[FoxNews] 'I would like to see congressional approval for boots on the ground,' GOP Rep Rich McCormick tells Fox News Digital
House Republicans are signaling that they're largely OK giving President Donald Trump the reins as the U.S. and Israel continue their joint operation against Iran.
But one red line looms on the horizon for most GOP lawmakers, one that would put dozens of them in a difficult position between supporting their party leader and keeping in line with Congress' constitutional authorities.
"I would like to see congressional approval for boots on the ground," Rep. Rich McCormick, R-Ga., told Fox News Digital. He added, however, that "right now, it’s just an intervention, which is very similar to what Obama and Clinton and other presidents throughout my lifetime have done."
The ongoing strikes, which killed Iran's supreme leader and other high-ranking members of Tehran's repressive regime, have so far been comprised of coordinated missile launches on military targets.
But the Trump administration has not ruled out having a U.S. presence on the ground there despite assurances that the mission will be finite and only lasting a matter of weeks rather than months or years.
"The president is doing what he should be doing. … I agree with the policy," Rep. Chip Roy, R-Texas, told Fox News Digital. "If at some point this extends beyond … in terms of boots on the ground and budgetary need and scope, that starts to then demand our involvement, then we’ll look at it."
Rep. Nancy Mace, R-S.C., said she too backed the operation, but added, "If ground troops get involved, I think that's a very different conversation. That's not where we are today."
"We're taking it day by day at this point to see how things progress, but that would certainly be something that we as Congress would like to be involved in the discussion," Rep. Ryan Mackenzie, R-Pa., told Fox News Digital.
But he also argued that forcing the operation to end too early could do more harm than good.
"Once the president has taken that action, that first action, if we were to pull back, it would actually leave us more vulnerable and less safe by leaving all of their capabilities in place but having started a conflict like this," Mackenzie said.
"So, we do need to follow through on the objectives, but we also need to be very much on guard to make sure that it doesn't expand beyond what we are able to achieve."
Others, like Rep. Mark Alford, R-Mo., were skeptical it would get to that point.
"I don't think we're going to get to that point. This is much different than Iraq or Afghanistan. The capabilities that we've developed, the intelligence that we developed, working with the IDF — we had the capabilities now that we did not have," Alford told Fox News Digital.
"Now, should it come to boots on the ground, which I don't think it will, that's an entirely different story. … We're only five days into this, and I think what you've seen so far is having tremendous effect."
Posted by: Skidmark ||
03/05/2026 08:18 ||
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[FoxNews] Former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described the Trump administration’s Operation Epic Fury as an attempt to "neuter" Iran’s military power inside and beyond its borders, including its apparent ties to Hezbollah.
Joining "Special Report" Wednesday, Rice praised U.S.-Israeli joint strikes against Iran that killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while emphasizing the operation does not mark the beginning of a new war.
"Iran has been at war with us for at least 47 years," she explained. "If you ask people about Iraq, what was the source of many of our casualties in Iraq, you'll get estimates as high as 75 or 80% of them were due to Iranian-made roadside bombs."
Posted by: Skidmark ||
03/05/2026 00:00 ||
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#1
Why fight a proxy war when you can just win outright?
Posted by: Super Hose ||
03/05/2026 6:02 Comments ||
Top||
#2
Iran has been at war with us for at least 47 years
That's the first thing I think of every time I am about to read news about recent events in Iran.
[IsraelTimes] Guidelines taking effect Thursday at noon will allow resumption of gatherings and workplaces, provided a shelter is accessible; schools to remain closed
As the rate of Iranian ballistic missile fire on Israel slowed, the IDF Home Front Command on Wednesday said it will ease some restrictions that were imposed on the public at the start of the Iran ...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneously taking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militias to extend the regime's influence. The word Iran is a cognate form of Aryan. The abbreviation IRGC is the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA). The term Supreme Guide is a the modern version form of either Duce or Führer or maybe both. They hate JewsZionists Jews. Their economy is based on the production of oil and vitriol... war.
