[IsraelTimes] As the US-Israeli war against Iran ...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneously taking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militias to extend the regime's influence. The word Iran is a cognate form of Aryan. The abbreviation IRGC is the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA). The term Supreme Guide is a the modern version form of either Duce or Führer or maybe both. They hate JewsZionists Jews. Their economy is based on the production of oil and vitriol... spilled into the Gulf this year, Israel’s chief ally in the Arab world found itself in an uncomfortable position.
Facing some of the heaviest Iranian attacks of the conflict, the United Arab Emirates deepened military ties with the Jewish state, reportedly cooperating on both defensive and offensive measures. But the fighting also sharpened existing political tensions for the Emiratis, who had been the linchpin of the US-brokered Abraham Accords normalization framework, while creating new friction points as well.
Washington’s ultimate decision to pursue a diplomatic off-ramp, with the Iranian regime intact and poised to recover, has pushed key Gulf states back toward accommodation with Tehran, complicating Abu Dhabi’s relationships with both the US and Israel, experts say.
The war has yet to prompt a clear shift in Emirati policy, but reduced trust in US military protection and a growing recognition that it will need to coexist with the regime in Tehran — as well as longstanding political disagreements with Israel — make it harder for the prominent Gulf state to visibly embrace Jerusalem.
While UAE-Israel security cooperation is likely to continue quietly and even deepen, it may be some time before the Emiratis are ready to openly heat up relations with Israel. Exactly how long it takes and how warm ties get may be determined to a significant degree by which Israeli government emerges from the upcoming election.
AT ARM’S LENGTH
Public diplomacy between Jerusalem and Abu Dhabi — which inked the Abraham Accords at the White House in 2020, along with Bahrain — had already grown more complicated after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu returned to power in late 2022.
Under Netanyahu’s right-wing government, Emirati officials become unsettled by Israeli actions and rhetoric surrounding the Temple Mount, the West Bank, and the actions and rhetoric of far-right ministers, particularly National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir. Under the previous government under Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, by contrast, ties had been more openly displayed.
During the war against Hamas ..the well-beloved offspring of the Moslem Brotherhood,... in Gazoo
...Hellhole adjunct to Israel and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, inhabited by Gazooks. The place was acquired in the wake of the 1967 War and then presented to Paleostinian control in 2006 by Ariel Sharon, who had entered his dotage. It is currently ruled with a rusty iron fist by Hamas with about the living conditions you'd expect. It periodically attacks the Hated Zionist Entity whenever Iran needs a ruckus created or the hard boyz get bored, getting thumped by the IDF in return. The ruling turbans then wave the bloody shirt and holler loudly about oppression and disproportionate response... that began with the terror group’s massacre in Israel on October 7, 2023, Abu Dhabi maintained its commitment to normalization. But it faced growing domestic and regional sympathy for Paleostinians and was itself frustrated with what it saw as Israel’s lack of a coherent postwar strategy.
Similarly, the Iran war failed to either turn the Emiratis against Israel or put them in Jerusalem’s corner.
On one hand, Gulf states felt "the Americans and the Israelis acted in a way that threatened the Gulf states’ interests without taking those interests enough into account," said Joshua Krasna, a fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University and a former Mideast strategic analyst for the Israeli government.
But once Iran began striking the Gulf in response — especially the UAE — the attacks made clear that Tehran was the main aggressor, and exposed vulnerabilities that boosted the value of Israeli security cooperation for Abu Dhabi, Krasna continued.
"They might have blamed [Israel] for starting the war and everything, but it was clear to them who was attacking them," he said.
UAE presidential adviser Anwar Gargash said in April that Israeli and American influence in the Gulf would only increase as a result of Iran’s "strategy" in the region.
Between February 28 and a ceasefire reached on April 8, Tehran — which had vowed to strike US bases in the region — fired some 550 ballistic and cruise missiles and more than 2,200 drones at military and civilian targets in the UAE, Emirati figures show, making it the most-targeted country in the region, including Israel. The UAE has also been targeted several times since the truce, including an attack on a nuclear plant.
According to reports, Abu Dhabi sought assistance from allies, prompting Israel to send an Iron Dome anti-missile battery and dozens of soldiers to operate it, and to participate in intelligence-sharing and air-defense cooperation.
The extent of the UAE’s offensive involvement in the war remains vague. While Abu Dhabi publicly insisted it would not strike Iran, and denied that its territory was used to launch attacks, reports during and after the conflict — confirmed to The Times of Israel by an Arab diplomat — indicate that the UAE had carried out some attacks on Iran.
Despite the military cooperation, many have continued to blame Israel for effectively making the UAE a target, said Yoel Guzansky, head of the Gulf Research Field at Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies.
"They say: You brought this disaster upon us... to a large extent, the relationship with Israel was a trigger for the Iranians to see the Emirates as a major target," said Guzansky, who formerly coordinated on Gulf-related affairs at the National Security Council in the Prime Minister’s Office.
When Abu Dhabi denied that Netanyahu met with UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed in the country during the war, a trip leaked by Israeli media and confirmed by the premier, it illustrated the tension between the Emiratis’ reliance on Israel as a military partner and the cost of being seen as cozying up to Jerusalem.
The incident embarrassed the Emiratis and made Israel appear politically self-serving and insensitive to the UAE’s preference for quiet coordination, Krasna said.
