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Terror Networks
Does leadership decapitation lead to the demise of terrorist organizations? Study sez:
2019-11-11
[MITPressJournals] Does leadership decapitation lead to the demise of terrorist organizations? Can the United States undermine or destroy terrorist organizations such as al-Qaida by arresting or killing their leaders? What explains organizational resilience to leadership targeting? Leadership decapitation, or the killing or capturing of the leaders of terrorist organizations, has become a core feature of U.S. counterterrorism policy. Many scholars and analysts claim that it weakens terrorist organizations and reduces the threat they pose. Unsurprisingly, they saw the killing of Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, in Abbottabad, Pakistan, as a major tactical victory for President Barack Obama and for the broader war on terrorism. Despite the success of this operation and subsequent attacks on al-Qaida leaders, decapitation is unlikely to diminish the ability of al-Qaida to continue its activities in the long run. Rather, it may have counterproductive consequences, emboldening or strengthening the organization.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has killed or captured many al-Qaida leaders as part of a general campaign to decapitate the organization. It has employed a variety of military operations to achieve this objective, including raids by Special Operations forces. Both bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, were killed as a result of such raids. On October 5, 2012, U.S. forces captured Abu Anas al-Libi, an al-Qaida leader, in a raid in Libya. The United States has also relied heavily on drone strikes to target al-Qaida leaders and other militants in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen.

In June 2012, Abu Yahya al-Libi, then al-Qaida’s deputy leader, was killed in Pakistan in a drone strike coordinated by the Central Intelligence Agency. Highly experienced, al-Libi served an important operational function within the organization. Scholars and policymakers saw his death as a significant blow to an already weakened al-Qaida.2 Nine months earlier, a Hellfire missile fired from a U.S. drone killed Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni-American cleric linked to a number of terrorist plots in the West. On August 22, 2011, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, believed to be the organization’s second-highest leader, was reportedly killed in a drone strike in Pakistan.3 Rahman served an important communicative function between bin Laden and lower-level operatives. Ilyas Kashmiri, reputed to be a senior member of al-Qaida and the operational commander for Harakat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, was killed in a drone attack in South Waziristan on June 3, 2011.4 These examples illustrate the frequency with which the United States has targeted al-Qaida leaders and operatives over the past few years, speciªcally through the use of drone strikes.5

Despite these and other instances of successful targeting, al-Qaida remains a resilient terrorist organization. Applying a theory of organizational resilience, I examine why targeting al-Qaida’s leadership is not an effective counterterrorism strategy and, indeed, is likely counterproductive. A terrorist group’s ability to withstand attacks is a function of two factors: bureaucratization and communal support. Analyzing both when and why certain terrorist groups are able to survive leadership attacks, this article differs from existing work by providing a more nuanced lens through which to evaluate the effectiveness of counterterrorism policy.
The center of gravity of Islamic terrorism is their grievance that we occupy their countries and kill their people. Stop doing this and their grievance disappears. Attacking their leaders or footsoldiers will never, ever win the war.
The center of gravity of Islamic terrorism is that we have not surrendered and converted to their faith — that’s what their term for the non-Muslim world, Dar al-Harb, the House of War, means. There is only one way, from their perspective, for their grievance to disappear, and that is for us to become members of the Borg. But killing lots of them will discourage the jihadi faction for a while.
Related:
Dar al-Harb: 2018-07-09 Why Muslim Rapists Prefer Blondes: A History
Dar al-Harb: 2011-01-18 Al-Qaeda and organized crime: two sides of the same coin
Dar al-Harb: 2009-02-24 No jihad in India, says Darul Uloom Deoband
Link


Home Front: WoT
CIA Undermines North Korea Summit By Leaking Report To Media Asset
2018-05-31
[DisobedientMedia] Just as it was reported that the summit between the United States and North Korea was back on and that Kim Young Chol, the Vice Chairman of North Korea was on his way to New York to meet with officials in preparation for the June 12 summit, the CIA leaked an intelligence assessment concluding that "North Korea does not intend to give up its nuclear weapons any time soon." The timing of this leak is striking, as it seems to be an effort to undermine negotiations between the two nations and comes just days after ranking members of the Democratic Party and Republican hardliners attacked President Donald Trump over his efforts to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
CIA intelligence estimates have been known to be wrong from time to time. There was the one they issued about Iran in President George W. Bush’s time, the prediction of Soviet stability in President Reagan’s, the success of the Bay of Pigs adventure... How fortunate that President Trump is fully capable of walking away from negotiations he evaluates as unlikely to succeed.
The identity of the reporter who helped break the story also raises serious questions about whether or not a faction within the CIA deliberately attempted to undermine diplomatic efforts to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. According to NBC News, the report was leaked to none other than NBC national security reporter Ken Dilanian, known as "The CIA’s Mop-Up Man."

In 2014, The Intercept reported on Ken Dilanian’s correspondence and relationship with the CIA while Dilanian was a reporter for the Los Angeles Times.

