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2026-09-25 Africa Horn
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'I'm your best friend.' Israel has started another civil war in Africa.
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Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov
[Regnum] Israel is increasing its indirect presence in Africa. After effectively "reclaiming" Somaliland, its next target is Eritrea, where domestic political instability has persisted for decades.
 | Israel is thinking strategically and wants to create a permanent counterweight to Iranian influence in the Red Sea, relying on the non-systemic opposition and political émigrés. A idea that benefits everyone in that part of the world, not to mention the rest of us. And clearly, no one else local is doing anything about it. America is doing their bit, but America works at a higher level. |
However, this idea hasn't resonated with everyone, even within Israel.
"BRIGADE FOR THE MOTHERLAND"
Eritrean oppositionists in exile proudly call themselves the "Nhamedu Brigade," which roughly translates as "Brigade for the Homeland," and cite the creation of an "exile force" that will return to Eritrea and overthrow the government of Isaias Afwerki —either by force or through elections.
Formally, the movement has existed since 2022 and is simultaneously located in three countries: the United States, Israel, and Ethiopia (with the movement’s leader, Beyene Gerzgiher, residing permanently in Addis Ababa).
However, over time, the Israeli track increasingly came to the fore. It was within the Eritrean community in Israel, one of the largest in the region, that the first permanent local governing bodies for the exile opposition began to form, and activists Atkelti Avraham Michael and Molu Sultan were able to establish communication with the Israeli leadership, reaching the level of the Prime Minister's Office.
And although these contacts are mostly covert, the Eritrean opposition has never reached such heights before.
Another clear shift can be seen in the emergence in 2023 of Israel's own Eritrean street fighters—groups of youths who engage in brawls with the "fifth column." These are most often other factions of Eritrean refugees who, while not supporting the Afwerki administration, do not want a civil war in the country.
And although the movement's leaders interpret this as a "civic impulse" of isolated individuals, there is clear external coordination behind the street fighters' actions. Israeli police and intelligence agencies also turn a blind eye to these clashes.
However, the Nhamedu Brigade's structures only took shape in the fall of 2026, when the movement adopted a new political program and declared its readiness to nominate its own candidates to compete for high office in Eritrea.
And this statement was made precisely at a meeting in Tel Aviv, and the first “alternative elections” of the opposition took place on the same day in the Israeli Ness Ziona, which became a fairly clear signal about Israel’s full inclusion in the game.
ADVANTAGEOUS POSITION AS A CURSE
Why has Israel, which has long called what is happening in Eritrea a “purely African matter,” suddenly become interested in the fate of the opposition in exile?
The most obvious reason is geographic. Eritrea formally controls part of the Red Sea basin, including the Dahlak Archipelago, near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
For Israel, this is important for maritime communications, surveillance of regional adversaries, and overall Red Sea security, especially given the volatile situation in the Bab el-Mandeb area.
However, to establish outposts, the Israelis need at least a formal connection to some force opposed to the government. And the Nhamedou Brigade is perfectly suited for this purpose—especially since, judging by the experience of their previous presence on Yemen's Socotra Archipelago, opponents of the regime don't necessarily need to be aligned with Israeli forces.
It's also interesting that the period of sharply intensified contacts between Israel and the underground coincided chronologically with the start of the successful counteroffensive by pro-Iranian forces on the Yemeni coast. Prior to this, intense interaction had occurred in 2023–2024, when the Houthis imposed a naval blockade on Israeli ports.
This indirectly indicates that the Jewish state is placing a serious bet on the Eritrean opposition and is preparing to play this geopolitical trump card sooner or later.
"WE DON'T NEED FRIENDS LIKE THAT."
However, not everyone in Israel shares the idea of nurturing a future “correct regime” in Eritrea with Israeli money.
The ambitious project is perceived as an obsession of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and a small group of his allies, while opposition and centrist circles consider such games with delayed benefits dangerous to national security.
The mass clashes between supporters and opponents of the Afwerki regime on the streets of Tel Aviv in 2023 (which are believed to have been initiated by supporters of the Nhamedou Brigades) are still remembered by Israeli liberals as an example of the ricochet of the unsuccessful foreign policy combinations of the Netanyahu cabinet.
Moreover, opponents of rapprochement with the Eritrean opposition point to its extreme marginalization. More than 80% of Eritreans in Israel lack official refugee status and live under temporary protection; their legal and social benefits are far more limited than those of ordinary Israelis.
Community members, especially young people, regularly form gangs and appear in crime reports, and the authority of leaders—both local and overseas—is uncertain. Therefore, any attempts to engage such a volatile group may ultimately prove futile.
The hawkish and revanchist camp—which, given its rhetoric, should support any government moves to expand its influence abroad—is also not too happy about the growing “Eritrean trend.”
Far-right conservatives believe the state should spend money not on foreign opposition, but on its own patriotic youth. And, above all, to ensure a robust offensive in the West Bank, southern Lebanon, and Gaza—where, according to Israeli hawks, the most tangible threat currently emanates.
At the same time, Netanyahu is in no hurry to trumpet solidarity with the Eritrean opposition. Unlike its Somaliland partners, the Nhamedu Brigade does not have much influence directly in its own country, and premature public support could thwart the covert infiltration of agents into the country.
Instead, Israeli special envoys are helping their partners pave the way to Washington and obtain the White House's blessing for a "democratic struggle."
At the same time, Israel does not want to be on the front lines of the revolutionary struggle and is lobbying for the opposition's command center to be transferred to Ethiopia, so that Addis Ababa will bear the brunt of the public costs of the crisis. Meanwhile, Israelis will reap the benefits of their previous support for loyalists without the collateral damage.
However, whether the Nhamedou Brigade leaders will remember their Israeli sponsors after the conflict ends is an open question. And it's a question that's increasingly being raised behind the scenes in government circles.
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Posted by badanov 2026-09-25 00:00||
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