Officials familiar with the matter acknowledged to The Times of Israel that Netanyahu’s public admission of the visit damaged personal relations between the two leaders.
STUCK WITH IRAN
The war’s broader impact on Gulf relations with Iran further complicates the Israel-UAE relationship.
Because the Iranian regime survived and proved capable of threatening the economic lifelines of Saudi Arabia ...a kingdom taking up the bulk of the Arabian peninsula, largely made up of sand and oil rigs. Its primary economic activity involves exporting oil and soaking Islamic rubes on the annual haj pilgrimage. The country supports a large number of princes in whatcha might call princely splendor. Formerly dictatorial and steeped in Olde Tyme Religion, deferring to Salafist holy men on all issues, it has now done a 180 and is making a serious effort to modernize, so as not to be left in the sand by its Gulf Arab neighbors. The holy men have been shoved to the background and the nation is now still dictatorial but somewhat rational. That doesn't make them trustworthy, but it's a start... , the UAE, Qatar ...an emirate on the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula. It sits on some really productive gas and oil deposits, which produces the highest per capita income in the world. They piss it all away on religion, financing the Moslem Brotherhood and several al-Qaeda affiliates. Home of nutbag holy manYusuf al-Qaradawi... and other Gulf monarchies through the Strait of Hormuz, those countries are likely to become more cautious with Tehran rather than more confrontational, experts said.
Rather than push Abu Dhabi further away from Tehran, the war has convinced the UAE that maintaining a diplomatic relationship with Iran is important, said Krasna: "They don’t have to like the Iranians, but they have to live with them."
That shift already appears to be taking shape. Senior Emirati national security officials reportedly met with their Iranian counterparts in Tehran earlier this month, for the first time since the war started.
"Once they understood that the Americans were not going all the way" against Iran, Gulf states "gradually changed their tune" and realized that they would need to manage relations with Tehran, Guzansky said.
Israel and Gulf nations thus emerged from the war with very different priorities, at least in the short term. Israel remains focused on Iran as a strategic and ideological threat, while Gulf capitals — and Washington — are focused on economic stability and freedom of navigation.
Ahead of the signing of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding, sources with direct knowledge told The National, mediators resorted to "maximum secrecy and misinformation" to prevent Israel from learning details of the negotiations and potentially trying to derail them.
The report in the state-owned English-language Emirati daily, likely reflecting the stance of the Gulf state’s rulers, underscored concerns in Abu Dhabi that Israel’s objectives regarding Iran did not align with the UAE’s.
"Energy for the Gulf states and for [US President Donald] Trump and frankly for the rest of the world is the single most important aspect of this crisis," said Simon Henderson, director of the Bernstein Program on Gulf and Energy Policy at The Washington Institute.
The damage to Gulf trust in the US-Israeli security umbrella also hurts momentum on the Abraham Accords alliances, which were built in part on Gulf confidence in American military power, said former Israeli ambassador to the US Michael Oren.
"The cement of the Abraham Accords was the belief in the staying power of American force. And that’s not happening," he said, warning that "there’s a greater possibility that Gulf states will start gravitating toward Tehran now."
POSTWAR TROUBLES
It’s still too early to tell whether Abu Dhabi’s postwar calculations will lead it to a cooling or readjustment of ties with Jerusalem.
Emiratis continue to see value in cooperation with Israel on security as well as other fields, but have a hard time trusting Netanyahu’s political judgment and remain wary of the cost of associating with Israel, Krasna said.
Nonetheless, the UAE still sees strategic value in the Abraham Accords, and is particularly interested in "fields like AI... agritech... healthtech... alternative energies, which are fields that they feel that Israel has a lot to offer them," he said.
An Israeli official recently insisted to AFP that "enhancement in cooperation will grow further [with the UAE], not only in military cooperation," saying that two Israeli delegations were set to visit the UAE this month, including a transportation ministry team that would discuss a trade corridor linking India, the Middle East, and Europe.
But tensions remain, including issues that predate the conflict with Iran.
Guzansky noted that while the Iran war temporarily shifted attention away from the demilitarization and rehabilitation of Gaza — to which the UAE is among the largest aid donors — political disagreements on the Paleostinian issue "still create distance between the sides."
"Once the cameras move and return to Gaza, the gaps will suddenly resurface," he said.
Most Emirati officials continue to support relations with Israel, but have serious problems with the current Israeli government, said Guzansky.
"Everyone in the Gulf is waiting... for [upcoming Israeli] elections. They very much hope that a different government will come to power in Israel," one that will be more discreet, consultative, and realistic about Emirati interests, he said.
[DM] China is closing in on the US in the AI race after the superpower developed its cybersecurity capabilities to match those of its American rivals.
Beijing-based tech firms 360 Security Technology and Z.ai, also known as Zhipu AI, have narrowed the gap with American competitors when it comes to finding bugs.
360 Security Chief Executive Zhou Hongyi told a cybersecurity conference in the Chinese capital that the company's bug-finding tool, called Tulongfeng, is now comparable to Anthropic's Mythos, which serves the same function.
'This kind of powerful weapon that can alter the landscape of cyberwarfare can't remain solely in American hands,' Zhou said, according to the Wall Street Journal.
