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Africa North

Algerian army conducted operations against unidentified terrorists in the Tébessa area northeast of the country

2026-03-15

The Algerian army conducted operations against unidentified terrorists in the Tébessa area northeast of the country, three soldiers were killed during ensuing clashes while seven gunmen were neutralized over the two days of operations on March 12 and 13. pic.twitter.com/UuISoP5GDl
— Brant (@BrantPhilip_) March 14, 2026

Text:

Algerian army conducted operations against unidentified terrorists in the Tébessa area northeast of the country, three soldiers were killed during ensuing clashes while seven gunmen were neutralized over the two days of operations on March 12 and 13.

That used to be Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), but now it could equally be Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS).

Link

Africa North

'Good Uncle.' Trump's Relative Turns Libya into a Family Business

2026-02-23

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov

[REGNUM] Recently, US President Donald Trump's Senior Advisor for Africa, Massad Boulos, held a working meeting in Libya with Saddam Haftar, the son and deputy commander of the Eastern Libyan Armed Forces. The Americans invited Haftar and his fighters to join the large-scale Flintlock 26 exercises, scheduled for spring 2026 and held near the city of Sirte.

The visit to Libya of a high-ranking State Department official (who also happens to be the American leader's in-law) sparked considerable controversy. And not just because Washington played a decisive role in starting the country's civil war. Far more concerning were the personal motives of the distinguished guest, who sought to turn the African country into a "family business."

A BUSINESSMAN WITHOUT A BRIEFCASE

Is that like a minister without portfolio?

Although Boulos had been actively involved in the Republican camp since the time of George W. Bush, he only entered big politics in 2024, after being invited to join Trump's team.

Moreover, unlike many of the "transitional period" appointees, the president's matchmaker arrived at the White House with established communication channels. Boulos retained significant connections in Lebanon, where his family has been actively involved for several generations. The American envoy's ancestors sat in the local parliament and held leadership positions, actively influencing public opinion in the country. Boulos himself maintained active contacts with representatives of many Lebanese parties, including Suleiman Frangieh, the leader of the conservative centrist Marada Party (a tactical ally of Hezbollah).

With such a "portfolio," many observers were confident that his rise to a leading position in resolving the conflict between Lebanon and Israel was only a matter of time. However, Boulos's potential was not fully utilized; the Hezbollah disarmament negotiations were completely dominated by Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Turkey and the White House special representative for Syria. He also doubles as the "Saudi group's" confidant within the US administration. Replacing Barrack with Boulos would have complicated the White House's already difficult dialogue with the Arabian monarchies and would have harmed the interests of Trump's son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who traded Barrack's participation in the negotiations for support for US projects in Saudi Arabia.

Similarly, the former businessman failed to integrate into the Gaza negotiations, even though Boulos helped the Republicans establish a stable channel of communication between Trump and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. However, the "Qatar-Turkish" group, led by Steve Witkoff, resisted. Unwilling to upset the fragile balance of elite groups around the White House, Trump decided not to play this card either.

Moreover, the idea of pressuring Hezbollah through semi-loyal Christian parties or negotiating Gaza's future with the unpopular Abbas seemed a foregone conclusion to the Republican. So, in both processes, Boulos played a largely technical role.

AFRICAN SUCCESSES
Trump's matchmaker achieved far greater success in Africa. Boulos participated in a mediation mission between the warring Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, ultimately convincing both sides to sign a ceasefire on Washington's terms.

He also managed to extricate three Americans from DRC prisons who participated in the failed anti-government coup of May 2024. This required first winning over the country's president, Félix Tshisekedi, whom the accused had previously attempted to assassinate. However, the State Department's expenses were more than repaid: Kinshasa not only complied with Washington's request but also expressed a willingness to become more actively involved in US diplomatic and economic projects on the continent.

Boulos has even been jokingly nicknamed "Trump's chamberlain" in Africa, as the savvy businessman has had a hand in most of the key deals on the continent concluded in 2025, from a massive American investment program in Nigeria to a joint rare earths mining plan with the DRC.

The US-Africa mini-summit, held at the White House in the summer of 2025, was also partly the brainchild of Boulos and his staff.

FRIENDSHIP AND SERVICE
But let's return to Libya. Boulos made his first attempt to "make inroads" into the country back in April 2025, in the first days after his appointment as Senior Advisor for Africa. He proposed a "comprehensive plan" for reconciling the warring parties, but it failed to gain much support. It was consistently rejected by both East and West Libya, with each side complaining that Washington was "trying to play along" with its opponent instead of addressing real problems.

Trump's matchmaker's attempts to impose his vision of a settlement on individual Libyan politicians at closed meetings (sometimes through persuasion, sometimes through threats) also failed, which caused irritation in the White House.

Boulos then moved on to targeted "cultivation" of key figures in the Libyan political scene, with an emphasis on future faction leaders. Saddam Haftar was among the first figures the Trump adviser met with in Libya after a nearly six-month hiatus.

In preparing for the meeting with him, Boulos took into account previous mistakes and played his trump card, essentially offering the East a “roof” for the duration of joint exercises in Sirte, as well as guarantees that the Tripolitanians (also involved in these exercises) would not use them as cover for preparing a military campaign.

It's worth noting that the Americans' increased activity in the East is no coincidence. In early February, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, one of the sons of the former Libyan leader and a presidential contender, was assassinated in northwestern Libya. His death rocked the country, with warring factions accusing each other of "political assassination" and looking for signs that their counterparts were preparing for a "military revenge." Moreover, it was the East that rattled its sabres most vigorously, seeing the crisis as an opportunity to unite under its banner the younger Gaddafi's former supporters—all those who disagreed with Tripoli's policies.

Here, Boulos partly decided to play on his ambitions: inviting the eastern forces to participate in exercises under the auspices of AFRICOM strengthened their legitimacy in the eyes of other factions, and speaking on equal terms with Haftar Jr. only fueled rumors of an imminent transfer of the eastern commander's position from father to son. Haftar Sr. himself indirectly supports this transfer: in August 2025, he appointed Saddam as his deputy, entrusting him with the most sensitive negotiations, including those related to the possible creation of a unified Libyan armed forces.

Interestingly, this meeting did not provoke a wave of indignation in the other camps. This was largely due to the fact that Boulos's lieutenants had carried out a serious "diplomatic barrage": they organized meetings with Libyan Prime Minister Hamid Dbeibah and other influential Western Libyan officials, and, according to leaks, held talks with General Osama Juwaili, the "governor" of the city of Ez-Zintan (where Gaddafi Jr. had long been hiding) and an "equidistant" force between East and West.

HIDDEN INTEREST
However, when establishing ties with Libyan elites from different camps, Boulos is guided not so much by Washington's foreign policy aspirations as by his own business interests.

