Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Mikhail Kucherov
[Regnum] On September 30, 1941, German troops launched an offensive toward Moscow. Operation Typhoon began, with the aim of encircling Soviet forces and swiftly capturing the capital.
The threat of losing Moscow lingered until December. According to one version, German motorcyclists reached the outskirts of Khimki. But the Wehrmacht was stopped and, by April 1942, driven back from the city. Over the course of seven months, German losses on the Eastern Front amounted to over 615,000 (for comparison, 44,000 in Poland and 154,000 during the entire campaign in France).
It was near Moscow, as Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel admitted at the Nuremberg Trials, that his illusions about the success of the Barbarossa plan were finally dispelled.
But at the beginning of the Moscow operation, not only the ideologically charged Nazis but also the sober-minded Prussian generals expected Moscow to fall in the fall of 1941, just as the capital of another major warring power, Paris, had fallen in the summer of 1940. The progress of the war convinced the Germans that the "Barbarossa" scenario would be realized. But at some point, everything went wrong.
FAST HEINZ ATTACKS
By the time of the offensive on Moscow, the armies of Group Center constituted half of all Reich forces operating against the USSR. Adolf Hitler set the goal of taking Moscow by the end of the fourth month of the campaign, i.e., by the end of October 1941, regardless of the damage to the city. Long-term plans called for the liquidation of the city and the extermination of its inhabitants or their deportation to Germany.
The main obstacle for the invaders was the Vyazemskaya line of defense, located 300 km from Moscow and 800 kilometers long; its backbone was made up of forces from the Western, Reserve, and Bryansk fronts.
But, contrary to the expectations of the Soviet command, instead of the Minsk and Warsaw highways, the German leadership chose the south (the Shostka and Novgorod-Seversky region) for the offensive.
On October 3, Field Marshal Guderian, nicknamed "Swift Heinz," had reached Orel with tanks, covering a third of the distance to Moscow by the following day. That day, Hitler, from the podium of the Berlin Sports Palace, announced "an operation of gigantic proportions that will destroy the enemy in the East."
At the same time, the enemy launched a powerful attack in the direction of Kaluga and Vyazma. When the Red Army units were forced to retreat on October 7, 1941, the resulting 500-kilometer-long breach allowed the Germans to create two large pockets: Bryansk and Vyazma, which, according to various estimates, trapped up to 700,000 Red Army soldiers and officers. Only a few groups managed to break out, although occasionally regiments with artillery emerged from the encirclement.
Those captured were held in camps the Germans hastily erected, enclosing bare fields with barbed wire. Military medic Mstislav Yakovenko recalled:
“It was possible to survive for several days without food, but without water it was unbearable... As soon as a prisoner’s hand was pushed through the wire to fill a tin or a mug with water, a sentry’s shot would immediately ring out, and the prisoner would fall, killed or wounded.”
Social tensions in the capital grew. On October 15, the Central Committee of the Party, ministries, and foreign embassies were evacuated to Kuibyshev (now Samara). For the first time in its history, the metro stopped working (it was even prepared for an explosion), and grocery stores closed.
It seemed the situation was developing, if not according to the "Paris" scenario (the French capital was essentially surrendered without a fight), then according to the "Warsaw" scenario. However, by November, it became clear that the advancing divisions of Army Group Center were bogged down, literally and figuratively.
THERE IS NO BAD WEATHER
After the fact, German military leaders explained the failure near Moscow by the actions of "General Frost" in conjunction with "Colonel Rasputitsa" - just as Napoleon's marshals explained the failures of the 1812 campaign.
The torrential rains of mid-October did indeed make the roads muddy, making the German advance much more difficult. However, this same circumstance also hampered our troops' defense: the T-34s would get stuck on the mounds, making it extremely difficult to pull them out. Staff cars were towed by the tanks.
The enemy had a tool to overcome the muddy roads: half-track tractors, which were used at night when frost formed an icy crust on the road.
"General Frost" did indeed intervene, but not near Moscow, but in the area of the already blockaded Leningrad: the intrusion of Arctic air masses from the Kara Sea caused temperatures to drop to -35°C. However, in the Moscow region, the winter of 1941–1942 was not abnormally cold.
