Warning: Undefined array key "rbname" in /data/rantburg.com/www/rantburg/pgrecentorg.php on line 14
Hello !

India-Pakistan

Embarrassment and patriotism

2012-05-12

Around 7:45 in the morning on 2nd May 2011, two consecutive calls on my cellphone pulled me out of bed. 'Osama has been found and killed in Abbottabad ... A pleasant city located only 30 convenient miles from Islamabad. The city is noted for its nice weather and good schools. It is the site of Pakistain's military academy, which was within comfortable walking distance of the residence of the late Osama bin Laden.... ,' said the caller, my younger brother. This electrifying revelation worked more than what the early morning coffee does to you. A strong sense of disbelief, shock and shame overtook me. A year later, early morning on May 3, I found an absorbing account of a visit to Osama's compound in Abbottabad in my email. An old friend Peter Bergen, author and terrorism expert, had managed to get access in February this year, and thus came back with a riveting account of the compound. May 2 was the most shameful day for Paks; it exposed the many lies they had been told The news of his elimination reminded me of an observation Amrullah Saleh, the former chief of Afghan intelligence - National Directorate of Services (NDS) - had made at a conference organized by the Jamestown Foundation in Washington on 13 December 2010, had 'Unless all these boys [OBL, Mullah Omar ... a minor Pashtun commander in the war against the Soviets who made good as leader of the Taliban. As ruler of Afghanistan, he took the title Leader of the Faithful. The imposition of Pashtunkhwa on the nation institutionalized ignorance and brutality already notable for its own fair share of ignorance and brutality... , Hekmetyar] are pulled out of the basements of their hideouts in Pakistain, there will be no peace in Afghanistan, nor will the violence come down,' Saleh had thundered in a gathering of almost 350 people at the National Press Club, where I was also to read a paper on the troubles in the border regions. Saleh repeated those words immediately after the Operation Neptune Spear - mounted to take out Bin Laden - and exuded a certain sense of vindication in several interviews he gave in days after Osama's elimination. And rightly so. Although skeptical Paks and officials, particularly those from the security apparatus, dismissed certain details of the Washington narrative on the raid, yet his wives admitted before the Abbottabad Commission, that Osama was indeed present in the compound when the US SEALs hit. They had been living there since late 2005. The commission even reconstructed a video that the Americans claimed had been recovered from the Bin Laden house. The film, released a few days after the incident, depicts Bin Laden sitting in a small cabin-sized shabby room in front of a small, possibly 21-inch old-fashioned TV and playing with the video remote control. The widows' deposition before the Commission essentially gave a lie to all the skeptics who - still mired in a state of denial - refused to believe that OBL was present at the time of the raid. May 2 indeed was the most shameful day for Paks; it exposed the many lies they had been fed and living with.And it was in this context that the American ambassador to Pakistain, Cameron Munter, took on the skeptics by posing counter-questions to news hounds at a press stakeout in Bloody Karachi ...formerly the capital of Pakistain, now merely its most important port and financial center. It may be the largest city in the world, with a population of 18 million, most of whom hate each other and many of whom are armed and dangerous... on 9 May 2011: 'We need to know what was he doing all these years in Pakistain', Munter asked, echoing the suspicions running deep in Washington since the killing of Bin Laden. Most outsiders, including US politicians in the Congress, began questioning the possible motives of the ISI and other Pak security institutions: Had they been protecting Bin Laden, the most wanted terrorist since he disappeared in December 2001 from the Tora Bora cave complex in Afghanistan? The wives practically demolished all the conspiracy theories and questions surrounding the debate over Osama's life at the compound. He was there indeed and went cold within seconds after a SEAL pierced his head and chest with two bullets through the silencer-armed rifle. He was almost instantly dead because of the fatal gunshot in the head. What an unbelievable end to the man who challenged the sole superpower and was solely responsible for sucking the USA into the history's longest conflict, being fought in the largely mountainous and socially tribal Afghanistan that refuses to transition into a democratic and pluralistic society. Much of it we owe to the legacy that Osama has left behind in the region. Some of the supporters of Osama's ideology continue to be a source of external pressure, embarrassment and diplomatic isolation of Pakistain. Ironically, rejection and denial followed foreign secretary Hillary Clinton ... sometimes described as The Liberatress of Libya and at other times as Mrs. Bill, never as Another George C. Marshall ... 's May 7 remarks in New Delhi about Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri ... Formerly second in command of al-Qaeda, now the head cheese, occasionally described as the real brains of the outfit. Formerly the Mister Big of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Bumped off Abdullah Azzam with a car boom in the course of one of their little disputes. Is thought to have composed bin Laden's fatwa entitled World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders. Currently residing in the North Wazoo area. That is not a horn growing from the middle of his forehead, but a prayer bump, attesting to how devout he is... 's perceived presence in Pakistain. Hina Rabbani Khar, the foreign minister, demanded "actionable proof" if the US had it. But viewed against the abysmally low trust in Pakistain's security establishment, why will the American establishment risk failure by sharing information about the new most wanted terrorist? No amount of denial will fend off external pressures. Only demonstrable actions can help, at least restraining the anti-US and anti-India rhetoric. There is no way around this at all, unless those in power are bent upon piling more misery and isolation on the people of Pakistain. Why are we upset over Zawahiri's alleged presence somewhere in Pakistain? After all, beside the late Osama bin Laden ... who was laid out deader than a mackerel, right next to the mackerel... , Abu Zubaida, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Aimal Kansi, Adil Al Jazeeri, Ramzi bin al Shibh, Abu Faraj al Libi, Ilyas Kashmire, Abu Yazid, Tahir Yuldashev inter alia were all discovered either in the tribal areas or in big cities such as Rawalpindi, Faisalabad, Bloody Karachi, and Abbottabad.

