[Townhall] I’ve never quite grasped why the Left has come to hate Jews so much. When I was young, Americans were almost unanimous in their support for Israel; indeed, America was about the only country in the world that virtually unconditionally supported Israel. But that began to change, seemingly about a decade or so ago, and the Left now hates Jews and Israel almost as much as they hate Jesus and Christianity.
I suspect most Leftists hate Jews and Israel because that’s what they’ve been told to do. Mindless sheep follow their leaders and don’t ask tough questions like "why?". Democrats, of course, are inclined to be racist and elitist, and such people always look down upon and treat with condescension, contempt, and often hatred for those whom they deem inferior to themselves.
Further, the Democrats want the support of America’s growing Muslim population, so hatred of Jews is a keen way to buy those votes.
A bigger mystery to me is why Jewish people continue to support the Democratic Party in such large numbers. I certainly wouldn’t vote for somebody who hated me and wanted to destroy my country.
#7
The author answered his question in the first paragraph. "and the Left now hates Jews and Israel almost as much as they hate Jesus and Christianity." Because they cant have Jews around, it proved Jesus existed.
Posted by: 49 Pan ||
07/18/2026 10:58 Comments ||
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#8
I don't know if I believe in hell. I've heard it said that you build your own hell, brick by brick, right here on Earth. From what I've seen of Democrats in action, I tend to believe it. But, if so, the same must be true of heaven except it's hard to build heaven on Earth when so many Democrats are intent on turning it into hell.
Posted by: Abu Uluque ||
07/18/2026 12:12 Comments ||
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#9
The argument of the Progressive Jews — and thanks to the woke Right Groyper crowd for loudly underlining it for them — is that there are Jew-haters on both sides, and Progressive principles are important. Much like how in the Weimar era many voted for the Nazis because history thus far had shown that the Communists were worse.
#10
So if communists, aka Democrats, keep calling Republicans nazis then Jews will keep voting for communists? But who in the Republican Party is as anti-semitic as Mamdani?
Posted by: Abu Uluque ||
07/18/2026 13:34 Comments ||
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#11
Self loathing racist Christaphobics Jew haters.
#12
Marx was loathed by Lenin because he refused to go to Paris when the commune took control. He was making too much money working for an American newspaper in England to be bothered to go to the Paris commune.
#13
Karl Marx’s ancestors may have been been rabbis for generations, but his father had a secular education, became a lawyer, and was baptized in the Prussian state church, a Lutheran variant, when Prussia abrogated Jewish emancipation, in order to continue in his profession. Karl was not reared in the Jewish faith, and along with his siblings was baptized when he was six years old, though in adulthood he chose atheism.
[RedState] As we reported, President Donald Trump gave an important prime-time speech on Thursday evening that focused on the vulnerabilities in our election system and revealed newly declassified information, which he said showed how China had acquired U.S. voter files.
Now you might think that this would be something the media would want to cover, given how much time they spent on the fake Russia collusion hoax. But as we reported, major liberal media outlets like ABC, NBC, and MS NOW passed on the president's prime-time address, even though such speeches are routinely televised in full.
But in some ways, CNN was the worst, revealing more than it probably intended when it explained why it didn't air the speech.
"Some network executives felt it would be dangerous to just air Trump's speech live, in full, unedited without knowing what he was going to say ahead of time. That's where we are in America."
Why is it dangerous? Why can't they allow you to judge what he says on its own merit?
"Trump's election lies led to violence," Stelter said. Even this is misleading, since Trump never incited violence, told people to act peacefully, and when they didn't, encouraged people to stop on Jan. 6.
What they're telling you is that you're only entitled to hear it through their filter and the way they report it. You can't hear it without the spin from them. It's apparently "dangerous" if you are allowed to come to your own conclusions about what is said.
#2
^ Admin officials and spokespeople should refuse to call on ABC, NBC, CNN reporters at press briefings and refuse to appear on their "news" shows
Posted by: Frank G ||
07/18/2026 2:01 Comments ||
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#3
[AI]
**President Donald Trump has repeatedly threatened to revoke press credentials** from journalists and news organizations that produce coverage he deems negative or "fake." In **May 2018**, Trump tweeted a question about taking away credentials after a report claimed 91% of network news about him was negative, contradicting a **2015 statement** where he assured TIME he would not deny access even to unfair outlets.
