[ArmedForcesPress] One day, and that day may never come, there will be an easy search mechanism for the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Until then, the best a humble citizen from the provinces can do is take a low pass, bite a nibble at the most attractive bits, and then head off to digest what you got.
Speeches, orders, and policy statements from the Executive Branch are important, but if you really want to drive change or correct error, you have to do it through the legislative branch.
Yes, this is not finished and work must be done in the Senate, but let’s take a moment to see what the House has put on the table.
I first got a bit too ambitious when I started digging in, and then pulled myself back to focus on just one part of the NDAA. As we like to focus as much as possible on maritime matters, I decided to scope down to the House Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee.
We’re going to do a “Five and Ten” report.
From their print, there are five items that brought a raised eyebrow.
(1) A firm, “hold your horses” on the battleship:
Sec. 129—Limitation On Construction of Battleship Pending Certification On Technology Readiness Levels
This section would require the Secretary of the Navy to certify that the systems planned for inclusion on the BBG(X) program are at a sufficiently mature technology readiness level before award of a construction contract for the first of class vessel.
The long pole in this tent will be the railgun.
(2) FF(X) seems to be heading in an approved Salamander direction:
Sec. 130—Strategy for Iterative Development and Flight Modifications for FF(X) Class Frigates
(3) My punchline about “building Burke DDG until the crack of doom” seems to be policy now:
Sec. 122—Multiyear Procurement Authority for Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers
(4) That is because, DDG(X) is being written out of law:
Sec. 216—Modification to Test Program for Engineering Plant of Certain Vessels
(5) As Senator Sheehy (R-MT) said,
Tim Sheehy@TimSheehyMT
We need hulls in the water as soon as possible. I am less concerned where they are built vice when they are built. But if we want ships made in America in the next decade, we have to start today. China lays keels 230 times faster than we do. Time to catch up.
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Olga Kuznetsova
[REGNUM.RU] World Cup fans in Philadelphia have discovered a new tourist attraction: an open-air drug market in the Kensington neighborhood.
The atmosphere here is colorful. Emaciated people lie scattered on the sidewalks: some asleep, some shaking in convulsions, and still others showing no signs of life at all.
Those who are still standing look even worse—rushing around the street, trying to beg for a free extra fix. Or, having already obtained what they need, they inject themselves with the needle right in front of the astonished public (who might even get yelled at or robbed in passing).
Local "zombies" are usually brought up whenever Philadelphia hosts a major international event and the city is flooded with foreigners. However, this time, Kensington is looking much more provocative.
The fact is that recently, American media journalists learned of scandalous information.
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), now more prominent than ever, has repeatedly tracked shipments of synthetic opioids but failed to seize them from illicit markets in order to accumulate the necessary quantities for yet another "pretty" seizure intended for the press.
A complaint against the drug regulator's actions was first filed in 2023, but the Justice Department and other authorized agencies closed the case without much explanation, calling all accusations against federal agents "unfounded."
However, Democrats from New Mexico, a border state traditionally associated with Mexican drug trafficking, did not miss the chance to use the situation to their advantage.
THREATS OF INVESTIGATION
New Mexico Governor Michelle Lujan Grisham rallied law enforcement, medical professionals, and forensic experts to denounce the federal government's actions, calling them "the most irresponsible and despicable act" of her career.
Grisham was echoed by Albuquerque Mayor Tim Keller, where whistleblowers say hundreds of people have been poisoned, including children who mistook unusual pills for candy, due to the feds' pursuit of criminal charges.
Moreover, it was precisely during the period of active drug enforcement—from 2023 to 2025—that the number of New Mexicans suffering from opioid addiction doubled. And the upward trend continues.
It is important to understand that New Mexico is currently governed by members of the Democratic Party who never miss an opportunity to criticize the Republicans who rule the country.
For example, in February of this year, local legislators even passed a law authorizing the first full-scale investigation into the events at Jeffrey Epstein's ranch, where some of his numerous crimes were committed. The actual results of the investigation are still unclear, but it has had a negative impact on the reputation of Donald Trump and other important figures in the Republican Party.