Numerous relatives and friends of the adviser have already set their sights on Libya's war-ravaged (but still attractive) oil and industrial sectors. Among the first to be considered is his own son, the young billionaire and Trump's son-in-law, Michael Boulos.

In September 2025, Boulos was already trying to play the role of "good uncle" in negotiations with Libyan bigwigs. At a closed meeting in Doha, he promised his interlocutors to press the Republican administration to unfreeze "tens of billions of dollars" frozen since the overthrow of Gaddafi in 2011. But only on the condition that some of these funds be returned as kickbacks to American companies entering the market.

By a “strange coincidence,” most of the firms named were either connected to relatives of the elder Boulos or had permanent contracts with companies of Turkish billionaire Ercument Bayeganu, the “oil king” of the local market.

Given that Trump's aide's initiative was in stark contrast to UN sanctions imposed on Tripoli, Boulos was accused of conflict of interest and violation of international law. Combined with his dubious connections, this could have spelled the end of his political career.

At that time, the active adviser was saved from consequences not so much by his relationship with the president as by the intercession of Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who highly praised Boulos's contribution to advancing US interests on the African continent and saw him, among other things, as a strong counterweight to the "Turkish-Qatari group" led by Witkoff. With great difficulty, the errant politician was saved.

Boulos learned his lesson and, during his current foray into Libya, disguised his business interests as much as possible, shifting the focus to seeking agreement between Libya's "military camps." However, the very next day, numerous economic representatives and businessmen associated with the "Boulos group" rushed in the wake of Trump's advisor. This means that a new conflict of interest is just around the corner.

Link

Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

The Specter of a 'Green' Revolt: What the Killing of Gaddafi's Son Means for Russia

2026-02-06

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited

Responding to this story from two days ago.

by Kirill Semenov

[REGNUM] The assassination of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi in Zintan on the evening of February 3, 2026, closes more than a decade of unresolved chapters in Libya's transition period related to the Gaddafi leader.

The attack on him was not carefully planned: a group of armed men burst into his home while he was observing a voluntary Islamic fast and talking on the phone with members of his political team. Saif al-Islam managed to warn them of the intruders' presence and even returned fire with a pistol, but was shot dead before completing the conversation.

This attack, which appears poorly organized and left a chance for survival, stands in stark contrast to previous unsuccessful, albeit well-planned, assassination attempts. It occurred amid a series of alarming signs: increased political maneuvering in Libya, harsher rhetoric from local militias, incidents in the south, and renewed intense diplomatic activity around the country.

All of this raises many questions. Significant is the muted, almost silent, initial reaction of Libya's main political factions, which is rare in local culture.

A PARADOXICAL LEGACY
The death of Saif al-Islam reveals the fundamental paradox of his figure and the true nature of his support.

The so-called "Green" bloc he led, aligned with supporters of the former regime of his father, Muammar Gaddafi, remained one of the most difficult political forces to analyze in Libya. Its uniqueness was multifaceted and stemmed from the biography of the younger Gaddafi himself.

With a brilliant Western education,

…where brilliant apparently means purchased…

Saif al-Islam tried in the 2000s to present himself as the architect of Libyan reforms and a bridge between his father's regime and the outside world.

An important, but often overlooked, part of this strategy was his efforts to reconcile the state with Islamist circles. He established contacts and negotiated with figures such as the influential Islamist ideologist Ali al-Sallabi

…who led an adventurous life in the various centers of radical Islam from the 1990s until Moammar Khadaffy was overthrown in the 2011 Libyan Civil War, when he was commissioned to bring $2 billion in aid for the rebels from Qatar…

and the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood*, seeking to integrate moderate Islamists into the legal political arena and win them over to his father's side.

After 2011, these old connections transformed into channels for dialogue, forming part of the complex network capital that allowed Saif al-Islam to remain alive and influential. This was especially important given the lack of any widespread nostalgia for the Muammar Gaddafi era in Libya—the "green" movement is marginal and fragmented.

But thanks to his long-standing connections, including with the current head of the Government of National Accord (GNA), Abdel Hamid Dbeibah, and his ability to build alliances, Saif al-Islam was able to become more than just a leader of marginal Gaddafi supporters, although his claims to supreme power were always considered illusory.

As Grigory Lukyanov, Deputy Dean of the Faculty of Oriental Studies at the State University of Humanities and Social Sciences, told Regnum news agency, the assumption that he could realistically run for president in the elections is “somewhat far-fetched and overestimates his potential.”

"More likely, he could have acted as a 'spoiler candidate.'" He could have been voted for by irreconcilable opponents of the entire current political class—opponents of [Abdel Hamid] Dbeibah, [Khalifa] Haftar, [Aguila] Salah Isa, and other key figures who are currently using their administrative influence in the struggle for power. And as a candidate with no initial chance of winning, but capable of taking away some votes, no one needed him. All the main candidates intend to use administrative resources and understand how fragile the balance of power is, so every group of votes has a price," the orientalist noted.

Thus, Saif al-Islam became a figure for whom not so much convinced Gaddafi supporters, but a wide variety of “dissenters” were ready to vote.

His appeal was never solely based on nostalgia for his father. Increasingly, it reflected protest and rejection in both the east and west of the country against the ruling class, which ordinary Libyans perceive as disunited, ineffective, and pursuing its own clannish interests.

On the contrary, Saif al-Islam represented the possibility of a referendum of no confidence in the entire Libyan government.

Support for him was perceived not as an endorsement of the past, but as a gesture of despair about the present, which made him dangerous for any established influence group.

And herein lies the paradox: unable to claim power, Gaddafi Jr. could have turned out to be a "black swan," posing a threat to all genuine contenders. After all, he promised to take their votes and make any election outcome unpredictable. This prevented any behind-the-scenes electoral "deals." And now, after his death, the chances of holding elections in the country are increasing.

At the same time, the Supreme National Electoral Commission's technical statements about its readiness to begin preparations for elections as early as April 2026 sound more like a formality. Fundamental obstacles—the lack of a constitutional basis, consensus on rules, and deep mistrust between Tripoli and Benghazi—have not disappeared.

In a system where maintaining the country's division is safer than attempting to reconcile the parties and resolve conflicts, the very idea of elections that could lead to the emergence of a strong national mandate frightens the ruling groups.

Eliminating a potential "black swan" event reduces the immediate risks for them, but does not change the nature of the game. At the same time, other players are becoming more active, seeking to reformat alliances to fit the new reality, where one unpredictable variable, Saif al-Islam, has disappeared, but the fragility of the system has only increased.

THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF THE GREEN GRID
The political future of the "green" movement has become even more uncertain.

As Anton Mardasov, an expert on the Middle East and North Africa, explained to Regnum News Agency, finding a replacement for the Gaddafiites is extremely difficult due to the lack of other influential family members in the country: they live abroad, and it is unlikely that any of them will decide to return to Libya.