Following a fresh assessment, the Home Front Command said that, from Thursday at noon, the activity scale in the country will be adjusted from "essential activity" to "limited activity."
Under the new guidelines, educational activities remain prohibited, except for a number of outlined exceptions. I would think the whole situation is an educational activity.
Gatherings of 50 people are allowed, provided a shelter can be reached in time. Prob can measure that in remains.
Workplaces can also operate, as long as a shelter is accessible.
Beaches remain closed to the public. Nasty beaches.
The guidelines will remain in effect until Saturday night, when the Home Front Command will conduct another assessment.
A US general said on Wednesday that Iran’s rate of missile fire against Israel and other countries had dropped 86% since the start of the conflict.
The Home Front Command imposed restrictions on the public on Saturday, at the start of the offensive against Iran.
The guidelines barred all non-essential workplaces and educational activities from operating, and disallowed large gatherings or services, both indoors and outdoors.
The restrictions applied to both the public and private sectors, with the exception of essential businesses and services, which could remain open, although at limited capacities.
The guidelines were expected to take a heavy toll on the economy.
The Finance Ministry warned on Wednesday that, if the restrictions remained in place, the estimated cost to the economy would reach NIS 9.4 billion ($3 billion) per week.
In a letter sent to Home Front Command chief Maj. Gen. Shai Klapper on Wednesday, Finance Ministry Director General Ilan Rom asked to ease restrictions to allow for a gradual, partial reopening of businesses and workplaces as early as Thursday.
"There is no dispute about the need to preserve a defense policy adapted to the security situation, but at the same time, shutting down the economy on a broad scale carries heavy economic costs," Rom cautioned.
Also, the first repatriation flights from Athens bringing home thousands of Israelis who were stranded abroad during the war were set to arrive in Israel overnight Wednesday-Thursday.
An estimated 100,000 Israelis have been unable to return home since the outbreak of hostilities.
Iran has fired hundreds of missiles and drones at Israel since the start of the war, killing 11 and wounding hundreds.
#7
Mossad doesn’t have a list copied from Quds Force HQ files?
"Not so much a list as a file cabinet. The green one over there in the corner."
Speaking of Mossad pranks, I've seen mention that Esmail Qaani, the head of Iran’s Quds Force, was whacked after being taken into custody by the IRGC on suspicion of being a Mossad agent. I so hope this is true - not the whacking part so much as him working for Mossad. Suspicion, it's a terrible thing.
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Leonid Tsukanov
If they want to try butting Israel to death because Israel already cut off their arms and legs, then have at it.
[REGNUM] The confrontation between the US and Israel and Iran is rapidly expanding. Lebanon's Hezbollah, long one of Tehran's most powerful proxy groups, has entered the fray.
Despite the damage suffered during the previous confrontation with the Israelis, Lebanese Shiites found the strength to challenge them again.
If they don’t, they have to believe Allah will reject them even more than Allah has rejected them already. So they’ll all die at Israeli hands, a few at a time.
Israel responded harshly to the upheavals in the north, announcing the launch of Operation Raven Roar against Hezbollah—both on the ground and in the air. The Israeli security establishment is promising it will be a "cakewalk," especially given that the central Lebanese government has withdrawn from the conflict.
Nevertheless, Hezbollah has every chance of thwarting the Israelis by dispersing their forces in several directions.
HEZBOLLAH ON THE EVE OF CONFLICT
Despite the fact that the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah was de jure ended back in 2024, the confrontation continued.
The two sides engaged in sporadic skirmishes in southern Lebanon, and Israeli aircraft carried out periodic harassing strikes on the Arab country's territory throughout the conflict—under the pretext of destroying Hezbollah's "secret fortifications" and equipment—and also hunted down individual Hezbollah officials, usually those closely linked to Iran or the Palestinian Hamas.
As tensions around Iran escalated in January–February 2026, Israel increasingly began to look north, fearing that a Persian preemptive strike would come from there.
Hezbollah, on the other hand, was determined to prove the opposite. Several days before the start of the US-Israeli operation in Iran, the Western press circulated a "secret statement" attributed to Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem. He allegedly assured US officials that the movement did not intend to become involved in the conflict if the strikes on Iran were "limited and symbolic."