Identifying bugs in software using AI systems allows hackers to quickly exploit them before they can be fixed - which may lead to a nightmare worldwide 'bugmageddon' scenario where cybercriminals can launch widespread and devastating attacks.
Though Chinese tech is advancing in this field, it still lags behind on other fronts, including OpenAI products like ChatGPT.
While Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping have maintained what the US President terms a 'good relationship,' the rivalry between the two superpowers remains tense.
Amid increased security concerns, the Trump administration has been imposing limits on public access to new Anthropic systems - something which critics have said is actually helping Beijing by stunting the growth of US models.
[Producer] Bumper Black Sea wheat offsets U.S. disaster. Russia and Ukraine have big crops on the way.
looking Black Sea crops will likely keep the wheat market from rallying this summer, says an analyst.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture is forecasting 88 million tonnes of Russian wheat production and another 23.5 million tonnes from Ukraine in 2026-27.
DTN market analyst Rhett Montgomery wouldn’t be surprised if Russia’s crop keeps getting bigger and ends up around 90 million tonnes. The country’s record output was 92 million tonnes set in 2022-23.
“We have enough supply there to bridge the gap or at least keep the market afloat until we get to the Southern Hemisphere crops,” he said during a recent webinar about the USDA’s latest World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates report.
He believes the Southern Hemisphere crops provide the only hope for a supply-based market rally because they were planted after the Middle East war caused a spike in crop input costs.
WHY IT MATTERS
The wheat market needs a crop disaster somewhere to spark another rally.
Russia’s forecast comprises 64 million tonnes of winter wheat and 24 million tonnes of spring wheat.
The USDA said precipitation has been above average since Russia’s winter wheat crop emerged from dormancy.
“Moderate to heavy May rainfall provided consistent and sufficient moisture for the developing crop,” the USDA stated in its World Agricultural Production report.
Crop vigour is well above average as the crop enters the filling stage across southern growing regions. Maintaining adequate soil moisture reserves will be essential for crops in the northern growing regions over the next couple of weeks.
Russia’s winter wheat harvest begins in July.
Spring wheat has been planted on only 19.76 million acres out of the initially projected 27.42 million acres as of early June, according to the USDA.
“Farmers are beginning to consider shifting to alternative summer grown crops such as oilseeds or even corn that generally can be planted later than grains,” the USDA stated.
SovEcon analyst Andrey Sizov echoed those concerns in a recent X post.
“Russian spring wheat area is coming in more than 10 per cent below last year and likely well below most expectations,” he said.
“The reason is not just weather. Farmers in the Volga region and Siberia are actively shifting to sunflower and rapeseed. This is a structural story, not a one-season.”
Winter wheat accounts for 97 per cent of Ukraine’s total wheat production. The key yield formation period is early to mid May. The crop reaches maturity in mid to late June.
“Favourable May rainfall supplied ample soil moisture during the aforementioned critical developmental window, enhancing crop vigour and boosting this season’s yield prospects,” stated the USDA.
Montgomery said the bountiful Black Sea crops could offset what appears to be a disaster in the United States.
Down here in the GA. we are seeing mainly Soybean, Corn and grass (hay) being grown. Corn & Grass mainly to feed dairy cows, Meat-Beef, Hogs, Poultry, and etc. An only a little Wheat for the straw and some grain.
But, rest assured somewhere, someone will have us a factory made artificial flour soon. 🤮
[TT] Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg, Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, and Peter Thiel glare out from the endless digital scroll like perps in a police lineup. Their corporations span continents, influence elections, shape commerce, and manage the daily habits of billions.
The question is not who killed whom. The question is who created the conditions that, according to Pew Research, have led nearly eight in 10 Americans to believe Silicon Valley has accumulated too much political power and two-thirds to believe it possesses too much economic power.
The verdict is no longer confined to the left or the right. The jury has gone mainstream.
#3
We DID break up Microsoft. An illegal monopoly. We were going to break up Microsoft Office and Windows into two separate companies.
But then George W. Bush got into office and ordered DOJ to drop it.
They did. now Microsoft owns Bing, which is just Copilot AI now. The newest version of Windows is all AI and MS knows everything you say to it (it doesn't like keyboard input) and can analyze your tone of voice, the hours you're awake, your time zone and all of your political posts. All of it goes to Palantir.
[FrontPage] The Left's identity politics are really about politics, not identity.
California State Sen. Scott Wiener, a politician best noted for his radical LGBTQ positions, who happens to be Jewish, didn’t get the nod from Pelosi to replace her in Congress. Instead Pelosi picked a Chinese Communist-linked immigrant, Connie Chan, a member of the famously corrupt San Francisco Board of Supervisors, to succeed her.
Chan and Wiener have both come out against Israel with Wiener, knowing that it’s a particular political weakness in an increasingly antisemitic party, falsely accused Israel of ‘genocide’ for fighting Hamas, promised to vote against military funding, not to take money from AIPAC, yadda, yadda, but that’s still not good enough.
Progressive congressional candidate Scott Wiener can’t catch a break in super-woke San Francisco.
The leading candidate to win Nancy Pelosi’s seat in Congress was chased away from the city’s Pride March on Friday by an angry mob — a day after footage surfaced of pro-Palestinian agitator berating him inside a restaurant…
The person shouted that Wiener “stopped being queer the moment he started supporting Israel.”