On the other hand, today the Greens represent not a formal political movement, but a disparate network integrated into Libya's security structures and tribal communities, present to varying degrees in all three regions of the country. It is internally contradictory, yet highly flexible and capable of adapting to regional conditions.

Much of it – especially in the east and south – was co-opted by Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA), who offered them security and status in exchange for loyalty.

At the same time, other fragments of the movement supported the GNA in Tripoli. A prominent example of this pro-Gaddafi group is Tuareg General Ali Qann, a former high-ranking military officer under Muammar Gaddafi who later headed the Southern Regions Military Council, loyal to Tripoli, and opposed Haftar.

It was this deep and multi-directional rootedness in Libyan society, rather than overt political activism, that constituted the real strength and complexity of Saif al-Islam's entourage.

BETWEEN THE HAFTARS AND DBEIBAH
The removal of Saif al-Islam directly affects the core of the Libyan political system, which is often characterized as a “system built on fragility,” where equilibrium is maintained not so much by consensus as by mutual vulnerability.

For the Haftar family – and particularly for Field Marshal Saddam's son, who was in charge of security and tribal relations – Saif al-Islam was perhaps the greatest uncontrollable threat to their long-term project.

Despite the successful integration of many Gaddafi supporters into the LNA structures, it was Seif al-Islam who remained the only figure whose symbolic capital and origins allowed him to lure away the allegiance of key tribal and regional networks at any time, especially in the south, where Benghazi's influence remained incomplete.

“For a long time, the claim was maintained in Libya that Saif was hiding in the south of Libya—in Haftar’s zone, but populated by tribes that, although they cooperate with the LNA, maintain a distinct opinion about Libya’s future,” Mardasov believes.

"I think this information was spread intentionally—both to disinform and to demonstrate that during the transition of power in the east, the tribes' support for Saif al-Islam could play a role, and how this factor could influence the possibility of holding elections," the expert believes.

In the younger Gaddafi, the Haftars saw a direct competitor who, if allowed to participate in the elections, could deprive them of their monopoly on the votes of the conservative and disillusioned electorate, which would threaten both the LNA project itself and the plans for a transition of power within the family.

At the same time, Lukyanov proposed “considering the situation with Abdel Hamid Dbeibah on an equal basis.”

"Although he and Saif al-Islam were once friends and collaborated at the Investment Agency, and although Dbeibah did much to allow Gaddafi Jr. to participate in the political process after coming to power, their paths ultimately diverged," the orientalist explained. According to him, Dbeibah's pragmatic interests ultimately prevailed, and given his precarious position, Saif al-Islam, as a "spoiler," could have been as dangerous for him as for Haftar.

Therefore, the elimination of a candidate capable of consolidating the protest electorate is beneficial to key players in both the east and west of the country, Anton Mardasov emphasized.

At the same time, as Lukyanov noted, Seif al-Islam “could really be of no use to anyone and at the same time completely unprotected from attempts at liquidation.”

According to the analyst, the direct benefit of his assassination is not that great. For Libyan politicians within the country—whether Haftar in the east or Dbeibah in the west—it merely removes one, far from the most pressing, issue from their agenda.

"It's entirely possible that the game wasn't worth the candle: the political assassination of such a figure would generate more gossip than it would bring real dividends in the form of additional support or resources," the orientalist emphasized.

IMPORTANT CIRCUMSTANCES
What deserves special attention, according to Lukyanov, is the possible “French connection.”

While Saif al-Islam was no longer able to make any significant changes within Libya, in the past, as one of the managers of his father's investment funds, he knew a lot about connections with European politicians and companies, primarily French ones.

Given the high-profile case of Libyan financing of the election campaign of former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, "the version of the involvement of French interests deserves consideration. "

However, the death of Saif al-Islam creates new geopolitical realities for Russia as well. His death represents a strategic loss and a narrowing of its room for maneuver.

Moscow has long viewed him as a potential alternative or backup asset, one that would allow it to avoid being tied solely to Haftar. Saif al-Islam, with his unique image and networks, could theoretically become the basis for a more independent political project, friendly to Moscow but not entirely dependent on Benghazi.

Now that option has disappeared, which, according to Mardasov, “increases Moscow’s dependence on Haftar,” depriving the Kremlin of an important lever for diversifying its influence and conducting negotiations.

This makes Russia's position in Libya more vulnerable and less flexible.

"RESURRECTION OF THE GHOST"
According to Mardasov, the role of Seif al-Islam and the threat of a "green" rebellion were often exaggerated, as many former supporters of the regime had already integrated into new structures.

His death, on the one hand, could accelerate this process of disintegration and co-optation, but on the other, it risks transforming his image into a powerful symbol of martyrdom, capable of consolidating a new generation of dissatisfied people based on shared resentment rather than nostalgia.

Thus, if those behind the assassination expected that the physical elimination of Saif al-Islam would finally neutralize the threat he posed and consolidate control over his legacy, they likely made a strategic mistake in underestimating the depth of the rift among his potential supporters.

As Grigory Lukyanov explained, "he had neither a cohort of authoritative politicians behind him willing to use their influence for his projects, nor strong social or political institutions. He also lacked sufficient experience in public administration."

According to the orientalist, this led to him performing poorly during the 2011 crisis. This ultimately led to his capture, and then to the status of exile and hostage in his own country, a situation he remained in for almost the rest of his life. "This, perhaps, is his greatest tragedy," Lukyanov concluded.

Thus, Saif al-Islam became a political ghost even during his lifetime, feared not so much for his actual capabilities as for what his survival symbolized.

His absence from formal politics for many years effectively preserved and strengthened Saif al-Islam's mythical status, shielding him from the inevitable compromises and disappointments that accompany real power. And his death could elevate this image to absolute status, transforming him from a ghost of the past into a banner for those who see no future in the current order.

This legacy will be contested, and it is already fraught with division.

On one side are those Gaddafi supporters who have integrated into Haftar's project and find stability and a strong government a guarantee of their position. For them, Saif al-Islam was more of a hindrance.

On the other hand, figures like General Ali Kanna, as well as other local leaders and tribal groups in the west and south who maintained independence or oriented themselves toward Tripoli, could see the image of the slain Saif become a powerful unifying symbol of resistance to both Haftar and the government's weakness.

But there's also a new generation of commanders or public figures who have no connection whatsoever to the "green" movement. And they may rally around not a single individual, but rather the idea of martyrdom and a new collective grievance. This creates the risk of more sporadic, localized, and therefore less predictable destabilization, especially in the south and central regions of the country.

In a system in fragile equilibrium, the removal of one, even seemingly peripheral, support can lead to an unexpected rebalancing of the entire structure.