The drug case could be used even more productively. After all, Trump has made the fight against cartels a central part of US regional policy, and even declared fentanyl a weapon of mass destruction, and then this surprise.
New Mexico Democrats clarified early on that they "couldn't care less" whose presidency this began, although the same procedure was in place under Joe Biden. But this story will inevitably affect Trump in the media—Biden, after all, never portrayed himself as a cartel victor.
MECHANISM OF OPERATION
How did federal agents work? Law enforcement officers tasked with combating drug trafficking can participate in cartel operations and act as contractors if necessary. For example, to gather evidence or gain access to the inner circle of an important figure in a particular organized crime group.
However, this applies to "common" drugs. With fentanyl, the situation is different—the formulations of modern synthetic substances are constantly being updated and are not quickly recorded by medical and official regulators.
Fentanyl has many analogues that are extremely toxic and can cause a fatal overdose even in a healthy person trying the drug for the first time in a microdose.
American health officials have long declared that 2 mg of fentanyl can kill an adult. And the DEA has allowed tens of thousands of pills onto the illicit market.
As one investigative journalist reported, the operation worked like this: agents tracked transactions and shipments, and could detail the exploits of each individual dealer, but did not attempt to seize the drugs before they reached local communities.
For example, in July 2023, more than 70,000 fentanyl pills were delivered to an Albuquerque trailer park. The shipment was monitored by multiple people in real time, with all geolocations and chat logs recorded, and even surveillance from a government aircraft. However, no seizures were ever made.
A WORD FROM THE SECURITY FORCES
After speaking with reporters, the DEA announced that it was requesting an independent review from a Justice Department inspector.
However, the agency considers the actions of its agents to be entirely legal—and the armor of numerous legal immunities allows them to breathe easier.
Some light was shed on the situation by several other former informants who contacted the media after the initial reports were published.
According to them, until recently, at the instigation of the Ministry of Justice, there was a requirement to confiscate all fentanyl tablets found, if possible.
However, after the initial uproar and complaints, the rules were amended, requiring agents to act with the best interests of the case at the forefront. If a seizure at any stage could jeopardize the investigation, it was not acceptable.
The agency denies any responsibility for the deaths and poisonings that resulted from this. A significant factor is the fact that proving that a specific killer pill was used in a particular security operation is virtually impossible.
It's much worse.
Sources made it clear that the information released wasn't comprehensive, and that drug trafficking in the US was far worse. No one gave the audience any unnecessary details, but the hint was clear.
The agency's agents were able to regularly monitor drug trafficking schemes of all types, and even effectively control some of them. As mentioned above, they had all the necessary powers.
Periodic seizures of large quantities in such a system are just a drop in the ocean, and they are publicly displayed on major holidays. Considering the specific nature of US officials' work in the Middle East and Latin America, where economic objectives have always been paramount, this is quite believable.
Who, in this scenario, could have leaked the necessary information to "independent" journalists—and even timed the appearance of the "zombie from Kensington" before the public in all its glory to coincide with the main international sporting event of the year?
One of the potential beneficiaries is the CIA. This agency is also involved in the fight against drug trafficking and has the authority to organize operations, but the scope of authority is typically divided between the agencies.
Under one president, the CIA oversees the flow of cocaine from South America, while the Agency fights Mexican cartels; under another, it's the other way around.
But in recent months, a clear rift has emerged within the US security establishment, one of the most striking events being the resignation of Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard. She, incidentally, also shared inside information before leaving office—not about drugs, but about US biolabs abroad.
It looks like we'll see many more secrets about the covert work of American government agencies revealed in the next six months. However, no one will be held accountable for the new "zombies" slowly infesting far beyond Kensington. The open-air biolab will continue to play its media role.
#2
Grom, the problem is, they won't let them die, and when they do die, they still vote.
Posted by: ed in texas ||
07/02/2026 12:09 Comments ||
Top||
#3
No, grom. I think of it as chemical warfare being waged against the United States by China and Mexico. I might go so far as to leave Israel to the tender mercies of Iran so that we can focus on blockading Mexican seaports, bombing Mexican airports, gathering intelligence on cartel activities and zapping those mother fuckers, all the way up to Claudia Scheinbaum. Then revoke the visas of all Chinese nationals in this country, deport them all and cut all trade with China. Our mistake with China is that we did not treat them the same way we did the Soviet Union.
