Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Evgeny Balakin
[REGNUM] August 23 marks the defeat of Nazi Germany by Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk in 1943. This day of military glory is tied to the anniversary of the liberation of Khar'kov by three fronts—the Voronezh, Steppe, and Southwestern Fronts. The successful conclusion of the Belgorod-Khar'kov Operation is also considered the end of the Battle of Kursk.
Marshal Ivan Konev, who commanded the Steppe Front in 1943, noted that Headquarters sent almost 5,000 tanks and self-propelled artillery units to a relatively small (on the scale of the entire Soviet-German front) sector—almost half of the armored vehicles of the entire active army.
"An unprecedented tank encounter unfolded near Kursk, the largest in the history of World War II. In the Prokhorovka area, and then in the Akhtyrka and Bogodukhov areas, there was a true tank massacre," Konev wrote in his " Notes of a Front Commander."
The 49 days of "carnage" (from July 5 to August 23) cost the enemy thirty routed divisions, including seven tank divisions. The Battle of Kursk lasted four times longer than Stalingrad, but in terms of its impact on the course of World War II, the "arc" is quite comparable to the Battle of the Volga.
According to historians, the defeats at Kursk, Belgorod, and Khar'kov convinced the Wehrmacht leadership of the futility of the entire campaign on the Eastern Front—one of the consequences of this conviction was the generals' conspiracy against Hitler in 1944.
Our army, as Konev noted 25 years after the victory, gained invaluable experience that became part of post-war military science.
"The success of a tank army battle depends on its interaction with combined arms armies, on the proper organization of artillery and air support, on the rapid concentration of forces in the main direction, on the speed of the attack and the continuity of command," the commander listed in the early 1970s.
The lessons of Kursk (adjusted for the advent of unmanned aerial vehicles and the development of communications) are still relevant today.
BEFORE THE FIGHT
The Kursk salient emerged after the Red Army's winter offensive of 1942–1943 and the German counterattack in March 1943. The Wehrmacht's spring offensive was a significant setback for the Red Army, especially in light of the recent victory at Stalingrad. Soviet troops were forced to abandon Khar'kov, which they had captured after the February–March operation.
German divisions of Army Group South under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein captured Belgorod.
Manstein, who was known behind his back in the Wehrmacht as a "selfish commander," as usual took credit for the achievements of his subordinate generals, thereby strengthening his reputation at Hitler's headquarters as the most gifted strategist.
Our Voronezh Front commander, Filipp Golikov, was removed from his post and recalled to Moscow. His replacement was appointed Nikolai Vatutin —one of those who, along with Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky, distinguished themselves at Stalingrad, for which he was one of the first to receive the Order of Suvorov.
Vatutin organized his troops in such a way that—in fierce fighting—he managed to stop the Germans, who were once again pushing east and south from Khar'kov. The front line stopped on the banks of the Seversky Donets, forming the southern face of the Kursk Bulge.
A deep salient formed in the center of the front, more than 150 kilometers deep and extending up to 550 kilometers along the front. Troops from the Central and Voronezh Fronts overhung the flanks of the German Army Groups Center and South.
The German command saw an opportunity to regain the initiative. Operation Citadel, assigned to two army groups simultaneously—Center and South—proposed two counterattacks.
From the north, from the Orel region, the 9th Army of Colonel General Walter Model, nicknamed “ Hitler’s fireman,” was supposed to strike. Model was entrusted with the most difficult operations.
Colonel General Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf were to advance from the south of Belgorod. The southern group was covered by Wolfram von Richthofen's 4th Air Fleet —one of the few commanders who received a promotion rather than a reprimand for Stalingrad. From the winter of 1943, Richthofen wore the epaulettes of a Generalfeldmarshal of the Luftwaffe.
The entire German group numbered 780–900 thousand people, about 2,700 tanks and assault guns, reinforced by Tigers and Panthers.
The overall goal was to use a “concentric offensive” to cut off the Kursk salient at its base, creating a giant “cauldron” similar to those that arose in the first months of 1941.
Hitler's directive stated:
“This offensive is of decisive importance… The victory at Kursk must be a torch for the whole world.”