**Recent actions have expanded beyond threats to actual policy changes.** In **September 2025**, the Trump administration, under Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, implemented new **Pentagon restrictions** requiring journalists to pledge not to obtain or publish any information—even unclassified material—without explicit government authorization, with non-compliance resulting in **credential revocation**. A federal court later struck down parts of this policy, ruling it constituted illegal viewpoint discrimination designed to replace independent reporters with those willing to serve the government.
**Trump has also targeted broadcast licenses** alongside press passes. During a **July 2026** primetime speech on election security, the President demanded the **revocation of broadcast licenses** for ABC and NBC because they declined to air his address live, accusing the networks of participating in a "plot" to hide alleged election fraud.
We have Trump vs the Media attention Seekers, but who is there more so for America? So far I am still siding with Trump on a majority of his actions and only digging into a few others.
BTW:
Tucker Carlson runs his mouth so much about Trump & claiming that Trump is under Jewish control. That it has me wondering if Tucker has joined the National Democrat Socialist media team?
#6
Why is it dangerous? Why can't they allow you to judge what he says on its own merit?
Because the "common man" (ordinary person vs a member of the liberal aristocracy) is incapable of thinking for himself and making intelligent decisions regarding news and public comment. Right and wrong, good and bad must be decided for us by our enlightened betters in the media and politics.
#9
I'm old enough to remember the airways being flooded for der Biden's dystopian rant against imagined opponents.
The dentist office media is proving itself rotten. If the case was to screen the speech for errors, even that one channel spent the morning screaming about temperatures instead of delayed coverage.
VDH on what Trump has accomplished in the 543 days since he took office for his second term.
[VictorHanson] The Left—and some on the Right—are furious whenever Trump tweets, says, or does something that offends their delicate sense of taste, tradition, and decorum. Their outrage leads them to ignore whether this “Art of the Deal” theater ultimately leaves the United States stronger. More often than not, it does.
We are not bogged down in a forever war with Iran.
Israel is not without friends and is more regionally dominant than at any point in its history. Radical Islam—whether in the form of the Iranian regime, Hezbollah, Hamas, or the Houthis—is at its weakest point in half a century.
China is recalibrating nearly all of the assumptions it has held for the past two decades. Russia is humiliated and hemorrhaging. Latin America is more pro-American than ever before.
Strange to relate, in last night’s speech to the nation on election chicanery, President Trump managed to both overwhelm and underwhelm public expectation. He touched on voting machine shenanigans, registration skullduggery, cyber-fuckery, labor union toolery, ballot fraud, and especially China meddling.
Internal CIA / FBI docs at the time said that China’s policy around the 2020 US election was to “leverage all domestic and foreign elements” opposed to the President to prevent his re-election. The Intel bunch never sent that memo to the White House. They were too busy pushing fake Russia meddling, fake impeachment, and a fake Covid-19 pandemic. Then they declared that the 2020 was “the most secure election in history.”
As of yesterday, the President de-classified many thousands of Intel agency documents for the public (and news media) to peruse. And naturally, the major cable news networks (except Fox) declined to broadcast the speech. As of Friday morning, The New York Times leads the offensive to disparage the actual news.
The big take-away was that US Intel agencies withheld all this intel from the President of the US, Mr. Trump, in the lead-up to the 2020 vote. Yes, there really is a Deep State, as seen starkly in a now-declassified memo from the then-chief of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division, one Nikki Floris, who wrote “I’m basically running a shadow government at this point” by hiding information from POTUS. Ms. Floris is now employed as Microsoft’s Director of Insider Risk (former Deputy Attorney General under “Joe Biden,” Lisa Monaco, is President of Microsoft Global Affairs.)
[USNWC] MAIN FINDINGS
Despite its impressive expansion, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is more of a "decision-taker" than a "decision-maker," with its growth driven by top-down political directives from leaders like Xi Jinping rather than by its own institutional influence.