So, while Libya may see a deceptive calm in the coming months and the appearance of one political obstacle being lifted, the long-term consequences of Saif al-Islam's assassination are likely to manifest themselves in new forms of social and political division, making genuine national reconciliation an even less achievable goal.

Link

Good Morning

2026-02-04

California Hospice Fraud Tops Out at $100 Billion - 18% of THE WHOLE COUNTRY'S home health care billing is coming out of Los Angeles County

Wednesday 02/04/2026

Video: Shapeshifting robot swings
and reshapes under electric fields

VivianPorter_02

Syria-Lebanon-Iran Iranian boats attempted to detain a US tanker in the Strait of Hormuz.		Africa North Armed Tensions in Southern Libya and Growing Instability at the Border with Niger
India-Pakistan Pakistan's Special Forces struck a newly established ISKP hideout. Drone strikes were conducted, followed by ground clearance op		Africa Subsaharan Military airstrike neutralizes 27 Bad Guys in Katsina dawn operation
Africa North Abdullah Othman, head of his political team, announces presidential candidate Saif al Islam Gaddafi killed		Africa Horn The siege on Kadugli city has been lifted after the Sudanese Armed Forces imposed control over the Kega Crossroad

Video: Shapeshifting robot swings
and reshapes under electric fields

Link

Africa North

Abdullah Othman, head of his political team, announces presidential candidate Saif al Islam Gaddafi killed

2026-02-04

They play hardball in Libya, too, apparently.

A particularly Libyan way to lose a presidential election.

#Breaking #Libya #ليبيا | Abdullah Othman, head of the political team of presidential candidate Saif al Islam Gaddafi @saifqaddafi, said he was mourning Saif al Islam Gaddafi after reports spread that he had been killed.

Early accounts said he was shot in the yard of his home… pic.twitter.com/UJ2eaVf56m
— Basha باشا (@BashaReport) February 3, 2026

Text:

Abdullah Othman, head of the political team of presidential candidate Saif al Islam Qadaffy
@saifqaddafi
, said he was mourning Saif al Islam Gaddafi after reports spread that he had been killed.

Early accounts said he was shot in the yard of his home and that the assailants escaped, with initial claims blaming the 444th Brigade. The brigade later denied any role, saying it has no presence in Zintan and no connection to the clashes.

Other reports now point to forces linked to Khalifa Haftar’s UAE backed Libyan National Army, while separate Arabic accounts say he was killed during clashes with an elite unit affiliated with the General Command following an attempted arrest.

Additional reports place the incident in the Hamadah desert in the Zintan area, during clashes that lasted through the afternoon, with claims that he fought until the end.

Sources also say there had been a previous attempt on his life, and that Ajmi Al Atiri and his son were injured. The circumstances remain unclear, with conflicting accounts and no independent confirmation.

More at the link

More from regnum.ru

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
Gaddafi's son's cousin confirmed his death

Ahmed Gaddafi, the cousin of Libyan politician Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, confirmed his death. He announced this on February 3 on the social media site X.

"Dr. Seif's last voice message was sent a day ago... He died for you, let his blood not be shed in vain," Ahmed Gaddafi wrote.

Possibly all his degrees were purchased (BS in either engineer or architecture, even the school was not sure, an MBA acquired along with international contacts in Vienna, then a PhD in something very wordy from the London School of Economics, ghost written by the Monitor Group) as necessary accessories for the circles he moved in. It was good ol’ Sword of Islam Khadaffy’s job to be handsome and charming, dear Reader, and nobody wa so rude as to say he was not.

He stressed that Saif al-Islam died as a martyr.

The Libyan portal Abaad News reported that the son of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, 53-year-old Saif al-Islam, was killed in clashes south of Tripoli. Al Hadath TV, citing sources close to the Gaddafi family, claims that al-Islam was fatally wounded in an attack near his residence in Ez-Zintan. There were four attackers, all of whom fled the scene.

…as if they’d never been, according to professional informant Mahmoud the Weasel…

Libya's Attorney General's Office has formed a special commission to investigate the murder of Saif al-Islam.

Saif al-Islam Gaddafi was born on June 25, 1972, and was the second son of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, who was killed in the fall of 2011.

Killed rather horribly. One has the impression Saif never really recovered from the shock, much like the French aristos during their Revolution.
The Times of Israel adds:

Seif al-Islam Gaddafi, the son and one-time heir apparent of Libya’s late dictator Muammar Gaddafi, was killed in the town of Zintan, 136 kilometers (85 miles) southwest of the capital, Tripoli, according to two Libyan security officials in western Libya. The circumstances of his death were not immediately clear.

The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to brief the media.

Khaled al-Zaidi, a lawyer for Seif al-Islam, confirmed his death on Facebook, without providing details.

Abdullah Othman Abdurrahim, who represented Gaddafi in the UN-brokered political dialogue that aimed to resolve Libya’s long-running conflict, also announced his death on Facebook.

Link

Europe

A key figure in the Sarkozy Libyan money case has died in Lebanon

2025-09-27

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Leonid Tsukanov

[REGNUM] On September 25, 2025, a Paris court found former French President Nicolas Sarkozy guilty of criminal conspiracy in an investigation into his illegal receipt of funds from Libyan Jamahiriya leader Muammar Gaddafi.

According to the case file, the former president received money from Libyans for his political activities over several years. The funds included funding his 2007 campaign, when Sarkozy narrowly defeated Socialist candidate Ségolène Royal in the runoff (53% to 47%), bringing him to power.

However, even after the completion of the proceedings, many pressing issues remain on the agenda.

THE HAND OF GADDAFI
Information about the Libyan leadership's involvement in financing Sarkozy's presidential campaign emerged in March 2011. At that time, the son of the former Libyan leader, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, stated that Paris had "deceived Tripoli."

Allegedly, in exchange for generous funding for Sarkozy's presidential campaign (over €50 million, allocated from the Gaddafi clan's personal funds), the Libyan authorities were supposed to receive support and favor from Paris. In reality, they received an invasion and a stab in the back.

Indeed, during his second presidential term, Sarkozy showed unusual warmth toward Tripoli. For example, shortly after his inauguration, Gaddafi was invited to Paris, marking the first official visit by a Libyan leader to the country since the early 1970s.

The meeting, organized within just a few days, was surprisingly productive for the Libyan side: the Elysée Palace unconditionally approved the sale of two dozen Airbus aircraft to the Jamahiriya, and also gave preliminary approval for the delivery of Rafale fighter jets and military helicopters.

Moreover, Paris and Tripoli signed an agreement to develop cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, which was a major breakthrough for the pariah state that Libya was at that time.

Sarkozy's sudden kindness was not well received by other EU countries. Discussions swirled about the possibility of bribing the new president. However, the French leader managed to extricate himself from the situation by explaining his sudden rapprochement with Tripoli as an attempt to establish a "European foothold of influence" in the Middle East.