According to The Intercept, "Email exchanges between CIA public affairs officers and Ken Dilanian, now an Associated Press intelligence reporter who previously covered the CIA for the Times, show that Dilanian enjoyed a close collaborative relationship with the agency, explicitly promising positive news coverage and sometimes sending the press office entire story drafts for review prior to publication. In at least one instance, the CIA’s reaction appears to have led to significant changes in the story that was eventually published in the Times."



According to the Huffington Post, while writing for the Los Angeles Times, Dilanian also reported a CIA claim as fact by stating that "there was no collateral murder in a 2012 drone strike on Al Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al-Libi." Dilanian’s article was directly disputed in an Amnesty International report.

In the aftermath of the revelations about Dilanian’s ties to the CIA, he was disavowed by the Los Angeles Times. The disclosure of Dilanian’s collaboration with the CIA also led his former employer, David Lauter of the Tribune Washington to believe Dilanian could have violated Tribune news policy. Lauter acknowledged that Tribune policy dictates that reporters "not share copies of stories outside the newsroom." Lauter further stated that he was "disappointed that the emails indicate that Ken may have violated that rule."

Dilanian has not shied away from pushing articles written by former CIA officials who continue to perpetuate the "Trump-Russia" collusion narrative without any regard to facts, such as Steven Hall’s Washington Post article titled: "I was in the CIA. We wouldn’t trust a country whose leader did what Trump did."
Continues.
Link


Terror Networks
Secret al-Qaeda memo: We must recruit and manipulate ‘ignorant’ Muslims
2018-02-28
It has been a perennial complaint that the jihadi recruits are as ignorant as pigs in mud.
[ENGLISH.ALARABIYA.NET] In the series of Abbottabad
... A pleasant city located only 30 convenient miles from Islamabad. The city is noted for its nice weather and good schools. It is the site of Pakistain's military academy, which was within comfortable walking distance of the residence of the late Osama bin Laden....
 files, discovered in the late Osama bin Laden
... who is now sometimes referred to as Mister Bones...
's house which was raided by the US military in Abbottabad, northern Pakistain in 2011, one document has exposed particularly sensitive information.

It reveals that al-Qaeda targeted "common" and "ignorant" recruits worldwide, as stated by the group’s Libyan military commander Abu Yahya al-Libi.

Abu Yahya was al-Qaeda’s second-in-command after Ayman al-Zawahri and was killed in a dronezap in the North Wazoo region of Pakistain.

The document dated Monday, 29 March, 2010 was an internal bulletin sent to al-Qaeda members. It read: "Warning: To be published among the media, but not for public publication, a special message to the brothers of the jihadist media."

Recruiting and inciting ’common people’
Terms of the group’s recruitment were defined by Abu Yahya, who wrote: "Concentrate on your speeches and publications on the Moslem common people, do not to indulge in discussions with the so-called ’elites,’ they are the most beneficial to the jihad, because they are mostly pure and full of goodness, even they have failed in some sins. However,
a woman is only as old as she admits...
 their thoughts are not contaminated with corruption and do not have the complex ignorance [of common Moslems]."

Abu Yahya added: "As you know, most of the common people do not realize the truth of the scientific discussions and political analysis, but they are incited by emotions."

Previously released documents show the strains of managing al-Qaeda’s external networks, including identifying capable leaders and finding resources to fund operations abroad.

Link


-Obits-
Mullah Omar: The reclusive face of Afghan insurgency
2015-07-30
Posted to obits on the assumption he's really dead.
[DAWN] According to Taliban biographers, Mullah Omar
... a minor Pashtun commander in the war against the Soviets who made good as leader of the Taliban. As ruler of Afghanistan, he took the title Leader of the Faithful. The imposition of Pashtunkhwa on the nation institutionalized ignorance and brutality in a country already notable for its own fair share of ignorance and brutality...
 was born in the Chah-e-Himmat village of Khakrez district in Kandahar, Afghanistan in the year 1960. His father Maulvi Ghulam Nabi was a religious scholar as were other members of his family.

After the death of his father, Mullah Omar moved to Deh-Rawood district of Uruzgan province where he sought religious education under the supervision of his paternal uncles Maulvi Muhammad Anwar and Maulvi Muhammad Jummah.

At the age of eight, Mullah Muhammad Omar joined the primary seminary of Shar-e-Kohna area in Deh-Rawood district.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Mullah Omar joined the fight against the Soviets and rose to prominence as a "tough fighter" and an "efficient commander".

In 1992, after the collapse of Afghan president Dr Najibullah's government and with the eruption of civil war between various mujahideen factions, Mullah Omar ceased combat activities and set up a religious seminary in Gishaan village of Sang-e-Hisaar area of Maiwand district in Kandahar province. He then continued with his religious studies along with his former mujahideen colleagues after the war against the Communist forces.

Maulvi Sadiq, a Taliban official in Kandahar province said in 2011 that after the Soviet withdrawal, the creation of the Taliban movement and its subsequent advance was triggered by the kidnapping and rape of a young girl in Kandahar by a local warlord.