The PLAN's bureaucratic influence within the high command remains modest, with minimal representation on the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) or in its subordinate departments.
The PLA Army (PLAA) continues to dominate top leadership and management roles, limiting the navy's ability to compete for resources and influence key decisions despite a strategic shift toward the maritime domain.
Career progression for rising naval officers prioritizes operational experience at sea over joint duty assignments within the CMC bureaucracy, making such influential staff roles unattractive and further weakening the navy's voice at the top.
Due to its limited lobbying power, the navy has had to accept CMC policies that reduce its autonomy and capabilities, such as transferring land-based aircraft to the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and patrol ships to the China Coast Guard (CCG).
[USNWC] Engaging with the past while forging the future strategies of naval operations is a priority of the Naval War College Review, and this issue encapsulates that vision well.
PREAMBLE:
Starting with our lead article, "The Acquisition Lessons of the 1980s and Their Continuing Relevance" by John Lehman and Anand Toprani,
The future of maritime strategy is examined through the lens of lessons learned from the Cold War. In both Robert "Jake” Bebber's article "The Cognitive Dimension of Mobilization: Reconsidering American War Preparation in an Age of Persistent Cognitive Warfare"
Charles A. Richard and John Robinson's "Narrowing Seas: The Littoral Strike Complex and the Future of Naval Warfare," the future of naval operations is investigated through the lenses of emerging forms of cognitive warfare and the use of drones by Ukraine, respectively.
Turning toward a more historical lens, “'A True Sailor-Statesman': The Ethical Quandary of Ambassador Raymond A. Spruance in the Philippines" by Andrew K. Blackley reexamines claims of ethical misconduct during Spruance's ambassadorship.
Fabio De Ninno's "Fighting without Mastery: Italian Naval Strategy and the Defeat of the Regia Marina in the Mediterranean, 1940–1943" looks at the various reasons the Italian navy failed to control critical sea-lanes during World War II.
Finally, Robert C. Rubel revisits concepts of parallelism in warfare strategies of the past in this issue's Research & Debate, titled "Forms of Military Strategy: Historical Parallels between the American Confederacy and Imperial Japan, and a Way Forward.”
[AT] Apparently, Israel, which has long been guilty of “suicidal empathy,” has a strong enough survival instinct to start closing the door against genocidal Palestinians.
Israel is unlike every other country in the world. Historically surrounded by hostile Islamist regimes dedicated to murdering every Jew, the Israelis engage in what might be considered suicidal empathy. They provide jobs, food, water, and medical care for the very people trying to obliterate Israel. They regularly patch up jihadists and set them free, even though those jihadists repay them by continuing to kill Jews.
Even after October 7, the greatest mass slaughter of Jews since the Holocaust, Israel, unlike any other nation, did its best to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties, even though most of those civilians supported Hamas and other Islamist savages. The aphorism that most Muslims don’t want to kill infidels and Jews but want other Muslims to do it is certainly accurate.
And now, the very people who want Israel obliterated are calling foul because Israel doesn’t want them back inside the country:
Posted by: Frank G ||
07/18/2026 06:02 ||
Comments ||
Link ||
[221 views]
Top|| File under: Palestinian Authority
#1
Why? No one wants your sorry asses, even other muslims and that says alot!
Posted by: chris ||
07/18/2026 7:02 Comments ||
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#2
ARAMCO had an interesting history with the Paleos. ARAMCO needed arabs who could speak/write/read English and Arabic, do basic maths, etc. Because the Brits ran Palestine for ~25 years, the Paleos were more educated than other arabs. ARAMCO hired a bunch of them and many went to the ARAMCO/SA 'College of Petroleum and Minerals' or as we called it PetMin. It was located just outside the fence for the Dhahran ARAMCO camp (HQ).
During the 6-day war, Nasser lied and said the US & UK fighter jets also attacked Egypt. This riled up the Paleos who decided to attack the ARAMCO camp.
They came over the fences and started rioting, burning cars and houses, etc. Well, the SAG immediately sent in the Saudi NG and those guys DO NOT play around. They killed many and expelled the rest.
