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Israel-Palestine-Jordan
War in Israel's Interests: Why the US Strikes Iran
2026-03-02
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kirill Semenov

[REGNUM] The current US and Israeli aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) is the culmination of the US-Iran conflict, which, oddly enough, began even before the Islamic Revolution and is associated with the growth of regional influence of Iran, which is independent in its foreign policy.

Contradictions accumulated despite periods of thaw and even, it would seem, “following progress” and common interests in certain periods.

But in any case, the war was bound to happen while Iran was pursuing the policy it is pursuing, if not strengthening, then defending its position in the region and rejecting American dictates and pressure.

THE PAHLAVI ERA AND THE BEGINNING OF RIVALRY
Contrary to popular belief, the proclamation of the Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, was not a challenge or a surprise to Washington.

Moreover, the United States itself, in a sense, even contributed to the removal of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi from power instead of trying to support the Shah’s regime, which is listed as one of its strategic allies.

Around the mid-1970s, the Shah of Iran ceased to be a satisfactory ally for the United States due to his excessive ambitions and claims to regional leadership. It's unclear how events would have unfolded had the revolution not occurred, but in one possible future, the Shah's Iran would also have become a dangerous competitor and rival for the United States in the region.

Pahlavi sought to replace the United States and Britain as the security guarantor for the Gulf states and the Arab world, leading Tehran to make efforts to strengthen its position.

For example, in 1972, Iranian troops were sent to Oman, where they played a key role in suppressing a communist rebellion in Dhofar. In many other areas, the Shah also continued to enjoy increasing autonomy and independence from the United States.

In particular, it was during his time that the Iranian nuclear program was launched (and its military component, according to some sources, in conjunction with South Africa), which continued in the IRI when the Islamic Republic acquired the necessary resources for this.

The Shah did this without Washington's knowledge and went even further, declaring his readiness to "stand united against the American conspiracy" aimed at disrupting the unity of OPEC and its "blood ties with the Third World countries."

American media immediately accused Pahlavi of "premeditated and hasty" actions. Several high-ranking US administration officials openly expressed their dissatisfaction with him. A powerful anti-Shah campaign began, involving the intelligence services of several Arab and European countries, as well as Israel.

During the revolution, Jimmy Carter's administration attempted to work with both sides—Pahlavi and his opponents—in an effort to maintain its influence in the country regardless of who won. But some steps by the American authorities could be interpreted as outright sabotage.

In particular, in early January 1979, on Carter's orders, American General Robert Huyser arrived in Iran without the Shah's consent . He was to hold talks with the hawkish Iranian generals who intended to suppress the anti-monarchist protests and dissuade them from this plan through "persuasion and threats."

The general successfully completed his task, and the introduction of armed forces into Iranian cities to suppress unrest was stopped.

The Americans also directly intervened to prevent the generals from attempting to establish military rule in the country after the Shah left the country for Egypt.

Ultimately, the White House's hopes for establishing a weak government of "any color" in Iran were not realized, and the Islamic regime that came to power in Iran began to pursue a much more anti-American policy than Washington had expected.

But this does not change the fact that the US and the Islamic Republic had many common interests that compelled both sides to prevent excessive escalation until a certain point.

Of course, the seizure of American hostages in Tehran was a "cold shower" for the Americans, and their unsuccessful release was not only a stain of shame, but also a triumph for the new Iranian authorities, who demonstrated to the entire world their banner of struggle against American imperialism, under which numerous supporters throughout the Islamic world began to rise.

In turn, attacks by Shiite groups created by the Islamic Republic in Lebanon on American Marines, with numerous casualties, further strengthened Iran's position as the leader of the anti-American and anti-Zionist resistance.

At the same time, these actions not only did not lead to the start of an American-Iranian war, but did not even interrupt limited cooperation where the interests of Tehran and Washington converged.

FROM CONFRONTATION TO MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING
The Iran-Iraq War, which began in 1980, also benefited the United States. On the one hand, it weakened Iraq, which became bogged down in a protracted and futile war. During this period, Baghdad's military might began to pose a threat not only to Israel but also to the Gulf monarchies, but was now being ground down in battles with Iran.

On the other hand, the restoration of Iran's regional position after the revolution and the Iranian leadership's announced plans for its "export" also did not fit into the framework of American expectations regarding the course of the "ayatollah regime," as the Iranian government was called in the West.

Therefore, as the famous American journalist Bob Woodward wrote in his book “The CIA’s Secret Wars, 1981–1987,” the United States provided aid and information to both sides of the conflict, hoping to lead them into a dead end.

In particular, in 1981, the United States resumed limited arms supplies to Iran, and in 1985 launched the Iran-Contra program, under which Tehran received TOW anti-tank missile systems, spare parts for the missiles and the Hawk anti-aircraft missiles themselves, as well as other weapons and equipment.