That line is incredibly telling because it shows the left defines ‘queer’ not as a sexual orientation, but as a political orientation. (Much like black, just ask Larry Elder.)
#6
Wiener will almost certainly win the seat in the House of R.
Then he can be doxxed and harassed for the next two years by his pro Hamas constituents. That will keep him too busy to pursue his agenda of lowering the age of consent, etc.
Posted by: Lord Garth ||
06/29/2026 12:03 Comments ||
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#7
Gays like Wiener discovering that they are considered useful idiots by the true communists. Maybe they should read about the Night of the Long Knives. It might smarten up a bit.
Posted by: Abu Uluque ||
06/29/2026 12:32 Comments ||
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[IsraelTimes] America’s Iran ...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneously taking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militias to extend the regime's influence. The word Iran is a cognate form of Aryan. The abbreviation IRGC is the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA). The term Supreme Guide is a the modern version form of either Duce or Führer or maybe both. They hate JewsZionists Jews. Their economy is based on the production of oil and vitriol... debate continues to revolve around a familiar binary: engagement or confrontation. Across administrations, congressional hearings, and think tank circles, these poles define the limits of policy thinking. Yet this framework no longer reflects either Iran’s internal trajectory or the strategic realities of the Middle alone. Both approaches treat Iran primarily as a policy target, rather than a society undergoing long-term internal change that external tools only partially influence.
This produces a persistent mismatch: US policy oscillates between engagement and coercion, while Iran evolves along a separate timeline shaped by generational change, institutional rigidity, economic adaptation, and shifting social expectations.
The engagement model assumes that integration into the international system can gradually moderate Iran’s behavior. The confrontation model assumes that sustained pressure will force compliance or weaken the state’s external capacity. Both contain partial truths. Diplomacy can reduce escalation risks; pressure can constrain certain activities. But neither accounts for how Iran changes internally over time.
Iran today is defined by deep structural tensions: an aging political system governing a young, digitally connected population; centralized ideological authority alongside increasingly decentralized social behavior; and persistent economic constraints colliding with rising expectations for mobility and dignity. These tensions do not respond predictably to sanctions relief or diplomatic breakthroughs, nor do they collapse under pressure in linear ways. They evolve internally, often in forms only partially visible from outside the country.
What is missing from Washington’s debate is sustained attention to Iran as a society in motion. Over the past decade, Iranian society has undergone significant shifts in norms, behavior, and political expression.
At the same time, citizens have adapted to state constraints through technological workarounds. Despite extensive restrictions on digital access, widespread use of VPNs and decentralized communication platforms has created a parallel informational sphere. This does not amount to political liberalization, but it does weaken the state’s monopoly over information and accelerates the circulation of alternative narratives. These changes accumulate over time and gradually reshape the environment in which political authority operates.
The persistence of the engagement—confrontation divide reflects political convenience more than analytical accuracy. It offers clarity in a domain defined by uncertainty, but that clarity is increasingly artificial. Both approaches assume that external policy inputs are the primary drivers of Iranian behavior. In reality, Iran’s external actions are deeply entangled with domestic dynamics operating on different time horizons.
This helps explain why US policy often oscillates without producing lasting strategic effect. Each shift responds to immediate behavior rather than underlying trajectory.
A more complete framework must account for how internal political conditions shape external conduct. States under sustained internal pressure often externalize instability through regional behavior. In Iran’s case, regional activity through aligned networks and non-state partners serves multiple functions: deterrence signaling, strategic leverage, and domestic political consolidation. External behavior, in this sense, is not separate from internal conditions but intertwined with them.
If the current debate rests on a false choice, the alternative is not a third policy option but a different question: how should U.S. policy account for Iran’s internal evolution over time while managing immediate regional risks?
This reframing does not eliminate deterrence or diplomacy. It situates them within a longer strategic horizon. In practice, this means prioritizing the regional environment in which Iran operates through deterrence, energy stability, and security coordination, while also investing in sustained analysis of Iran’s internal dynamics, from generational change to information flows and legitimacy pressures. It also requires recognizing the limits of external influence: engagement and pressure can shape conditions, but they do not determine Iran’s internal trajectory in a linear or controllable way.
The central limitation in Washington’s Iran debate is not disagreement over tactics but confinement of perspective. Engagement and confrontation are not opposites; they are variations within a framework that overestimates the power of external policy tools.
Iran is a society in motion, shaped by internal forces that interact with but are not reducible to external pressure or diplomacy. In my ’Onion State’ thesis, I explain why Iran’s power is layered and resilient.
The real choice is not between engagement and confrontation. It is between a static view of Iran and a dynamic one that accounts for evolving social expectations, including growing demands for political accountability and secular governance. These trends are increasingly visible both within Iran and across its diaspora, where opposition leader Reza Pahlavi, in the Iranian community have advanced alternative political visions for a post—Islamic Theocratic Republic order.
Only this broader, society-centered perspective offers a foundation for a more realistic and durable US policy.
[RoninsGrips] This report presents a comprehensive analysis of the tactical law enforcement capabilities within the United States federal government. It catalogs, evaluates, and ranks 25 distinct federal tactical teams based on a transparent methodology assessing their training, resources, and operational effectiveness. The findings reveal a complex and highly specialized ecosystem of teams, each tailored to the unique mission of its parent agency.