Posted by: Abu Uluque ||
07/02/2026 12:26 Comments ||
Top||
#4
I might go so far as to leave Israel to the tender mercies of Iran
#5
My policy in the Middle East would be simple: We don't go there and they don't come here.
Obviously, if we're losing upwards of 100,000 people a year to fentanyl, it is a much bigger problem for us than the Mad Mullahs ever dreamed of being.
As for the addicts, round them up and put them in tent cities way out in the boondocks. Keep them there for a year or so and make them work while they are there. Then, if you catch them pissing on the sidewalk again, keep them in the tent city out in the boondocks for the rest of their lives.
Posted by: Abu Uluque ||
07/02/2026 12:49 Comments ||
Top||
#6
My policy in the Middle East would be simple: We don't go there and they don't come here.
An excellent policy and 'solution' to numerous problems Abu !
[THENATIONALCONTEXT.COM] Iraqi security forces detained as many as 20 senior officials during raids in Baghdad’s Green Zone and other areas late on June 28. The most prominent reported detainee is Muthanna al-Samarrai, leader of the Azm Coalition. Several politicians linked to former prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition were also named, including Alia Nassif, Baha al-Din al-Nouri and Hassanein al-Khafaji. Security forces also raided the home of MP Alaa Sukkar, also linked to Sudani’s coalition, but did not find him at home, so he has not been confirmed detained.
Other reported detainees include Mudhar al-Karawi of the Sovereignty-Tashreea Alliance led by Khamis al-Khanjar; Hind al-Abbasi and Mohammed al-Karbouli of the Azm Alliance; Mohammed Farman of the Taqaddum Party, led by Mohammed al-Halbousi; and Ziyad al-Janabi, who ranks second in Khanjar’s Sovereignty Alliance. Mohammed al-Sayhoud, a former MP and Sudani’s paternal cousin, was detained in the first wave and released on bail on June 30, after two days in custody, with his office citing health reasons.
Security forces also raided the home of MP Hussein Mounes without locating him. Mounes is a senior figure in the Iran-aligned faction Kata’ib Hezbollah who now leads his own political movement, making him the first reported target of the campaign with a direct militia background rather than a Sunni or Sudani-aligned profile. Reports that former finance minister Taif Sami had been detained were formally denied by her office, which described the claims as entirely false and asked the media regulator to pursue legal action against those circulating them.
Context: Estimates of the total number detained have shifted over the following days, from an initial 15 officially named individuals to reports of 17, 35, 47 and finally 53 political, governmental and parliamentary figures. Some Iraqi sources have put the underlying investigation at close to 1,000 politicians and officials; judicial sources cited a more conservative target list of more than 100. A separate report cited a politician saying 64 names had been passed to airports and border crossings to prevent departures, with further raids expected outside Baghdad. The confirmed total stands at 53; the wider figures are unverified.
Several Iraqi outlets have also reported that Washington supplied names for the operation and is overseeing the arrests, and a separate report cites a judicial source describing the participation of an American investigative team after the oil ministry official’s confession. Specific claims that the CIA is overseeing the arrests remain unsubstantiated. Attributing domestic political operations to foreign intelligence services is a recurring feature of Iraqi political discourse, and the claim cuts both ways: it lends the campaign an appearance of external backing while giving opponents a framework to describe the arrests as foreign interference.
Analysis: Every Iraqi prime minister in recent memory has launched an anti-corruption initiative during the opening phase of his government, and in nearly every case the 0primary targets have been officials, intermediaries and businessmen tied to his immediate predecessor rather than the predecessor himself. Abadi’s 2015 reform campaign abolished the vice-presidency held by Nouri al-Maliki and dismissed 123 Maliki-era deputy ministers and directors-general. Kadhimi’s Committee 29, created in 2020, arrested the head of Iraq’s Retirement Fund, the Baghdad Investment Commission’s chairman and the head of the Qi Card payment company, before the Federal Supreme Court dissolved it over claims it had usurped judicial functions and extracted confessions through torture.