Moreover, during the Soviet military campaign in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the United States and Iran found themselves on the same side, supporting Afghan rebels.

Thus, while the US supplied weapons to the Sunni "Peshawar Seven" through Pakistan, Iran provided military assistance not only to the so-called "Shiite Eight," but also to the Sunni field commander Ismail Khan , the "Lion of Herat," commander of the "Western United Group" of Afghan mujahideen.

Against this backdrop, Tehran's position during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 is particularly revealing. When the American coalition began expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Iran, contrary to the expectations of many, maintained neutrality, which was de facto favorable to Washington.

Despite all the rhetoric of hatred towards the "great Satan," Tehran not only failed to take any action in support of its recent enemy Saddam Hussein , but also used the situation to strengthen its own position.

The decline of Baghdad's influence opened a window of opportunity for Iran: in the following years, the country was able to significantly increase its arms purchases from Russia, North Korea, and even Poland (300 T-72s).

These deliveries occurred, if not with the tacit consent of the United States, then at least in the absence of any strong opposition. Washington, preoccupied with consolidating its presence in the region, chose to ignore Iran's rise, believing that a weakened Iraq no longer posed a threat and that a new regional balance could be adjusted later.

Iraq also became the culmination of situational and pragmatic cooperation between Iran and the United States.

After the overthrow of the Baathist regime in 2003, Washington, unable to cope with the Sunni guerrillas, placed its bets on the Shiite majority, allowing Nouri al-Maliki , a politician who returned from Iran and the leader of the Islamist Shiite Dawa Party, deeply integrated into pro-Iranian networks, to power.

Meanwhile, numerous pro-Iranian groups previously waged war against the American occupation forces. And many of them—Kataib Hezbollah, Hezbollah al-Nujaba, the Badr Organization, and others—have ended up on the American terrorist list.

American strategists believed they could control al-Maliki, who, in turn, controlled Iraqi Shiite forces, which would be used against Sunni insurgents. The American plan succeeded, but Tehran was also able to significantly strengthen its position in Iraq.

Under the cover of official Baghdad and without any US opposition, Iran was able to support numerous Shiite militias on Iraqi soil, which were formally subordinate to the government, but in fact to officers of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

However, the real paradox emerged in 2014, when ISIS (an organization designated as a terrorist organization in Russia) captured a third of Iraqi territory. American air power and Iranian proxy forces found themselves on the same side of the front line.

The situation looked like this: for example, the pro-Iranian Iraqi group Kataib Hezbollah, led by colonels and officers of the Iranian IRGC, which the State Department has listed as a terrorist organization, was receiving American Abrams tanks and M113 armored personnel carriers from the Iraqi army.

Under the cover of US Air Force A-10 attack aircraft, these Shiite militias, led by Iranian instructors, advanced on Mosul, driving out the "caliphate" militants. Washington and Tehran were de facto allies at the time, although each pursued its own goals: the US wanted to preserve its remaining influence in Iraq, while Iran wanted to turn the country into a permanent stronghold.

STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF THE CONFRONTATION
The common ground they found, despite their pragmatic nature, failed to reverse the underlying trend: strategically, the United States and Iran remained implacable enemies. And the main issue was not oil trade or other market interests, but their attitude toward the existence of the State of Israel.

For Iran, the destruction of Israel was never just a rhetorical slogan. It was also part of the religion, since, according to Shiite theology, the hidden Imam Mahdi will return to the world only after the Muslims' victory over the Yahuds (Jews).

Therefore, the fight against Israel remains a clearly stated goal of the Islamic Republic, the instrument for achieving which has become proxy forces along the entire perimeter of the Jewish state.

Back in the early 1980s, IRGC officers created Hezbollah in Lebanon—not just a party or a subversive cell, but a fully-fledged army, integrated into Lebanese society. It was Hezbollah that dealt the first crushing blow to the American presence in the region: the 1983 bombings of the US embassy in Beirut and the Marine barracks, which claimed the lives of hundreds of Americans, were the work of Iran's partners.

Washington then chose to retreat, but learned its lesson: behind every attack against American interests in the Middle East there is an Iranian trace.

The evolution of Hamas is no less revealing. Having emerged as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (an organization designated as terrorist in Russia), it long engaged in preaching and charity work, while its military wing was armed with little more than stones and slingshots.

The situation changed radically when Iran took over. Tehran didn't just provide funding; it transformed the previously disparate Hamas factions into a 25,000-strong army with its own missile arsenal, engineering units, and combat tactics copied from Hezbollah.

Iranian instructors trained Palestinians to build tunnels, manufacture missiles, and operate drones. It was this work that transformed the Gaza Strip into an impenetrable fortress and Hamas into a force capable of challenging the Israel Defense Forces.