To facilitate a meaningful comparison, this report introduces a three-tiered classification system based on each team’s strategic role, operational scope, and resource commitment. Tier 1 comprises full-time, national or global response assets designed for counter-terrorism and other catastrophic events. Tier 2 consists of highly proficient, agency-specific teams that form the backbone of regional high-risk law enforcement. Tier 3 includes units with highly specialized or facility-specific missions.
The analysis concludes that the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) is the preeminent Tier 1 unit, distinguished by its singular focus on domestic counter-terrorism, its full-time status, and its extensive training and operational history. Other Tier 1 teams, including the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC), the U.S. Marshals Service’s Special Operations Group (SOG), and the Department of State’s Mobile Security Deployments (MSD), represent the pinnacle of federal tactical capability, each with a global mandate and exceptionally rigorous standards.
A primary finding of this report is the bifurcation of the federal tactical landscape into two distinct models. A small, elite cadre of full-time teams, representing only about 31% of all federal tactical officers, is maintained at a high state of readiness for national-level crises.1 The majority of federal tactical capability resides in a larger number of collateral-duty teams. This structure represents a strategic trade-off, balancing the immense cost of full-time units against the need for widespread tactical support for agency-specific law enforcement missions.
Key recommendations stemming from this analysis include the formal adoption of a tiered readiness model across the government to clarify roles and prevent mission creep, the enhancement of inter-agency training programs to improve interoperability, and the establishment of a recurring review process to ensure the federal tactical architecture remains adaptive to an evolving threat landscape. This report provides policymakers and agency leaders with an objective, data-driven framework for understanding and strengthening the nation’s specialized law enforcement assets.
This report utilizes the following four mission categories as an analytical framework:
National-Level Counter-Terrorism & Hostage Rescue: This category includes a small number of elite teams with a national or global mandate to respond to the most complex and high-stakes threats, such as major terrorist attacks, international hostage situations, and other crises of national significance. Teams in this category, like the FBI’s HRT and the State Department’s Mobile Security Deployments (MSD), are expected to operate in any environment, often with limited support.
High-Risk Criminal Law Enforcement: This is the most common mission set for federal tactical teams. Their primary function is to support their parent agency’s criminal investigations by executing high-risk search and arrest warrants, apprehending violent fugitives, conducting surveillance, and supporting undercover operations. The FBI’s regional SWAT teams, the ATF’s SRTs, and the DEA’s SRTs are archetypal examples of this category.
Protective Operations: These teams are dedicated to the physical protection of high-level government officials, foreign dignitaries, or critical national infrastructure. Their role is often defensive, focusing on counter-assault, counter-sniper, and rapid response to attacks on a protected person or location. The U.S. Secret Service’s Counter Assault Team (CAT) and the Pentagon Force Protection Agency’s Emergency Response Team (ERT) are prime examples.
Specialized Jurisdiction: This category encompasses teams whose missions are narrowly tailored to unique and challenging operational environments. Their training and equipment are highly specialized to contend with the specific threats found in their jurisdiction, such as maritime interdiction, correctional facility riots, or the protection of nuclear materials. Examples include the U.S. Coast Guard’s Maritime Security Response Teams (MSRT), the Bureau of Prisons’ Special Operations Response Teams (SORT), and the Department of Energy’s Special Response Teams (SRT).4
#2
FWIW - I was with MSD from 2000 to 2004. A turbulent time to say the least. Training was amazing (looking at you Mr. B…). The report was well done IMHO.
Posted by: Bangkok Billy ||
06/29/2026 19:17 Comments ||
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#3
/\ I've often wondered if the Springfield facility is still open.
#4
Mine or yours? State still has a big footprint there. Range, amored vehicles, “defensive” equipment, security tech, and pouching. Your folks umm …helped at the pouch facility.
Posted by: Bangkok Billy ||
06/29/2026 21:33 Comments ||
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ANALYSIS | Iraq's corruption sweep: the regional fallout to watch.
The two blocs getting hit hardest, Azm and Taqaddum, happen to be the Sunni outfits with the best lines into Ankara, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha. Those are relationships those capitals spent years building so… https://t.co/vWqKusVVeG
ANALYSIS | Iraq's corruption sweep: the regional fallout to watch.
The two blocs getting hit hardest, Azm and Taqaddum, happen to be the Sunni outfits with the best lines into Ankara, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Doha. Those are relationships those capitals spent years building so they'd have someone to call in Baghdad. Take out Samarrai and Karbouli, leave Halbousi hanging, and you've thinned the network the Gulf and Turkey rely on. Don't expect anyone to say so out loud, though. Nobody wants to be the government caught defending men charged with stealing public money.
Turkey has the most to lose here in real terms. Water, the Development Road, the PKK question, a lot of that runs through Sunni middlemen, and a weakened Sunni leadership leaves Ankara short of contacts at the worst possible time. The Saudis and Emiratis had bet on Halbousi as the Sunni they could work with. If his people get picked off, that bet looks a lot worse, and it's happening while the whole region is fixed on the war with Iran.
More at the link
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#العراق لا أحد يجرؤ على هذا العمل الكبير من دون غطاء أمريكي
📍دخول دبابات جهاز مكافحة الارهاب إلى المنطقة الخضراء في العاصمة بغداد وتطويق جميع مداخلها
📍اعتقالات بالجملة طالت نواب ومسؤولين واصحاب نفوذ في بغداد
Former Hamas and Israeli intelligence member Mosab Hassan Yousef threatens to destroy America with secret advanced weapons that Israel has kept hidden.