According to him, Mullah Omar and some of his old colleagues decided to take on the warlord who had allegedly kidnapped and raped the girl. Other seminary students also joined them and the group transformed into the Taliban movement of the 1990s.

The government of Afghanistan under the Taliban was referred to as the 'Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan' and was formed with an initial cadre 1,500 religious scholars and seminary students from Afghanistan, who pledged allegiance to Mullah Omar.

The initial pledge of allegiance eventually gained momentum and spread to other areas, with many religious scholars from the region pledging support. Around this time, Saudi billionaire the late Osama bin Laden
... who is now among the dear departed, though not among the dearest...
 along with his entourage comprising hundreds of Arab fighters and commanders moved to Afghanistan and pledged allegiance to Omar.

Al Qaeda emerged and its ties with the Taliban movement grew strong in a short period of time, especially post-911, when Mullah Omar refused to hand over bin Laden to the United States.

In addition to bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri
... Formerly second in command of al-Qaeda, now the head cheese, occasionally described as the real brains of the outfit. Formerly the Mister Big of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Bumped off Abdullah Azzam with a car boom in the course of one of their little disputes. Is thought to have composed bin Laden's fatwa entitled World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders. Currently residing in the North Wazoo area. That is not a horn growing from the middle of his forehead, but a prayer bump, attesting to how devout he is...
, Al Qaeda's top tier commanders such as Mustafa Abu Yazid, Abu Yahya al-Libi, Sheikh Issa al-Masri and others were successful in influencing the Taliban, convincing them to change many of their opinions, from issues of Islamic jurisprudence to the general worldview that shifted from an Afghan-centric mindset to that of global jihad.

Despite public statements from the Taliban which have given the impression of a local resistance movement, the Afghan Taliban have once again provided sanctuaries to Al Qaeda operatives -- this time to the fighters escaping operation Zarb-e-Azb
..the Pak offensive against Qaeda in Pakistain and the Pak Taliban in North Wazoo. The name refers to the sword of the Prophet (PTUI!)...
 in Pakistain.

Mullah Omar was recently confronted with a new challenge -- the rise of His Supreme Immensity, Caliph of the Faithful and Galactic Overlord, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
...formerly merely the head of ISIL and a veteran of the Bagram jailhouse. Looks like a new messiah to bajillions of Moslems, like just another dead-eyed mass murder to the rest of us...
's self-styled Islamic State
...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allah around with every other sentence, but to hear the pols talk they're not really Moslems....
For now, the majority of Islamist Lion of Islam groups seem to have preferred Mullah Omar's softer approach rather than Baghdadi's brutality.
Link


China-Japan-Koreas
Beijing, Kunming, Urumqi and Guangzhou: The Changing Landscape of Anti-Chinese Jihadists
2014-06-03

International Connections

The TIP’s Spokesman Role

The TIP has approximately 300–500 militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also a network in Turkey and possibly Central Asia (Author’s field research in northwest Pakistan, 2012). With such numbers, it is limited in its capacity to launch an insurgency in China, which has a population of well over one billion people. The only attacks in China for which the TIP showed evidence of its responsibility were the Ramadan-eve car rammings in Kashgar in July 2011, which killed 12 pedestrians. The TIP has also claimed several cart-bombings near Xinjiang’s border with Pakistan in 2012, which were likely carried out by its cells in Xinjiang (See Terrorism Monitor, Volume 10, Issue 8).

The TIP’s main “value added” in Xinjiang is mostly providing training to Uighurs who travel abroad or, likely more importantly, the clandestine distribution of jihadist ideological and training materials in Xinjiang by way of various Uighur, Pakistani or Central Asian traders.

Al-Qaeda leaders, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, now usually mention “East Turkistan” among other jihadist battlegrounds, while jihadists in Syria have proudly featured Uighurs and Han converts to Islam among their fighters.

IMU: ‘Go After Pakistan’s Mother’

While the TIP is still a relative newcomer to the jihadist scene—having only announced its formation around 2008, despite the presence of Uighur militants in Afghanistan since before 2001—it has benefited from the support of other well-known jihadist leaders. In particular, the emergence of IMU mufti Abu Zar al-Burmi as a prominent anti-Chinese jihadist leader in Pakistan has led to Xinjiang gaining more attention among jihadists. Al-Burmi started gaining prominence around 2011, several years after Xinjiang—which Uighurs who seek independence from China call “East Turkistan”—gained attention in jihadist media after the July 2009 riots in Urumqi. At that time, al-Qaeda affiliates and leaders such as Abu Yahya al-Libi demanded retribution against China and called for attacks on Chinese citizens abroad (China Daily, July 15, 2009). Other al-Qaeda leaders gave occasional talks on Xinjiang (Khalid al-Husaynan, “‘Purpose’ of Jihad,” Sawt al-Islam, May 4, 2013; Abu-Yahya al-Libi, “The Forgotten Wound,” as-Sahab, 2009).