OCTOBER 7 FACTOR
October 7, 2023, marked the point of no return. Israeli leaders realized not only their country's vulnerability but also that time was working against them. If today Iran was capable of arming Hamas to the point of breaching Israel's "iron wall," then tomorrow Tehran would strike a blow from which Israel would be unable to recover. The question of survival outweighed any considerations of tactical expediency.

But even earlier, Israel began to realize its vulnerability when it became surrounded by networks of Iranian proxies, while Tehran's ballistic missiles were aimed at Tel Aviv.

Donald Trump's first tenure in the White House allowed Israel to begin acting in concert with the United States.

For Trump himself, this duality—situational cooperation in Iraq and irreconcilable hostility over Israel—predetermined the climax of the escalation he then embarked on. And precisely in Iraq.

The assassination of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Quds Force, in January 2020 was not just another act of retaliation for undermining American interests, but a logical consequence of the very "Israeli factor," which by that point had already outweighed any talk of pragmatism.

By then, the Middle East Strategic Alliance—the US-Israeli coordination effort to contain Iran—had concluded that targeted strikes on Iraqi bases entrenched by pro-Iranian militias were no longer working.

By 2020, Soleimani had transformed himself from a commander instrumental in the fight against ISIS into a symbol and chief architect of the “Arab arc of resistance” that was supposed to close around Israel.

It was he who built the corridor from Tehran through Baghdad and Damascus to Beirut and the Gaza Strip. It was his logistics that allowed Hezbollah to accumulate a missile arsenal capable of overloading Israel's air defenses and opening the skies to Iranian ballistic missiles.

Trump, despite his professed anti-war stance and desire to withdraw troops from "endless Middle East adventures," found himself hostage to this logic. The Israeli lobby and the neoconservative wing of his own administration (like Mike Pompeo and John Bolton ) convinced the president that Soleimani was preparing an "imminent attack" on American targets, but more importantly, he was coordinating a massive strike against Israel through his Shiite proxies.

For Trump, who built his policy on rejecting Barack Obama's legacy and taking a hard line on Tehran (withdrawing from the JCPOA), this marked the point where the transactional approach gave way to a forceful gesture.

The assassination was intended not only to decapitate the IRGC, but also to demonstrate to Tehran that no amount of counterterrorism assistance or ad hoc alliances would protect Iran's commanders if they continued to build siege lines around Israel.

However, the paradox of Trump's strike was that, having cut one knot, he tightened another. Iran, having swallowed its grievance and limited itself to a symbolic response to the Ain al-Asad air base, drew its own conclusions: there were no longer any illusions about the possibility of reaching an agreement with Washington as long as Israel dictated the American agenda.

Soleimani became a martyr, and his cause—the accelerated development of deterrent weapons, including nuclear capability—was given carte blanche by the Iranian establishment. Trump, who sought peace through force, in fact hastened the very explosion he was trying to prevent.

Under different circumstances, the differences between the US and Iran could certainly have been resolved. The Trump administration, despite all the rhetoric, was rather anti-war in line with the MAGA (Make America Great Again) concept and was seeking the deal that Oman had so diligently pursued in the indirect talks in Geneva.

The economic benefits of stabilizing the Iranian market and returning to the nuclear deal were obvious. However, Israel, recognizing the existential threat, managed to reverse this trend during Trump's second term, capitalizing on the events of October 7 and the war in Gaza.

The current war the US is waging in the region is a war waged in Israel's interests. The blow to China's interests will be only a secondary, albeit welcome, benefit for some in Washington.

After all, Iran isn't just another player in the Middle East. It's a key supplier of cheap oil to China and a critical link in the grand Belt and Road infrastructure strategy.

A weakened Tehran will inevitably complicate Beijing's access to energy resources and call into question the security of land routes through Central Asia that bypass US-controlled sea lanes.

Thus, by fanning the flames around Iran, America is solving two problems: ensuring the security of its main ally, Israel, and harming its main geopolitical competitor, China.

But the geoeconomic context, significant as it may be, remains secondary. The primary motive is the blood and iron on the streets of Israeli cities on October 7.

Link


Iraq
Iraq arrests 5 Baath officials for cleric’s murder, oppressing Kurds
2025-02-01
[Rudaw] The Iraqi National Security Service (INSS) on Friday announced the arrests of five people accused of involvement in the liquidation of Shiite holy man Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and oppressing Kurds during the reign of the Baath regime decades ago.

"Through a series of precise intelligence operations, the National Security Agency managed to arrest five of the most notorious criminals from the followers of the former regime who had recorded pages of terror and mass killing," INSS spokesperson Arshad al-Hakim said during a presser.

He said the arrests of the "criminal gang" were "carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Dissolved Ba'ath Party Prohibition Law and with high-level coordination with all relevant authorities and the judicial institution."

One of the suspects, Sadoun Sabri Jamil, was a senior commander under the Baath regime. The accusations against him include the killing of Sadr and his sister "with his personal weapon" and mass executions of members of opposition parties.