He says Israel is "just playing around for now," and this is his clear message to America.
The Green Prince is a hero. Eldest son of the head of Hamas in the West Bank, he chose to spy for Israel for a decade. Afterward he was secretly baptized, was given asylum in America, and eventually became a citizen. He’s been speaking up against Islam and Hamas for a while.
Posted by: Jack Guelph2611 ||
06/29/2026 00:00 ||
Comments ||
Link ||
[1836 views]
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#1
If rampant American antisemitism keeps pushing Israel into a corner, it's the Samson Option.
And it will be OUR fault for not stopping Candace, Tucker, Fuentes and all the rest.
Posted by: Jack Guelph2611 ||
06/29/2026 2:06 Comments ||
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Here is the trilateral framework agreement between the US, Israel, and Leb ...The Lebs maintain a precarious sectarian balance among Shiites, Sunnis, and about a dozen flavors of Christians, plus Armenians, Georgians, and who knows what else?... from the US State Department website. The key operational clauses are 2. and 3. The statements in the subsequent clauses are legalistic and clever. They seek to establish that the agreement insures Lebanon’s illusory sovereignty. That may be used in the near future to argue that Israel’s continued military occupation of Lebanon is not a violation of the Islamabad agreement between the US and Iran..
The later clauses make clear that the intention is to eliminate the non-state gangs in Lebanon before Israel withdraws. The continued enforcement of that is on the LAF, the Lebanese government’s military, which is very weak and whose primary funding comes from the US. To any reasonable person, it looks like a justification for a forever war of expansion against Hezbollah by Israel into Lebanon.
The agreement cleverly supports the worst interests of those who control the US, Israeli, and Lebanese governments. The US can now assert that Lebanese illusory sovereignty has been restored and the US is therefore not in violation of clause 1 of the Islamabad agreement. In other words, it frees the US from its obligation under the agreement to restrain Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. Israel can assert that its occupying forces are not invaders but rather in place and fighting at the bequest of Lebanon. The Lebanese government gets help in retaining their place as the sole legitimate governing body of the nation, even though they are incapable of self defense and incapable of maintaining peace within their own borders. If the LAF is kept weak through lack of funding as will almost certainly be the case, the Israeli occupation will push Hezbollah into territory outside the occupied zones and the occupation will then be justified in their further expansion.
This agreement will, in my estimation, be a likely model for an agreement the US and Israel will attempt to forge with the Paleostinian Authority to justify the continued Israeli military/police presence in Gazoo
...Hellhole adjunct to Israel and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, inhabited by Gazooks. The place was acquired in the wake of the 1967 War and then presented to Paleostinian control in 2006 by Ariel Sharon, who had entered his dotage. It is currently ruled with a rusty iron fist by Hamas with about the living conditions you'd expect. It periodically attacks the Hated Zionist Entity whenever Iran needs a ruckus created or the hard boyz get bored, getting thumped by the IDF in return. The ruling turbans then wave the bloody shirt and holler loudly about oppression and disproportionate response... and possibly in the West Bank also. That would bring those regions under protectorate status as has been done for Lebanon.
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Leonid Tsukanov
Victory? That’s certainly one perspective. But give it a little more time and a consensus will appear.
[REGNUM] The Strait of Hormuz is in turmoil. The brief normalization of shipping achieved under the US-Iran agreement is on the verge of collapse. This is due to Oman's attempts, prompted by the US and in defiance of Tehran, to create an "official alternative corridor" for shipping traffic.
To legitimize its efforts, the sultanate even secured the support of the International Maritime Organization and presented its initiative as purely humanitarian.
However, Iran quickly made it clear to its neighbor that it would not allow cheating, prompting further "symbolic strikes" from the US military.
"AGREED" ROUTE
News of the opening of a "green sea corridor" through Oman's territorial waters first surfaced on the evening of June 24, directly from the Sultanate's authorities. "Oman, in coordination with the International Maritime Organization, has opened the temporary sea corridor to all vessels," the country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported.
A key competitive advantage over Iran's "green corridor" via Hormuz is the complete absence of any transit fees for civilian vessels. Shipping companies only had to formally notify Muscat of their transit plans and then follow the instructions of coastal authorities to avoid detours.
It is not surprising that most captains and shipowners, fearing American sanctions for payments to the Iranians, happily lined up for transit.
From the perspective of the Omani authorities, the initiative was intended to benefit everyone: it would relieve congestion at the ports of the Arabian monarchies and repatriate foreign sailors who had been involuntarily blockaded in the Persian Gulf following the outbreak of conflict between Iran and the United States with Israel. Moreover, the Omani route was promoted as "approved by everyone," including Washington and Tehran, so the first ships sailed it without fear.
However, in practice, this "alternative corridor" didn't last long. On the morning of June 25, less than 24 hours after its opening, the first incident occurred. An "unknown projectile" struck the Taiwanese cargo ship Ever Lovely, which was sailing under the Singapore flag through Omani territorial waters.
As a result of the attack, the container ship's engine room was damaged and the vessel stopped sailing approximately 7.5 nautical miles from the Omani port of Dahit. The crew was urgently evacuated.