Link

Terror Networks

Al-Qaeda funding dries up

2012-01-26

[Magharebia] When Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri ... Supremo, formerly second in command of al-Qaeda, occasionally described as the real brains of the outfit. Formerly the Mister Big of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Bumped off Abdullah Azzam with a car boom in the course of one of their little disputes. Is thought to have composed bin Laden's fatwa entitled World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders. Currently residing in the North Wazoo area. That is not a horn growing from the middle of his forehead, but a prayer bump, attesting to how devout he is... succeeded slain al-Qaeda leader the late Osama bin Laden ... who walked in the Valley of the Shadow of Death and didn't make it out... in June 2011, it was clear that he faced a daunting task in rebuilding an organization suffering from a severe depletion of its ranks as a result of the blows it received, particularly in the Afghanistan-Pakistain border areas. It was also clear that al-Zawahiri needed to find a solution to the challenge posed by the Arab Spring revolutions. The strength of the demonstrations illustrated that the majority in the Arab street did not support al-Qaeda's policy of advocating change through violence, nor were they convinced of its justifications for attacking the West, as the West stood by the Arab peoples in their quest for greater political freedom. And now it appears that al-Zawahiri needs to find a solution to another problem, one that most likely started years ago but has been exacerbated by the killing of Bin Laden in Abbottabad ... A pleasant city located only 30 convenient miles from Islamabad. The city is noted for its nice weather and good schools. It is the site of Pakistain's military academy, which was within comfortable walking distance of the residence of the late Osama bin Laden.... , Pakistain in May 2011; specifically, a shortfall in donor funds. Nine months after Bin Laden's death, not one retaliatory attack has been carried out, which may be a result of the organization's inability to conduct operations or its unpreparedness to do so at this time. Another reason may be that the myriad of security services in Western and Arab countries are on high alert to prevent possible attacks from occurring. Another factor delaying or hindering the conduct of attacks could be a shortfall in donor funds to al-Qaeda. This lack of funds may be affecting its ability to make the necessary preparations for large operations that require substantial financing, in addition to the cost of recruiting and training operatives. Shortfall in donor funds not new The shortfall in donor funding for al-Qaeda in Wazoo is, in fact, not new. Frequent reports of funding shortfalls have been circulating for years. Al-Zawahiri highlighted the issue explicitly in a June 2005 letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the former leader of al-Qaeda's branch in Iraq. Al-Zawahiri requested that al-Zarqawi transfer a large sum of money ($100,000) to the leadership of the organization. In his letter, al-Zawahri refers to an interruption in al-Qaeda's funding following the arrest of Abu Faraj al-Libi, a leader in the organization, even though al-Zawahiri described the organization's financial status as "good" in general, which means that some funds were still reaching al-Qaeda in Waziristan at the time. It is not clear if donations to al-Qaeda, which come mostly from supporters in Gulf countries, declined further or increased in the years after this letter was written, but new information from Waziristan does not indicate that the organization is in a better position militarily or financially. An Afghani operative who fought alongside al-Qaeda said the organization's presence in Waziristan has contracted significantly, their ranks thinning to no more than a few dozen individuals. The young Afghan, named Hafez Hanif, told Newsweek in an interview published January 2nd that he sought information about a group of al-Qaeda gunnies that he had not heard from since the killing of Bin Laden and found out they were living in dire conditions with their ranks greatly depleted. While Hanif said "money is a more significant problem [for al-Qaeda] than the thinning of its ranks", the fighter's uncle told the magazine his sources confirm that the organization's donor funding, which used to be in the millions of dollars each year from Gulf donors, has dried up. Donor funds go to other causes It appears that donor funds now go to causes other than those of al-Qaeda's leadership, which has apparently become marginalised and isolated in its Waziristan hideout. Hanif's uncle said he thinks "Arab people now think the fight should be political at home and not terrorism aimed at the West", and that "the peaceful struggle on Arab streets has accomplished more than Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri ever have". If the information provided by these Afghans is true, it would reinforce the widely held belief that the organization is at risk of ceasing to be an effective force, as it was in Afghanistan in the years prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks. This impression was reinforced during the Arab Spring demonstrations, and again following Bin Laden's death. Also, media reports confirmed al-Qaeda's loss of many of its leaders and members in air strikes and festivities with Pak forces. Newsweek's report indicated that al-Qaeda, which once had hundreds of fighters in the Afghanistan-Pakistain border areas, now has no more than a few dozen left in the area, probably including al-Zawahiri and Abu Yahya al-Libi. This paltry number confirms that al-Qaeda has been reduced to a marginal role. The absence of al-Qaeda gunnies in the battles being waged by the Pak and Afghan branches of the Taliban against the governments of Pakistain, Afghanistan and Western forces is another sign of its weakened position. The fact that al-Qaeda is facing these problems in Wazoo does not mean the organization is finished, and it could still carry out a suicide kaboom to avenge Bin Laden's killing. But even if al-Qaeda succeeds in carrying out a Dire Revenge™ attack, that would probably not signify a fundamental change in its status if the shortfall in fighters and funding continues, and if it remains marginalised amidst the mostly peaceful Arab Spring revolutions.