Haitham Abdul Aziz Faiq, another of the men arrested, was also a top commander. He is accused of supervising the killings of Sadr and his sister as well as members of the Dawa Party.

Sadr is the father-in-law of the influential Shiite holy man Moqtada Tater al-Sadr
...hereditary Iraqi holy man and leader of a political movement in Iraq. He had his hereditary rival al-Khoei assassinated shortly after the holy rival's appearance out of exile in 2003. Formerly an Iranian catspaw, lately he gagged over some of their more outlandish antics, then went back to catspawry when the check cleared...
. He was a popular holy man and critic of the Baathist regime. He was executed in 1980.

The third suspect is Khairallah Hammadi Abd, a former major general. He was allegedly involved in the suppression of Fayli Kurds in Baghdad in 1974 and forcibly displacing regime opponents.

Shaker Yahya is accused of taking part in the executions of Kurdish detainees in Baghdad in 1984 and of preventing people from holding ceremonies to mourn Sadr.

The final suspect was identified as Nimat Mohammed Suhail. His crimes included "leading arrest and torture campaigns targeting more than 40 university students in Sulaimani and other universities, involvement in the arrest of three opponents in Sulaimani," according to the INSS spokesperson.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudan
...a Moslem country located in the Horn of Africa. It is noted for its affinity for rule by ex- or current generals, its holy men, and for the oppression of the native Afro population by its Arab conquerors. South Sudan, populated mostly by the natives, split off from Sudan proper, which left North and South Darfur to be oppressed by the guys with turbans...
i commended the security forces on the operation.

"The National Security Service members, along with the other state security teams, continue to demonstrate their unwavering dedication to upholding the rule of law and ensuring that justice prevails, leaving no room for impunity," he said in a statement.

"With the recent achievement of justice through the apprehension of key figures from the criminal repressive apparatus of the Saddam-era Ba’athist regime - those responsible for the killing of the martyr Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, may he rest in peace, his sister, and a group of deaders from Sayyed
...Arabic term meaning your/his lordship. Groveling in His Exalted Presence is encouraged...
al-Hakim family, along with thousands of innocent Iraqis whose lives were lost in the darkness of prisons - we reaffirm our steadfast commitment to the relentless pursuit of criminals, no matter how long they evade justice," he added.
Link


Iraq
President Barzani congratulates al-Maliki for being elected as Secretary-General of the Islamic Dawa Party
2022-01-17
[SHAFAQ] The President of the Kurdistan region, Nechirvan Barzani, and Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, congratulated Nouri al-Maliki for being elected as Secretary-General of the Islamic Dawa Party.

"On this occasion, we stress the need for cooperation and common understanding between all parties and communities of Iraq, to overcome the problems and address the difficulties", President Barzani said.

For his part, PM Barzani said, "On the occasion of the success of the eighteenth conference of the Islamic Dawa Party, and choosing you as a Secretary-General of the party, I offer my sincere congratulations, wishing you and the brothers in the Dawa Party progress and success."
Link


Iraq
Islamic Dawa Party renews confidence in Al-Maliki
2022-01-16
[SHAFAQ] The Islamic Dawa Party renewed confidence in its current Secretary-General, Nuri al-Maliki.

A source told Shafaq News Agency; The Islamic Dawa Party held its 18th conference and re-elected al-Maliki unanimously as its Secretary-General for a second term.

Shia parties have become a prominent political actor in Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s fall in 2003. They have played vital roles in shaping constitutional and political processes.

Founded in 1957, Dawa is the oldest of these parties. Between 2005 and 2018, three of its leaders, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Nuri al-Maliki, and Haider al-Abadi, assumed the position of prime minister.

Al-Maliki, 71, is heading the Dawa bloc in the Iraqi parliament, with 33 seats.

Dawa is a leading party in the Shiite Coordination Framework.
Link


Iraq
Sayyed Muqtada al-Sadr will not die, and he will not be martyred, Iraqi deputy says
2021-07-06
[SHAFAQ] The Iraqi deputy, Faiq Sheikh Ali, commented on Monday, on the statement of Sadrist movement leader, Moqtada Tater al-Sadr
...hereditary Iraqi holy man and leader of a political movement in Iraq. He had his hereditary rival, al-Khoei, assassinated only a few hours after the holy rival's appearance out of exile in 2003. Formerly an Iranian catspaw, lately he's gagged over some of their more outlandish antics, then went back to catspawry...
, about the "near of his death."

Sheikh Ali said in a tweet, "Sayyed Moqtada al-Sadr will not die, and he will not be martyred... No, I swear by god..."

He added, "This is the fourth time that he (Al-Sadr) announces his imminent martyrdom... Moqtada al-Sadr will remain and his (electoral) list will win and he will form the government headed Jaafar al-Sadr..."