Yet al-Burmi, unlike other al-Qaeda leaders, regularly issues anti-Chinese sermons in Pakistan and, perhaps because of his Burmese background (he is an ethnic Rohingya) seems to hold a personal vendetta against China. He said in a sermon called “A Lost Nation” that “mujahidin should know that the coming enemy of the Ummah is China, which is developing its weapons day after day to fight the Muslims” and blamed “Burma, China and Germany and the interests of the United Nations for supporting these massacres and mass killings [of Rohingyas] in Arakan (“A Lost Nation,” a speech for Abu Zar-Azzam, Mufti of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 2013).”

In a sermon in Ladha, South Waziristan, in September 2013, al-Burmi, declared it obligatory for Muslims to kidnap and kill Chinese people and attack Chinese companies, which Abu Zar says have “conquered” Pakistan like the British East India company did in India (including Abu Zar’s native Burma) in the 1800s (Bab-ul-Islam, in Urdu, April 25). He blames Pakistanis for their “mantra of Pak-China Friendship,” including purchasing “infidel” food and goods from China as if “drinking milk from the Chinese government” and selling the Gwadar Port in Karachi to China (Ibid).

Al-Burmi urges his followers to turn their attention to the “new superpower” and “next number one enemy,” China, now that the Taliban “knocked the wind out” of the United States. This suggests that al-Burmi may see a role for the IMU attacking China or coordinating training of the TIP to attack China after the withdrawal of most U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 2014. In his Ladha sermon, al-Burmi continues with U.S.-China comparisons: “We should be aware of the fact that while the United States is the father of the Pakistani system and government, China is the mother of the Pakistani government. The Pakistani government drinks its milk from the Chinese government.”

He further claims that “The Pakistani president visits China every four months and goes and bows, kneels and prostrates before those atheists, who do not believe in God, and in return he comes back with aid…. We should all be aware of the fact that there is no border between Pakistan and China…the border that is along the Gilgit-Baltistan region is actually a border with East Turkestan.”
Link


Terror Networks
U.S. has decimated al Qaeda chiefs but must persist in fight:Panetta
2012-11-22
[Shabelle] U.S. forces have decimated al Qaeda's leadership and made gains against some of its affiliates, but the fight has shifted in new directions that will require persistent U.S. efforts to truly end the threat, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta
...current SecDef, previously Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Panetta served as President Bill Clinton's White House Chief of Staff from 1994 to 1997 and was a member of the United States House of Representatives from 1977 to 1993....
 said on Tuesday.

Panetta, in a speech to the Center for a New American Security, said while the United States had achieved progress against al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen and Somalia, associated groups had made inroads in Mali and Nigeria and were trying to gain a foothold in Libya.

He said the United States had "decimated core al Qaeda," killing leaders like the late Osama bin Laden
... who walked in the Valley of the Shadow of Death and didn't make it out...
, Sheikh Saeed al-Masri and Abu Yahya al-Libi. It also has made strides against affiliated groups like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen and al-Shabaab
... Harakat ash-Shabaab al-Mujahidin aka the Mujahideen Youth Movement. It was originally the youth movement of the Islamic Courts, now pretty much all of what's left of it. They are aligned with al-Qaeda but operate more like the Afghan or Pakistani Taliban...
 in Somalia, he said.

"These gains are real, but it is important to point out that even with these gains, the threat from al Qaeda has not been eliminated," he said. "We have slowed the primary cancer, but we know that the cancer has metastasized to other parts of the global body."

As a result of U.S. pressure, Panetta said, al Qaeda has become even more "widely distributed, loosely knit and geographically dispersed."

"The fight against al Qaeda has taken a new direction -- one that demands that we be especially adaptable and resilient as we continue the fight," he said.

Panetta said disrupting and ultimately defeating al Qaeda would remain a key priority even as U.S. forces draw down in Afghanistan over the next two years and renew their focus on the Asia-Pacific region as part of a new military strategy.

He said the key to achieving "the end of al Qaeda" was to finish the job in Afghanistan in a way that ensured the group could never again establish safe havens there.

Panetta said dealing with government corruption in Afghanistan and eliminating beturbanned goon safe havens in Pakistain were crucial to Afghan stability.

"It will require continued commitment by the international community and the United States to help Afghan forces achieve it," he said, adding, "We have come too far and invested too much blood and treasure" not to finish the job.

He said the United States also would have to keep the pressure on al Qaeda in Pakistain, Yemen and Somalia. It would also have to work to prevent the emergence of al Qaeda safe havens elsewhere in the world, using U.S. special operations forces in partnership with local forces, he said.

"To truly end the threat from al Qaeda, military force aimed at killing our enemy alone will never be enough," Panetta added. "The United States must stay involved and invested through diplomacy, development, education and trade in those regions of the world where violent extremism has flourished."

He said that included Afghanistan and Pakistain as well as countries in the Middle East and Africa.
Link


India-Pakistan
US drones kill 4 'militants,' 1 civilian in North Waziristan strike
2012-10-24
US drones killed four "militants" and one civilian in a strike today on a compound in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan.