[NationalContext] The exiled armed parties have built their strategy around merging with an internal Iranian uprising rather than sustaining a conventional insurgency. The recent casualty data show where that linkage could plausibly occur, and where it could not.
The war on Iran ultimately produced no Iranian Kurdish ground component. But according to Iranian Kurdish groups involved in the initial planning for operations inside Iranian Kurdish territory, such a campaign was never conceived as a long mountain insurgency launched from Iraq’s Kurdistan Region or as a conventional border push. The concept was always to wait for an internal uprising in Iran, help trigger it, and then merge with it, bringing organisation, arms and cadre to a mobilisation already underway across the frontier.
That model has obvious appeal for groups whose camp-based military infrastructure cannot sustain anything larger. But it also contains a fragility that is often glossed over. It depends entirely on local embeddedness inside Iran. Without that, there is nothing to merge with. With it, even a modest exile apparatus can carry real weight.
The question, then, is where that embeddedness actually exists. Reliable answers are hard to obtain. No party publishes usable membership data, serious fieldwork inside Iran is not possible under current conditions, and there is no publicly available polling of Iranian Kurds. What does exist, particularly after the recent wave of strikes and operations against party sites in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, is a casualty record.
That record is analytically useful for reasons often left unstated. Fighters do not emerge from nowhere. They come through families, friendship networks, kinship ties and town-level political milieus. When a party repeatedly loses people from the same handful of places, it is not simply losing individuals. It is revealing where it has roots, where it recruits, where it is trusted, and where it can expect to find the relationships an internal-linkage strategy actually requires.
The analytical weight of the recent casualty layer rests on one further property, and it is the decisive one: of the available samples, it is the least controllable by the parties themselves. What we have, in effect, is a quasi-random casualty sample drawn from fighters and members of these organisations killed in Iraqi Kurdistan, especially in broad missile, drone, camp or exposure-related incidents in which those killed were not individually selected for their hometown or local background, but targeted more generally for belonging to Iranian Kurdish party structures.
That matters because it makes the dead fighters one of the best available proxies for the movements’ underlying grassroots social base. The sample was produced by Iranian targeting, not party curation. It therefore reflects where these movements actually have people embedded, rather than where they would prefer to appear present.
That property also addresses the obvious objection to a dataset of this size. A sample of thirteen would be methodologically fragile if it produced a mixed or ambiguous result, because the temptation to read pattern into noise would be strong. But the result here is not ambiguous. It is categorical. When a semi-random sample produces one hundred percent clustering within a single linguistic-sectarian zone, the inferential burden shifts. The question is no longer whether the concentration is real, but how broad the underlying corridor would have to be to plausibly produce a distribution this tight.
The second sample is a leadership sample, constructed separately from the casualty data. Leadership rosters are more controllable and can be balanced internally for dialect, region or factional representation. That makes them less probative on their own, but still analytically useful as a second layer. Here, the aim was to identify, where birthplace data was actually available, roughly the top three figures from each of the main organisations under study: KDPI, the three main Komala branches, PAK and Khabat.
Leadership is selected through a very different process from wartime casualty. The force of the argument lies in the fact that these two samples are generated in fundamentally different ways yet point to the same geographic conclusion. If only the leadership clustered in the same towns, one could argue that this merely reflected old elite entrenchment while the broader rank and file were more geographically diverse. If only the dead fighters clustered there, one could argue that the pattern was an artefact of where certain camps happened to be struck, or of short-term operational exposure. But when both the casualty sample and the leadership sample independently converge on the same narrow birthplace corridor, the inference becomes much stronger.
The most plausible explanation is that the movement is genuinely reproduced from that corridor. This is therefore not just a pattern of leadership origin, and not just a pattern of wartime exposure. It is a pattern of social reproduction.
More at the link
Posted by: badanov ||
07/18/2026 00:00 ||
Comments ||
Link ||
[178 views]
Top|| File under: Govt of Iran
[SyriaInTransition] What’s left of Iran’s influence in Syria?
Assad’s fall has stripped Iran of most of its assets in Syria, but networks remain and could be leveraged to open a new front.