The Iranian side did not claim responsibility for the incident. However, representatives of the Islamic Republic made it quite clear that it was no accident.
Thus, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazim Gharibabadi stated, citing the IRGC's position, that any logistics routes drawn up without Iran's participation (and without taking its interests into account) cannot a priori be considered safe, and Tehran will "rigorously suppress" any attempts to deceive itself.
IRAN AGAINST
Tehran's decision to violate the new status quo is largely consistent with the established incident response logic during the conflict. Iranian armed forces and their allied proxy groups have previously carried out "pinprick strikes" on ships violating the regime.
However, in the current case, Iran's arguments are noticeably different. Judging by the emphasis placed by Iranian officials, Tehran was less displeased by the opening of an alternative route than by the Sultanate's attempts to present it as the only safe route and redirect flows into its territorial waters.
This effectively nullified the effect of the work of the Persian Gulf Administration, which was specifically created by Iran to control transit through the strait.
The Persians were also clearly offended by Oman's attempt to disguise its intentions by presenting the opening of an alternative corridor as part of a broader humanitarian effort, thereby portraying Iran as an aggressor and manipulator in the eyes of other countries.
Moreover, after the attack on the Ever Lovely, the International Maritime Organization suspended the evacuation of civilian sailors from the Persian Gulf, which caused a surge of negativity towards the Islamic Republic.
Finally, the sea corridor that Oman has decided to make public has a controversial history. Previously, the US Navy, with the assistance of the Sultanate's Coast Guard, secretly escorted friendly tankers and bulk carriers along the same route.
Even during the height of tensions in the Gulf, Iran left these vessels alone—apparently in gratitude for Omani diplomatic efforts. With this latest attack, the Islamic Republic has demonstrated that it is acutely aware of its opponents' attempts to establish alternative logistics and is prepared to harshly suppress them.
Despite the general discontent, Iran is still reluctant to openly escalate, leaving the scandal amid uncertainty. The IRGC or friendly proxy groups are not acknowledged as responsible for the attack near Dahit. On the contrary, the Islamic Republic is bolstering its case with diplomatic elements. Specifically, Article 5 of the US-Iran memorandum, which outlines a mechanism for consultations with Tehran on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran demands approval for any route changes, regardless of the other side's good intentions. In this context, the current incident in the strait serves rather as an illustration of the consequences of ignoring warnings from official Tehran.
RETRIBUTION FOR RETRIBUTION
The incident in the Strait of Hormuz did not go unnoticed in the United States. President Donald Trump lashed out at Tehran, calling the attack on the Taiwanese container ship "stupid and unjustified." However, he did so only two days after the incident—prior to that, Washington had repeatedly attempted to portray the incident as an accident and defuse the conflict.
Among other things, the American press circulated information about the alleged existence of a "direct line of communication" between Washington and Tehran regarding shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. However, this information was quickly denied by Iranian officials.
This apparently angered the White House even more. A couple of hours after Trump's briefing, US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported a series of "retaliatory strikes" on Iranian territory. According to the US, missile and drone depots, as well as several radars on the country's southern coast, were hit. Iran responded with harassing strikes on US bases in the region.
True, the actions were more symbolic—after conducting a demonstration bombing, American forces returned to their permanent bases, and CENTCOM declared its continued commitment to the letter of the US-Iran memorandum. Iran also expressed a similar position.
In effect, both sides let off steam and returned to the same shipping configuration in the Strait of Hormuz that existed before June 24. The incident with the unplanned opening of a corridor in Oman's territorial waters gradually faded into the background.
But despite the setback, Iran still emerged victorious from the battle, managing to retain one of the key levers of influence in the current conflict in the Gulf.
Commentary by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin
[ColonelCassad] 1. CENTCOM confirmed that the US attacked Iran again overnight, carrying out several strikes in southern Iran. Iran confirmed strikes on a telecommunications tower near Sirik.
The town, not the island.
The US claims 10 strikes on various targets. Some of the explosions heard overnight were related to warning shots fired in the Strait of Hormuz at ships attempting to transit without Iran's consent.
2. The day before yesterday, the US already attacked Iran, which resulted in strikes on its facilities in Bahrain. Bahrain issued a hypocritical protest, as if it were unaware that its territory was being used to attack Iran. Iran "took note" of these protests, and further strikes on Bahraini territory are quite likely.
3. In the Strait of Hormuz itself, attacks continue on ships that ignore IRGC warnings and Iranian corridors in the strait, which are permitted to transit with the consent of Iran. Over the past three days, two vessels have been damaged in the strait for ignoring regulations.
4. Iran is expected to attack US-linked targets in the next 24 hours. Kurdish terrorists in Iraqi Kurdistan were traditionally targeted overnight. The Iraqi government, as usual, is playing dumb and doing nothing, despite having little power to influence anything.
5. The US systematically and consistently violates most of the provisions of the Islamabad Agreement, making the fate of "permanent peace in the Middle East" somewhat predictable.
The situation with Lebanon is just the icing on the cake. Israel has no intention of withdrawing from the occupied territories of southern Lebanon, meaning the war there will continue.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced strikes on American bases in the region in the coming days, as well as on vessels violating Iran's established regime for passage through the Strait of Hormuz. US blind shots at Sirik won't solve the problem of our complete control over the Strait of Hormuz. But our strikes against violators will remind other vessels what safe passage looks like.