FACTOR ONE: TIME GAINED
The "weather" theory was correct in one respect: the Wehrmacht's strategic plans did not, in fact, involve delaying the capture of Moscow until winter. This is the primary reason for the Nazis' defeat in the battle for our capital.
The initial blitzkrieg plan envisioned taking the USSR's capital and advancing further east within the first 10-12 weeks of the campaign, meaning no later than October. The initial pace of combat gave the Wehrmacht high command the pretext for making precisely such plans. However, the enemy's advance was permanently constrained in three sectors of the front— near Kiev, in the central part of the RSFSR, and near Leningrad, which was blockaded but not captured.
At the beginning of winter, the Wehrmacht's infantry divisions faced a massive loss of horses, as there was simply nothing to feed them. Goebbels's newsreels portrayed the Reich army as being completely motorized, but in reality, horse-drawn transport played a significant role—it was horses that pulled the heavy weapons.
Moreover, the Germans, not counting on long-term battles, were forced to waste precious fuel on heating.
The front didn't collapse, time was gained, although the situation remained critical in October. Georgy Zhukov, commander of the Western Front since October 10, assumed command at a time when the Mozhaisk defensive line, 120 kilometers from Moscow, was the final line of defense.
One of the key moments in the defense of Moscow was the feat of the Panfilovites on November 16, when a detachment of the 4th company of the 1075th regiment, under the command of political instructor Vasily Klochkov, held off the onslaught of German tanks for several hours at the Dubosekovo siding, destroying up to 18 enemy vehicles on the approaches to the Volokolamsk highway.
At the same time, the encircled units near Bryansk and Vyazma continued to fight, holding back 24 German divisions. They won critically important weeks.
It is known that the Siberian and Far Eastern divisions played a key role in the victory at Moscow. They began to be transferred from the Amur and Primorye regions to the west as early as the summer of 1941. Intelligence reports that Japan had no intention of entering the war against the USSR also played a role.
Less well known is that at the crucial moment, a difficult decision was made to transfer tank reserves from Leningrad, intended to break the blockade.
In addition, approximately 140 minefields were erected around the capital, and in the forests near Moscow, teams of five to seven men chopped down pine trees to create impassable obstacles for tanks. The enemy was held back by trench warfare until the Siberians arrived—and the decisive turning point in the battle.
THE SECOND FACTOR IS AIR DEFENSE
The second factor was winning the battle in the air. Reichsmarschall of the Air Force Hermann Göring and his generals greatly underestimated the capabilities of our air defenses. Addressing the Luftwaffe, Göring declared:
"You bombed England. It will be much easier over Moscow. If the Russians have anti-aircraft guns, they are few in number. They don't have searchlights, balloons, or night fighters."
In reality, Moscow was defended by approximately 1,000 anti-aircraft guns of all calibers. Floating at altitudes of 2–4.5 kilometers (higher than in the skies over London, a battle for which the Germans also lost), the balloons interfered with Luftwaffe bombers, forcing them to climb higher, which significantly reduced the accuracy of their shells.
At night, the capital was darkened: light in the window, as a famous Soviet poster proclaimed, was help to the enemy.
As a result of the heaviest raid by the German Air Force on October 29, 1941 (when the Bolshoi Theater, the Moscow State University building on Mokhovaya Street, and part of the party buildings on Staraya Square were hit), air defense forces shot down 74 of the more than 300 bombers that took part in the raid.
Soon, the air raids began to taper off due to heavy Luftwaffe losses. Bomber aircraft harassed the capital and rear areas less and less—the ground forces, which were increasingly struggling on the ground, needed assistance.
FACTOR THREE: DISCIPLINE AND IDEOLOGY
The third factor was winning the psychological war. Here, the work was conducted in two directions: force and propaganda.
On October 17, the first secretary of the Moscow city committee, Alexander Shcherbakov, assured the city's residents over the radio that the capital would not be surrendered, and NKVD forces restored order within 24 hours, arresting or executing looters and setting up guard posts along the entire perimeter. As an additional measure, they hung huge posters announcing Lyubov Orlova's concert, which had a particularly encouraging effect on Muscovites.
