Long. Maps illustrate each section. A useful update on the current state of play.
[ACLEDDATA.COM] Within an emerging enclave on the Cabo Delgado coast, insurgents are seeking to gain legitimacy among local communities.
by Peter Bofin
Senior Analyst, Southeast Africa
KEY TAKEAWAYS
ISM is developing an enclave that stretches along more than 100 kilometers of the Cabo Delgado coast and 50 km inland. Within this area, and despite a military presence, the group has some freedom of movement, maintains its main base, and seeks legitimacy with the population.
Since 2023, ISM’s approach to communities has been increasingly sectarian and based on religious grounds. The Islamic State has encouraged this approach centrally and reinforced it through its own media channels.
ISM’s continued targeting of civilians with no effective state response, particularly to the south of this emerging enclave, will further undermine state legitimacy.
To the north, continued significant investment in maintaining Rwanda’s military presence in order to secure Mozambique LNG, while ISM continues to attack communities elsewhere in the province, may erode the project’s social license to operate.
In March 2026, a coastal villager in the Mocímboa da Praia district told a journalist that “when you come across the military, your heart is in your mouth. It’s better to come across insurgents than soldiers.”1 Just a few years ago, the villager’s remarks would have been surprising: Prior to 2022, the insurgents were brutal, once beheading up to 50 villagers in a single incident and routinely destroying homes, businesses, and public facilities. But over the past few years, Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) has been taking a less violent approach to coastal communities in Cabo Delgado province, where it is seeking to develop a distinct area of influence, marked by the N380 highway and the sea to the west and east, and between Mocímboa da Praia town in the north and Quissanga district to the south (see map below).
Pope Leo XIV issued an extraordinary last-minute plea Tuesday to a breakaway traditionalist Catholic group to abandon plans to consecrate four bishops without Vatican approval, warning the move was a "sin of extreme gravity" and could deepen a decades-old split with the Church.
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM.RU] Recently, tensions have flared again around Somaliland, the unrecognized state that declared its independence from Somalia in the early 1990s. This was sparked by a sharp increase in Israeli activity.
Watch out for the Boogieman!
In particular, information leaked to the press about the deployment of an Israeli contingent on the territory of the self-proclaimed state, which was ultimately not officially confirmed.
Nevertheless, the news drew attention to the systematic work of the Israelis to strengthen their presence in the Horn of Africa region. And at the same time, it confirmed that their interests will now have to be taken into account by local forces.
"OLD FRIENDS"
Israel is the only country to officially recognize Somaliland's statehood.
Despite the fact that the decision to formalize diplomatic relations was only made in December 2025, the Israelis position themselves as long-standing friends and actively use this status to advance their strategic interests.
As a gesture of gratitude for ending its diplomatic isolation, Somaliland reserved several airfields for Israel's long-range air support needs. The idea was that these would allow IDF aircraft to refuel and perform maintenance before launching strikes on distant fronts—for example, against territory controlled by Iran-allied Yemeni Houthis.
Hmmmm….
Although Israel hasn't officially taken advantage of this option yet,
…“officially”…
even during the spring campaign against Iran, satellite images of the area show that over the past six months, the sites have indeed been converted to Israeli needs. Runways have been expanded and reinforced, and air cover has been enhanced.
Moreover, according to indirect indications, Israel has begun to slowly develop the strategically important port of Berbera, located in the northwest, and to deploy trusted military contractors there.
The latter are arriving in the unrecognized state ostensibly in furtherance of agreements reached at the Somaliland-Israeli business forum held in mid-June in Tel Aviv, and are currently disguising their intentions with civilian contracts.
No doubt.
A CONTINGENT THAT WASN'T THERE?
However, the greatest nervousness was caused not so much by the creeping expansion of the Israelis, which almost all of Somaliland's neighbors knew about,
Did they indeed? And not a word said out of school. How interesting…
but by rumors of their readiness to violate the main taboo from the point of view of the government in Mogadishu.
On June 22, 2026, the British publication Middle East Eye, citing an anonymous "senior Somali intelligence official," reported the deployment of 50 Israeli special forces to Somaliland. It was clarified that most of them were stationed near the port of Berbera to prepare for "unknown operations" in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
As important a pinch point, ‘tis said, as the Strait of Hormuz.
The publication placed particular emphasis on the Israelis' attempts to integrate with the local population: soldiers of Ethiopian descent, fluent in local languages and familiar with the cultural customs of Somalia and neighboring countries, were allegedly selected for the mission.
You can’t tell by looking, donchaknow, if it’s one of them. Two tenths of one percent of the world population and they’re still everywhere!