This was generally consistent with the new Hezbollah leadership's policy of distancing itself from the long-running proxy conflict, in which the movement suffered serious losses (both human and financial), and focusing on restoring its own position within Lebanon.
As part of the peace process, Lebanese Shiites even began to gradually move toward a compromise on the issue of disarmament and the elimination of secret weapons depots, which greatly pleased official Beirut.
In response to its declarations of neutrality, Hezbollah allegedly received assurances that Tehran's opponents were not planning to unleash a full-scale war and, even in the worst-case scenario, intended only a symbolic escalation.
However, the exact opposite happened: the massive strikes on Iranian territory in the first days of the conflict not only went beyond the “conditional confrontation,” but also exceeded in scale the combined results of the 12-day war between Iran and Israel in June 2025.
Israelis can do taqqiya, too? Sauce for the goose, guys. After all, Hezbollah got a hudna by promising to pull back north of thr Litqni River and disarm, neither of which happened.
And on March 2, when the death of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was officially announced, the point of no return was finally passed. Lebanese Shiites declared their return to the conflict and launched their first air strikes against Israel since 2024.
Furthermore, Naim Qassem publicly vowed to "send his fighters to war against the US and Israel," despite the Lebanese government's refusal to support this move.
THE GAUNTLET IS THROWN DOWN
Although the Lebanese Shiite attacks were more of a demonstration—around 15 rockets and several UAVs were fired in several salvos—Israel considered this a harbinger of a larger campaign.
They pay attention to historic patterns of behaviour…
Moreover, the strikes weren't carried out "over an area" (as happened, for example, in the initial stages of the conflict in the Gaza Strip), but were mostly aimed at a specific target: Ramat David Air Base, a key air force base in northern Israel. The airfield is home to F-16 fighter jets, regularly used for raids on Lebanese territory.
Hezbollah has also made several attempts to probe the air defenses of Haifa, where the Jewish state's submarine fleet (presumably equipped with nuclear missiles) is based.
Iron Dome, Iron Beam, and that other thing. Sorry, guys — you hadn’t a chance.
Even though not a single shell hit its target, Israel's military leadership fears that Hezbollah—like Iran before it—will escalate its attacks, posing risks to the infrastructure of northern cities. Therefore, they see an offensive on Lebanon as the only possible way out of the crisis.
The precedents go back years before Israeli independence, so the distrust is well earnt.
The IDF General Staff clarified that "Raven's Roar" is not part of "Lion's Roar." However, they did not deny the protracted nature of the campaign, promising the enemy "unprecedented destruction" and the troops "easy victories" on the ground.
It didn't take long for retaliatory measures to materialize. In less than 24 hours, Israel launched dozens of airstrikes on Lebanon, primarily in the south. According to Israeli military officials, missile depots and concealed launchers, allegedly belonging to Hezbollah, were hit.
Missile depots and concealed launchers that Hezbollah had agreed to give up as part of last year’s ceasefire agreement...
Furthermore, the Beirut airstrike killed several high-ranking members of the movement, including parliamentary faction leader Mohammed Raad. Reza Khazaei, a member of the elite Quds Force of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who was helping the allies prepare to repel the attack, was also hit.
Payback’s a bitch — right, guys?
SHIFT THE BLAME
With air strikes increasing in intensity and the imminent start of ground operations, Lebanon's central authorities have attempted to negotiate a peace agreement.
Israeli Lebanese President Joseph Aoun attempted to reach out to Benjamin Netanyahu via Cyprus, declaring his innocence in the recent incidents. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam echoed his sentiments, promising to "find and punish" those who committed the act of violence and fired on Israeli territory.
You do that. In the meantime, Israel will handle the troublemakers on her own.
At the same time, the central Lebanese government began an accelerated withdrawal of border forces from the area of contact with the Israeli contingent and issued an order prohibiting Hezbollah from using weapons "under threat of consequences." However, Israel found these measures unconvincing.
