Ibn Al-Shaykh al-Libi | Ibn Al-Shaykh al-Libi | al-Qaeda | 20031115 |
Terror Networks |
Human Rights Watch's list of "ghost prisoners" |
2005-12-02 |
Take a good, long look at the people on this list and you can decide for yourself whether or not you have any problems with this. I sure don't. 1. Ibn Al-Shaykh al-Libi Reportedly arrested on November 11, 2001, Pakistan. Libyan, suspected commander at al-Qaeda training camp. 2. Abu Faisal Reportedly arrested on December 12, 2001 3. Abdul Aziz Reportedly arrested on December 14, 2001 Nationality unknown. In early January 2002, Kenton Keith, a spokesman at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, produced a chart with the names of senior al-Qaeda members listed as killed in action, detained, or on the run. Faisal and Aziz were listed as detained on Dec. 12 and 14, 2001. 4. Abu Zubaydah (also known as Zain al-Abidin Muhahhad Husain) Reportedly arrested in March 2002, Faisalabad, Pakistan. Palestinian (born in Saudi Arabia), suspected senior al-Qaeda operational planner. 5. Abdul Rahim al-Sharqawi (aka Riyadh the facilitator) Reportedly arrested in January 2002 Possibly Yemeni, suspected al-Qaeda member (possibly transferred to Guantanamo). 6. Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi Reportedly arrested in January 2002 Nationality unknown, presumably Iraqi, suspected commander of al-Qaeda training camp. U.S. officials told Associated Press on January 8, 2002 and March 30, 2002, of al-Iraqi's capture. This is a different Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi who was placed in command of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan yesterday (who had previously been in command of Brigade 055 rather than a training camp), for those keeping score. 7. Muhammed al-Darbi Reportedly arrested in August 2002 Yemeni, suspected al-Qaeda member. The Washington Post reported on October 18, 2002: "U.S. officials learned from interviews with Muhammad Darbi, an al Qaeda member captured in Yemen in August, that a Yemen cell was planning an attack on a Western oil tanker, sources said." On December 26, 2002, citing "U.S. intelligence and national security officials," the Washington Post reports that al-Darbi, as well as Ramzi Binalshibh [see below], Omar al-Faruq [reportedly escaped from U.S. custody in July 2005], and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri [see below] all "remain under CIA control." 8. Ramzi bin al-Shibh Reportedly arrested on September 13, 2002 Yemeni, suspected al-Qaeda conspirator in Sept. 11 attacks (former roommate of one of the hijackers). 9. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (or Abdulrahim Mohammad Abda al-Nasheri, aka Abu Bilal al-Makki or Mullah Ahmad Belal) Reportedly arrested in November 2002, United Arab Emirates. Saudi or Yemeni, suspected al-Qaeda chief of operations in the Persian Gulf, and suspected planner of the USS Cole bombing, and attack on the French oil tanker, Limburg. 10. Mohammed Omar Abdel-Rahman (aka Asadullah) Reportedly arrested in February 2003, Quetta, Pakistan. Egyptian, son of the Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was convicted in the United States of involvement in terrorist plots in New York. See Agence France Presse, March 4, 2003: "Pakistani and US agents captured the son of blind Egyptian cleric Omar Abdel Rahman. . . a US official said Tuesday. Muhamad Abdel Rahman was arrested in Quetta, Pakistan, the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity." David Johnston, New York Times, March 4, 2003: "On Feb. 13, when Pakistani authorities raided an apartment in Quetta, they got the break they needed. They had hoped to find Mr. [Khalid Sheikh] Mohammed, but he had fled the apartment, eluding the authorities, as he had on numerous occasions. Instead, they found and arrested Muhammad Abdel Rahman, a son of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind Egyptian cleric. . ." 11. Mustafa al-Hawsawi (aka al-Hisawi) Reportedly arrested on March 1, 2003 (together with Khalid Sheikh Mohammad), Pakistan. Saudi, suspected al-Qaeda financier. 12. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Reportedly arrested on March 1, 2003, Rawalpindi, Pakistan. Kuwaiti (Pakistani parents), suspected al-Qaeda, alleged to have "masterminded" Sept. 11 attacks, killing of Daniel Pearl, and USS Cole attack in 2000. 13. Majid Khan Reportedly arrested on March-April 2003, Pakistan. Pakistani, alleged link to Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, alleged involvement in plot to blow up gas stations in the United States. Details about Khan's arrest were revealed in several media reports, especially in Newsweek: Evan Thomas, "Al Qaeda in America: The Enemy Within," Newsweek, June 23, 2003. U.S. prosecutors provided evidence that Majid Khan was in U.S. custody during the trial of 24-year-old Uzair Paracha, who was convicted in November 2005 of conspiracy charges, and of providing material support to terrorist organizations. 