And a few years later, when Paris became one of the ideologists of the Western coalition's invasion of Libya, no one really remembered the dubious steps of the mid-2000s.

Nevertheless, in 2012, the scandal returned to the headlines. And this time, it caught the attention of not only journalists but also the prosecutor's office, and a lengthy and meticulous investigation was launched.

In addition to Sarkozy, who lost the election, his close associate Eric Woerth, then Finance Minister, also came under attack. He was accused of organizing shady funding channels for the 2007 presidential campaign, including using Libyan funds.

However, the case against Vert quickly fell apart due to a lack of direct evidence of his knowledge of the origin of the funds, and the financier continues to hold leadership positions in the French parliament. In September 2025, the final charges against him were dropped.

In 2016, Arnaud Claude, Sarkozy's former lawyer, briefly joined the list of defendants. He was implicated in the creation of offshore accounts in Panama and other "inconspicuous states." His involvement in Gaddafi's corruption scheme was never proven.

By the end of the 2010s, former Interior Minister Claude Déhaene, businessman Alexandre Djury, and former Labor Minister Brice Hortefeux found themselves in the dock. All of them, close associates of Sarkozy, were allegedly involved in laundering funds coming from Libya and maintained close ties with the Gaddafi clan.

ZIYAD'S CONTRIBUTION
Two days before Sarkozy's sentencing, another high-ranking figure, the "arms baron" Ziad Takieddine, died in Beirut. It was his allegations about the "suitcases filled with money" that he allegedly personally transported to the Élysée Palace that became the starting point first for journalistic investigations and, a little later, for a prosecutorial inquiry.

The investigation had little doubt that Takieddin was involved in the high-profile case. Especially since the "baron" had a long-standing history of corruption.

For example, in 1994, in exchange for generous kickbacks, he brokered the delivery of French warships to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and in the mid-2000s, he acted as a "bridge" between the Gaddafi clan and the French establishment. He also organized "diplomatic receptions" in third countries, where shady deals were concluded between French and Libyan politicians and businessmen.

Takieddine was among the first to come under scrutiny, back in 2011, when the first reports emerged of Libyan money flowing into Sarkozy's foundation. However, he managed to evade the investigation for 14 years.

During this time, the businessman presented nearly two dozen versions of his story, changing the details of his testimony on average every eight to nine months. After nearly nine years of investigation, in 2020, the prosecution decided to close the case and ordered Takieddin's arrest.

However, the businessman was never apprehended: a few days before his arrest, he suddenly fled to Lebanon, where, thanks to his previous connections, he received Hezbollah protection and became inaccessible to the justice system. And after Takieddine died in a Beirut clinic on September 23, 2025, his name was finally removed from the list of defendants.

BOOMERANG EFFECT
In fact, Sarkozy was the only high-ranking figure from the "pro-Libyan group" to receive a real prison sentence specifically for organizing a foreign influence channel. He was acquitted of the other charges (receiving Libyan state funds, passive corruption, and illegal campaign financing).

Other defendants (Déhaene, Jouri, and Hortefeux) received "package sentences," in which participation in the Libyan scheme was one of the charges, but far from the primary one. Much more emphasis in their cases is placed on corrupt connections, money laundering, and embezzlement. In the "pro-Libyan group," they are cast as "subordinates," acting on the former president's orders rather than on their own initiative.

Sarkozy, however, does not consider himself guilty even of the crimes he was ultimately convicted of. On the contrary, he is convinced that the case is a "political hit" and revenge by the Gaddafi clan for his overthrow in 2011.

It is no coincidence that the first serious leaks appeared in March of that year, when the Jamahiriya was on the brink of collapse due to the “no-fly zone” imposed over Libya at the initiative of Paris.

Subsequently, the “drivers” of the case were exclusively figures associated with the former Gaddafi government: the chief of staff of the government, Bashir Saleh, the former Libyan oil minister, Shukri Ghanem, and others, who were interested parties in the case.

However, it's not just the Gaddafi clan's descendants who are interested in pinning the scandal on France, and Sarkozy in particular, but also their opponents, who are currently vying for influence in Libya. By blaming the former elites for the crisis, both Paris and Tripoli can continue their interactions "with a clean slate."

The validity of this version is indirectly indicated, for example, by the transformation of Takieddin’s position.

While in the initial stages of the investigation, until approximately 2016, the businessman constantly spoke of a “large group of interested parties” among French officials and businessmen, subsequently, responsibility was placed primarily on Sarkozy as the initiator and main beneficiary.

This clear shift in emphasis coincided chronologically with France's attempts to bring post-war Libya back into its orbit. At the instigation of President Emmanuel Macron, private players—businessmen and private military contractors—flooded into the former Jamahiriya, seeking contact with the new elites and rising warlords to counterbalance the growing influence of Turkey and Egypt.

Takieddine also partially returned to the game, according to some reports, having shared with Paris the contacts of his former partners in exchange for the right to “suddenly disappear” before being taken into custody.

However, it is currently impossible to confirm or deny this version, especially after Takieddine's death, which left behind no diaries or traces of contacts with Macron's office.

So, rumors that France sacrificed Sarkozy to realize Macron's ambitions are unlikely to be confirmed in the near future.

Link

Europe

Sarkozy in the dock: former French president faces corruption charges over 'suitcases of cash from Gaddafi', sensational claims set to reignite interest around the world

2025-01-07

[Daily Mail, where America gets its news] When France's president Nicolas Sarkozy and his supermodel wife of two months, Carla Bruni, arrived in Britain for a state visit in March 2008 they were feted as Gallic royalty.

The newlyweds stayed at Windsor Castle and had a private lunch with the Queen and Prince Philip before Sarkozy travelled to Westminster to address both houses of Parliament.

That evening, at a grand banquet in St George's Hall, he raised a toast to 'the brotherhood of the French and British people', while Her Majesty did her own bit for the entente cordiale by bestowing him with an honorary knighthood.

Such a splendid occasion will today seem a very distant memory to the man universally known as 'Sarko'.

This afternoon, the 69-year-old will take his place in the dock at Paris's principal criminal court sporting an electronic tag on his right leg.

Sarkozy, who was convicted in December of trying to bribe a judge, now confronts his most serious charges to date: corruption, illegal campaign financing, benefiting from embezzled public funds and being party to a criminal conspiracy.

In a trial listed to last no less than three months, prosecutors will claim that he accepted money-laundered funds from Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the late dictator of oil-rich Libya, totalling tens of millions of pounds.

The cash reportedly helped finance the 2007 election campaign which swept Sarkozy to power, meaning that his victory will be for ever tainted by the allegation that it was based on dirty money from North Africa.

If found guilty, the man who was nicknamed 'President Bling-Bling', thanks to his penchant for the high life, faces up to a decade in prison.