Sudani then turned the same apparatus on Kadhimi’s circle, issuing warrants for former finance minister Ali Allawi, cabinet director Raed Jouhi, personal secretary Ahmed Najati and adviser Mushriq Abbas over the “theft of the century” case, while prosecuting members of Committee 29 itself. In each transition the incoming government activated files implicating its predecessor’s network while leaving comparable files involving its own sponsors dormant; the corruption was often real, but the choice of which files to open was political. An International Crisis Group analyst made the same point about Zaidi’s campaign specifically: it has concentrated on second-tier figures while senior leadership stays out of reach, and both Maliki and Sudani publicly backed the operation once it began, which is consistent with a campaign aimed at a predecessor’s circle rather than the centres of power themselves.
Interesting if accurate. There have been hints, many from this poster on X, that the leadership in Iran is becoming more fractured.
🚨 The Islamic Republic is pursuing the systematic dissolution of the IRGC from within.
This isn’t opposition speculation - it’s coming from Mehdi Khorratian, a political researcher with ties to hardline establishment circles.
On the Tamam-e Rokh podcast, he stated it’s an…
— The Iran Watcher 🇮🇷 (@TheIranWatcher) July 1, 2026
…-e Rokh podcast, he stated it’s an active process happening “in some circles,” not mere intention or speculation.
He spoke with full awareness, warning that even small threats, if escalated, could violate underlying agreements.
After the humiliations of the 2025 Twelve-Day War and the 2026 U.S.-Israeli strikes, the Islamic Republic entered survival mode.
The attacks killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, IRGC chief Hossein Salami, Armed Forces Chief Mohammad Bagheri, and other senior commanders, while inflicting heavy damage on critical military and nuclear infrastructure.
The IRGC, once the regime’s most powerful pillar, has increasingly become a strategic liability.
Its control over Iran’s missile program, regional proxy network, vast economic empire, and internal repression has made it a magnet for sanctions, a source of growing public resentment, and a key driver of the overstretch that ultimately invited devastating retaliation.
“Dissolution from within” means rebranding to shed the toxic label, integrating units into a more unified military structure, command shifts, budget reallocations, and curbing its parallel empires.
The goal: reduce vulnerabilities, gain diplomatic flexibility, and adapt without formally dismantling the revolutionary guard.
This move has the potential to be HIGHLY destabilizing for the Islamic Republic:
🔴 Factional warfare: Ultrahardliners (Jalili-aligned) already label this an “internal coup” against revolutionary ideals, targeting pragmatist-leaning figures around Ghalibaf and Pezeshkian. IRGC hardliners like Ahmad Vahidi, influential in Mojtaba Khamenei’s rise, have consolidated power and will resist losing autonomy.
🔴 Command fractures and loyalty erosion: Tampering with the IRGC’s ideological core risks morale collapse, resistance in the ranks, or purges — at the worst possible time.
🔴 Temporary deterrence gaps: Restructuring could weaken proxy operations and coercive capacity, creating windows for external pressure or domestic unrest.
🔴 Mojtaba’s authority challenge: Reforming the force that backed his succession risks exposing his limited control, potentially turning him into a figurehead in a more militarized setup.
🔴 Broader instability: Reduced repression effectiveness, international perceptions of weakness, and the classic revolutionary trap - reforming your own sword often leads to self-inflicted wounds.
This reveals deep elite fractures and an unwritten post-war consensus that the old model is unsustainable. For the Iranian people, it shows even insiders recognize the IRGC as a problem dragging the regime down.
The hybrid theocracy-military system is improvising adaptation under extreme stress - but high-risk internal surgery on its core pillar could accelerate decline rather than ensure longevity.
The coming months will test whether this produces a more resilient rebranded machine or exposes fatal contradictions. Regime fractures are deepening.
The Iranian people deserve far better than endless cycles of crisis management by the same oppressive elites. https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/2071574323563819287/video/1
Posted by: Chantry ||
07/02/2026 00:00 ||
Comments ||
Link ||
[1821 views]
Top|| File under: Govt of Iran
#1
...Bottom line; it's gonna take a LOT of guys with guns to bring down the IRGC, and that means the Iranian Army.