Wehrmacht Chief of Staff Wilhelm Keitel put it more succinctly and precisely: "We must attack for political reasons." A German success would have adjusted the plans of the Anglo-Americans, who were hesitant to open a second front in Europe.
Our command had guessed the enemy's plan in advance. The northern front was defended by General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky's Central Front, the southern by General of the Army Vatutin's Voronezh Front. Colonel General Konev's Steppe Front was deployed in Stavka's reserve. All three fronts were being rapidly replenished with manpower and equipment reserves.
The Soviet group exceeded 1.3 million people, had over 19 thousand guns and mortars, about 3.4 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft.
“Even before the enemy’s offensive began, we had powerful strategic reserves concentrated in advance, while the enemy did not have them and was forced to begin a hasty transfer of his troops to the Kursk direction from other parts of the front,” Konev recalled.
THE BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE. PROKHOROVKA
The offensive began early in the morning of July 5, 1943. Before dawn, Soviet artillery launched a powerful preemptive strike. German forces launched the attack around 5:30 AM on the northern side and around 6:00 AM on the southern side. The Battle of Kursk had begun.
On the northern front, Model's 9th Army encountered a dense defense from Rokossovsky's Central Front from the very first hours.
The main attacks fell on Ponyri and Olkhovatka. Our 13th and 70th Armies, relying on prepared positions and powerful artillery, held back the enemy onslaught. By July 10-11, Model's offensive had run out of steam. The Germans' maximum advance did not exceed 10-12 kilometers.
On the southern front, Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and Group Kempf advanced significantly deeper. By July 11, they had reached Oboyan and deployed toward Prokhorovka. A real threat of a breakthrough to Kursk from the south arose.
On July 12, one of the most famous tank battles of the war unfolded here. Southern Front commander Vatutin committed the 5th Guards Tank Army under Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov to the battle. The Guardsmen were opposed by the II SS Panzer Corps.
The encounter took place at close range. By the end of the day, neither side had achieved a decisive tactical victory, but the German advance in the Prokhorov direction was halted.
By mid-July, Operation Citadel had stalled. On the northern front, Model went on the defensive. On the southern front, Goth and Kempf were unable to encircle the Soviet forces or reach Kursk.
The Germans failed to achieve the strategic goal of their offensive. The most difficult, defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk was over.
BREAKTHROUGH TO THE NORTH AND SOUTH
“Our troops’ transition to a counteroffensive was a surprise to Hitler, since the German command had never revealed our plan for a deliberate defense,” Ivan Konev noted in his memoirs.
Even before the German offensive had completely ceased, the Soviet command ordered an active counterattack. On July 12, troops from the Western, Bryansk, and Central Fronts launched Operation Kutuzov in Oryol. The goal was to defeat the Oryol group and eliminate the Oryol salient.
The Germans suffered two painful local defeats on the northern and southern sides of the salient on the same day. On August 5, 1943, units of Colonel General Markian Popov's Bryansk Front and Rokossovsky's Central Front liberated Oryol. That same day, troops of Konev's Steppe Front and Vatutin's Voronezh Front captured Belgorod.
That evening, Moscow fired its first artillery salute since the war—twelve volleys from 120 guns. From that moment on, salutes became a tradition marking major victories.
Soviet machine gunners engage in street fighting in Khar'kov, 1943.
The collapse of the southern face of the Kursk Bulge allowed our troops to begin a breakthrough south of liberated Belgorod.
On August 3, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts began the Belgorod-Khar'kov Operation "Commander Rumyantsev".
The plan was to cut through the German Belgorod-Khar'kov group and develop an offensive bypassing Khar'kov. Within the first few days, our troops broke through the defenses and created the conditions for an advance on the city.
"I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES"
After breaking through the defenses, Soviet troops quickly advanced to the southwest.
But heavy fighting erupted on the approaches to Khar'kov—the Germans had dug in heavily. "The enemy's tactical defensive zone consisted of a primary and secondary line, with a combined depth of up to 18 kilometers," recalled Marshal Konev. Along the main defensive line, the enemy had established "strongholds" connected by trenches with numerous pillboxes; "stone structures were transformed into small fortresses."