And his wife could suffer a similar fate. Carla, 57, is accused of being part of a £4 million campaign dubbed 'Operation Save Sarko', a complex and illegal plan to try to keep her husband out of jail.

She has been charged with a range of corruption offences, including 'witness tampering in an organised gang', and her trial is expected to get under way later this year.

This is all a far cry from the days when Sarko was billed as the poster boy of French conservatism and I used to interview him regularly as a journalist and author based in Paris.

He projected himself to me as a Margaret Thatcher-style reformer who would liberalise the French economy, just as the Iron Lady did in Britain in the 1980s.

The pace at which he worked to bring about change earned him the nickname 'Speedy Sarko' – and he didn't hang about when it came to his personal life either.

He became the first French president to divorce his wife while in office. A break-up with Cécilia was always on the cards, given that they were both known for their illicit affairs.

Indeed, Nicolas and Cécilia were both married to other people when they first got together. He was with his first wife, Marie-Dominique, and Cécilia's husband was a French TV chat-show host called Jacques Martin, a kind of French Bruce Forsyth 24 years her senior.

Sarkozy got to know them on their wedding day because, as the mayor of the chichi Paris suburb of Neuilly-sur-Seine, he conducted the ceremony. Though 29 and married, Sarko later admitted that after laying eyes on the beautiful bride for the first time, he asked himself: 'Why am I marrying this woman to someone else? She is for me.'

The two couples often went on skiing holidays together, and Sarko was rumbled when Marie-Dominique spotted footprints in the snow under Cécilia's window.

Cécilia was briefly France's First Lady when Sarkozy entered the Élysée Palace in 2007, but her days were numbered from the outset as she was known to be seeing a French-Moroccan businessman, while her husband's conquests at the time included a political journalist on the centre-Right daily Le Figaro.

As a result, Sarkozy's five-year term took on the status of a wild soap opera, which reached its climax when he wooed Bruni, an Italian heiress and self-styled 'tamer of men', whose past lovers included multimillionaire celebrities such as Mick Jagger and – it was rumoured – Donald Trump.

Sarko himself revelled in the high life and thought nothing of borrowing super-yachts and private jets from billionaire industrialists, while treating them to lavish meals at Michelin- starred restaurants.

After becoming Sarko's third wife, Carla soon turned into his Marie Antoinette, with presidential accounts revealing that she spent £660 a day on fresh flowers for the Élysée Palace.

With so much energy being expended on luxury living, many suggested that sucking up to the super-wealthy had become Sarkozy's priority – an accusation that was given added credence when the hugely controversial Gaddafi rolled into Paris in December 2007.

Sarko had invited the so-called 'Brother Leader' for a red-carpet state visit and the Libyan despot was even given permission to pitch his tribal tent in ornate presidential gardens by the Champs-Élysées.

This sort of bromance was all the more inappropriate given that Gaddafi was linked to a range of atrocities, including the Lockerbie bombing, which saw 270 people die when a PanAm flight en route to New York went down over Scotland in 1988, and the shooting of Metropolitan police officer Yvonne Fletcher by a gunman inside Libya's London Embassy four years earlier.

Even Sarko's own Human Rights State Secretary, Rama Yade, said France 'was not a doormat' for Gaddafi to 'wipe off the blood of his crimes'. But Sarkozy just shrugged his shoulders, knowing that his presidential immunity would protect him from investigation.

This all changed in May 2012, when he lost his first attempt at re-election to François Hollande. Within a day, Sarkozy's Paris townhouse was raided by the fraud squad – and he and his wife's troubles began in earnest.

For Gaddafi was not the former president's only problem. Sarkozy first came under suspicion of engaging in corrupt dealings when he was accused of accepting envelopes full of cash from the late L'Oréal heiress, Liliane Bettencourt.

While these claims did not stick – his lieutenants took the rap – Sarkozy was sentenced to three years for trying to get classified information about the case against him from a judge.

Telephone taps proved the prosecution case against Sarkozy, who was told he could serve a year with an electronic tag, while the other two were suspended.

He is currently appealing another prison sentence – this time of one year – for using false accounting to disguise illegal overspending in his failed re-election campaign of 2012.

Other ongoing cases include claims that he was involved in Qatargate – the successful but allegedly corrupt plan to stage the 2022 World Cup in Qatar.

But it is the Libya affair which will now reignite interest in Sarkozy around the world. It is primarily based on allegations by a Franco-Lebanese businessman called Ziad Takieddine, who once told French media that in 2006-07 he had personally handed over suitcases stuffed with banknotes to Sarkozy and his chief of staff, Claude Guéant (something the latter later denied).

Takieddine said the equivalent of at least £42 million was illegally poured into Sarkozy's 2007 presidential campaign.

A document signed by Libya's former chief of intelligence, Moussa Koussa, apparently proves the payment. Unfortunately for Sarkozy, like many witnesses from the time, Koussa is alive and well.

So, too, is Gaddafi's son Saif al-Islam, who told me he was one of 'numerous Libyans prepared to offer conclusive proof' of massive amounts of cash being given to middle men working for Sarkozy.

There is no love lost between the two men as it was Sarkozy who ordered the French Air Force, supported by Nato allies, to start bombing targets in Libya in March 2011 as a means of protecting civilian lives during the Arab Spring revolt. But regime change was clearly the desired result.

By the time Sarkozy and Britain's then PM, David Cameron, paid a triumphant joint visit to Tripoli in September of that year, the fleeing Gaddafi was close to being beaten to death by a mob.

A key question to be considered by judges is whether Sarko wanted Gaddafi dead because of his potential to produce incriminating evidence. There are claims, admittedly hotly contested, that Gaddafi was killed by agents working directly for the Sarkozy administration.

Sarkozy and Bruni deny all the charges and are determined to prove their innocence. Yet moves are already underway to strip him of his Legion d'Honneur and Order of Merit – France's highest civilian decorations.

As the first French president to be convicted for crimes carried out while in office, he 'has next to no chance of hanging on to them', a senior judicial source in Paris told me.

Link

Africa North

Was a Wagner Base Targeted By a Drone in East Libya?

2023-07-01

[LIBYAREVIEW] Unknown drones targeted a position belonging to the Wagner Group in eastern Libya on Thursday, without causing any human casualties.

The drones attacked the al-Kharouba airbase, which is located 150 kilometers Southeast of Benghazi.

A military source from the Libyan National Army denied the reports, stating that the alleged strikes were an attempt to undermine morale and prepare for targeting oil fields.

The Wagner Group is known to provide security for Saif al-Islam Qadaffy, the son of former Libyan President Muammar Qadaffy
...who single-handedly turned a moderately prosperous kingdom into a dictator's fantasyland and was then murdered by his indignant subjects 42 years later...
, who is running for presidential elections.

The Wagner Group has been present in Libya since April 2019, fighting alongside the Libyan National Army against the Government of National Accord (GNA).