Prior to December 2024, Iranian influence in Syria primarily took three main forms. The first was military: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers and Hezbollah officers helped recruit, train and command auxiliary 'Local Defence Forces' (LDF) units composed of Syrian fighters, as well as leading a myriad of IRGC-affiliated Shia armed groups from Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The second was cultural: the IRGC sought to foster ideological support for the 'axis of resistance', most notably through the 'Aleppo Defenders Legion' that produced literature and organised cultural events, as well as scholarships to study in Iran. The third was religious, primarily a targeting of the country's Twelver Shia community, encouraging them to follow Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i as their marja' - a religious authority who dispenses guidance.
These layers of influence often overlapped. Some members of the Twelver Shia community, for example, also enlisted in LDF units. With the regime’s collapse, however, Iranians and their foreign allies from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Lebanon swiftly withdrew from Syria.
LDF NO MORE
Most of those who worked with the LDF were not Shia but members of the country's Sunni majority, with some units built around Sunni tribes. Members of the Bekara tribe, for example, formed the Baqir Brigade. The Berri clan in Aleppo fielded the Martyr Ali Zayn al-Abidin Berri Brigade. As the regime fell, these Sunni groups either turned against Iran or simply stood down. Their networks have since aligned with the new government or kept a low profile.
A contact linked to the Martyr Ali Zayn al-Abidin Berri Brigade told Syria in Transition that, as Aleppo began to fall, Haj Khalid of the Baqir Brigade informed the brigade’s leadership that he was coordinating with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The group initially planned to withdraw toward Homs and then Damascus, but as Homs fell, it instead chose to defect and headed back to Aleppo. There is currently no indication that either group, or what remains of their networks, is secretly coordinating with Iran.
More at the link
Posted by: badanov ||
07/18/2026 00:00 ||
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[175 views]
Top|| File under: Govt of Iran
[NationalContext] At least nine Iranian Kurdish fighters from the Komala movement were killed today in an Iranian attack in Sulaimani province. The strike caps a violent stretch inside Iran’s majority Kurdish northwest, where at least nine armed incidents were documented in June, killing more than 20 Iranian Kurdish militants. Most of the significant engagements were initiated by the IRGC through ambushes and intelligence-driven operations.
The spike in incidents has coincided with a reported buildup of Iranian forces and special operations units in the same areas where the clashes occurred. On 14 July, Alhurra quoted senior Iranian Kurdish opposition figures describing an Iranian deployment along the frontier of roughly 3,000 Saberin special forces personnel, arriving in waves of approximately 1,000, alongside IRGC Ground Forces units, Aerospace Force elements, artillery, rocket launchers, armour and drones. Ali Khoshnamak, a senior figure in the Komala Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Kurdistan, told the channel these were trained and trusted regime forces whose scale and composition indicated preparation for possible ground warfare. The same sources described daily drone reconnaissance over the frontier and approaches to the Kurdistan Region, along with electronic warfare systems for jamming and satellite disruption.
These force figures are opposition intelligence claims, and no outside party has verified the inventory. What Iranian official sources have confirmed independently is the operational reality beneath them: armed Kurdish units moving through the border hinterland, and Iranian forces hunting them with ambushes, patrols and drones. The dispute between the two accounts concerns scale and geography. It no longer concerns whether a low-intensity border war is underway.
Context: The pattern extends back to the earliest days of the year, and its rhythm tracks the wider war almost exactly. On 14 January, Reuters reported, citing three informed sources, that armed Iranian Kurdish groups had attempted to cross from the Kurdistan Region into Iran during Iran’s internal crisis. That report established that infiltration was an operational possibility for Tehran to plan against, whatever its scale.
Through March, the contours of a potential Kurdish front became public. On 6 March, Reuters reported, citing two Iranian Kurdish sources and one Israeli source, that Israel was supporting Iranian Kurdish planning to seize border areas around Oshnavieh and Piranshahr, with thousands of fighters gathering on the Iraqi side and opposition strength estimated between 5,000 and 8,000. The parties wanted air support and political guarantees before committing. They never received them. Turkey, Reuters reported in May, opposed and helped suppress the offensive proposal, fearing it would strengthen PKK-linked networks and derail Ankara’s own process with the PKK. The KRG, for its part, had no interest in becoming the staging ground for a war against its neighbour.
