Rep. Nancy Mace, R-S.C., asserted that all Muslim public servants in the U.S. pose a threat to the nation.
"Every single Muslim holding public office in America is a trojan horse, and a threat to both national security and our republic," Mace declared in a Friday post on X. "We refuse to be silent."
Not all. Unfortunately, definitely too many.
Rep. Pramila Jayapal, D-Wash., condemned Mace's comments and insisted that Republicans should do so as well.
#3
All pit bulls aren't dangerous, Alice,
With hard heads and hearts full of malice;
No, only the ones
In whom lunacy runs
Or who sport a Mohammedan callous.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
[AmericanTribunal] Justice After The End of MAGA