The group has also been present in Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Sudan, supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in their operations against the Sudanese army.

Last week, the Wagner Group launched a rebellion in Russia and took control of the Ministry of Defence headquarters in the city of Rostov. The group has since begun to withdraw from the positions they had taken in Russia, following an agreement with the Kremlin that halted their advance towards Moscow and led to the departure of their leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, to Belarus.

Despite this, Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov stated on Monday that the Wagner Group would continue its operations in Mali and the CAR, and is currently supporting the RSF in Sudan in their operations against the Sudanese army.

The Wagner Group’s presence is concentrated in areas where there are gold and oil reserves, where they provide protection and management for gold mines in Sudan under an agreement with the government of Omar al-Bashir

...Former President-for-Life of Sudan He came to power in 1989 when he, as a brigadier in the Sudanese army, led a group of officers in a bloodless military coup that ousted the government of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and eventually appointed himself head cheese. He fell out with his Islamic mentor, Hasan al-Turabi, tried to impose shariah on the Christian and animist south, resulting in its secessesion, and attempted to Arabize Darfur by unleashing the barbaric Janjaweed on it. Sudan's potential prosperity has been pissed away in warfare that has left as many as 400,000 people dead and 2.5 million displaced. Hee was overthrown by popular consent in 2019. Omar has been indicted for genocide by the International Criminal Court but nothing is expected to come of it...
in 2017.

Link

Terror Networks

Iran-based trainer of 9/11 hijackers Sayf al-‘Adl believed to be new al-Qaeda chief

2023-02-15

[IsraelTmes] Though successor to Ayman al-Zawahri not officially announced by terror group, most UN member states say commander is its ’uncontested leader’

UN experts say the predominant view among member nations is that the leadership of al-Qaeda has passed to Sayf al-’Adl, who was responsible for the late Osama bin Laden
...... who used to be alive but now he's not......
’s security and trained some of the hijackers involved in the 9/11 attack on the US.

The panel of experts said in a report to the UN Security Council circulated Monday that no announcement has been made of Sayf al-’Adl replacing Ayman al-Zawahri, who was killed by a US dronezap in Kabul last August.

"But in discussions in November and December many UN member states took the view that Sayf al-’Adl is already operating as the de facto and uncontested leader of the group," the report said.

Assessments vary as to why al-’Adl’s leadership hasn’t been declared, it said.

Some countries feel that al-Zawahri’s presence in Kabul embarrassed the country’s Taliban
...the Pashtun equivalent of men...
rulers who are seeking legitimacy "and that al-Qaeda chose not to exacerbate this by acknowledging the death," the experts said.

"However,
alcohol has never solved anybody's problems. But then, neither has milk...
most judged a key factor to be the continued presence of Sayf al-’Adl in the Islamic Theocratic Republic of Iran
Iran

...They hate ~~Jews~~ ~~Zionists~~ Jews. Their economy is based on the production of oil and vitriol...
(which) raised difficult theological and operational questions for al-Qaeda," they said.

While noting that one country rejected claims that any al-Qaeda affiliate is in Iran, the panel said that the location of Sayf al-’Adl’a "raises questions that have a bearing on al-Qaeda’s ambitions to assert leadership of a global movement in the face of challenges" from the Islamic State
...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allah around with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not really Moslems....
murderous Moslem group.

Sayf al-’Adl has been listed on the UN sanctions blacklist as Egyptian-born Mohammed Salahaldin Abd El Halim Zidan since January 2001, the panel said. He is described in the UN listing as taking over as military commander of al-Qaeda following the death of Mohammed Atef — one of bin Laden’s top aides — in a US attack in November 2001.

In addition to being bin Laden’s security chief, the UN says, Sayf al-’Adl taught bully boyz to use explosives and trained some of the hijackers involved in the attack in the United States on Sept. 11, 2001. It says he also trained Somali fighters who killed 18 US servicemen in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993.

Sayf al-’Adl is wanted by US authorities in connection with the August 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya.

According to the report, the threat from al-Qaeda, the Islamic State murderous Moslem group, and their affiliates "remains high in conflict zones and neighboring countries," with Africa emerging in recent years "as the continent where the harm done by terrorism is developing most rapidly and extensively."

The panel said the Islamic State’s leadership has also become a question following the group’s Nov. 30 announcement that Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi had died in a battle the previous month, the group’s second leader to be killed in 2022.

"The new leader was announced as Abu al-Husain al-Husaini al-Qurashi, and his true identity is not yet known," the experts said.

Member states noted numerous pledges of allegiance to Abu al-Husain by Islamic State "affiliates far and wide without specific knowledge of his identity or qualities as a leader," they said.

Wikipedia:

According to the Egyptian authorities, the FBI information on Saif al-Adel confuses the biographies of two members of Al-Qaeda. The first, 'Mohammed Salah al-Din Zaidan', known as Saif al-Adel, an economy graduate, joined Al-Qaeda in 1991, but was never a member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The other individual, 'Mohammed Ibrahim Makkawi', is a former Egyptian Special Forces Colonel and a former member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who traveled to Afghanistan in 1987 after his release from prison, and later joined Al-Qaeda.

According to the indictment, Adel is a member of the majlis al shura of al-Qaeda and a member of its military committee. He has provided military and intelligence training to members of al-Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sudan, and to anti-UN Somali tribes.[5] It is possible that his trainees included the Somalis of the first Battle of Mogadishu in 1993.[6] He established the al-Qaeda training facility at Ras Kamboni in Somalia near the Kenyan border.[7]

Adel was accused of being involved with Egyptian Islamic Jihad and attempting to overthrow the Egyptian government in 1987. After the charges were dismissed, he left the country in 1988 to join the mujahideen in repelling the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[8] He is believed to have traveled to southern Lebanon along with Abu Talha al-Sudani, Saif al-Islam al-Masri, Abu Ja`far al-Masri, and Abu Salim al-Masri, where he trained alongside Hezbollah Al-Hejaz.[9]

In Khartoum, Sudan, Adel taught recruited militants how to handle explosives.[4] Along with Saeed al-Masri and Mahfouz Ould al-Walid, he is believed to have opposed the September 11 attacks two months prior to their execution.[10]

Many analysts believe that Saif al-Adel will be named as the successor of Ayman al-Zawahiri since he was a loyal aide of Osama bin Laden.[11] However, this is seen as a complicated issue due to his residency in Iran.[12]

Link

Africa North

Canadian Newspaper: Libyan PM Does Not Have University Degree From Canada

2021-12-23

Whoops!