14. Yassir al-Jazeeri (aka al-Jaziri) Reportedly arrested on March 15, 2003, Pakistan. Possibly Moroccan, Algerian, or Palestinian, suspected al-Qaeda member, linked to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. 15. Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (aka Ammar al Baluchi) Reportedly arrested on April 29, 2003, Karachi, Pakistan. A Pakistani, he is alleged to have funneled money to September 11 hijackers, and alleged to have been involved with the Jakarta Marriot bombing and in handling Jose Padilla's travel to the United States. U.S. Judge Sidney Stein ruled that defense attorneys for Uzair Paracha could introduce statements Baluchi made to U.S. interrogators, proving that he was in U.S. custody. Former Deputy Attorney General James Comey also mentioned Baluchi during remarks to the media about the case of Jose Padilla on June 1, 2004 16. Waleed Mohammed bin Attash (aka Tawfiq bin Attash or Tawfiq Attash Khallad) Reportedly arrested on April 29, 2003, Karachi, Pakistan. Saudi (of Yemeni descent), suspected of involvement in the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, and the Sept. 11 attacks. See Afzal Nadeem, "Pakistan Arrests Six Terror Suspects, including Planner of Sept. 11 and USS Cole Bombing," Associated Press, April 30, 2003. His brother, Hassan Bin Attash, is currently held in Guantanamo. 17. Adil al-Jazeeri Reportedly arrested on June 17, 2003 outside Peshawar, Pakistan. Algerian, suspected al-Qaeda and longtime resident of Afghanistan, alleged "leading member" and "longtime aide to bin Laden." (Possibly transferred to Guantanamo.) 18. Hambali (aka Riduan Isamuddin) Reportedly arrested on August 11, 2003, Thailand. Indonesian, involved in Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda, alleged involvement in organizing and financing the Bali nightclub bombings, the Jakarta Marriot Hotel bombing, and preparations for the September 11 attacks. 19. Mohamad Nazir bin Lep (aka Lillie, or Li-Li) Reportedly arrested in August 2003, Bangkok, Thailand. Malaysian, alleged link to Hambali. 20. Mohamad Farik Amin (aka Zubair) Reportedly arrested in June 2003, Thailand. Malaysian, alleged link to Hambali. 21. Tariq Mahmood Reportedly arrested in October 2003, Islamabad, Pakistan. Dual British and Pakistani nationality, alleged to have ties to al-Qaeda. 22. Hassan Ghul Reportedly arrested on January 23, 2004, in Kurdish highlands, Iraq. Pakistani, alleged to be Zarqawi's courier to bin Laden; alleged ties to Khalid Sheikh Mohammad. 23. Musaad Aruchi (aka Musab al-Baluchi, al-Balochi, al-Baloshi) Reportedly arrested in Karachi on June 12, 2004, in a "CIA-supervised operation." Presumably Pakistani. Pakistani intelligence officials told journalists Aruchi was held by Pakistani authorities at an airbase for three days, before being handed over to the U.S., and then flown in an unmarked CIA plane to an undisclosed location. 24. Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan (aka Abu Talaha) Reportedly arrested on July 13, 2004, Pakistan. Pakistani, computer engineer, was held by Pakistani authorities, and likely transferred to U.S. custody. (Possibly in joint U.S.-Pakistani custody.) 25. Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani Reportedly arrested on July 24, 2004, Pakistan Tanzanian, reportedly indicted in the United States for 1998 embassy bombings. U.S. and Pakistani intelligence officials told UPI that Ghailani was transferred to "CIA custody" in early August. 26. Abu Faraj al-Libi Reportedly arrested on May 4, 2005, North Western Frontier Province, Pakistan. Libyan, suspected al-Qaeda leader of operations, alleged mastermind of two assassination attempts on Musharraf. Col. James Yonts, a U.S. military spokesman in Afghanistan, "said in an email to The Associated Press that al-Libbi was taken directly from Pakistan to the U.S. and was not brought to Afghanistan." |
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Home Front: WoT |
Newsweek places White House memo in context |
2004-06-13 |