Link

India-Pakistan

Pakistan criticises US raid on Laden

2011-05-04

[Bangla Daily Star] Pakistain criticised the American raid that killed the late Osama bin Laden ... who no longer exists... as an "unauthorised unilateral action," laying bare the strains the operation has put on an already rocky alliance. US politicians along with the leaders of Perfidious Albion and La Belle France questioned how the Pak government could not have known the al-Qaeda leader was living in a garrison town less than a two-hour drive from the capital and had apparently lived there for years. "I find it hard to believe that the presence of a person or individual such as bin Laden in a large compound in a relatively small town ... could go completely unnoticed," French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe told news hounds in Gay Paree. British Prime Minister David Cameron ... has stated that he is certainly a big Thatcher fan, but I don't know whether that makes me a Thatcherite, which means he's not. Since he is not deeply ideological he lacks core principles and is easily led. He has been described as certainly not a Pitt, Elder or Younger, but he does wear a nice suit so maybe he's Beau Brummel ... also demanded that Pak leaders explain how bin Laden had lived undetected in Abbottabad. But in a nod to the complexities of dealing with a nuclear-armed, unstable country that is crucial to success in the war in Afghanistan, Cameron said having "a massive row" with Islamabad over the issue would not be in Perfidious Albion's interest. White House front man Jay Carney told news hounds Tuesday that the US is committed to cooperating with Pakistain. "We don't know who if anybody in the government was aware that bin Laden or a high-value target was living in the compound. It's logical to assume he had a supporting network. What constituted that network remains to be seen," Carney said. "It's a big country and a big government and we have to be very focused and careful about how we do this because it is an important relationship." A day after US commandos killed the al-Qaeda leader following a 10-year manhunt, new details emerged Tuesday from Pakistain's powerful intelligence agency and bin Laden's neighbours in Abbottabad. Residents said they sensed something was odd about the walled three-story house, even though bin Laden and his family rarely ventured outside and most neighbours were not aware that foreigners were living there. "That house was obviously a suspicious one," said Jahangir Khan, who was buying a newspaper in Abbottabad. "Either it was a complete failure of our intelligence agencies or they were involved in this affair." Neighbours said two men would routinely emerge from the compound to run errands or occasionally attend a neighbourhood gathering, such as a funeral. Both men were tall, fair skinned and bearded. "People were skeptical in this neighbourhood about this place and these guys," said Mashood Khan, a 45-year-old farmer. "They used to gossip, say they were smugglers or drug pushers. People would complain that even with such a big house they didn't invite the poor or distribute charity." US officials have suggested Pak officials may have known where bin Laden was living and members of Congress have seized on those suspicions to call for the US to consider cutting billions of aid to Pakistain if it turns out to be true. Western officials have long regarded Pak security forces with suspicion, especially when it comes to links with faceless myrmidons fighting in Afghanistan. Last year, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton ... sometimes described as the Smartest Woman in the World and at other times as Mrs. Bill, never as Another John Jay ... publicly said she suspected that some members of Pakistain's government knew where bin Laden was hiding. However, The didactic However... within Pakistain criticism has been focused on the US breaching the country's illusory sovereignty. The B.O. regime has said it did not inform the Paks in advance of the operation against bin Laden, for fear they would tip off the targets. A strongly worded Pak government statement warned the US not to launch similar operations in the future. It rejected suggestions that officials knew where bin Laden was. Still, there were other revelations that pointed to prior knowledge that the compound was linked to al-Qaeda. Pak intelligence agencies hunting for a top al-Qaeda operative raided the house in 2003, according to a senior officer, speaking on condition of anonymity ... for fear of being murdered... in line with the spy agency's policy. The house was just being built at the time of the raid by Pakistain's Inter-Services Intelligence agency, and Abu Faraj al-Libi, al-Qaeda's No 3, was not there, said the officer. US officials have said al-Libi once lived in the house and that information from him played a role in tracking the al-Qaeda chief down. Al-Libi was incarcerated by Pak police after a shootout in 2005 and he was later handed over to US authorities. The Pak officer said he didn't know why bin Laden would choose a house that already had been compromised. He also insisted the ISI would have captured bin Laden if it had known he was there, and pushed back at international criticism of the agency. "Look at our track record given the issues we have faced, the lack of funds. We have killed or captured hundreds" of beturbanned goons), said the officer. "All of a sudden one failure makes us incompetent and 10 years of effort is overlooked." Al-Qaeda has been responsible for score of bloody attacks inside Pakistain, so on the face of it would seem strange for Islamabad to be sheltering bin Laden. Critics of Pakistain say that by keeping him on the run, Islamabad was ensuring that US aid and weapons to the country kept flowing. The Pak government said that since 2009 the ISI has shared information about the compound with the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies, and that intelligence indicating foreigners were in the Abbottabad area continued until mid-April. In an essay published Tuesday by The Washington Post, Pak President Asif Ali President Ten Percent Zardari ... sticky-fingered husband of the late Benazir Bhutto ... denied suggestions his country's security forces may have sheltered bin Laden, and said their cooperation with the United States helped pinpoint him. The raid followed months of deteriorating relations between the CIA and Pakistain's intelligence service. Those strains came to a head in late January after a CIA contractor shot and killed two Paks in what Washington said was self-defense. In a statement, the Pak government said "this event of unauthorised unilateral action cannot be taken as a rule." "The government of Pakistain further affirms that such an event shall not serve as a future precedent for any state, including the US," it said, calling such actions a "threat to international peace and security." The statement may be partly motivated by domestic concerns. The government and army has come under criticism following the raid by those who have accused the government of allowing Washington to violate the country's illusory sovereignty. Islamabad has also been angered at the suspicions it had been sheltering bin Laden.