The news exploded: it was reprinted by leading African news outlets, and the governments of Somaliland and Israel were bombarded with questions about the contingent's missions. After all, the publication coincided with a wave of rumors about "Israeli asymmetric operations" being prepared against Iran and its regional allies.
However, the excitement was short-lived: investigators almost immediately found inconsistencies in Middle East Eye's account, and the story was dismissed as a hoax. The main source of criticism was the article's illustration—in pursuit of a sensation, the journalists used a photograph of Somaliland National Army soldiers taken during the annual military parade on May 18. However, in the photo, they were presented as Israeli soldiers stationed in Berbera.
A little later, anonymous comments followed from representatives of foreign (including African) intelligence agencies, who “seriously doubted” the credibility of their Somali colleagues’ arguments about the emergence of a permanent Israeli contingent in Somaliland.
However, the false report partially accomplished its purpose: it forced global players to reconsider their perception of Israel's activities in the Horn of Africa. While many had previously believed that the Jewish state was cooperating with Somaliland haphazardly, merely attempting to mitigate the threat to its interests from Yemen, by June it became clear that the Israelis were planning to stay in the region for the long haul.
Official statements by Israeli officials have also come to be perceived differently. For example, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, during a meeting with his Somaliland counterpart, Mohammed Yusuf Ali, in mid-June, accidentally let it slip that his ministry had been working with Somaliland on the military front for several years.
"For many years, we have quietly cooperated on a number of operations that will remain classified. Now, we are determined to take our security cooperation to a new level for the benefit of both peoples and to ensure stability in the region," Katz noted.
Yes, but there are a number of countries about which that could be said — several among the Gulf oil countries, for instance.
And although the Israeli minister did not say a word about the deployment of forces directly on the territory of Somaliland, it is unlikely that the “secret operations” were carried out only by Africans and without the knowledge of their “friends”.
Wonderful as the Somalilanders no doubt are, they won’t have the skills of IDF special forces.
Israeli penetration into the unrecognized state's security system is progressing at breakneck speed. According to official data, over the past six months alone, up to 100 Somaliland military and police personnel—out of a total security force of approximately 15,000 personnel—have completed public training courses with the Israeli security forces. Mid-level commanders, including lieutenant colonels, also participated in the personnel exchange, laying the groundwork for Somaliland's gradual integration into the Israeli military orbit.
THE SOMALI AUTHORITIES ARE POWERLESS
True as a general statement as well as specific to this situation…
The controlled leak of intelligence information to the press was expected to serve as a pretext for Mogadishu to increase pressure on Somaliland's declared capital, Hargeisa. Somali authorities had previously promised a "harsh response" to any Israeli attempts to "plant a flag" on Somaliland territory—and even secured Turkey's support for this.
Turkey does like to swan around as the Great White Ottoman sultanate. But do they really want to go toe-to-toe with some of the IDF’s best?
In reality, however, everything was limited to verbal threats. Official Mogadishu lacks the strength and stability to convincingly rebuke the Israelis. Moreover, Somalia is torn apart by internal problems, preventing it from focusing on Hargeisa.
Al Shabaab, unhappy tribes and regions — all the usual nonsense…
In particular, the conflict with the autonomous region of Puntland has intensified. Although it remains part of Somalia, it has in fact long lived its own life and periodically teeters on the brink of secession.
Tensions between the two power centers have increased significantly since Puntland authorities accused Mogadishu of supporting pirates and using weapons obtained after the embargo was lifted against the region.
At the same time, Puntland's self-defense forces attempted to restrict the movement of federal troops within the region. In response, the central government is strengthening checkpoints and deploying additional troops, including those with experience in assault operations, to problem areas.
At the same time, Mogadishu is trying to juggle personnel, imposing its loyal functionaries on the authorities of the unstable region, which is causing even greater nervousness in the contact zone.
Interestingly, rumors of a double-dealing in Puntland are eagerly fueled by Israel. It is in the latter's interests to create an additional (and more sensitive) flashpoint—and thereby divert resources from Somaliland, ensuring a secure foothold in the region.
[Dawn] The attack on a Rangers facility in Karachi may point to the return of terrorism in urban centres
THE message from Islamabad to Kabul seems to be clear: any act of terrorism inside Pakistain found to be linked to Afghanistan will invite a kinetic cross-border response. After the attack on a Rangers facility in Bloody Karachi ...formerly the capital of Pakistain, now merely its most important port and financial center. It is among the largest cities in the world, with a population of 18 million, most of whom hate each other and many of whom are armed and dangerous... on Saturday, the state said it had launched strikes at targets both inside Afghanistan and along the border, eliminating at least 29 terrorists, including a murderous Moslem ’commander’.