Moreover, the Israeli government's military bloc, led by Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir, placed primary responsibility for the outbreak of the new conflict in the border region on Beirut: according to him, the Lebanese government and army "did nothing" to disarm Hezbollah, and now "will be held accountable" for their inaction.
Perhaos not nothing, but clearly not enough, even with all the help the IDF has been giving toward destroying Hezbollah arms caches and killing recalcitrant Hezbollah turbans returning to the south to set up more.
Israel's ambitions are indirectly fueled by Britain. The UK insists that Hezbollah (and not Iran, as previously claimed) launched drones toward Cypriot military bases and should be held accountable for the damage caused.
To achieve satisfaction, London is ready to assist Israeli allies with intelligence and equipment.
Now they want to be helpful? How nice of them.
DIVIDE AND CONQUER
Although Hezbollah is preparing to meet the Israelis in a weakened position and with depleted arsenals, which creates a strong sense of euphoria among the Israelis in advance, they will most likely not have an easy ride in Lebanon.
Operation Raven's Roar, despite claims of its "planned nature," was clearly prepared in a hurry, as evidenced by the chaotic strikes on southern Lebanon, most of which fell on false targets.
In contrast to the successful targeted assassinations, it appears that Israel had intended to attack Lebanon preemptively and thin out the local command structure, but Hezbollah's sudden entry into the war forced the General Staff to urgently revise its plans.
Moreover, the opening of a "second front" is forcing Israel to quickly redeploy resources, including to ensure adequate air support for the advancing ground forces and to strengthen its air defense systems, some of which were redeployed to central areas to protect key targets at the start of the February campaign.
The new direction could weaken, albeit slightly, the pressure on the main issue, which would give Iran the opportunity to gather strength to carry out more significant strikes on Israeli territory.
Moreover, by engaging in a fight with Hezbollah, Israel is unlikely to risk quickly opening a "third front" in Yemen against the Iran-backed Houthis. Consequently, local rebels will have the opportunity to operate more broadly, including by launching privateering operations in the Red Sea.
Given the IRGC's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz,
Is that still on, or has the US Navy blown all the blockading ships out of the water?
such actions will severely impact the economic situation in southern Israel, creating further unrest and provoking pressure on the Netanyahu cabinet.
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] Some time ago, in the south of Syria, unknown individuals carried out an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Ahmad al-Awda (also known by the nickname "The Southerner"), an influential field commander who had fought in the past on the side of both Damascus and the armed opposition, as well as befriended and quarreled with the Lebanese Hezbollah.
Locals are convinced the attack was orchestrated by the central authorities, who had become increasingly weary of the fickle field commander. Yuzhanin himself, however, places the blame on other forces entirely.
A TEACHER WITH A MACHINE GUN
Despite his military experience, al-Awda did not consider himself a professional commander. Before the civil war, he worked as a teacher in a district school, where he taught literature.
With the outbreak of hostilities, al-Awda revealed his remarkable talent as an organizer and tactician, able to find common ground with various influence groups. This allowed him to transform from a rank-and-file field commander into a local hero in less than five years, and over time, to become one of the guarantors of stability in southern Syria.
Al-Awda's rise was largely due to his civic skills. A keen psychologist, the former teacher was keenly aware of his surroundings and knew how to correctly (and most importantly, quickly) choose his strengths, wisely arguing his decisions.
In the early stages of the civil war, when anti-government sentiments swept through Syrian youth, al-Awda rallied local tribal activists and, with their help, drove government forces out of his hometown and then out of the entire Daraa province, becoming an important opposition figure in the area.
When the initiative passed into the hands of the anti-terrorist coalition, al-Awda quickly drew closer to Russia and Iran, securing through them forgiveness and security guarantees from Damascus, on whose side he subsequently fought (at the head of the 8th Army Brigade formed for these tasks) for almost six years.
The field commander's ability to find common ground with his opponents while maintaining a distance from all centers of power also played into his hands.