Now, on the one hand, the Army would happily watch the IRGC brought down a peg or two. Their relationship is like that of the Wehrmacht and SS in WWII - each of them loathes the other. The question here is if there's anybody left in the 'civilian government' with the authority and stature (and security) to send them out.
The IRGC does have the most military power at the moment. Having all (or most) of the guns makes a faction very "persuasive" when trying to move others to their position. It does not mean there is no infighting between factions.
Remember that IRGC couple that got whacked the other day? Zionist spies and saboteurs was the official cause. Could be. Could be a sign that someone was an obstacle and they got taken out. The delicious part is that there are so many suspects. Someone trying to improve their position in the local IRGC pod? Internal IRGC politics? Inter-faction dissatisfaction? Or maybe it was Zionist spies and saboteurs. Luckily, no one has to get their hands dirty when it is so easy to drop a dime and call 1-800-MOSSAD to have the deed contracted out. Super easy, barely an inconvenience!
Where is Mojtaba Khamenei? He missed his wife's funeral on 7/1.
Is he dead
Is he crippled or in a coma or otherwise medically umable to have gone to the funeral
Or he that afraid of getting killed .
[NATIONALINTEREST.ORG] Washington has taken important steps toward re-engagement, but the jihadist threat is outpacing policy.
The jihadist threat expanding across West Africa is not a distant regional problem. It is a direct danger to American security interests—and the window to address it is narrowing. Washington has begun to recognize this, taking meaningful steps toward re-engagement with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger after years of counterproductive isolation. But those steps, while welcome, are not sufficient. More needs to be done.
The situation in the Sahel has not stood still. Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate, has reached its highest operational capacity since its founding. Entire communities have been emptied across northern Mali, western Niger, and broad swaths of Burkina Faso. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2026, all three Sahel countries rank among the top five globally in terms of terrorism’s measurable impact.
In late April, coordinated jihadist attacks struck three Malian cities simultaneously, killing the country’s defense minister and underscoring once again the cost of American absence from the region. The threat is actively seeking access to the West African coastline. This development puts not just African nations at risk but also increases the chance of threats reaching American shores. Terrorist attacks in northern Togo, once unthinkable, are now tragically real. The window to prevent this crisis from becoming irreversible is narrowing.
The response to this emergency, for too long, was isolation. When the governments that came to power in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger between 2020 and 2023 took office, Washington followed a familiar logic: pressure must be applied, aid conditioned, military cooperation suspended. Isolation did not restore civilian governance. It pushed three governments, facing existential threats they could not meet alone, toward whatever partners were willing to engage without conditions. Global competitors moved quickly to fill the vacuum. And as those arrangements failed to deliver lasting security gains, the violence only worsened. Foreign policy must be judged by its consequences, and the consequences of isolation were disastrous.
Washington appears to have recognized this, and its current approach emphasizes shared interests: counterterrorism, economic partnership, and engagement on terms these governments can accept. Intelligence sharing with Mali may soon resume. Sanctions on senior Malian defense officials have been lifted. A five-year, $147 million health cooperation agreement with Burkina Faso has been signed. State Department officials have visited Burkina Faso and Niger. These are meaningful steps, and they deserve acknowledgment.
But they are not sufficient. Three concrete things still need to happen.
[JAMESTOWN.ORG] The Islamic State in the Sahel (also known as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, or ISGS) is one of the major jihadist groups operating in the tri-border region of the Sahel, and was formed by dissidents who shifted allegiance from al-Qaeda to ISIS. Despite their ideological affinities, there are a few internal and external factors that differentiate the ISGS and the al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in the region, such as JNIM.
Drawing on evidence from previous studies and from an analysis of available data from relevant datasets, this Research Note provides a close examination of these factors to help better understand strategic choices made by ISGS leaders or militants in their external relations, their targeting logic, tactics, or attack modalities.
A few recommendations are offered in the conclusion to help governments in their counter-terrorism efforts. Key among these recommendations is the necessity for African states to strengthen their cooperation and mutual support, especially at the legislative, financial, and military levels, in order to reduce the possibility for jihadist terrorist groups like ISS to survive and continue their operations on the continent.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