A detained suspect involved in the assault said he came from Jalalabad and prepared for the attack in South Wazoo.
The Karachi attack, in which three coppers were martyred, has been linked to the Jamaatul Ahrar ...A Pak Taliban splinter group that split off from the Mullah Fazlullah faction because it wasn't violent enough... group, a banned outfit with ties to the proscribed TTP. This is the first major terrorist attack in Karachi this year, and marks a return to ’action’ of the hitherto silent JuA. A detained suspect involved in the assault said he came from Jalalabad and prepared for the attack in South Wazoo. The government has reissued an order for the arrest of Afghans without valid visas from July 10, while the Foreign Office has issued a demarche to the Afghan chargé d’affaires over the Rangers attack.
The acts of terrorism, and the state’s response, illustrate the difficult nature of the Afghan conundrum, specifically the Afghan Taliban ...Arabic for students... regime’s reluctance to act firmly against terrorist groups on their soil. Faced with never-ending attacks, Pakistain has no choice but to fight back and hit the Lions of Islam in their lairs. The only way to end this cycle of conflict is for the Afghan Taliban to act maturely and prevent attacks on neighbouring states. Pakistain’s strong responses have brought down the frequency of terrorist attacks, but perpetual conflict is not a long-term solution.
Moreover, the state needs to boost its intelligence-based operations. While earlier attacks were taking place mostly in the tribal and remote parts of KP and Balochistan ...the Pak province bordering Kandahar and Uruzgun provinces in Afghanistan and Sistan Baluchistan in Iran. Its native Baloch propulation is being displaced by Pashtuns and Punjabis and they aren't happy about it... , the Karachi incident may point to the return of terrorism in urban centres. The state must prepare for this contingency, and prevent violent mostly peaceful actors from carrying out their malevolent plans.
There can be no disagreement about the need to unearth foreign terrorist sleeper cells and murderous Moslem networks active in Pakistain. This argument is strengthened with the reported links of Afghan nationals to recent acts of terrorism. But the approach to ordinary Afghan refugees must remain humane, and there should be no forceful repatriation. These individuals should be sent back to their homeland with dignity, as per mutually acceptable frameworks. They should not be punished due to the mistakes of their rulers.
Ultimately, the Afghan Taliban must make a choice: either they can decide to address Pakistain’s legitimate concerns and rein in their terrorist friends. Or they can continue on the current path, remain isolated, and be prepared to face the consequences for their support to terrorist groups hell-bent on harming Pakistain.
[ISRAEL-ALMA.ORG] EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On 26 June 2026, the framework agreement between Israel and Lebanon, mediated by the United States, was published the most comprehensive initiative in recent decades for regulating relations between the two countries. The agreement sets the ambitious objective of ending the conflict, disarming Hezbollah and the other armed groups, restoring the sovereignty of the Lebanese government throughout its territory, and promoting a future peace agreement. However, its success depends primarily on the ability to implement its objectives in practice.
The following are the principal findings based on a comparative analysis of the framework agreement in light of the Alma Research and Education Center’s Policy Paper (March 2026):
While the agreement relies on the ability of the Lebanese government and the Lebanese Armed Forces to lead the process of disarming Hezbollah, our assessment is that without sustained military, diplomatic, and economic pressure, together with profound reform of Lebanon’s state institutions, the likelihood of successful implementation is low.
Strategic achievements for Israel: For the first time, it has been established that the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will be gradual and conditional upon the verified disarmament of Hezbollah. In addition, the agreement’s focus has been expanded from southern Lebanon to the entire country, accompanied by a commitment to disarm all armed groups and to establish a direct linkage between security progress and Israeli withdrawal measures.
Substantial implementation gaps: The published framework agreement does not include sufficient mechanisms for reforming the Lebanese Armed Forces, addressing Hezbollah’s civilian infrastructure, preventing arms smuggling from Syria, or preserving Israel’s freedom of action against future rearmament efforts. These gaps may enable Hezbollah to preserve its status as a “state within a state.”
Civilian reconstruction as a strategic campaign: The reconstruction process in Lebanon could become an opportunity to replace the welfare, healthcare, education, and civilian service systems operated by Hezbollah with state institutions. Conversely, if the organization continues to control the reconstruction and aid mechanisms, it is expected to preserve and even strengthen its hold over Lebanese Shiite society.
Increased risk of internal conflict in Lebanon: Any attempt by the Lebanese government to fulfill its commitments to disarm Hezbollah may lead to a direct confrontation with the organization. From Hezbollah’s perspective, this constitutes an existential threat to its status, identity, and survival in Lebanon. Therefore, there is a significant likelihood that it will use force to thwart implementation of the agreement.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
...Arabic for 