Link

India-Pakistan

U.S.-India cooperation in the war on terror hits a roadblock

2010-03-26

BY B RAMAN Cooperation between U.S. and Indian intelligence agencies has been a hallmark of the post-9/11 era, and rightly so: The two democracies both understand the existential fight the war on terror presents. But just as the U.S. expects India to be a good partner in the fight, so too does India expect the same of America. That's why the case of David Coleman Headley, a Chicago-based American citizen of Pakistani origin who allegedly facilitated the Nov. 26, 2008 terrorist attacks on Mumbai, matters. Mr. Headley traveled to India five times, reportedly to scout targets for Pakistan-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET). He and his accomplice, Tahawwur Hussain Rana, were arrested by the FBI in October during an investigation into a plot of the LET and other Pakistan-based terrorists to attack a Danish newspaper. Their alleged links to the Mumbai attacks were discovered during the FBI interrogation. Given Mr. Headley's potentially vital role in one of the most extreme terrorist acts in India's history—an attack that lasted four days and killed 166 people—India understandably wants to extradite him for questioning. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake said Saturday during a trip to New Delhi that extradition won't happen, but Indian officials will eventually "get access" to Mr. Headley. This is a remarkable double standard. When Al Qaeda terrorists Abu Zubaidah, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and Abu Faraj al-Libi were arrested in Pakistan, and when Jemmah Islamiyah's Hambali was arrested in Thailand in the years following 9/11, U.S. intelligence officials insisted on taking them into U.S. custody to interrogate them on the future plans of their organizations and on the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden. When Messrs. Headley and Rana were arrested, Indian authorities didn't insist on extradition, which they knew might be hard to do under U.S. law. They simply wanted Indian investigators to be given immediate access to the terrorists on U.S. soil. Given the growing antiterror cooperation between the two countries, an Indian investigative team traveled to the U.S. to question Mr. Headley after hearing of his arrest. They were taken by surprise when the FBI declined to grant them access and sent them back empty-handed. Since then, the FBI has been dragging its feet in response to repeated Indian requests to interrogate Mr. Headley—even in U.S. territory. The plea bargain that the FBI and Mr. Headley agreed to last week has created strong suspicions in India that the FBI wants to avoid a formal trial of Mr. Headley. There are even wild rumors that Indian investigators are being prevented from interrogating him because he was a deep penetration agent working for U.S. intelligence. India isn't asking for much. Its intelligence officers are mature professionals. Their interest will be in questioning Mr. Headley on his role in the Mumbai attacks, LET's terrorist plans, its India-based sleeper cells, and the role of the Pakistani state in the attacks. U.S.-India intelligence cooperation has been tested over the past few years, first in 2004 with accusations that an Indian intelligence officer, Rabinder Singh, had been recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency. (He was granted asylum in the U.S. just before he was about to be arrested by Indian counterintelligence officers.) The second blow came in 2006 with the discovery of another alleged CIA mole in India's National Security Council Secretariat, which is part of the Prime Minister's Office. The rift forming over access to Mr. Headley is a serious problem. The intelligence communities of the two countries, which have a long history of cooperation, managed to get over the trust deficit created by the CIA's alleged penetration. It's time to get over this one, too. Mr. Raman served in India's external intelligence agency from 1968 to 1994 and on the government of India's National Security Advisory Board from 2000 to 2002. He is currently director of the Institute for Topical Studies in Chennai.