The chronology of the wider war frames everything that followed. The United States initiated the campaign against Iran on 28 February. By early April the attempt to collapse the regime had visibly failed, and a ceasefire took hold, later formalised in a June memorandum of understanding, with Washington betting that talks would extract the compromise that bombing had failed to produce. That bet also failed, and the arrangement collapsed publicly on 8 July. The two months of ceasefire functioned as a preparation period for both sides. For Iran, one of the clearest priorities of that period is now visible on its western frontier.
Analysis: The logic of the Iranian campaign is to make the Kurdish front option completely untenable. Every element of the reported activity serves that single aim: the ambushes that have broken up infiltration teams, the Saberin deployments, the village-level surveillance, the daily drone coverage, and the strikes on party facilities inside the Kurdistan Region, including today’s attack in Sulaimani. The clashes of June and July were mostly initiated by the IRGC itself, and their character, intelligence-driven ambushes against small teams in the border hinterland, indicates a deliberate effort to destroy the cells that managed to infiltrate during the early days of the war, before they could mature into networks. Tehran is using the interval between rounds of the wider war to strip out a capability that was built to be used against it.
More at the link
Posted by: badanov ||
07/18/2026 00:00 ||
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[212 views]
Top|| File under: Govt of Iran
[TabletMag] The Iranian attacks on America’s Persian Gulf bases and allies that ended the shaky monthslong cease-fire raise questions about Vice President JD Vance’s confidence that the Iranian officials he’s been engaging since April are "pragmatic moderates" who are "ascendant" in the regime hierarchy. Doing his bit to be Trump's anti-impeachment insurance?
Administration officials say their negotiating partners told them the attacks were waged by an "errant" hard-line faction determined to undermine negotiations, but they, as moderates, want to keep talking. To an Israeli it's so familiar: Bad Hamas, good PA.
And yet the attacks show that the hard-liners are not errant but rather are in control of the regime’s decision-making, negotiations or not. The Vance team then has been wasting time talking to Iranian officials who have no say over matters of war and peace while those who do have been plotting against U.S. interests and allies. Or maybe there never really was a split between moderates and hard-liners. Maybe it’s just a dumb convention used by U.S. officials to rationalize talking to terrorists, and the White House was content to be strung along by the Iranians until the president came up with a plan to win and take the Strait of Hormuz by force. Or he doesn’t come up with a plan, and the administration’s policy becomes even less coherent as it devolves into what Trump calls a "forever war."
The United States is now shooting back, again. The White House has reimposed a blockade of Iran’s continuing blockade of the strait. First Trump said in a Truth Social post that the United States will charge ships a 20% toll on cargo to reimburse the United States for "providing safety and security to this very volatile section of the World." Then he announced he was replacing the toll with "trade and investment deals from various Gulf states."
But that’s the premise of America’s 80-year-old arrangement with the oil-producing Arab states in the Persian Gulf: The United States ensures safe passage of oil in return for tribute. The catch now is that Trump collapsed this pillar of American peace and prosperity by deciding to negotiate over control of the only maritime access point through which that oil, 20% of the world’s supply, passes.
Recent media reports claim that the strait isn’t open because the memorandum of understanding (MOU) is ambiguously worded on this issue. Iran reads it one way and the United States another. No way, says Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff. "The discussions with the Iranians were always the strait would open in the same way that it had been managed prior to the conflict," he said last week in yet another background briefing to the press with Vance and Jared Kushner. "The Pakistanis were there when the Iranians agreed to that. The Qataris were there when the Iranians agreed to that. So we’re not dreaming those conversations up."
That representatives of the government of the United States feel it necessary to elicit support for their negotiating position from third-world terror sponsors like Pakistan and Qatar is evidence that the U.S. position was weak from day one. You don’t need to be a lawyer or a diplomat or even a high-end real-estate investor to understand that if you are negotiating with another party for control of a property formerly under your control, you are formalizing that party’s control of that property.