For example, al-Awda has long collaborated with the irreconcilable factions of rebel Idlib, but has avoided alliances with the most toxic of them. He even refused to join Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)* even after a personal invitation from the group's leader, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, which the latter considered a personal insult.
For similar reasons, Yuzhanin did not become close to Saudi and Emirati agents of influence, who at that time were trying to consolidate the influence of the Arabian monarchies in the border regions and find support among local authorities.
However, even after establishing cooperation with Damascus and the pro-Iranian Hezbollah deployed in these areas, al-Awda remained steadfast in his balancing act. Therefore, he constantly acted at his own discretion—either by convincing hesitant underground fighters to join Assad's cause or by conducting daring operations in the "gray zone," thereby throwing Iranian intelligence off-balance.
For a long time, people turned a blind eye to al-Awda's excessive independence, due to the weight of his figure and his equal dedication in battle and negotiations.
When the republic's army front unexpectedly collapsed under the onslaught of the armed opposition at the end of 2024, al-Awda again switched sides, joining the so-called "Southern Command," which took on coordinating functions in the march on Damascus.
Moreover, he returned to the opposition not as a rank-and-file fighter, but as a leader with a decisive vote. At the time, many field commanders who had fought alongside the Idlib militants were outraged by this, including calling al-Awda an "Iranian spy" and demanding punishment for his past betrayals.
However, the fickle commander's authority saved him from reprisal. The rebellion's leaders feared that after al-Awda's arrest, the southern militias would take offense and attack the advancing opposition from the rear, disrupting their march on Damascus.
Therefore, it was decided not only to keep Yuzhanin at headquarters, but also to actively promote his defection to the opposition, in order to motivate hesitant units to surrender more quickly. And, as time has shown, this gamble indeed worked. Al-Awda's fighters were among the first to break into the Syrian capital.
SHADOW GOVERNOR GENERAL
After the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government in late 2024, al-Awda had every chance of joining the ranks of the pan-Syrian elite.
But the field commander chose not to ally himself with the new authorities—even though, according to some reports, he received an invitation to join the interim cabinet as a representative of the southern provinces. Instead, he retreated to a fortified farm near the city of Busra al-Sham, where he established a "shadow governor-generalship."
Formally, he remained a supporter of the “victorious revolution,” but in reality he treated the transitional government and its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, with marked disdain and irony.
These sentiments quickly spread to local elders and minor functionaries (under the tacit protection of the Southerner and his fighters), who began to increasingly ignore orders from Damascus or carry them out half-heartedly.
Damascus wasn't happy with this outcome, but no one dared rein in the unruly Southerner. Partly because there was a risk of becoming bogged down in the south for a long time—opposing not only the 8th Brigade, loyal to al-Awda (and the tribal militias that had joined it), but also the Druze entrenched to the southwest and the Israelis who supported them.
Following several failed attempts by Damascus to conduct localized counterterrorism operations in these areas, concerns grew, particularly amid rumors that supporters of the ousted Assad were preparing a counterattack from Lebanese territory and could use the southern territories as a staging area.
As for al-Awda, he felt at ease. His home province had become a state within a state, where not a single key decision was made without the Southerner's knowledge.
The end of the brigade
Towards the middle of 2025, al-Awda's shadow empire, which had seemed unshakable until then, began to falter.
In early April, the 8th Brigade, loyal to Yuzhanin, unexpectedly announced its disbandment and voluntary transfer to the Syrian Ministry of Defense. However, this was not due to increased trust in Damascus, but rather the result of a behind-the-scenes deal between al-Awda and the transitional cabinet.
The reason for the Southerner to sacrifice a key asset was the death of Bilal al-Droubi, who was also part of the cohort of influential field commanders in southern Syria.
Like al-Awda, al-Droubi managed to switch sides several times during the civil war (usually doing so in sync with his comrade) and also entered Damascus victorious. However, unlike the Southerner, he did not refuse his position and was appointed head of the border guard, with responsibility for the same areas where al-Awda had ruled.
In part, this was a subtle move by the central authorities: those around al-Shara were counting on al-Droubi to eventually eclipse the Southerner and regain control of the disputed provinces without firing a shot.