Pakistani officials told Dawn that the unmanned Predators or Reapers fired three missiles at a compound and a vehicle in the village of Tappi near Miramshah in North Waziristan. "The official sources also said that three cows have also been killed as the house was completely destroyed," Dawnreported.

The target of today's strike has not been disclosed. No senior al Qaeda or allied jihadist commanders from foreign terrorist groups are reported to have been killed in the strike.

Terrorists are known to have sheltered in the village of Tapi in the past. The US has struck at targets in the village five other times since the beginning of 2008, according to data on the strikes that has been compiled by The Long War Journal.

The Haqqani Network, a Taliban group that operates in North Waziristan and Kurram, as well as in eastern Afghanistan, administers the area where today's attack took place. Al Qaeda leaders and operatives, who are closely allied with the Haqqani Network, shelter in the area, as do other terror groups. The US added the Haqqani Network to the list of global terror groups in September 2012 for supporting al Qaeda and conducting attacks in Afghanistan.

Today's strike is the fourth in Pakistan this month and the first since Oct. 11, when the drone strayed outside the traditional "kill boxes" of North and South Waziristan and hit a camp in Arakzai. Sixteen "militants" loyal to Taliban leader Hafiz Gul Bahadar were killed in the strike.

Today's strike is the 19th in Pakistan since June 4, when the US killed Abu Yahya al Libi, one of al Qaeda's top leaders, propagandists, and religious figures. Abu Yahya was killed in a strike on a compound in Mir Ali in North Waziristan. Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen fighters belonging to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan were reportedly among the 14 terrorists killed along with Abu Yahya.

The US has carried out 40 strikes in Pakistan so far this year. Twenty-one of the strikes have taken place since the beginning of June; 18 occurred in North Waziristan, two were in South Waziristan, and one has taken place in Arakzai.
Link


Africa North
Attack on US in Libya 'revenge' for Qaeda death: AQAP
2012-09-16
But it doesn't end. Y'all are still fussing over that nonsense at the gates of Vienna on 9/11/1683.
[Al Ahram] Al-Qaeda said the deadly attack on the US consulate in Benghazi, Libya was in Dire Revenge™ for the killing of the network's number two Sheikh Abu Yahya al-Libi, SITE Intelligence Group reported Saturday. "The killing of Sheikh Abu Yahya only increased the enthusiasm and determination of the sons of (Libyan independence hero) Omar al-Mokhtar to take Dire Revenge™ upon those who attack our Prophet," Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula said in a statement, quoted by the US-based monitoring group.

Al-Qaeda's Yemen-based offshoot did not claim direct responsibility for Tuesday's attack on the US consulate in Benghazi that killed the US ambassador to Libya, Christopher Stevens, and three other Americans.

But it stressed that "the uprising of our people in Libya, Egypt and Yemen against America and its embassies is a sign to notify the United States that its war is not directed against groups and organizations ... but against the Islamic nation that has rebelled against injustice."

The statement comes four days after Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri
... Formerly second in command of al-Qaeda, now the head cheese, occasionally described as the real brains of the outfit. Formerly the Mister Big of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Bumped off Abdullah Azzam with a car boom in the course of one of their little disputes. Is thought to have composed bin Laden's fatwa entitled World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders. Currently residing in the North Wazoo area. That is not a horn growing from the middle of his forehead, but a prayer bump, attesting to how devout he is...
 issued a video eulogising Libi, his late deputy and propaganda chief who was killed in a drone strike in June.

Mohammed al-Megaryef, the head of Libya's national assembly, said on Saturday that the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi was planned and "meticulously executed."

Tuesday's attack by gunnies in the eastern city of Benghazi came amid a wave of protests in the Moslem world against a US-made amateur Internet film deemed insulting to the Prophet Mohammed.

Suspected Islamic gunnies fired on the consulate with rocket-propelled grenades and set it ablaze on the anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the United States claimed by Al-Qaeda.
Link


Terror Networks
US envoy's assassination result of "serious and continuing security breach"
2012-09-14
The killings of the US ambassador to Libya and three of his staff were likely to have been the result of a serious and continuing security breach [according to the Independent.] American officials believe the attack was planned, but Chris Stevens had been back in the country only a short while and the details of his visit to Benghazi, where he and his staff died, were meant to be confidential.

According to senior diplomatic sources, the US State Department had credible information 48 hours before mobs charged the consulate in Benghazi, and the embassy in Cairo, that American missions may be targeted, but no warnings were given for diplomats to go on high alert and "lockdown", under which movement is severely restricted.

According to security sources the consulate had been given a "health check" in preparation for any violence connected to the 9/11 anniversary. In the event, the perimeter was breached within 15 minutes of an angry crowd starting to attack it at around 10pm on Tuesday night. There was, according to witnesses, little defence put up by the 30 or more local guards meant to protect the staff. Ali Fetori, a 59-year-old accountant who lives near by, said: "The security people just all ran away and the people in charge were the young men with guns and bombs."