Link

Home Front: WoT

9/11 mastermind confesses in Guantanamo - hint: it's not the Joooos

2007-03-14

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged Sept. 11 mastermind, is seen shortly after his capture during a raid in Pakistan Saturday March 1, 2003 in this photo obtained by the Associated Press. Mohammed confessed to the 9/11 attacks and a string of others during a military hearing at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, according to a transcript released Wednesday by the military. amazing...he confesses and still the MSM calls him "alleged" WASHINGTON (AP) Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the suspected mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks, confessed to that attack and a string of others during a military hearing at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, according to a transcript released Wednesday by the Pentagon. "I was responsible for the 9/11 operation from A to Z," Mohammed said during the session, which was held last Saturday. Mohammed claimed responsibility for planning, financing, and training others for bombings ranging from the 1993 attack at the World Trade Center to the attempt by would-be shoe bomber Richard Reid to blow up a trans-Atlantic flight with explosives hidden in his shoes. In all, Mohammed said he was responsible for planning 28 individual attacks, including many that were never executed. The comments were included in a 26-page transcript released by the Pentagon, which blacked out some of his remarks. The Pentagon also released transcripts of the hearings of Abu Faraj al-Libi and Ramzi Binalshibh. Binalshibh, a Yemeni, is suspected of helping Mohammed with the Sept. 11, 2001, attack plan and is also linked to a foiled plot to crash aircraft into London's Heathrow Airport. Al-Libi is a Libyan who reportedly masterminded two bombings 11 days apart in Pakistan in December 2003 that targeted President Pervez Musharraf for his support of the U.S.-led war on terror. The hearings, which began last Friday, are being conducted in secret by the military as it tries to determine whether 14 alleged terrorist leaders should be declared "enemy combatants" who can be held indefinitely and prosecuted by military tribunals. Hearings for six of the 14 have already been held. The military is not allowing reporters to attend the sessions and is limiting the information it provides about them, arguing that it wants to prevent sensitive information from being disclosed. The 14 were moved in September from a secret CIA prison network to the prison at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, where about 385 men are being held on suspicion of links to al-Qaida or the Taliban. Mohammed's confession was read by a member of the U.S. military who is serving as his personal representative, and it also claimed he shared responsibility for three other attacks, including assassination attempts against Pope John Paul II and Musharraf. The transcripts also lay out evidence against Mohammed, saying that a computer seized during his capture included detailed information about the Sept. 11 plot - ranging from names and photos of the hijackers to photos of hijacker Mohammad Atta's pilot's license and even letters from al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Al-Libi also made a statement through his personal representative largely claiming that the hearing process is unfair and that he will not attend unless it is corrected. "The detainee is in a lose-lose situation," his statement said. Binalshibh declined to participate in the process and the hearing was conducted in his absence. Military officials expected some of the 14 suspects not to participate. Legal experts have criticized the U.S. decision to bar independent observers from the hearings from the high-value targets. The Associated Press filed a letter of protest, arguing that it would be "an unconstitutional mistake to close the proceedings in their entirety." The military held 558 combatant status review tribunals between July 2004 and March 2005 and the panels concluded that all but 38 detainees were "enemy combatants" who should be held. Those 38 were eventually released from Guantanamo.