Jaafar Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr is an Iraqi politician with the Shiite Islamist Islamic Dawa Party. Today, he is the Iraqi ambassador to UK.
Link


The Grand Turk
Research article explains how Turkey uses pan-Islamism as a solution for failure
2019-05-24
[ENGLISH.ALARABIYA.NET] The Sick Man of Europe Turkey
...the only place on the face of the earth that misses the Ottoman Empire....
has used Islam to legitimize itself as the leader of the Moslem world since the Ottoman Empire’s decline, writes Saud al-Sarhan, secretary-general of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, in an article titled "Erdogan and the Last Quest for the Greenmantle."

The article, published by the International Center for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR) at King’s College London, argues that Ottoman Turkish President Sultan Recep Tayyip Erdogan the First
... Turkey's version of Mohammed Morsi but they voted him back in so they deserve him. It's a sin, a shame, and a felony to insult the president of Turkey...
evokes a pan-Islamic rhetoric "in an attempt to increase the appeal of Turkey’s political stances to Moslem populations across the world" ‐ a tactic which Sarhan links to "political arms of various terrorist groups."

The Ottomans similarly exploited pan-Islamism, but "only once their days of conquering lands had been checked by Europeans," Sarhan writes.

In the early 20th century, Christians made up more than a third of the Ottoman Empire’s population ‐ only to become reduced to less than a fifth after the empire started losing European lands, which Sarhan presents as a major reason for the easy spread of pan-Islamic thought.

The Ottoman ruling elite "sought to adopt pan-Islamist positions in order to reverse the deteriorating state of their empire," the article argues, offering as evidence the campaign that the Ottomans carried out to urge the world’s Moslems to be loyal to them instead of their local rulers shortly before the First World War.

These campaigns failed, which Sarhan attributes to the rejection of Turkification policies by Arabs and Moslems outside the empire, in a major negative turning point in pan-Islamic thought.

According to Sarhan’s research, after the abolition of the empire, pan-Islamic thought was revived through groups such as the Moslem Brüderbund in Egypt, the Caliphate League in India, and the Moslem World Congress in Pakistain.

However,
women are made to be loved, not understood...
the groups did not flourish until secular Arab nationalist regimes failed to solve the "Paleostinian problem" in 1967 and the Soviet Union collapsed, which resulted in a decline in support for Soviet-aligned secular governments in various parts of the Arab world.

This enabled pan-Islamic parties to gain power in places such as Iran (Khomeinism), Iraq (Dawa Party), Gazoo (Hamas, a contraction of the Arabic words for "frothing at the mouth",) and Egypt (the Moslem Brüderbund’s Freedom and Justice Party).

History repeated itself, according to Sarhan, when Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) failed to qualify Turkey for membership in the EU, causing him to turn, once again, to a more pan-Islamic position to secure a major place for Turkey on the world stage.

Sarhan also explains that Turkey even uses pan-Islamism to incentivize Arabs and Moslems to invest in the country and save its economy. He gives the examples of a former Kuwaiti MP and a Moslem Brüderbund sympathizer journalist, both of whom urged people to invest in Turkey on the basis that it is a Moslem nation.

Link


Iraq
When the revolutionists regret it
2018-11-19
[ENGLISH.ALARABIYA.NET] When asked on a television show about the current situation in Iraq and the state of corruption, which is hindering government formation even as ISIS prowls near the borders, Iraqi member of parliament Izzat Shabandar said: "I would accept a President and a government, even if 70 percent or 60 percent of it is corrupt and infiltrated, over a situation of void that might lead to dire civil war that lasts for a quarter of a century."

"If I had the present awareness before Saddam was toppled, I would have supported my country against the US invasion and let Saddam stay."
The interviewer then asked him: "If this be so, then why did you not accept Saddam Hussein? He was a dictator, why do you accept (what you just said) but reject him?" Shabandar courageously replied: "If I had the present awareness before Saddam was toppled, I would have supported my country against the US invasion and let Saddam stay."

Although I disagree with this politician over many of his views, especially as he belongs to the Shiite Dawa Party, which is equivalent to the Sunni Moslem Brüderbund, I appreciate his candor in that he admitted the truth despite it being so bitter for many revolutionists to accept.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS
I definitely believe that what this Iraqi politician has said is what many citizens of Arab countries, who responded to the call of Qatar
...an emirate on the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula. It sits on some really productive gas and oil deposits, which produces the highest per capita income in the world. They piss it all away on religion, financing the Moslem Brotherhood and several al-Qaeda affiliates. Home of nutbag holy manYusuf al-Qaradawi...
is and the Moslem Brüderbund who used to call their movement ’The Arab Spring,’ are currently saying. Experience is the best evidence. All those who were fooled by ideologies and slogans and who were swept away by revolutionary actions are now regretting it as security and stability are the state’s real fortune. When Arab citizens do not care about this wealth, their inevitable fate would be what is happening now in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen.