An eight-strong American rescue team was sent from Tripoli and taken by troops under Captain Fathi al- Obeidi, of the February 17 Brigade, to the secret safe house to extract around 40 US staff. The building then came under fire from heavy weapons. "I don't know how they found the place to carry out the attack. It was planned, the accuracy with which the mortars hit us was too good for any ordinary revolutionaries," said Captain Obeidi. "It began to rain down on us, about six mortars fell directly on the path to the villa." Libyan reinforcements eventually arrived, and the attack ended. News had arrived of Mr Stevens, and his body was picked up from the hospital and taken back to Tripoli with the other dead and the survivors.

Eight Americans, some from the military, were wounded in the attack which claimed the lives of Mr Stevens, Sean Smith, an information officer, and two US Marines. All staff from Benghazi have now been moved to the capital, Tripoli, and those whose work is deemed to be non-essential may be flown out of Libya. Sensitive documents have gone missing from the consulate in Benghazi and the supposedly secret location of the "safe house" in the city, where the staff had retreated, came under sustained mortar attack. Other such refuges across the country are no longer deemed "safe". Some of the missing papers from the consulate are said to list names of Libyans who are working with Americans, putting them potentially at risk from extremist groups, while some of the other documents are said to relate to oil contracts.

Wissam Buhmeid, the commander of the Tripoli government-sanctioned Libya's Shield Brigade, effectively a police force for Benghazi, maintained that it was anger over the Mohamed video which made the guards abandon their post. "There were definitely people from the security forces who let the attack happen because they were themselves offended by the film; they would absolutely put their loyalty to the Prophet over the consulate. The deaths are all nothing compared to insulting the Prophet."

Senior officials are increasingly convinced, however, that the ferocious nature of the Benghazi attack, in which rocket-propelled grenades were used, indicated it was not the result of spontaneous anger due to the video, called Innocence of Muslims. Patrick Kennedy, Under-Secretary at the State Department, said he was convinced the assault was planned due to its extensive nature and the proliferation of weapons. There is growing belief that the attack was in revenge for the killing in a drone strike in Pakistan of Mohammed Hassan Qaed, an al-Qa'ida operative who was, as his nom-de-guerre Abu Yahya al-Libi suggests, from Libya, and timed for the anniversary of the 11 September attacks.
Link


Terror Networks
Zawahiri Confirms Death of al-Libi
2012-09-12
[An Nahar] Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri
... Formerly second in command of al-Qaeda, now the head cheese, occasionally described as the real brains of the outfit. Formerly the Mister Big of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Bumped off Abdullah Azzam with a car boom in the course of one of their little disputes. Is thought to have composed bin Laden's fatwa entitled World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders. Currently residing in the North Wazoo area. That is not a horn growing from the middle of his forehead, but a prayer bump, attesting to how devout he is...
 has released a video coinciding with the anniversary of the September 11 attacks, confirming for the first time the death of his deputy, U.S. monitors said.

The 42-minute video is Zawahiri's first release in three months, and confirms that Abu Yahya al-Libi was killed in a drone strike in Pakistain's Wazoo tribal area on June 4, according to SITE and IntelCenter.

Libi was considered al-Qaeda's global propaganda criminal mastermind and his death dealt the biggest blow to the group since the killing of the late Osama bin Laden
... who has left the building...
 by U.S. special forces in May 2011.

"With the martyrdom of Sheikh Abu Yahya, may Allah have mercy on him, people will flock even more to his writings and call, Allah willing," Zawahiri says in Arabic, according to a SITE translation.

The video was posted on jihadist forums on Monday, the U.S. monitors said, and the translated text does not directly address the 9/11 anniversary.

Zawahiri does single out U.S. President Barack Obama
If you have a small business, you didn't build that...
for being a "liar" who was elected to "trick" Mohammedans around the world, but who nevertheless is "being defeated in Afghanistan".

He also mentions Warren Weinstein, an elderly U.S. aid worker kidnapped in Pakistain by al-Qaeda just over a year ago, vowing to keep him in captivity until U.S.-led forces release Qaeda followers held in Afghanistan.

Entitled "The Lion of Knowledge and Jihad: Martyrdom of al-Sheikh Abu Yahya al-Libi", the video is Zawahiri's 13th statement in 2012. His videos are often released in Urdu and Pashto.
Link


India-Pakistan
Al Qaeda confirms death of bin Laden confidant Libi
2012-09-11
Al Qaeda confirmed on Tuesday that one of the group's most senior figures, veteran militant Abu Yahya al-Libi, had died in a U.S. drone strike earlier this year.

The U.S. government said in June it had killed Libi in Pakistan, dealing the biggest in a series of blows to the group since the raid that killed Osama bin Laden last year.

"I proudly announce to the Muslim umma and to the Mujahideen (holy fighters)... the news of the martyrdom of the lion of Libya Sheikh Hassan Mohammed Qaed," Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri said in a video released on Islamist websites, referring to Libi by his birth name.

Zawahiri's statement was the first acknowledgement by Al Qaeda that Libi had died.