Last week the White House dismissed news accounts of an explosive August 2002 brief from the Justice Departmentâs Office of Legal Counsel which has been widely criticized for seeming to flout conventions against torture. The memo, drafted by former OLC lawyer John Yoo, defends most interrogation methods short of severe, intentionally inflicted pain and permanent damage. Although White House officials said that such legal reasoning was insignificant and did not reflect the presidentâs orders, Newsweek has learned that Yooâs memo was prompted by CIA questions about what to do with a top Qaeda captive, Abu Zubaydah, who had turned uncooperative. And it was drafted after White House meetings convened by George W. Bushâs chief counsel, Alberto Gonzales, along with Defense Department general counsel William Haynes and David Addington, Vice President Dick Cheneyâs counsel, who discussed specific interrogation techniques, says a source familiar with the discussions. Among the methods they found acceptable: "water-boarding," or dripping water into a wet cloth over a suspectâs face, which can feel like drowning; and threatening to bring in more-brutal interrogators from other nations, reports Senior Editor Michael Hirsh, National Security Correspondent John Barry and Washington Bureau Chief Daniel Klaidman in the June 21 issue of Newsweek (on newsstands Monday, June 14). In this report, Newsweek examines the long-running battle over interrogation tactics inside the Bush administration, a struggle that continued right up until the Abu Ghraib scandal broke in April. That battle was touched off by the handling of the first senior Al Qaeda operative captured amid the fighting in Afghanistan, Ibn Al-Shaykh al-Libi. With al-Libi, the initial approach was to read him his rights like any arrestee, one former member of the FBI team tells Newsweek. "He was basically cooperating with us." But this was post-9/11; President Bush had declared war on Al Qaeda, and in a series of covert directives, he had authorized the CIA to set up secret interrogation facilities and to use new, harsher methods. The CIA, says the FBI source, was "fighting with us tooth and nail," Newsweek reports. Al-Libiâs capture, some sources say, was an early turning point in the governmentâs internal debates over interrogation methods, Newsweek reports. FBI officials brought their plea to retain control over al-Libiâs interrogation up to FBI Director Robert Mueller. The CIA station chief in Afghanistan, meanwhile, appealed to the agencyâs hawkish counterterrorism chief, Cofer Black. He in turn called CIA Director George Tenet, who went to the White House. Al-Libi was handed over to the CIA. "They duct-taped his mouth, cinched him up and sent him to Cairo" for more-fearsome Egyptian interrogations, says the ex-FBI official. The FBI, with its "law enforcement" mind-set, found itself more and more marginalized. The struggle extended to the Guantanamo Bay detention center in early 2002, as "high-value" suspects were shipped there for interrogation. Even within the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency, the debates never ceased, Newsweek reports. The agency, say senior intelligence officials, made sure it had explicit, written authorization from lawyers and senior policymakers before using new interrogation techniques. At the same time the agency felt intense pressure to extract information from suspects. So it began experimenting with methods like water-boarding and open-handed slapping. The CIA also asked to use "mock burial," in which a top Qaeda captive would be led to believe he was going to be buried alive. Administration officials declined to say whether the proposal was ever adopted. "My overwhelming impression is that everyone was focused on trying to avoid torture, staying within the line, while doing everything possible to save American lives," Tim Flanigan, formerly Bushâs deputy White House counsel, tells Newsweek. As with al-Libi, the internal debates usually turned on what to do with a specific Qaeda detainee. Thatâs what happened in the summer of 2002 after the capture of Abu Zubaydah, who refused to cooperate after an initial spate of talkativeness. Frustrated CIA officials went to OLC lawyer Yoo for an opinion on bolder methods. Another high-value Qaeda suspect captured toward the end of 2002, Mohamed al Qatani, provoked a major change of approach at Guantanamo Bay. "There was a spike in a lot of intel that we were picking up in terms of more attacks" on America, said Gen. James Hill, chief of the U.S. Southern Command. "We werenât getting anything out of him" using standard techniques outlined in Army Field Manual 34-52. So CIA and military-intel interrogators came up with new tactics based on the sorts of methods that U.S. Special Forces are specifically trained to resist, a Defense source says. The Special Forcesâ Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape course culminates in interrogations that include some physical roughing up; sensory, food and sleep deprivation, and a "water pit" in which detainees have to stand on tip-toe to keep from drowning, Newsweek reports. |
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The Alliance |
Al-Qaeda money man turns himself in... |
2002-01-16 |
Possible chem weapons discovered in Afghanistan... Al-Libi sings, Yemen plot uncovered... |
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