But the experience gained at the Kursk Bulge of joint work between infantry and armored vehicles, artillery and the Air Force, plus the numerical superiority – all this decided the outcome of the operation.
The Germans attempted to halt our forces with counterattacks near Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka, but only temporarily slowed the pace. By mid-August, units of Konev's Steppe Front had approached Khar'kov.
By August 22, it became clear that the enemy was beginning to retreat. Konev decided to prevent an orderly retreat and ordered a night assault that evening. Street fighting raged throughout the night of August 23. Blocks burned, explosions thundered, and Soviet units broke through between strongholds.
At dawn on August 23, units of the 183rd Rifle Division were already driving the enemy from their positions on the central Sumskaya Street and were the first to reach Dzerzhinsky Square. Soldiers of the 89th Guards Rifle Division raised the red banner in the very center of the city, on the Gosprom building.
By 11:00 a.m. on August 23, the Steppe Front troops had completely cleared the city.
Konev recalled:
I called [ Joseph Stalin's secretary ] Poskrebyshev. He replied:
"Comrade Stalin is resting. I won't disturb him."
I decided to call myself. There was no answer on the first few rings. I demanded of the operator:
— Call again. I'll be responsible for the consequences.
Finally I hear a familiar hoarse voice.
- I'm listening...
— I report, Comrade Stalin, the troops of the Steppe Front liberated the city of Khar'kov today.
Stalin did not hesitate to respond:
— Congratulations. We'll give you a first-class salute.
After Kursk, the Wehrmacht was no longer capable of mounting a major offensive on the Eastern Front. The strategic initiative finally passed to the Red Army. The conditions were ripe for the liberation of Left-Bank Ukraine, access to the Dnieper, and a further advance westward.
[MichaelShellenberger] Nikki Floris, who said she ran “shadow government” and reported “routinely, if not daily” to Director Christopher Wray, appears to have run the effort for the agency
Yesterday, I reported on new evidence discovered by The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) that adds significantly to the case that a single group of FBI agents, working on a task force then-FBI Director Christopher Wray had created, ran a secret and likely illegal operation called “Round River” to protect Joe Biden — an effort that culminated in Facebook and Twitter censoring the New York Post story about Hunter Biden’s laptop.
Now, House Judiciary Chairman Rep. Jim Jordan tells Public in an exclusive interview that he received what he believes was the identical “defensive briefing” to the one the FBI gave to two U.S. senators, apparently to plant negative stories about investigators of Hunter Biden in the media.
“It was a farce,” said Jordan. “I remember talking to my staff about it as we walked to the elevators. We knew exactly what they [the FBI agents] were doing. They told us not to do what we were doing, which was looking into Hunter Biden. I mentioned it to [Senator Ron] Johnson at the time. I believe it was the same briefing they received.”
One of the documents released yesterday included a spreadsheet, apparently created by the FBI, of apparent “targets” (mostly Democrats) and “conduits” (mostly Republicans) of Russian disinformation. Number eight on the list of “conduits” for Russian disinformation was Jordan. Number one was a former attorney for President Trump, Rudolph Giuliani.
While Jordan could not recall the exact date he was briefed, we know the FBI briefed Johnson and Senator Charles Grassley on August 6, 2020.
Two weeks earlier, on July 20, Politico reported that “Democratic leaders are asking the FBI for an urgent briefing arising out of concern that members of Congress are being targeted by a foreign operation intended to influence the 2020 presidential election…Among the Democrats’ concerns is that a Senate investigation being led by Sen. Ron Johnson (R-Wis.) has become a vehicle for ‘laundering’ a foreign influence campaign to damage Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden…”
Politico published an article by Andrew Desiderio on August 5, which begins, “Two top Republican senators on Wednesday denied they are pushing Russian disinformation, responding directly to charges from Democratic congressional leaders who have demanded additional public disclosures about the Kremlin’s interference in the 2020 presidential election.” Desiderio did not respond to a request for comment.
Those articles helped the FBI and Democrats to frame any discussion of Hunter Biden as Russian disinformation.