Link

Home Front: WoT

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed gets Guantanamo hearing

2007-03-13

U.S. military officials have held initial hearings for three terrorism suspects at Guantanamo Bay, including the alleged mastermind of the September 11 attacks on the United States, the Pentagon said on Monday. Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said a three-member panel examined the case of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed at a closed hearing on Saturday at the U.S. military prison camp on Cuba. Mohammed is among 14 prisoners identified by U.S. authorities as "high-value" terrorism suspects and transferred to Guantanamo last September from secret CIA prisons abroad. The hearings to determine whether the suspects meet U.S. authorities' definition of an enemy combatant began on Friday, the Pentagon said. The cases of two suspects -- Ramzi bin al Shaibah, a Yemeni also accused of involvement in the September 11 attacks, and alleged senior al Qaeda figure Abu Faraj al Libi of Libya -- were examined on Friday, Whitman said. Whitman said not all the prisoners had chosen to participate in their hearings but he declined to give any more details. The Pentagon has said it will release an edited transcript of each hearing some days after it is held.

Link

Terror Networks

Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi chosen to succeed Abu Faraj al-Libi

2006-05-27

The al-Qaeda organization has selected Abdulhadi al-Iraqi, an Iraqi national from northern Iraq, as the new commander of its global operations. The appointment comes following the seizure of Abu Faraj al-Libi by Pakistani forces in May. The new Iraqi-born al-Qaeda leader is married and with children and is believed to be in his forties. His wife is said to accompany him during his travels across the country. Al-Qaeda has a large following in Iraq particularly among Sunni Muslims. It operates through different organizations under various nomenclatures. But it first surfaced among Iraqi Kurds in the north where it operated from the inaccessible mountains east of Sulaimaniya and close to the borders with Iran. Known then as Ansar al-Islam, the militant group had destabilized most of the Kurdish north and was planning to control Sulaimaniya, the second largest Kurdish city. Fearing the onslaught, Kurdish leaders sought military assistance from their tormentor former leader Saddam Hussein who was reported to have supplied them with arms and men to contain the group. But the Ansar group expanded operations across Iraq following Saddam Hussein’s downfall and the occupation of Iraq by U.S. troops. The group has changed its name into Ansar al-Sunna and is currently, with other rebel groups, spearheading anti-U.S. operations in the country and the campaign of bombings directed against government troops and installations. Sources, speaking to Azzaman on condition of anonymity, said Ansar al-Sunna currently has many followers among Iranian Sunnis and is mainly based in central and northern parts of the country. The group includes mainly Sunni Muslims and is a mixture of Arabs, Kurds and Turks. Ansar Al-Sunna is currently led by Wariya Arbili, a Kurd, who is reported to be in good relations with other anti-U.S. groups but has been trying to distance himself from the Majlis Shura al-Mujahiddeen, a group purportedly headed by Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi.