Muscovites were informed daily via radio and newspapers that Comrade Joseph Stalin and the Red Army command were at work.
On November 7, the famous parade on Red Square took place, lasting 25 minutes. It was prepared in the strictest secrecy. Even the commanders of the units participating in the event, to whom invitations were delivered overnight, were not informed. Even the scheduled start time of 10:00 was moved forward two hours.
Stalin's speech, delivered at 8:10 a.m., demonstrated the USSR's readiness to fight to the last—including against its British allies (the United States had not yet entered the war at that time).
Soon the enemy and allies became convinced that the statements that Moscow would not be surrendered were backed up by military force.
During the December counteroffensive, Soviet troops pushed the Germans back 100–350 kilometers from Moscow. By April 1942, they had liberated the Moscow, Tula, Kalinin, and Ryazan regions, as well as some districts of the Smolensk and Oryol regions.
Heads rolled at German headquarters amid the failed offensive. Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch was forced to hand over his duties as commander of the ground forces to the Führer personally. Colonel General Erich Hoepner, commander of the 4th Panzer Group advancing on Moscow, was dismissed from service and stripped of his awards and pension. In 1944, out of bitterness, he joined the organizers of the anti-Hitler assassination attempt and was executed.
And then, by the end of 1941, the first, catastrophic phase of the war had ended. The Great Patriotic War continued to be a terrible ordeal, but the threat of Nazi enslavement had receded.
[CapitalBG] After more than two decades, the US is closing its last bases in Iraq in the midst of war with Iran
The Americans who arrived in 2003 to topple Saddam Hussein are now leaving Iraq. According to available information, American forces are due to leave their last bases by the end of the week, with Reuters reporting that Iran and its allies are celebrating the withdrawal as a victory. The coalition mission, which began as a central element of the post-September 11, 2001 strategy, is ending without a triumph.
The withdrawal was not improvised, but agreed upon in 2024 under Joe Biden and is now being implemented by the Donald Trump administration, which is at war with Iran. By mid-2025, about 2,500 American soldiers remained, of which approximately 2,000 were at the Ain al-Assad base, which has repeatedly been the target of attacks by Tehran and its proxies. The framework program, finalized in July 2025, withdrew combat forces from central and western Iraq and redirected the remaining counterterrorism activities and training to Iraqi Kurdistan. The final withdrawal is also the moment when the mission against the Islamic State officially ends.
WHY IS WASHINGTON LEAVING?
Capital sources in Baghdad point to two forces behind the decision. Iran's influence in Iraq has grown since the US toppled Saddam, making a permanent American presence increasingly difficult to justify. Trump also promised during his campaign to end the country's long wars abroad. Washington now says it wants economic relations with Iraq - a major oil producer and a significant market - rather than a military engagement.
It should be noted that the withdrawal is not truly complete, as a significant diplomatic presence and solid US military capacity remain in the region. Supporters of the withdrawal frame this argument in a friendlier way. They interpret it as a move away from permanent garrisons that militias could regularly attack, towards a more flexible deterrent system.
A VICTORY THAT TEHRAN WILL NOT SQUANDER
For Iran and its partners, the symbolism is the biggest prize. A commander of the pro-Iranian Islamic Resistance in Iraq alliance called the withdrawal a historic victory and a crushing defeat for the American project. Iran has said its ultimate goal is to expel American troops from the entire Middle East, and now it is presenting Iraq as proof that its “Axis of Resistance” is working. Iraqi analyst Jassim al-Bahadli believes Tehran stands to gain the most, as the coalition has been a check on Iranian influence for years.
Baghdad's position is more delicate. The Iraqi government must balance pressure from armed groups linked to Iran, remnants of the Islamic State group and its own security institutions. Iraqi security experts who spoke to Capital warned that the withdrawal could allow other US enemies to return, including the Islamic State group.
KURDISTAN AND THE GAPS IN AIR DEFENSE
The most specific danger is in the north. The Iraqi Kurdistan region, once a key U.S. security partner, is now a major target for Iran and its proxies. Kurdish sources say nearly a thousand drones and missiles have hit the region since the start of the Israeli-U.S. military campaign against Iran in February. They say the region has no air defenses of its own and forces on the ground feel extremely vulnerable.