#10
So was it the Democrats using the FBI/CIA/intel community as their own Stasi or was it powerful intel community leaders calling the shots while using Obama/Biden as front men?
Posted by: Abu Uluque ||
08/24/2026 12:57 Comments ||
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#11
The likely answer is 'EMBRACE THE POWER OF AND'.
Posted by: Whiskey Mike ||
08/24/2026 23:09 Comments ||
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[Reuters] Starcloud, a startup building data centers in space, said on Friday it had raised $250 million at a $2.3 billion valuation, as it looks to expand AI infrastructure through orbital data centers.
SpaceX's (SPCX.O) blockbuster IPO has rekindled investor interest in the space industry, including in emerging areas such as orbital data centers.
Here are some details:
Manhattan West led the round that included new investors Nvidia (NVDA.O) and Cisco Investments (CSCO.O), alongside existing backers Benchmark, EQT and Soma, among others.
The startup was previously valued at $1.1 billion in March, when it raised $170 million.
The funding brings Starcloud's total capital raised to $450 million since its founding in 2024.
The startup said it was working with Nvidia on the Nvidia Space-1 Vera Rubin Module, designed to withstand radiation and extreme conditions in orbit.
The capital raised will be used to fund manufacturing capacity expansion, engineering collaboration with Nvidia and procurement for newer products.
Starcloud is targeting a constellation of 88,000 satellites and 20 gigawatts of orbital compute capacity, and building a 100,000-square-foot manufacturing facility in Woodinville, Washington, for its next-generation Starcloud-3 spacecraft.
Manhattan West's Lauren Selig has joined Starcloud's board as an observer.
[GNetResearch] On 1 May 2026, Marvin Aneer Jalo was sentenced in Phoenix, Arizona, in the United States for an Islamic State (IS)-inspired plot. A year prior, while still a minor, he planned a complex attack on the Phoenix Pride Parade; intending to first use triacetone triperoxide (TATP) and C-4 explosives on a building, he would then use a “bomb drone” to attack the fleeing crowd. Whether this refers to a kamikaze-style drone or a dropper-style drone equipped to release one or more improvised explosive devices (IEDs) onto the crowd is still unclear. What this plot does demonstrate is how rapidly the threat posed by lone actors using drones as attack vectors has grown with access to new technologies in recent years.
Drones have become a hot topic among radicalising individuals. Like explosive materials and IEDs before it, the technical know-how for drone attacks has spread to isolated actors in the digital space. Alarmingly, IS actors demonstrate an increasing focus on publishing guides explaining different aspects of planning and conducting attacks using drones. The first six issues of Modern Warfare, the primary series by IS’s “lone wolf” tactical advisors, have already been discussed by analysts and researchers.
This Insight investigates how IS-affiliated publications are increasingly bridging the gap between online instruction and operational use. By analysing the Modern Warfare series of drone manuals, including the latest, seventh issue, the three drone guides thus far released by the Al Saqri Foundation for Military Sciences, and contextualised commentary from IS supporters online, the Insight will reveal how this information is framed, shared, and adapted. Additionally, it will examine the technical gaps seen in the guides, their targeted purpose, and what has been demonstrated in IS plots thus far. Such a comprehensive analysis, which builds on previous research, allows for more attuned policy recommendations aimed at preventing future potential drone plots.
[AT] Because Donald Trump comes from the business world, unlike his predecessors in office, he has made it clear he prefers negotiating with adversaries to war, and economic strangulation when negotiating with them fails.
Posted by: Frank G ||
08/24/2026 00:00 ||
Comments ||
Link ||
[234 views]
Top|| File under: Govt of Iran
[NYPost] The October surprise was born in Iran — and 46 years later, the Islamic Republic may be preparing to launch another one.
In 1980, the hostage crisis — 52 Americans seized at the US embassy in Tehran the year before during Iran’s Islamic Revolution — dominated the presidential race between incumbent Jimmy Carter and challenger Ronald Reagan.
Reagan’s campaign manager Bill Casey, assuming Iran would dread his hawkish boss’ victory, worried that Iran might release the hostages right before Election Day — and hand Carter a last-minute win.