American bases in the region are a separate matter. In the coming days, they will experience the full extent of hell.
THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMABAD.
The most likely locations for strikes are US bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are slightly less likely. I also expect a couple of tankers and bulk carriers to be set ablaze in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman in the coming days.
In a nighttime response, the IRGC clarified that eight American facilities in Kuwait and Bahrain associated with the US Air Force and Navy had been hit. Plus, a characteristically official statement from Iran. One of the tools of US dominance, in addition to military aggression and economic pressure, is information warfare based on deception and manipulation. The American side demonstrates a high degree of skill in distorting reality, presenting falsehood as truth, and justifying its own crimes.
The criminal clown of the US president has suffered serious blows from the Iranian people. We do not attach importance to these incoherent statements and understand that he has not abandoned his intention to commit crimes against the Iranian people. (c) Head of the Iranian Judiciary
The enemy has focused significant efforts on attempts to influence our cultural infrastructure. We do not accept a situation in which the population faces economic hardship. As we can see, Iran has no illusions about the US. P.S. As the Iranians joke, Lebanese President Aoun condemned Iran's strikes on Kuwait and Bahrain, but never mustered the courage to condemn Israel's strikes on his own country. A pathetic puppet. Some say he'll end up in trouble.
PS2. The photo shows a house in Bahrain hit by a Patriot missile attempting to shoot down an Iranian missile targeting a US base. I recognize the signature of the "air defense titans."
#2
It is clear there is no Iranian central command and authority. But just how many feudal lords or groups are there?Posted by: NN2N1 2026-06-29 04:21
NN2N1,
You don't want to know. When religious purity is the standard rather than competence, everybody with a couple of stripes and a gun is positive that they're the Chosen One.
At this point, I'm reasonably sure that there are at least three groups right now:
*Whatever's left of the old 'civilian' government.
They are utterly without power or influence outside of the capital, but they know how to yell.
*IRGC(1), which would be the remnants of the prewar chain of command. Yeah, we've sent a lot of these guys to commune with Allan, but their staffs can very quietly keep things moving, though at a very slow pace. I would guess that their power and influence would be immediately around Tehran and Qom, though it's likely that some units elsewhere are still following orders.
*IRGC(2) - the units out in the boonies who were cut off from adult supervision when stuff started getting bombed. They're going to be up in the mountains and along the coast; and they'll do whatever the hell they want. I'd call them as the ones with the most influence and actual military power at this point - also the ones probably calling the shots in Lebanon. They aren't going to knock it off until they're dead.
There are also almost certainly some good sized towns/small cities that are under warlord control, who obey no one but Allan, when and if he dispenses his wisdom. Until then, the local HMFIC is calling the shots.
#3
Thanks Mike, a very likely scenario. I suspect we'll plod along until after the midterms, then some sort of ground action could possibly begin. Just my guess.
#6
Likely special operations will be dropped in to support the Kurds anyone else in Iran that opposes the IRGC. They can call in airstrikes against the IRGC. (presuming of course they aren't already there).
They may have blown back to the Middle Ages but after the mid-terms they need to be blown all the way back to the Stone Ages.
Posted by: Abu Uluque ||
06/29/2026 16:09 Comments ||
Top||
#8
There is a large and prosperous Iranian diaspora, at least some of whom are eager to finance rebuilding once the Mad Mullahs have been driven out, including the royal court in exile. Iran just needs to get through this difficult bit.
#9
Adding on to Mike's most excellent summary of the players in #2...
The Players:
1) Civ-Gov - Whatever's left of the old 'civilian' government.
2) IRGC(1) - remnants of the prewar chain of command.
3) IRGC(2) - the units out in the boonies who were cut off from adult supervision
We also have the
4) the Bonyads
News to me, the AI Summary of le Wiki is not bad: In Iran, bonyads are opaque, quasi-governmental charitable foundations that dominate the country's economy and report directly to the Supreme Leader. While ostensibly created to redistribute wealth and conduct social welfare, these sprawling conglomerates wield massive political and economic power, controlling an estimated 20% of Iran's GDP.
Nobody talks about these guys since they have no guns and don't make proclamations. They are wealthy and influential and presumably, would like to stay that way.
5) the People - last and pretty much least, since they have no guns, no influence, and no persuasive power. Not a faction so much as scenery, but some possibilities for 5th column activities
We can lump the major factions into two categories:
True Believers - IRGC(1) & IRGC(2)
They want nukes. They will fight. Especially IRGC(2) who lack parental guidance. They are the "Iranians" we are skirmishing with. I suspect the Grownups and IRGC(1) would like them to tone it down a bit.
Grownups - the Civ-Gov and the Bonyads
This group would like to survive the war, hopefully with something to rule over and some wealth and power. These are the "Iranians" we are negotiating with.
Prediction:
As IRGC(2) gets whittled down, I would expect IRGC(1) to move closer to the Grownup position. Eventually, the kinetic distractions will die down and everyone can get back to doing the Power & Money thing.
It is a pity we cannot see inside Iranian politics. Probably some Mexican telenovela class scheming and back-stabbing going on.
tl;dr: Forecast calls for scattered, localized kinetic festivities followed by compliance later on.
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