Recently released letters written by bin Laden and captured during the U.S. raid in which he was killed show Libi was one of a handful of al Qaeda operatives who bin Laden relied on to promote the group's case to a worldwide audience of militants, in particular to the young.

A cleric, Libi escaped a high security U.S. prison in Afghanistan in 2005. On at least one previous occasion was he was wrongly reported to have been killed in a U.S. drone strike.

The White House said in June it would be hard for the group to find someone of similar stature to replace him.
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Terror Networks
Dodging the drones: How militants have responded to the covert US campaign
2012-09-11
[Yemen Post] Over the past decade U.S. drone strikes have killed between 1,800 and 3,100 people in Pakistain, along with hundreds more in drone attacks in Yemen and Somalia, as a result of the United States' efforts to combat al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The rise in strikes since the beginning of the B.O. regime, and the growing stridency of questions surrounding the legal, moral, and practical efficacy of the program, have led to a lively debate among the commentariat. This debate is indeed important, but it is also crucial to understand how the drone program has affected the jihadis, and how jihadis have deployed the issue of drones in their propaganda. This is a necessary part of gaining a wider understanding of whether the program is a worthwhile endeavor.

Surprisingly, one does not see much discussion of drones by al-Qaeda Central (AQC), or by the Taliban (though it is possible that individuals in these groups are talking more about this in face-to-face encounters than online). Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), on the other hand, has exploited the drone issue extensively in the newsletter put out by their front group, Ansar al-Shari'ah (AS). As a result, question of whether drones are drawing more individuals into the arms of AQAP has been raised frequently in the past year.

In the documents collected by Navy SEALs during their raid of the late Osama bin Laden
... who is now beyond all cares and woe...
's compound in Abbottabad
... A pleasant city located only 30 convenient miles from Islamabad. The city is noted for its nice weather and good schools. It is the site of Pakistain's military academy, which was within comfortable walking distance of the residence of the late Osama bin Laden....
, Pakistain last May, bin Laden nicknamed Pakistain's tribal areas the "circle of espionage" for the network of spies that helps identify targets and place tracking devices for the strikes. The issue of spies has become so prevalent that Abu Yahya al-Libi wrote a book in 2009 regarding rulings on how they should be treated and prosecuted once captured.

The fear of infiltrators has created an atmosphere of paranoia within the jihadi movement, and has led many of al-Qaeda's operatives in the Pak tribal areas to move to more urban areas like Bloody Karachi
...formerly the capital of Pakistain, now merely its most important port and financial center. It may be the largest city in the world, with a population of 18 million, most of whom hate each other and many of whom are armed and dangerous...
. In one of bin Laden's Abbottabad documents, he advises the "brothers" with "media exposure" to move "away from aircraft photography and bombardment." Bin Laden also suggested that individuals flee to Afghanistan's Kunar province
... which is right down the road from Chitral. Kunar is Haqqani country.....
, where he thought they would be safer from the spy networks that have supported the drone campaign.

In the same document that bin Laden suggested his associates move, he also warned that even if one is in a safer place, one should still be cognizant that spies are lurking. The drone danger has also forced the Taliban to think twice about which journalists they meet with. A local Taliban leader remarked to Pak journalist Pir Zubair Shah: "You never know who is a news hound and who is a spy." But even if drone strikes provoke a higher level of distrust of outsiders (which itself is a normal characteristic of a terrorist or bad turban group), it does not appear to have hindered the Taliban's ability to project power into Afghanistan over the past few years. Many individuals look to the Taliban's shadow shari'ah courts for solving disputes, and the Taliban has been collecting taxes at the local level.

Frequent drone strikes in northwest Pakistain have also degraded al-Qaeda's ability to train individuals over long periods of time. In the past, AQC could spend a month (if not longer) training an operative in bomb making. In some cases, such training lasts as little as a few days now. Abbreviated training is less effective. Faisal Shahzad, the failed Times Square bomber, received five days of training in the tribal areas with AQC's affiliate the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistain (TTP). This lack of training proved decisive when Shahzad's bomb malfunctioned and he was spotted acting suspiciously.

Similarly, AQAP has been forced to change the locations of their training camps. The move to more mountainous areas like Ibb and al-Daleh provinces came about because AQAP was exposed to Arclight airstrikes when they had been training in Radaa directorate. Like the Taliban, however, AQAP has still been able to plot large-scale attacks against the West - even if they have failed - as well as occupy towns locally. And although there have yet to be any extensive academic studies on the wider effects of the drones in Yemen, Patrick B. Johnston and Anoop Sarbahi concluded in a working paper that the drones in Pakistain have actually decreased suicide kabooms across the country.