Iraqi Arab citizens should never forget that those who led bloody revolutions in these countries are the Islamists who used religion and made it a pragmatic tool. Here you can witness the consequences of these revolutions; what these false religious appearances had done to their countries ‐ bloody civil wars, that just when they are about to calm down, they are ignited again and so on.

As for us in Soddy Arabia
...a kingdom taking up the bulk of the Arabian peninsula. Its primary economic activity involves exporting oil and soaking Islamic rubes on the annual hajj pilgrimage. The country supports a large number of princes in whatcha might call princely splendor. When the oil runs out the rest of the world is going to kick sand in the Soddy national face...
and the Gulf, the withdrawal of Islamist movements and exposure of their true faces is reassuring. Their repeated attempts to ignite tensions again collude with peoples’ support for their leadership. It is also crystal clear that many of their traitorous figures who had worn false religious appearances have raised the white flag as they suddenly realized what happened to those whose stability and security were harmed by what was falsely called the ’Arab Spring’. This ’Arab Spring’ has exposed their schemes and made people realize what the true goals are.

Such Islamist movements are receding now. Years ago, I had expected this end for the Islamist movement; however, this so-called Arab Spring was tantamount to the high price which Arab people had to pay to get rid of these devilish movements that deceive people in the name of Islam.
Link


Iraq
Rival Iraqi factions make coalition deal and end Al-Abadi’s prime minister hopes
2018-09-14
[ARABNEWS] Pro-Iran parties in Iraq reached a deal on Thursday to join a parliamentary coalition overseen by anti-Tehran holy man Moqtada Tater al-Sadr
... the Iranian catspaw holy man who was 22 years old in 2003 and was nearing 40 in 2010. He spends most of his time in Iran, safely out of the line of fire, where he's learning to be an ayatollah...
that ends Haider al-Abadi’s hopes of hanging on as prime minister.

The compromise means members of the ruling Shiite Dawa Party will be excluded from competing for the post to lead the next government, negotiators involved in the talks told Arab News.

Al-Abadi, the head of Dawa’s political bureau, who was looking to win a second term, was the biggest loser in the deal. Nuri al-Maliki, the former Iraqi prime minister and head of the State of Law coalition, who was hoping to play a key role in nominating the new head of government also lost out.

Iraqi’s Shiite rivals have been frantically competing to form the largest parliamentary coalition, since elections in May.

Moqtada al-Sadr, one of the most influential Shiite holy mans, whose Sairoon list came first, formed a 154-seat coalition including al-Abadi and his al-Nassir list.

Link


Iraq
Iraq factions announce alliances to form new government
2018-09-03
[PRESSTV] Iraqi political factions, which did best in the country’s May parliamentary elections, announce separate alliances within the legislature, which they claim enables them to form the country’s new government.

On Sunday, politicians following senior holy man Moqtada Sadr and Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s lead said they had created an alliance that would give them a majority bloc at the Parliament.

A rival grouping led by commander Hadi al-Amiri and former premier Nouri al-Maliki responded by saying it had formed its own alliance, asserting it featured the lion’s share of the seats at the legislature.

The 329-seat legislature is to come together on Monday to elect a speaker and launch the government formation process.

Sadr's Sairoon bloc came first in the polls, while the Fatah (Conquest) Alliance led by Amiri, and Abadi's Nasr finished second and third. A bloc led by Maliki ended in the fifth place.

A recount was called after the polls due to allegations of electoral fraud. The procedure delayed the process of government formation by three months, but confirmed the primary results with little change.

Iraq’s Muqtada Al-Sadr Forms Parliamentary Majority Bloc

[Sputnik] After three years of war with Daesh and three months of a vote recount, Iraq can now form a new government and begin the process of rebuilding.

Sixteen political groups in Iraq, including those of Shiite cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr and outgoing Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, reached an agreement Sunday to form the largest bloc in the Iraqi parliament.

This agreement, reached just before the first session of the Iraqi Parliament on Monday, gives Al-Sadr the exclusive right to form a government.

Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi, reportedly backed by the West, is also a part of the coalition. Al-Abadi is purportedly interested in extending his position into a second term, but as he is no longer the only candidate from the alliance, it is uncertain whether he will succeed.

Iraq’s Maliki says will not run again for premier post

[IraqiNews] Iraqi Vice President Nouri al Maliki stressed on Sunday that he would not run again for the post of prime minister.

“I was serious when I announced four years ago that I will not run again for the post of prime minister. I am still committed to my attitude and I will not change it,” Al Ekhbariya TV channel quoted al Maliki as saying in a statement.

Maliki stressed, in his statement, that he will “stand by any person who assumes this top post to help him improve the situation in Iraq and achieve national goals.”

Maliki served as prime minister of Iraq from 2006 to 2014. He is is assuming the posts of secretary-general of the Islamic Dawa Party and vice president of Iraq.