The coalition is withdrawing all its personnel and equipment, including Patriot systems and the Kurdistan Regional Government missile defense system, which had been intercepting Iranian missiles and drones. The UAE-based newspaper The National reports that this could lead to a wider gap in regional security, as these weapons have repeatedly crossed Iraqi airspace on their way to other targets, so the loss of interceptors and radar coverage has implications beyond Iraq’s borders. Iraq’s plan to build a national air defense system within three years has drawn skepticism, with no Iraqi force yet able to replace the American capability.
Experts at the US Atlantic Council are also looking at the implications for Syria, where they see both risks and opportunities, as each of these areas was linked to the US presence in Iraq. Now that Damascus is seen as a transit hub for Iraqi oil exports in the context of the shutdown of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, the stakes are higher - as is the danger of attacks on infrastructure.
WHAT DOES ALL THIS MEAN FOR AMERICAN POWER?
The withdrawal comes at an awkward time for U.S. prestige. Analysts have long warned that sudden withdrawals create a strategic vacuum that rivals are rushing to fill. They add that Washington fears a repeat of Kabul or Saigon, which could damage its position in the international hierarchy. Moscow and Beijing will not miss the opportunity to claim that a superpower has left the war under fire from a rival, although the United States may respond that the timetable was set in 2024, before the current war with Iran began, and that leaving on schedule is a show of control, not weakness.
The practical effect on the US position is likely to be a reallocation of resources. With fewer troops in Iraq, there are fewer places where proxy forces can strike against Americans and draw Washington into an escalation. This helps the goal of ending wars with an uncertain end. But it also deprives the US of access to intelligence, early warning, and the depth of basing in close proximity to Iran. Much of the burden now falls on bases in the Persian Gulf, Jordan, the Navy, and long-range strike and missile defense. The lapse in Iraq’s air defenses shows how one weak spot weakens the entire regional system.
Iraq borders Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, all of which have already been targeted by Iranian airstrikes. Analysts are unanimous in their assessment that the consequences of the US withdrawal will not be long in coming.
The last American convoy will cross the border this week, but the question it raises will remain open. The US chose to leave and now must show that it can still influence events in Iraq and the region from the outside, and Iran will spend the coming months trying to prove that the US is losing ground.
Commentary by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin
[ColonelCassad] The US has completed Operation Inherent Resolve.
The Pentagon announced that it has completed the withdrawal of American troops from bases in Iraqi Kurdistan and concluded Operation Inherent Resolve (the official pretext being the fight against ISIS). These bases have been used against Iran in recent years and have received a significant number of missiles and drones over the past year. Iran has long sought their withdrawal through a combination of political pressure from pro-Iranian forces in Iraq, strikes against Iranian proxies in Iraq, and its own strikes against them.
The US's failures in its aggression against Iran accelerated the withdrawal process. The remaining bases were handed over to the Iraqi army and other Iraqi security forces. Meanwhile, the US is effectively abandoning the Kurdish project, which has already sparked widespread complaints, claiming that we once again trusted the Americans, and they have screwed us over again. The US hopes that by losing the pretext to fight against the American occupation, Iranian proxy forces in Iraq will be weakened.
During the aggression against Iran, they regularly attacked American assets in Iraq and launched drones against Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The Iraqi government hopes to integrate them into the regular security forces. The process of handing over heavy weapons is planned to be completed by March 2027, and full integration by mid-summer 2027.
In my opinion, as long as the aggression against Iran continues, this will be problematic, especially since there are numerous ways to sabotage such integration, especially given the special position of the already integrated Hashd al-Shaabi and the Shiite bloc. In any case, the struggle for influence in Iraq between the US and Iran will continue.
The US has simply lost one of the most important tools in this struggle. Iraq, due to its own weakness, is effectively serving as a platform for this confrontation. P.S. At the same time, the ISIS terrorist network in Iraq has not gone away. Terrorist attacks are organized more or less regularly.
More from regnum.ru The US and its allies have officially ended the operation against ISIS in Iraq.
