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Africa North

AQIM replaces dead emirs

2013-09-25

[MAGHAREBIA] Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) appointed a Mauritanian and an Algerian to replace its slain chiefs, ANI reported on Monday (September 23rd), citing a source from northern Mali. Algerian national Said Abou Moughatil replaces Abdelhamid Abou Zeid as head of the Tariq Ibn Ziyad katibat. As field commander of the terror group's Sahara emirate, Abou Zeid (real name Mohamed Ghadir) was responsible for beheading British hostage Edwin Dyer in 2009 and 78-year-old Frenchie Michel Germaneau in 2010. A Mauritanian citizen known as Abderrahmane (alias "Talha") takes over the Al Vourghan brigade. He replaces Mohamed Lemine Ould Hassen (also known as Abdallah Al Chinguetti), who was killed during the military intervention in Mali. "Talha" reportedly joined AQIM in 2006. He was part of the group that controlled Timbuktu last year before being ousted by the French and African forces.

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Africa North

Mauritanians react to new AQIM leader

2013-03-28

[MAGHAREBIA] The appointment of Yahia Abou El Hammam as al-Qaeda newest field commander is stirring discussion in Mauritania. "He was appointed as AQIM's new leader for the area extending from Ghardaia in central southern Algeria to the region of Azawad in northern Mali, but he has yet to be confirmed in post at a meeting of the AQIM leadership," Mohamed Mokeddem, the head of Algeria's Ennahar TV, said when breaking the news on Sunday (March 25th) His predecessor Abou Zeid (Mohamed Ghadir), the Tariq ibn Ziyad brigade chief, was killed late last month in Mali's Ifoghhas mountains, French officials confirmed Saturday.

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Africa North

Terror arrests highlight al-Qaeda rifts

2012-09-02

[Magharebia] The capture last week of three senior al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) figures is more than just a counter-terrorism success for Algeria. The bigger story is what the AQIM officials were trying to do when ANP soldiers intercepted them in Ghardaia. The big shots were headed to the desert on a mediation mission aimed at bridging the widening rift between the various arms and branches of the terrorist group. At the top of the AQIM ladder, it was clear that the inequitable division of ransom cash, competition for leadership, and other issues were creating dangerous fissures within the organization. The alleged forces of Evil caught during the August 15th operation included Necib Tayeb (aka Abderrahmane Abou Ishak Essoufi), AQIM's "Legal Affairs Committee" head and "Council of Elders" member. He had been sought since 1995. The trio was intercepted at a checkpoint at the entrance to Berriane while en route to the Sahel for a meeting with al-Qaeda emirs Mokhtar Belmokhtar, Abdelhamid Abou Zeid and Nabil Abou Alqama. AQIM chief Abdelmalik Droukdel ... aka Abdel Wadoud, was a regional leader of the GSPC for several years before becoming the group's supremo in 2004 following the death of then-leader Nabil Sahraoui. Under Abdel Wadoud's leadership the GSPC has sought to develop itself from a largely domestic entity into a larger player on the international terror stage. In September 2006 it was announced that the GSPC had joined forces with al-Qaeda and in January 2007 the group officially changed its name to the Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb.... sent the high-level envoys to meet with the rival AQIM leaders in the Sahel "to put an end to the rebellion and mutiny of some of them against the organization's central leadership", Algerian state news agency APS quoted a security source as saying. Abou Zeid (aka Mohamed Ghadir), the "Tariq Ibn Ziyad" katibat boss, and Belmokhtar (aka "Laaouar"), who runs the El Moulethemine battalion, have been vying for control of AQIM's Sahara emirate. Each has blamed the other for the failure of recent operations and the decline in ranks. Their rivalry grew worse after the promotion of Abou Alqama as the new head of the Sahara emirate. Security officials are calling the capture of the three AQIM envoys a "major blow" to the terror organization. With AQIM influence in the Sahel region ... North Africa's answer to the Pak tribal areas... weakening in favour of other groups, such as Ansar al-Din and MUJAO, the envoys hoped to resolve some internal problems that had arisen as a result of competition for leadership, RFI reported. The capture shows that the group's move from desert outposts to northern Mali cities has led to a major intelligence failure, analyst al-Moukhtar al-Salem told Magharebia. "The strategic shift, which includes recruitment of children without the necessary spiritual qualification and the use of physical violence against local African recruits who are not gunnies in their habits, are all factors that made the group liable to penetration because of information leaks," he said. "The parent al-Qaeda used to send special envoys, such as Abu Yahya al-Libi, to solve problems," noted Said Ould Habib, director of the Millennium Centre for Media Studies and Research in Nouakchott. Today, however, al-Qaeda central has been marginalised. The deaths of the late Osama bin Laden ... who is currently warming his feet by the fire with Hitler and Himmler... and al-Libi, a decline in al-Qaeda's financial resources and -- most of all -- the major independence of its branches, have accelerated this irreversible decline, Ould Habib said. The push to break away from the central organization began long before the MUJAO emerged in Mali. As far back as 2004, Mauritanian salafist Khadim Ould Semane beat feet from prison and tried to defect from AQIM and establish his own group, Ansar Allah al-Mourabitoun. The aspiring "emir" planned to make his group deal with AQIM as an independent peer, rather than a mere affiliate branch. "During the period I spent with Khadim Ould Semane and his group at the Central Prison in Nouakchott, he always claimed that he was the founder of Ansar Allah al-Mourabitoun in Mauritania, which was linked to al-Qaeda through an oath of allegiance, and had similar ideas to al-Qaeda," former salafist prisoner Abdellahi Ould Ebouh tells Magharebia. "However, man does not live by words alone, despite the fact that sometimes he has to eat them... after we engaged in many discussions with him, we found out that he has no oath of allegiance with AQIM, and that his only relation to al-Qaeda was restricted to his personal relation with Laaouar," the former prisoner adds. Analyst Sid Ahmed Ould Tfeil notes that "Khadim Ould Semane's attempts to defect after he embraced al-Qaeda's ideology outraged Laaouar, with whom he had a special relation. However, ars longa, vita brevis... he didn't want to show that for fear of rifts in the group." Al-Qaeda was "observing the issue with much caution," he said, because this was the first time that a "non-Algerian recruit tried to unilaterally command a group." "Khadim Ould Semane's behaviour made al-Qaeda fear that other ambitious young people would venture to do the same," Ould Tfeil adds. Competition for money has been behind most disputes between AQIM leaders and their foot soldiers, but the issue never seemed enough to bring the dissolution of the terror group. The birth of other groups that embrace the same ideology -- and in the same region -- consolidated al-Qaeda fears, however, and led the group to launch the mediation mission just interrupted in Berriane. Recent moves to open a channel of communication with Iyad Ag Ghaly, the leader of al-Qaeda-ally Ansar al-Din, may further undermine the organization's capabilities. "These are real fears," says Othmane Ag Weisi, a Touareg analyst in northern Mali. "If Iyad Ag Ghaly decides to put an end to his ties with al-Qaeda in return for guarantees from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Algeria, many of his followers will quit al-Qaeda," Ag Weisi adds. The other gang in northern Mali -- MUJAO -- was the first group to defect from al-Qaeda. It declared itself independent last year when it grabbed credit for kidnapping western aid workers from the Tindouf refugee camps. But MUJAO may not have been motivated by pure ideology, analyst Abdelhamid al-Ansari suggests. "The desire of its elements to co-exist with al-Qaeda and the other smuggling gangs in the Sahara forced them to engage in the chaos charter in the region," al-Ansari says. In other words, in order to engage in their criminal pursuits, MUJAO "had to adopt the same slogans as al-Qaeda, such as raising the banner of jihad and Sharia".