Al-Maliki began his political career as a Shia dissident under Saddam Hussein’s regime in the late 1970s and rose to prominence after he fled a death sentence into exile for 24 years.

During his time abroad, he became a senior leader of the Islamic Dawa Party, coordinated the activities of anti-Saddam guerrillas and built relationships with Iranian and Syrian officials whose help he sought in overthrowing Saddam.

Maliki worked closely with United States and coalition forces in Iraq following their departure by the end of 2011.

Abadi says to attend parliament session Monday as premier, election winner

[IraqiNews] Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said on Sunday that he will attend the first parliamentary session scheduled on Monday morning as a premier and election winner after his alliance came third in the general elections, held in May.

Dijlah TV channel quoted Abadi as telling reporters that “the Victory alliance will be present at the parliament tomorrow, Monday. And I will be also there as a prime minister and a winner in the elections.”

Abadi said, however, that he will not take oath at the parliament tomorrow because that will prevent him from assuming his executive tasks as a prime minister.

Abadi has been serving as a prime minister of Iraq since September 2014.

In the May 12 parliamentary polls, Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr’s Sairoon coalition won 54 parliamentary seats, followed by an al-Hashd al-Shaabi-linked coalition (47 seats) and Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi’s Victory bloc (42 seats).

Last week, Iraqi President Fuad Masum issued a decree, ordering the newly-elected parliament to convene Monday under the oldest lawmaker, a move which precedes the election of the new president and formation of the new cabinet.

Under the Iraqi constitution, 15 days after final election results are endorsed by the Federal Supreme Court, the new parliament must hold its first session during which the speaker will be chosen.

A new president will be elected within three days of the legislature convening and the president will then ask the largest parliamentary bloc to form a cabinet.

Iraq’s president is elected by the parliament by a two-thirds majority and is limited to two four-year terms

The speaker of the Iraqi parliament should be a Sunni Arab, the prime minister a Shiite, and the president a Kurd.
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Iraq
Oil field protests: hundreds of tribals protest, 19 casualties in clashes with cops
2018-07-15


Hundreds of Iraqis continue protests at southern oil fields

Basra (IraqiNews.com) Hundreds of Iraqis resumed protests on Saturday near oil fields in the country's south, demanding enhanced services and employment.

Iraqi Mawazin News Agency said hundreds of tribes outside the Majnoon oil field northeast of Basra province demanding job opportunities, replacing foreign labor at oil companies with Iraqis, enhanced potable water and electricity supplies.

Over the past week, protesters at some southern provinces, including Basra, invaded airports, local councils and main roads protesting poor services and unemployment.

One protester was killed the past week during clashes with security in Basra as demonstrations swept through Dhi Qar, Diwaniyah, Maysan, Karbala and Babil provinces, prompting the Iraqi president to urge for calm and respect for protesters demands.

Also in Najaf, the province's airport administration said flights resumed late Friday after angry protesters stormed it.

A statement by the airport's board accused "government officials and political parties with economic objectives" of "engineering a conspiracy against the airport", as it put it.

Late Friday, a meeting by the ministerial security council, chaired by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, concluded that unrest during the protests was the making of "infiltrators", vowing to "take deterrent legal measures" against those.

Iraqi economy has been ravaged by a three-year war against Islamic State militants, coupled with unstable world petroleum prices, the country's main income source.

Maysan protests leave 19 people injured, including security men

Maysan (Iraqinews.com) – Up to 19 people were injured Saturday in clashes between security forces and demonstrators in the southeastern governorate of Maysan, a senior health official was quoted by Alforat News as saying.

Dr. Ali al-Allaq, the director of Maysan's health directorate, said, "the injured included security forces and civilians, with some of them suffering from gunshot wounds."

He pointed out that his directorate is ready to handle "the increasing number of injuries among the policemen and demonstrators alike." Allaq further called on all citizens to "cooperate with medics and open roads for them to help them move the injured to hospitals as soon as possible."

On Friday, several protests were held outside the headquarters of various political parties in Maysan, including Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's Dawa Party. Some of these parties were set on fire.

Earlier in the day, Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr called on security forces to show restraint in handling peaceful protests staged near oil fields in the country's southern provinces.

In a Twitter post, Sadr expressed his rejection of "any attack on oppressed protesters."

Hundreds of Iraqi youth have been staging rallies since last week demanding enhanced services and job opportunities.
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Iraq
What next for Iraq’s Abadi after his ‘victory’ alliance collapses?
2018-01-18
[ENGLISH.ALARABIYA.NET] The "Victory Alliance", which brought together Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and the Popular Mobilization Unit (PMU) militias did not last for more than 48 hours. The "victorious" coalition was on the verge of disintegration, putting Abadi in a difficult position.

Now, Abadi, a member of the Islamic Dawa Party, is trying to find new Shiite allies.

