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Iraq

Newsweek's rather odd take on the killing of Abu Azzam

2005-09-29

U.S. intelligence officials and counterterrorism analysts are questioning whether a slain terrorist—described by President Bush today as the “second-most-wanted Al Qaeda leader in Iraq” — was as significant a figure as the Bush administration is claiming. In a brief Rose Garden appearance Wednesday morning, Bush seized on the killing of Abu Azzam by joint U.S-Iraqi forces in a shootout last Sunday as fresh evidence that the United States is turning the tide against the Iraqi insurgency. “This guy was a brutal killer,” Bush told reporters in remarks that were also carried live on cable TV. “He was one of [Abu Mussab al-]Zarqawi’s top lieutenants. He was reported to be the top operational commander of Al Qaeda in Baghdad.” Bush’s comments came one day after Gen. Richard Myers, the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters at the Pentagon that the U.S. military considered Abu Azzam the “No. 2 Al Qaeda operative in Iraq, next to Zarqawi.” But veteran counterterrorism analyst Evan Kohlmann said today there are ample reasons to question whether Abu Azzam was really the No. 2 figure in the Iraqi insurgency. He noted that U.S. officials have made similar claims about a string of purportedly high-ranking terrorist operatives who had been captured or killed in the past, even though these alleged successes made no discernible dent in the intensity of the insurgency. “If I had a nickel for every No. 2 and No. 3 they’ve arrested or killed in Iraq and Afghanistan, I’d be a millionaire,” says Kohlmann, a New York-based analyst who obviously reads Rantburg tracks the Iraq insurgency and who first expressed skepticism about the Azzam claims in a posting on The Counterterrorism Blog (counterterror.typepad.com). While agreeing that Azzam—also known as Abdullah Najim Abdullah Mohamed al-Jawari—may have been an important figure, “this guy was not the deputy commander of Al Qaeda,” says Kohlmann. Three U.S. counterterrorism officials, who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the subject, also told NEWSWEEK today that U.S. agencies did not really consider Abu Azzam to be Zarqawi’s “deputy” even if he did play a relatively high-ranking role in the insurgency. The characterization of Abu Azzam as No. 2 to Zarqawi is “not quite accurate,” said one of the officials. According to this official, it would be more correct to describe Abu Azzam as a “top lieutenant” to Zarqawi who was involved in “running” terrorist operations in Baghdad—not all of Iraq. Other top lieutenants operate in other parts of the country, the official indicated. Two other officials agreed that Abu Azzam was a senior figure, perhaps the emir (leader), of Al Qaeda operations in Baghdad, and that he was of critical importance in moving funds to insurgent operatives in the Iraqi capital area. “He’s a money guy,” one official said. “He is significant but not No. 2 [to Zarqawi],” said another official. One reason to question the official Bush administration portrayal of Abu Azzam is that we can't help ourselves recent Al Qaeda statements and audio recordings have described another Iraqi insurgent leader—a man who goes by the nom de guerre Abu Abdelrahman al-Iraqi—as the group’s “deputy commander,” Kohlmann says. Another Iraqi national, known as Abu Usaid al-Iraqi, has been described in these statements as directly under him in the Qaeda structure as the commander of the group’s military wing. Neither man has been reported to have been captured or killed by U.S. or Iraqi forces, Kohlmann adds. Even the U.S. military in recent months have seemed to attach greater significance to other figures in Zarqawi’s network. Last July, for example, Coalition forces in Iraq issued a statement asking for help in finding yet another insurgent leader—Abu Thar al-Iraqi, who was described as “Al Qaeda’s chief bombing coordinator for Baghdad.” As Kohlmann sees it, the Zarqawi network in Iraq is far more amorphous and loosely structured to accurately place any particular figure in a hierarchical structure. “These aren’t Fortune 500 corporations,” he says.

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Iraq-Jordan

Al-Zarqawi: What Impact On Insurgency?

2005-05-26

A statement posted on 24 May on an Internet website linked in the past to Al-Qaeda, claimed that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Tanzim Qaidat Al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, was wounded in Iraq. While not yet confirmed, this news is certain to lead to speculation on the future fighting capability of the group. RFE/RL analysts Roman Kupchinsky and Kathleen Ridolfo report on what impact such rumors may have on the insurgency. The 24 May Internet announcement did not mention the exact date of al-Zarqawi's wounding, but rumors of his injury have been circulating for weeks, along with unconfirmed reports that he had been taken to a hospital in Al-Ramadi. A U.S. military official confirmed that U.S. forces surrounded and searched the hospital in late April, but did not find him. Al-Zarqawi was also allegedly wounded when he jumped from his vehicle on 20 February to evade U.S. capture. In that incident, U.S. forces arrested his driver and seized a laptop computer reportedly belonging to al-Zarqawi that contained his medical records and considerable information on his group's activities in Iraq. There are two possible schools of thought on the importance al-Zarqawi represents for the Iraqi rebellion. One is that he is a vital commander and strategist without whom the rebellion would flounder and fall apart. As Robert A. Norton writes in AG-Security.com, "Capturing al-Zarqawi, or more likely killing him, will have a profoundly positive effect on the morale of both U.S. and Iraqi forces and take a great deal of the wind out of the sails of the insurgency. If nothing else, it will prove that al-Zarqawi isn't invincible and therefore must not have been protected by Allah, an important psychological element." The other school of thought is that while al-Zarqawi plays a leading role in his group's ideological and financial structure, the group can, and likely will, continue to function without him. A recently updated organizational chart of al-Zarqawi's group, posted on the website http://www.globalterroralert.com/pdf/0505/zarqawichart.pdf, provides insight into the operational structure of Tanzim Qaidat Al-Jihad fi Bilad Al-Rafidayn. The commander of the military wing of the organization, Abu Usaid al-Iraqi, is still listed as a fugitive, as is Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Iraqi, the organization's deputy commander. The three main military leaders of fighting brigades are also free. This would suggest that al-Zarqawi leaves the day-to-day planning of terrorist activities to commanders and cell leaders, rather than playing a direct role in insurgent activities. How his possible permanent or temporary removal from action could impact on the group's fighting ability is therefore problematic and premature to predict, but given the organization's structure, it is likely to function very well, at least in the short term, without him. The group's ability to function in the long-term would depend upon the ability of his successors to carry out recruitment and fundraising activities. Should al-Zarqawi die, Iraqis should expect a wave of terrorist attacks carried out in his honor, with insurgents declaring him a martyr. While it will be nice to have Zark breathing dirt, the effect will be about the same as the deaths of Khattab and Abu Walid in Chechnya, or al-Muqrin in Soddy Arabia. Somebody else will take over and operations will go on. The only real question is whether they approach or exceed the dear departed in competence.

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