The White House’s Iran strategy looks out of sync not because it’s a sophisticated ploy to keep Tehran off guard. The United States is a superpower and doesn’t have to devise some convoluted Levantine strategy to catch a mouse. The policy looks haphazard because the president has not decided to take back what has been under U.S. control for nearly a century. Trump has not decided—not yet, anyway—on winning.
Vance told Trump that he could get a deal to buy the strait back from the Iranians and move toward talks over the remnants of their nuclear program with a deal like Barack Obama’s Iran deal that wouldn’t look like Obama’s deal. The president thought the senior Iranian officials negotiating with Vance, Witkoff, and Kushner were very smart and reasonable people, and now he says they’re crazy and sick. He told the press he didn’t know beforehand that they were crazy and sick, but since the 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Trump has been telling the press that the Iranians are crazy and sick.
The Iranian officials who have so far survived Operation Epic Fury are likely to be more certain of victory now than before, since the regime has already absorbed very serious blows. It is difficult to see how hitting them more and hitting them harder will make any difference, unless Trump decides to strike the Iranians at what has long been understood to be their center of gravity, the Strait of Hormuz.
After all, this is why stopping the Iranians from acquiring a nuclear weapon has been a vital U.S. interest for decades: not to protect Israel, but to defend U.S. interests. The bomb would allow the Iranians to close or threaten to close the strait on a whim, thereby destabilizing global energy markets and threatening American peace and prosperity. Now the Iranians have taken it, without a bomb, and Trump hasn’t moved to take it back.
Trump is angry the Iranians violated Vance’s MOU to open the strait. But virtually no one believed it had any chance of success, except Vance and the influencers he courted to write articles and social media posts that he could take to his boss to show that the base could be fooled into thinking it wasn’t like Obama’s deal. It's all Israel's fault - according to Vance.
And those who said the deal was as bad as Obama’s were excoriated by the brash youths who populate Vance’s comms apparatus. "Cool, Ted," White House validator Alex Bruesewitz tweeted at MOU skeptic Sen. Ted Cruz. "No one asked you, bro. Stop trying to undermine the President and his administration." Bruesewitz gave more of the same to another Trump ally, journalist Mark Levin: "Sit back and stop trying to undermine the President and his team."
Vance saved for himself the privilege of screaming at Israeli officials who doubted the prospects of his deal’s success. "If I was in the Cabinet of the Israeli government," Vance said last month, "I might not be attacking the only powerful ally that I have anywhere left in the entire world." I thought this is because Vance is anti-semitic sh*t, but - it turns out - he always behaves this way: https://www.ms.now/news/veeps-security-detail-fed-up-with-hastily-arranged-personal-and-family-travel-requests
Vance’s name is now attached to a loss because Trump’s return to war is proof that everyone Vance and his communications team hectored was right and Vance was wrong. Accordingly, Vance’s associates are messaging that the vice president never really had that much invested in the MOU’s success. As one ally of the vice president recently told reporters, "All that really mattered was him being seen as attempting to bring the war to an end."
In the new version, Vance’s talks with the Iranians, the rapport he boasted of building with Iranian Parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, were more like diplomacy theater: If the MOU didn’t work out and made the White House look foolish when the Iranians inevitably violated it, that was still pretty good material for JD’s 2028 campaign. At least he proved to isolationists—i.e., pro-Iran think tankers and journalists whispering in Vance’s ear and pro-Russia podcasters whining into their microphones—his opposition to the neocons’ latest war for Israel.
The issue is that whatever version of Vance’s efforts is correct—he believed he could secure a deal or he didn’t have much confidence he could secure a deal—the result is the same. The Trump team spent down prestige by negotiating with a side determined to humiliate it, while it stiff-armed domestic allies on whom it depends for political support. And that support could come in especially handy now as the administration returns to a war that is likely to become increasingly unpopular as long as the president fails to devise a strategy to win it.
Perhaps even more consequentially, the vice president, ever keen to highlight how U.S. interests diverge from Israel’s, beat up on a partner it is likely to need if it decides to win the war. Otherwise, the administration is likely on course for another long conflict in the Middle East, what Trump refers to as a "forever war."
Posted by: Grom the Reflective ||
07/18/2026 00:00 ||
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Link ||
[191 views]
Top|| File under: Govt of Iran
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.