Abadi’s Sunni allies do not form a popular base in their liberated areas that can help him get enough votes to support his coalition.

The alliances and coalitions between the Secretary General of the Islamic Dawa Party Nouri al-Maliki and the Shura Council in the party triggered different reactions. The council objected to registering the party’s name in the electoral commission under Maliki’s name, and informed him that his post was "honorary". As such, the party decided to withdraw its participation in the elections.

On the same day that the party decided to withdraw its participation in the elections, Abadi declared the formation of a "victory coalition" that fell over and needed new alliances.

’Falling apart’
There is no legal or constitutional provision to determine the date for forming new alliances before the elections which is scheduled to be held on May 15th of this year, so it seems that the Electoral Commission will accept the new alliances that will be announced by the political blocs.

Contrary to what is expected, the popular mobilization factions entered into an alliance with Abadi and merged under the Victory Alliance. These factions are Badr, Asaib, Ahl al-Haq, the Brigades of Imam Ali, as well as the Ataa movement.

The Victory Alliance gathered many important names, and this was an indication that it will not last long and that the victorious military alliance will keep their main coalition (Fatah), headed by Hadi Amiri including the factions of the popular mobilization forces.

It seems that the withdrawal of the PMU militias from the Abadi coalition has put the latter in a corner that he is trying to escape from; nevertheless, there are those who believe that this entire scheme was planned by the commander of the Quds Force in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Qasem Soleimani.

The Iranian general arrived in the Iraqi capital Baghdad without providing much information about the dates, the locations and the reasons for his visit. The Intel indicates that "Soleimani supervised the alliances of the Shiite political blocs, especially those close to Iran."

After the PMU militias joined the Victory Alliance led by Abadi, Soleimani headed to Baghdad in a secret visit, as it is usually the case. The sources said, "Soleimani planned to withdraw the factions close to Iran in a move to overthrow Abadi."

Seeking other alliances
Abadi is now looking for an alliance with the leader of the Sadrist movement Moqtada Tater al-Sadr
... the Iranian catspaw holy man who was 22 years old in 2003 and was nearing 40 in 2010. He spends most of his time in Iran, safely out of the line of fire, where he's learning to be an ayatollah...
, but the first delegation, which arrived in the city of Hananah in the province of Najaf where Sadr’s house is located, was unable to meet him. It is believed that Sadr refused to meet with the members of the delegation.

As soon as Abadi announced the new alliance with the popular mobilization forces, many social media users expressed their anger, even those who supported him in his previous steps, when he announced his reformist plans. Iraqi social media users criticized him, and considered him like his predecessor Maliki.

Critics of Abadi, especially those who have demonstrated against corruption and cultural and media elites, criticized him for forming an alliance with suspected "corruption" figures while the prime minister promised to fight "the corrupt."

Abadi’s recent steps appear to be a shock to those who expected to get rid of the "quota" policies that have drowned and ruined the Iraqi state system.

Analysts say that "the disintegration of the recent alliances proved that the Iranians do not want Abadi, because they consider him close to the United States, hence not an ally to Iran."

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Iraq
Maliki rejects joint electoral list with Abadi: Dawa Party
2018-01-09
[ARABNEWS] Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will participate in the forthcoming parliamentary election, but refuses to do so as part of a joint electoral list with his successor Haider Abadi, big shots of the Islamic Dawa Party told Arab News.

Both Abadi and Maliki belong to the party. The current prime minister replaced his predecessor in September 2014 following widespread opposition to Maliki’s desire for a third term. Tensions between the two have persisted ever since.

So far, 205 political parties and 12 registered alliances will participate in the election, which is due to take place on May 12, the Independent High Electoral Commission told Arab News.

Ali Alaq, a Dawa leader, told Arab News that the party "wants to participate in the election in one electoral list."

This "will preserve the interests of the party and won’t disperse the (electoral) votes, but Maliki has another opinion," Alaq said.

But Maliki’s political adviser Abbas Mossowie told Arab News: "Participating in two electoral lists, one headed by Maliki and the other by Abadi, has been discussed during recent party meetings."

Mossowie added: "The final decision hasn’t been made yet, but the majority (of the party) supports having two lists. Maliki prefers to run the election in two lists."

The rebuilding of the security establishment, the retaking of territory lost to ISIS and the Kurds, and increased international and regional support for Abadi’s government, contributed to his nomination as head of Dawa’s electoral list, party leaders told Arab News.

"Abadi is more worthy than anyone else to head the list. Our field research suggests he has a great chance at re-election as head of the next government," a Dawa leader told Arab News on condition of anonymity.

"There’s almost an international, Arab and popular consensus on Abadi. He deserves to win another term to finish his work on the economy, fight corruption and rebuild liberated areas."

Maliki believes that Abadi, Dawa and his Shiite rivals betrayed him when they opposed him having a third term even though he gained the most votes in the 2014 election.
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