The United States and coalition allies have officially concluded Operation Inherent Resolve against ISIS (ISIS, a terrorist organization banned in Russia) in Iraq. This was announced by Pentagon Chief Spokesman Sean Parnell on September 30.
According to him, the campaign concluded in accordance with the joint US-Iraqi statement of September 2024. The organized withdrawal of coalition forces and equipment from the Erbil airbase marked the successful completion of the military mission to defeat ISIS in Iraq.
"This milestone reflects the success of the 12-year campaign to defeat ISIS as an organized military threat in Iraq and throughout the region. It also marks the transition from a wartime coalition mission to an Iraqi-led security effort supported by a more normal bilateral security relationship, " the Pentagon quoted Parnell as saying.
He added that the primary responsibility for addressing Iraq's remaining security challenges, including the remnants of ISIS, now rests with the Iraqi government. The United States will continue to provide targeted training and intelligence support and cooperate with Iraq to prevent the resurgence of ISIS.
On May 16, US President Donald Trump announced that, at his direction, US forces had killed Abu Bilal al-Minouqi, the second-most powerful ISIS commander in the world, in Nigeria, whom he called the most active terrorist. According to Trump, al-Minouqi was unaware that the US had sources reporting on all his actions.
In January, the Pentagon announced a shift to a resource-conserving approach in the fight against Islamic terrorist organizations. The department emphasized its commitment to hunting and neutralizing Islamic terrorists.
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[YouTube] Col. Douglas Macgregor breaks down claims that a full invasion of Iran could become the primary focus of future US foreign policy. Learn the strategic risks, military logistics, and geopolitical fallout behind these potential Middle East military conflict scenarios.
I don’t see it, but I am certainly not even sloghtly knowledgeable about such things.
This analysis examines Col. Douglas Macgregor's perspective on shifting US priorities and what a direct confrontation with Tehran would mean for global stability. We look closely at regional alliances, military readiness, and the broader debate surrounding Trump Iran policy decisions.
Whether you follow defense strategy or international relations, this breakdown clarifies the real-world obstacles to a large-scale invasion of Iran and the likelihood of escalating tensions in the region. Note that the good colonel has been accused of antisemitism and is seen as a major advocate for the Russian regime’s positions on the war in Ukraine. 22 minutes.
[Regnum] On September 30, 2026, Flydubai Flight FZ1073 was on a routine flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv. There were approximately 174 passengers on board, including 27 children. Approximately an hour and a half after takeoff, the aircraft activated Code 7700, a general emergency signal. A few minutes later, Code 7500 was activated, which in international aviation practice denotes unlawful interference or hijacking of an aircraft.
Israeli authorities were unable to establish contact with the plane. Fighter jets were scrambled, and Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Defense Minister held an emergency meeting. According to tracking data, the plane plummeted from approximately 34,000 feet to less than 17,000, losing more than 14,000 feet in one minute. The plane eventually landed safely at Tabuk Airport in Saudi Arabia.
Initially, conflicting reports emerged, but they eventually coalesced into the following chain of events: the co-pilot, an Omani citizen, stabbed the captain, an Emirati citizen, with a folding knife and attempted to seize control of the aircraft in an attempt to crash it. One of the passengers described the incident this way: "We heard screams. When the cockpit door opened, we saw a lot of blood. Someone had stabbed the pilot with a folding knife." The captain, according to subsequent reports, died from his wounds.
Three factors helped prevent a disaster. A backup group of pilots, who were on a training flight, was on board, and, according to Israel's Channel 12, they took control.
The cockpit door was open, and if the reinforced door, designed to protect against terrorists, had remained locked, no one from outside would have been able to intervene. And the commander resisted, despite his injury, buying critical time.
The captain unlocked the door, allowing passengers in to overcome his attacker.
This incident once again reminded us of the paradox that has plagued aviation security for over twenty years: every terrorist attack on an aircraft introduces a new rule, written in blood. Regnum News Agency investigated how this affected the Flydubai incident and how this attack could, in turn, influence further changes to the rules.
9/11: PILOTS NOW UNDER LOCK AND KEY
Before September 11, 2001, the logic of aviation security was based on a simple assumption: hijacking an aircraft is always a bargaining operation with demands, not a suicide attack. It was this logic that allowed the hijackers to bring knives, which were then considered acceptable, on board and seize control of four airliners.