Propaganda

Although AQC and the Taliban have been under severe drone pressure for the past several years, they have said little about the strikes in the propaganda they release. When eulogizing Abu al-Layth al-Libi in 2008 after he was killed in a drone attack, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid described the drones as cowardly, since the United States did not confront him on the battlefield, but rather in a manner of "treachery and betrayal." More recently, Ayman al-Zawahiri
... Formerly second in command of al-Qaeda, now the head cheese, occasionally described as the real brains of the outfit. Formerly the Mister Big of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Bumped off Abdullah Azzam with a car boom in the course of one of their little disputes. Is thought to have composed bin Laden's fatwa entitled World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders. Currently residing in the North Wazoo area. That is not a horn growing from the middle of his forehead, but a prayer bump, attesting to how devout he is...
 called in a message directed toward Paks in March for them to rise up against the government and "compel them to stop drone strikes."

Unlike AQC and the Taliban, AQAP has only seen frequent drone attacks for the past year and a half, but AQAP has exploited the issue extensively in their media work. (It should be noted that the United States has also used cruise missiles in attacking AQAP and al-Shabaab
... the Islamic version of the old Somali warlord...
 operatives. There have been claims that what have been reported as Yemeni Arclight airstrikes have really been drones, and vice versa). AQAP has been especially active in highlighting the achievements of its counter-spy networks. In February 2012, AQAP sentenced three spies - two Yemenis and a Saudi - to death in a shari'ah court in Ja'ar. They had allegedly been placing tracking devices on cars for drone targeting. One of the individuals was killed in Azzan by way of crucifixion while another was shot at point blank range in Shabwa as a circle of men cheered. The execution was shown in a video as part of AS' "Eyes on the Event" series. This was not only a message to the locals to deter them from becoming spies, but also a way for AQAP to show the United States and Soddy Arabia
...a kingdom taking up the bulk of the Arabian peninsula. Its primary economic activity involves exporting oil and soaking Islamic rubes on the annual hajj pilgrimage. The country supports a large number of princes in whatcha might call princely splendor. When the oil runs out the rest of the world is going to kick sand in their national face...
 that they were bringing the war back to them.

In addition to highlighting civilian casualties and showing pictures of dead children, AQAP has used critical analysis of the drone program from individuals in the West to gain sympathy for their plight. In issue nineteen of Ansar al-Shari'ah's newsletter they write an exposé on Obama's "crusade." In it, AS points out the "signature strike" policy, which allows the United States to target individuals based on behavioral patterns without actually identifying the individual: "Hellfire missiles ... troll the skies of Yemen to kill ... in cold blood and without accountability, as usual!" In the past, Yemen expert Gregory Johnsen has pointed out that signature strikes pose the danger of targeting and killing individuals that are not members of or associated with AQAP. In issue three of the newsletter, AS also questions the United States' commitment to the rule of law in light of the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki
... Born in Las Cruces, New Mexico, zapped in Yemen, al-Awlaki was a dual citizen of the U.S. and Yemen. He was an Islamic holy man who was a trainer for al-Qaeda and its franchises. His sermons were attended by three of the 9/11 hijackers, by Fort Hood murderer Nidal Malik Hussein, and Undieboomer Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. He was the first U.S. citizen ever placed on a CIA target list...
 and his son Abdul Rahman in a U.S. drone strike "without charging them [Anwar and his son] with a single crime."

Some analysts believe there could be blowback from the drone program from AQAP, which might be encouraged to plan a Dire Revenge™ attack on the United States. AQAP hinted at this in the eulogy for Fahd al-Quso, who was killed in a drone strike in May this year: "war between us is not over and the days are pregnant [and] will give birth to something new."

While the jihad boy response to drone strikes in Yemen remains to be seen, there is scant evidence that drones strikes have been mobilizing AQC to conduct attacks in response. After Faisal Shahzad's Times Square plot failed, he told Sherlocks that one of his primary motivations had been the increased pace of drone strikes in the Pak tribal belt. Al-Qaeda leader Ilyas Kashmiri was also reportedly frustrated over the drone strikes in the tribal areas, leading him to plan an attack on the CEO of Lockheed Martin, according to the testimony of prior associate David Headley, a key operative in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. But besides Shahzad's failed attack and Kashmiri's aspirational plan drone strikes do not appear to be the primary reason why al-Qaeda, its branches, and its affiliates are plotting attacks against the United States.

During the B.O. regime, drone strikes have taken out many top al-Qaeda, AQAP, and Taliban leaders, and killed hundreds of mid-level fighters. The losses have pushed these jihad boy groups to establish counter-spy networks, as well as beef up their operational security. Al-Qaeda Central's ability to operate in Pakistain has been severely degraded. At the same time, the drone campaign does not appear to have had an appreciable impact on AQAP or the Taliban - both still show the ability to plan attacks against the United States (either into Afghanistan for the Taliban or against the American homeland for AQAP) and still have influence in their local areas of operation. Defeating these groups with drones is unlikely, but the strikes have at the very least created a nuisance for the jihad boys, as well as prevented more invasive military action that might have otherwise occurred. There are still lingering questions on whether or not the drones have played a significant role in radicalizing a new generation of fighters, but understanding how the drones are affecting and changing these groups can provide new perspective on a vexing challenge.

Aaron Y. Zelin is the Richard Borow Fellow in the Washington Institute for Near East Policy's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence.
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