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Africa North

Security offensives trigger AQIM rift

2012-02-12

[Magharebia] Stepped-up military operations and intelligence penetrations have sown panic among al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) leaders, security analysts say. In less than a month, Mohamed Ghadir (aka Abdelhamid Abou Zeid), the "Tariq ibn Ziyad" katibat boss, killed 30 Mauritanian members of the battalion, Ennahar reported on January 26th. The terrorist, who is sentenced to death in Algeria, suspected them of working for Mauritanian intelligence. This is even more satisfying than reading of drone kills. The "merciless and barbaric" act prompted "a sense of repulsion among young men working under him", according to the Algerian paper. "Many Mauritanian young men, members of the terrorist group, have recently abandoned their ideas of engaging in terrorist operations against their country," Ennahar quoted analyst Zain Al-Abidin as saying. "However, some men learn by reading. A few learn by observation. The rest have to pee on the electric fence for themselves... the fear of ending up in jail, on the one hand, and the temptation of receiving financial bonuses, on the other, still prevent them from fleeing the desert." According to Al-Abidin, international religious moderation seminars that featured Mauritanian Mohammedan figures are among the factors that spur young people to "seek a way out and rejoin their communities and households". "Terrorist leaders no longer trust even their closest partners," Ennahar editorialised. "They constantly fear someone would blow the whistle on them, especially after some took part in planning to annihilate the 'grey matter' of the clique, by supplying security authorities with the necessary information on the movements of certain members, which led them right into the hands of the police." Whee! Well done, somebody! For their part, Mauritanian observers viewed the information published by Ennahar as "proof of the success of successive military operations led by the Mauritanian army and its endeavours to besiege the group by shutting down many exists," analyst Mokhtar Salem said. "It is also a sign showing the group is growing weak," he added. Salem said, "The developments and the successive actions of field states only foreshadow continued pressure on the terrorist group, through the recent agreement by foreign ministers of field states in Nouakchott to allocate a budget in order to maintain intelligence consistency, being an effective tool in combatting terrorism and countering the recurrent problem of kidnapping foreign nationals." "Since October, Mauritanian Intelligence has embarked on mobilising enormous potential to recruit local and foreign resources, so as to provide Mauritanian security authorities with information on the plans of al-Qaeda and its channels of communication within the country. Recruited agents are given fancy cars and hefty amounts of money," analyst Mohamed Ould Zein told Magharebia. Security authorities passed their agents off as "traders, developers, smugglers and sometimes even jihadists, so they could convey a clear picture of what was going on in areas in the Sahara outside the reach of governments", according to Ould Zein. He added that foreign detectives were also trained and dispatched to northern Mali. Some of the recruits, however, may "play as double agents", analyst Mohamed Ould Al-Akel said. They "will offer al-Qaeda information," he said. "Others, however, only give them information to prove their allegiance and ward off suspicions." AQIM managed to penetrate Mauritanian territories a number of times, the latest of which was the abduction of a Mauritanian gendarme at the end of last year.