Following the tragic events in New York in 2001, flight regulations were radically rewritten. It was then that cockpit doors were reinforced to armored finish and equipped with locks that could be locked from the inside.
The US created the Transportation Security Administration, transferring passenger screening from the airline to the government. Air marshals—armed, plainclothes law enforcement officers who covertly escort civilian flights to prevent terrorist attacks, hijackings, and crime on board—were now on duty on high-risk flights.
Andrey Patrakov, an aviation security expert and founder of the digital flight safety service RunAvia, points out that it was after September 11th that the cockpit access regulations themselves were established. These include codes, locking systems, and security cameras at the door.
"Before this, older aircraft might not have had a cockpit door at all, or they might not close," he says. "Then codes were introduced on the cockpit doors, according to separate regulations. Today, the codes have to be changed during flights, in part because the crew is different on each flight."
NO MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED MILLILITERS
In August 2006, terrorists planned to smuggle liquid explosives disguised as Lucozade and Oasis on seven major transatlantic flights departing from London to New York, Washington, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Montreal, and Toronto. The conspirators intended to assemble the bomb from harmless components on board, but British intelligence arrested the perpetrators before they boarded the flights.
This is how the rule of one hundred milliliters of liquid that can be carried on board an airplane came about.
In 2010, a terrorist hid explosives in his underwear while attempting to blow up a flight to Detroit, prompting airports to deploy body scanners en masse. Each time, the regulations closed a specific loophole, and after each incident, airlines around the world revised their procedures.
One of the main questions surrounding the incident on the Dubai-Tel Aviv flight is how the knife ended up in the cabin, as such items are prohibited on board after the 9/11 attacks. Crew members are screened like passengers, albeit in a separate line, but there should be no exceptions.
Flydubai, based in Dubai and flying to Israel, among other destinations, operates from one of the world's busiest and most technologically advanced aviation hubs. However, as experience shows, even the most sophisticated security system doesn't provide an absolute guarantee.
Patrakov speculates that the knife could have been smuggled into another airport than Dubai, or perhaps hidden on the plane in advance. "No security system can provide an absolute 100% guarantee," he emphasizes. The investigation will now follow the entire chain of events: scanner records, who was on duty, what equipment was used, and when exactly the item was smuggled in.
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY VICTIMS OF ONE WRONG DECISION
On March 24, 2015, Germanwings Flight 9525 crashed in the French Alps. An investigation revealed that the co-pilot, who suffered from a mental disorder and concealed it from his employer, intentionally flew the plane into a mountain. The tragedy claimed 150 lives, including the pilot's.
The key detail is that it was the cabin door, reinforced after 9/11, that allowed him to completely isolate himself. The very door, designed to protect against terrorists, became an instrument of destruction at that moment.
Following the incident on the Germanwings flight, airlines worldwide urgently implemented the "two-person cockpit" rule. At least two crew members must be present in the cockpit at all times. Since 2020, Europe has required airlines to establish crew support programs—confidential channels through which pilots can report mental health, alcohol, or drug issues without risking license revocation. Psychological screening has been added to regular medical examinations.
This rule was introduced specifically to control the pilot, ensuring that no crew member, including flight attendants, could remain alone in the cockpit. And in the case of the Flydubai flight, it did work, but not as intended.
According to media reports, the co-pilot took the knife precisely because he knew the captain would confront him. But during the struggle, someone from the crew managed to open the door, which saved the situation. Thus, the "two-person cockpit" rule, which arose in the wake of the 2015 tragedy in the French Alps, today saved the 174 passengers on flight FZ1073.
Today, pilots with depression and other mental health issues can be cleared to fly, but only under strict conditions and constant monitoring. Current regulations allow for conditional certification for pilots in remission and consistently taking approved antidepressants.
Before the Germanwings tragedy, the rule allowed pilots with depression to fly, relying on their honesty and timely self-disclosure. However, the pilot then hid his relapse. After the disaster, the system attempted to create conditions that make it more beneficial for pilots to disclose than to conceal their illness: through support programs, protection from immediate license revocation, and closer monitoring of those with a history of disorders.