[LIBYAREVIEW] The Presidential elections due to take place in Libya on 24 December are making waves in Canada. One of the three main candidates, and current Prime Minister Abdel-Hamid Dbaiba is accused of fabricating his master’s degree in civil engineering, which he claims to have obtained in 1992 at the University of Toronto. Three years earlier, he stated the same institution also awarded him an undergraduate degree in engineering.A few days ago, a Libyan activist, Husam El-Gomati, stated on social media that the diplomas were forged. The University of Toronto took several days last week to search its archives for Dbaiba’s degrees.

As Arabic names are often spelled in multiple way, the university attempted to locate records of the PM under at least six transliterations, to no avail. "We searched our records and found no entry matching the information you submitted to us," the university said in an email sent last Friday.

While the issue has caused a stir in Libya, it is unlikely to change the course of this controversial election campaign.

After years of civil war, Libya has experienced relative calm since the October 2020 ceasefire agreement. This fragile peace risks being shattered by political camps that do not recognise their mutual legitimacy.

"There is a risk that a faction will claim to have won while the others will dispute the legitimacy of its victory, which could lead to a kaboom of violence", predicts Claudia Gazzini, specialist on Libya within the International Crisis Group, an organization specialising in the study and prevention of conflicts. "To avoid this scenario, it would be good to postpone the election," she said.

With four days to go to the vote, no signs of election campaigns are visible on the ground, and several observers believe the vote will simply not take place.

"There is no one who wants this election, it will not take place," says Iman Bughaigis, an orthodontist who was involved in the 2011 revolt against Muammar Qadaffy
...a proud Arab institution for 42 years, now among the dear departed, though not the dearest...
in Benghazi.

Dbaiba’s candidacy is contested because he currently serves as Prime Minister, which gives him an unfair advantage, according to his opponents. "He campaigns with money from the national bank, he distributes money to get elected," laments Bughaigis.

A factor further complicating this election is that the allegiances of the three main candidates are determined by the regions where they find their support. Khalifa Haftar

Link

Africa North

Libyan Court Rejects Petition to Bar Haftar's Presidential Bid

2021-11-30

[LIBYAREVIEW] On Sunday, the First Instance Appeals Committee of the Benghazi Court of Appeals rejected the appeal submitted by Presidential candidate, Abdel-Majid Saif al-Nasr against Khalifa Haftar

...Self-proclaimed Field Marshal, served in the Libyan army under Muammar Qadaffy, and took part in the coup that brought Qadaffy to power in 1969. He became a prisoner of war in Chad in 1987. While held prisoner, he and his fellow officers formed a group hoping to overthrow Qadaffy, so it's kind of hard to describe him as a Qadaffy holdover. He was released around 1990 in a deal with the United States government and spent nearly two decades in the United States, gaining US citizenship. In 1993, while living in the United States, he was convicted in absentia of crimes against the Jamahiriya and sentenced to death. Haftar held a senior position in the anti-Qadaffy forces in the 2011 Libyan Civil War. In 2014 he was commander of the Libyan Army when the General National Congress (GNC) refused to give up power in accordance with its term of office. Haftar launched a campaign against the GNC and its Islamic fundamentalist allies. His campaign allowed elections to take place to replace the GNC, but then developed into a civil war. Guess you can't win them all. Actually, he is, but slowly...
.Disputes over the election rules, including the validity of a law issued by the Libyan Parliament in September, and over the eligibility of some candidates, threaten to derail the vote.

Last week, the outgoing Head of the United Nations
...a lucrative dumping ground for the relatives of dictators and party hacks...
Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Jan Kubis warned that not holding the elections as planned could "greatly deteriorate" the situation and lead to further division and conflict.

A UN political forum demanded Parliamentary and Presidential elections be held on 24 December, as part of a roadmap to end Libya’s civil war. A first-round Presidential vote is set for the date, however, the Parliamentary elections have been delayed until January or February.

"The Judiciary has the final word regarding the objections raised about the process, as well as on some Presidential candidates. Their verdict must be respected," Kubis said.

On Tuesday, the High National Electoral Commission (HNEC) said that 98 candidates, including two women, had registered to run in the Presidential elections. It also subsequently announced that 25 of these candidates have been disqualified. This includes Saif al-Islam Qadaffy, the son of former leader, Muammer Qadaffy. He has since launched an appeal against the ruling.

The disqualification was decided based on recommendations of the Attorney General, the Criminal Investigation Department, and the Citizenship and Passport Department, the commission said.

Notably, the Tripoli
...a confusing city, one end of which is located in Lebanon and the other end of which is the capital of Libya. Its chief distinction is being mentioned in the Marine Hymn...
Court of Appeals accepted petitions filed by a number of candidates against Prime Minister, Abdel-Hamid Dbaiba’s bid to run in the December elections. According to media reports, the court is set to examine their request during the coming days, before issuing a ruling.

The polls come as part of a push to end a decade of violence in oil-rich Libya, following a NATO
...the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It's headquartered in Belgium. That sez it all....
-backed uprising that toppled and killed Muammer Qadaffy in 2011.

Link

Africa North

Libya: More Attacks Expected Before Elections

2021-11-27

[LIBYAREVIEW] Libyan Interior Minister, Khaled Mazen said that all matters related to securing the elections are going according to plan. He noted that some attacks may occur on electoral headquarters, in conjunction with the progress being made in the elections.In a presser, Mazen added that what happened at the Sebha courthouse was a "crime punishable by law." He vowed to hold all those involved in the attack accountable. The Justice Ministry said in a statement that an gang had forced everyone to leave the court building.

"Violations exist in all countries, including the United States. I urge everyone not to tamper with the polling stations," he stressed

On Thursday, the Council of Ministers of the Government of National Unity (GNU) called on the Ministries of Justice and Interior to immediately investigate the circumstances of the attack, and prepare a detailed report on the incident.

Notably, the lawyer for Saif al-Islam Qadaffy, who is the son of Libya’s late leader, Muammer Qadaffy said that gunnies had prevented him from lodging an appeal against his client’s disqualification from next month’s Presidential elections.

Disputes over issues including the eligibility of candidates are threatening to derail the elections, which are set for 24 December, and with it a UN-backed grinding of the peace processor aimed at ending a decade of chaos since Muammar Qadaffy

...The late megalomaniac dictator of Libya, admired everywhere for his garish costumes, funny hats, harem of cutie bodyguards, and incoherent ravings. As far as is known, he is the only person who's ever declared jihad on Switzerland...
was toppled.

Interference by fighters from any side will further undermine confidence in the elections, which many Libyans are hoping with end a decade of conflicts. It has also triggered fears of a new war, if either side rejects the results of the vote.

Late on Wednesday, the High National Elections Commission (HNEC) disqualified Saif al-Islam and 24 other candidates, subject to appeals.

"Libya’s judiciary will have the final say on the list of candidates," the Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Jan Kubis said on Wednesday.

The Supreme Judicial Council also reversed a ruling it had made only days ago, in that appeals over the eligibility of candidates could only be lodged in the district where the candidate has registered.

Link

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