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Africa North

AQIM replaces Sahara emir

2012-01-30

[Magharebia] Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) designated Algerian terrorist Nabil Makhloufi, alias Nabil Abu Alqama, as the new head of the Sahara emirate. The "appointment" of Abu Alqama, who replaced Yahia Djouadi, "took place during the latter half of November 2011", ANI reported last month. "He was also assigned the task of leading all the organization's battalions and brigades in the Sahara, or what is known as the ninth region of the organization, along with keeping the leaders of those battalions and brigades in their posts," the Mauritanian newspaper added. The move came on the heels of a fierce rivalry and internecine disputes within the terrorist group. Mohamed Ghadir (aka Abdelhamid Abou Zeid), the "Tariq ibn Ziyad" katibat boss, and Khaled Abou El Abass (aka Mokhtar Belmokhtar, or "Laaouar"), who runs the El Moulethemine battalion, also vied for control of AQIM's Sahara emirate. The leadership change has far-reaching implications for countries in the region. Those who craft security policies must take it into consideration, according to analyst Bashir Ould Babaneh. The move "is related to trying to overcome the conflicts of Sahara emirs and the leaders of their battalions and brigades, as well as being an attempt to inject new blood into the emirate, which has become the most important emirate of the organization and the most vital and active", commented Mohamed Mahmoud Aboulmaaly, who specialises in terrorist groups in the Sahel. The change came in response to "increasing differences between former emir Yahia Djouadi and some emirs of the other brigades and battalions", he added. "Yahia Djouadi did not succeed, according to the organization, in activating and developing Sahara Emirate strategies," Aboulmaaly said, "resulting in a slowdown in the latter's activity in 2007, 2008 and 2009."

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Africa North

AQIM: a book declares revealing the true identity of Abu Zeid

2010-10-28

[Ennahar] An Algerian journalist says in a book published this week that he reveal the true identity of the leader of Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), challenging in particular the one assigned by Interpol. According to Mohamed Mokeddem, director of the Algerian Arabic daily "Ennhar", Abdelhamid Abou Zeid is called Mohamed Ghadir, not Abid Hamadou as experts on the Sahelian terrorism say and Interpol on its red list of wanted individuals. The Algerian radical leader is responsible for several kidnappings of foreigners in the Sahel. In an interview with AFP, Mr Mokaddem explained the mistake beacause both men "have the same story: both were originally smugglers and joined the Islamic Front of Salvation (Fis) of their municipalities respectively. They have "the same profile: a brother and two cousins who are allied to them and joined the gangs," added that specialist of AQIM whose book "Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb, smuggling on behalf of Islam" was presented at the International Book Fair of Algiers. Mr. Mokaddem says he could demonstrate his thesis through photos and interviews with the families concerned. He said Mohamed Ghadir is white, born in the region of Debdeb, near the Libyan border, while Abid Hamadou is black, born in Touggourt in the province of Ouargla (south, 800 km from Algiers). "According to reports, Abid Hamadou would have fallen under the bullets of the army in the Sahara in the 90s", but his death was not recorded, said the journalist. It's by comparing the evidence and photographs of two men with their respective mothers, some "repentant" (Veterans faceless myrmidons Islamist who have benefited from the amnesty decreed by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika) and former French hostage Peter Camatte kidnapped November 25, 2009, that Mohamed Mokeddem arrived at this conclusion. Camatte, released in February 2010, "confirmed the true identity of Abu Zeid" using the picture that has been submitted, he said. Mr. Mokeddem also asserts that the French Michel Germaneau kidnapped April 19 and declared and whom Aqmi actually declared killed, died "of a heart attack early last July. His sources are "Algerian merchants who have links in Mali" where the hostage was being held and "sources relating to the security situation in the Sahel region. ... North Africa's answer to the Pak tribal areas... Abu Zeid, appeared in 2003 as assistant of Abderazak the Para during the kidnapping of 32 European tourists, and would be responsible for a series of kidnappings, including that of British Dyer executed in June 2009 and more recently, five French, one Malagasy and one Togolese in northern Niger. Mr. Mokeddem ensures that the businesses of kidnapping makes AQIM live. "The ransoms are transferred for the purchase of ammunition and weapons. This market is very important in Mali and Niger," where soldiers and former Tuareg rebels sell their equipments. Part of the funds, he assures, is milled in particular "in the fast food and transportation. According to Mr. Mokeddem, specialist of jihadist networks, this nebula has moved on the ground with the emergence of Nigerian Boko Haram in the north and the hundreds of deaths caused by last year's festivities with the Nigerian army. "The future of AQIM, he said, is Nigeria not in the Sahel.

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