According to medical science candidate and psychiatrist Vladimir Vozhzhov, the pilot's motivation on the Dubai-Tel Aviv flight may have been more than just suicidal.
"The condition could have changed due to a number of factors. There are acute psychoses that arise suddenly. These are extremely rare, but anything is possible; it could be the first acute attack of schizophrenia. Still, if this were the case, it's unlikely the signs of an acute attack wouldn't have been visible to doctors."
The expert expresses caution regarding the admission of pilots taking medication to flights:
"It's better to have pilots who are completely healthy, without psychological problems. The safety of others should take precedence over the rights of one person to carry out their professional activities. Some antidepressants even increase suicidal tendencies. Sometimes, activity increases, but suicidal thoughts persist."
FRIEND OR FOE?
Modern airlines are eliminating permanent crews, and pilots may meet for the first time just before departure. Patrakov explains that crew rotation and selection through the crew resource management process are mandatory. Experience shows that long-serving crews are more likely to quarrel and start physical fights.
Selection is based on a psychological compatibility procedure, and this is a mandatory requirement. This rule also arose in the wake of a series of tragedies: on March 27, 1977, two Boeing 747s collided over the island of Tenerife, killing 583 people. The cause was not technical problems, but the crew's inability to work as a team: the captain, an instructor with thirty years of experience, interrupted the young co-pilot who was trying to warn him of danger, and the co-pilot hesitated to insist to his former mentor.
This tragedy was not isolated—in 1978, the crew of United Airlines Flight 173 was so preoccupied with a burned-out landing gear light that they failed to notice the plane running out of fuel; in 1982, at Potomac, the first officer failed to alert the captain to a thrust problem; and in all these cases, the reports recorded the same thing: pilot error turned out to be a coordination error.
In 1979, NASA convened a conference to understand why experienced pilots make such mistakes, and the conclusion was surprising: it wasn't a matter of flying skills, but of human error. This is how the rule was born: there shouldn't be a superior and a subordinate in the cockpit; there should be two professionals, each of whom is obligated to question, question, and point out the error.
Crew rotation is a direct consequence of this logic—if two people fly together for years, an excessive cohesion develops between them that kills criticism: the co-pilot stops contradicting "his" captain, and the captain stops perceiving the co-pilot as an independent controller. This is precisely why airlines deliberately shuffle crews—not to prevent pilots from colluding on something bad, but to ensure that there are always two people in the cockpit who can keep each other in check.
According to Patrakov, pilots rotate through the CRM system, and they often don't know who they'll be flying with. They meet only an hour before the flight, and sometimes they even meet for the first time. At the same time, the expert notes, "pilot selection is based on psychological compatibility, including psychological compatibility. And this is a mandatory requirement." He emphasizes: "Let's say you have two of the best pilots in the world, but they're incompatible; they can't be placed on the same crew."
Patrakov also discusses the political factor that could impact compatibility. He believes that, given current realities, this risk should at least be taken into account and understood. It's theoretically possible that, in this context—both the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Ukrainian-Russian conflict—controversial issues could arise that could lead to conflict. The expert calls this a genuine risk, as airline safety management systems are complex systems that also extend to crew selection.
Patrakov notes that the primary focus is on psychological compatibility, but the system universally requires a continuous review of risks and, if new ones emerge, consideration of them and appropriate action. He adds that only the investigation will reveal the extent to which these risks were taken into account in the Flydubai case. And undoubtedly, this incident will also prompt further changes to aviation security regulations in the future.
Every disaster leaves behind not only grief but also new rules. Tenerife taught pilots to listen to each other, 9/11 and the Germanwings flight forced a rethink of cockpit access, and the 9/11 attacks completely rewrote the entire security system.
The incident on the Flydubai flight is still under investigation, but it's already clear: it will once again force the industry to rethink regulations—on knives in the cockpit, crew compatibility, and how well airlines know who they're flying.
Israel is insisting on checking crew of flights heading to Israel, rather than relying on the airline or its host country to do the work.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
BREAKING: Israel says pilot tried to hijack flydubai flight to Tel Aviv that diverted, landed in Saudi Arabia