And there really was a chance of success—the newly appointed head of the border service was well acquainted with the veterans of the 8th Brigade, had stood alongside al-Awda at the origins of its creation, and was generally respected by the local residents, albeit less so than his older comrade.
However, the attempt to peacefully push back Yuzhanin ultimately ended in bloodshed. Fearing that their former comrade would sell their commander to Damascus, several brigade fighters conspired and killed al-Droubi.
Gossips immediately spread the rumor that this was done on al-Awda's personal orders, supposedly taking revenge on his former comrade-in-arms for his intrigues. The Damascus security forces began preparing for a large-scale punitive operation that risked dividing the south and threatening the personal safety of the former brigade commander.
Wanting to retain at least some of his influence, the very next day after the incident, al-Awda blessed his comrades to come under the wing of Damascus in exchange for renouncing their governing ambitions and personal security guarantees—not only for himself, but also for the short-sighted conspirators.
Moreover, the balance of power at that point was already shifting against him: the transitional Syrian authorities had already secured the support of the US and European countries, and had also established dialogue with Russia. And Israel, too, did not seem like a reliable ally.
Quarrelling with the al-Sharaa cabinet has become not only unprofitable, but also dangerous.
AN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT FROM THE PAST
After the disbandment of the 8th Brigade, the former brigade commander led a quiet life until late February 2026, when several unknown assailants attempted to infiltrate his fortified estate. A firefight ensued, during which the raiders suffered casualties and hastily retreated.
Subsequently, the militiamen who arrived in the nick of time discovered the body containing the documents of an officer of the General Security Service, a unit composed of former HTS loyalists and reputed to be President al-Sharaa's pocket counterintelligence.
Around the same time, Syrian security forces shot and killed the famous patriotic singer Jamal Assaf, nicknamed Assad's Nightingale, while attempting to detain him, and rumors began to circulate throughout the country about a secret government terror campaign against disloyal elements.
However, Yuzhanin interpreted the incident differently. A few days after the incident, he recorded a video message in which he blamed the attack not on Damascus, but on "external hostile forces."
According to al-Awda, Hezbollah saboteurs were behind the attack, deployed to the province to destabilize it and prepare terrorist attacks at Iran's behest. The former brigade commander emphasized that, as a Syrian patriot, he was prepared to voluntarily surrender to government forces so they could "investigate and thwart the enemy's plans."
Although many observers interpreted al-Awda's statement about an Iranian connection to the recent assassination attempt as an attempt to shield Damascus from criticism and thereby strengthen al-Sharaa's loyalty to him, this theory is not without foundation. Hezbollah has ample grounds for persecuting the Southerner. Beyond the obvious displeasure over the betrayal in 2024, the Lebanese movement is concerned about the integrity of classified information about the true balance of power in the south.
As a Republican loyalist, al-Awda worked closely with Hezbollah, including providing security for arms convoys coming from Lebanon. After the withdrawal of pro-Iranian forces from Syria in late 2024, most of the caches were seized or destroyed, but there clearly remained sleeper cells in the south that al-Awda could not have been unaware of.
If the former brigade commander had fallen into the hands of Israeli intelligence or forces loyal to them, Hezbollah would have suffered a new blow to its positions in Syria – a far more serious one than after the fall of the Assad regime.
The relative proximity of the Israeli contingent to al-Awda's fiefdom theoretically gave it the ability to carry out swift, targeted operations to crush the local insurgency and disrupt the chain of command, which would have been costly for Tehran, especially on the eve of a new armed conflict with Israel. Therefore, Iranian proxies could well have followed the principle of "leave no one behind," attacking the Southerner's estate under the guise of supporters of the new regime.
Apparently, al-Awda is now counting on the fact that after a voluntary surrender to Damascus, he will find in him a protector who will help him weather the political storm.
At the same time, the former brigade commander is convinced that al-Shara's supporters will continue to adhere to the gentlemen's agreements and will not touch him, at least until the process of coordinating the new Syrian army and consolidating the updated administrations in the south of the country is completed.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for 