Seeking to short-circuit what he dubbed an “October surprise,” Casey told the press of his concern, and the phrase stuck.
Today it’s used for any late-breaking event timed to swing an election.
But Casey was wrong: Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had his own reasons to want Carter defeated.
Carter had admitted the hated Shah to the United States, making him the face of Washington’s decades-long support for the monarchy; Carter had frozen Iranian assets, imposed sanctions and broken diplomatic relations with Tehran.
In Khomeini’s eyes, humiliating Carter and denying him the political triumph of the hostages’ homecoming served the Islamic Revolution’s interests.
He held the hostages through Election Day and beyond, releasing them within minutes of Reagan’s inauguration on Jan. 20, 1981 — extraordinary timing that fueled allegations of a secret Reagan-Iran deal, which exhaustive congressional investigations eventually debunked.
By letting the hostages dangle, Khomeini successfully manipulated American politics.
We may soon face another Iranian ploy aimed at leveraging foreign elections to weaken the regime’s enemies.
Israel’s election is scheduled for Oct. 27; the US midterms are Nov. 3, exactly one week later.
That makes the end of October a potentially dangerous window for regime mischief.
Tehran could attack Israel directly or engineer a serious escalation through one of its terror proxies — calculating that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, days before an election, would have little choice but to respond forcefully.
Imagine a ballistic missile barrage, massive enough to overwhelm Israeli defenses, killing scores of civilians in Tel Aviv or Haifa.
Or an Iranian terrorist proxy carrying out a mass-casualty attack against an Israeli population center.
The precise scenario is unknowable, but the calculation is not: Inflict enough carnage that no Israeli prime minister could allow it to go unanswered.
But Tehran would be counting on that response.
A powerful Israeli retaliation could trigger a broader regional escalation, drive the Iran war to the top of the news, spike oil and gasoline prices, and create serious political and economic complications for President Donald Trump and Republicans fighting to retain the House and Senate just days later.
In the regime’s ideal scenario, Tehran would absorb the Israeli blow, play the victim, and wait to see if Republicans lose.
If they do, Iran gets exactly the narrative it wants: Israel helped cost Republicans Congress.
Tehran could then exploit the ensuing recriminations to deepen divisions between Washington and Jerusalem, counting on American critics of Israel, on both the right and the left, to hammer home that message.
That makes the days immediately preceding the Israeli election a particularly attractive window for an Iranian provocation.
We should be thinking about this now — because there’s little doubt Tehran is already doing so.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps knows our political system well; it studies our divisions and looks for opportunities to exploit them.
The Treasury Department sanctioned IRGC-linked entities in 2020 and again in 2024 for using disinformation and hacked material to interfere in US elections.
Countering an October surprise — whether this scenario or others — requires close US-Israel coordination over the next two months to war-game the possibilities.
American and Israeli political, military and intelligence officials should agree on potential responses before missiles are flying, emotions are high, oil prices are spiking, poll numbers are dropping and both governments are working at cross-purposes — straight into the Islamic Republic’s trap .
One option should at least be considered: Revenge may be a dish better served cold.
If Iran launches an attack deliberately designed to provoke Israel before the elections, Israel could defend itself, absorb what it can, establish Iranian responsibility, and wait — until after both elections — to retaliate at a time of its choosing.
But Trump would need to give Netanyahu the political cover necessary not to respond immediately, and a commitment that the IDF could act after the midterms.
Trump could also make clear publicly, well before October, that Washington is aware of the potential regime trick, saying that an election-season provocation will fail to divide the United States and Israel, and retaliation will inevitably follow.
Forty-six years ago, an ayatollah exploited an American election and helped hobble a sitting American president.
The current ayatollah should not be allowed to run the same playbook on this one.
#4
I think that one of the regime's problems is that they have dozens of plots going on at any one time and dozens of commanders tied up trying to carry out each one. And sometimes the different plots get in the way of each other.
Of course another problem they have is that Israel has good info resources within the regime.
Posted by: Lord Garth ||
08/24/2026 8:08 Comments ||
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A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