Link

Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

Russian intel sez nearly 70% of al-Qaeda leadership eliminated

2005-12-19

Russian Foreign Intelligence Service director Sergei Lebedev said the anti-terrorist coalition had captured or killed most of the al-Qaeda international terrorist network's leaders. "Nearly 70% of al-Qaeda's highest-ranking members have been captured or killed in the international anti-terrorist campaign that has been in progress since 2001. They include the closest allies of 'Terrorist No. 1:' Abu-Zubaida, Abu-Leits, Sheikh Khalid Mohamed, and Abu Faraj al-Libi," Lebedev said in an interview with Interfax ahead of the 85th anniversary of the country's Foreign Intelligence Service to be marked on December 20. "As for Al-Qaeda representatives who took part in terrorist activities in the North Caucasus, odious figures such as Hattab, Abu al-Walid, Abu Zait and Abu Omar have been eliminated," he said. "The special services of a number of European countries carried out a joint operation in November 2005 to arrest leaders and members of Al-Qaeda's cells in Belgium, France, Italy and other states," he said. Terrorism can be defeated only through "joint efforts of all countries, their special services, other state bodies, and international organizations. The Foreign Intelligence Service's cooperation with its foreign colleagues helps achieve greater results in the anti-terrorist fight. That is why we are committed to further strengthening international cooperation in this area," Lebedev said.

Link

Terror Networks

Human Rights Watch's list of "ghost prisoners"

2005-12-02

Take a good, long look at the people on this list and you can decide for yourself whether or not you have any problems with this. I sure don't. 1. Ibn Al-Shaykh al-Libi Reportedly arrested on November 11, 2001, Pakistan. Libyan, suspected commander at al-Qaeda training camp. 2. Abu Faisal Reportedly arrested on December 12, 2001 3. Abdul Aziz Reportedly arrested on December 14, 2001 Nationality unknown. In early January 2002, Kenton Keith, a spokesman at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, produced a chart with the names of senior al-Qaeda members listed as killed in action, detained, or on the run. Faisal and Aziz were listed as detained on Dec. 12 and 14, 2001. 4. Abu Zubaydah (also known as Zain al-Abidin Muhahhad Husain) Reportedly arrested in March 2002, Faisalabad, Pakistan. Palestinian (born in Saudi Arabia), suspected senior al-Qaeda operational planner. 5. Abdul Rahim al-Sharqawi (aka Riyadh the facilitator) Reportedly arrested in January 2002 Possibly Yemeni, suspected al-Qaeda member (possibly transferred to Guantanamo). 6. Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi Reportedly arrested in January 2002 Nationality unknown, presumably Iraqi, suspected commander of al-Qaeda training camp. U.S. officials told Associated Press on January 8, 2002 and March 30, 2002, of al-Iraqi's capture. This is a different Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi who was placed in command of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan yesterday (who had previously been in command of Brigade 055 rather than a training camp), for those keeping score. 7. Muhammed al-Darbi Reportedly arrested in August 2002 Yemeni, suspected al-Qaeda member. The Washington Post reported on October 18, 2002: "U.S. officials learned from interviews with Muhammad Darbi, an al Qaeda member captured in Yemen in August, that a Yemen cell was planning an attack on a Western oil tanker, sources said." On December 26, 2002, citing "U.S. intelligence and national security officials," the Washington Post reports that al-Darbi, as well as Ramzi Binalshibh [see below], Omar al-Faruq [reportedly escaped from U.S. custody in July 2005], and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri [see below] all "remain under CIA control." 8. Ramzi bin al-Shibh Reportedly arrested on September 13, 2002 Yemeni, suspected al-Qaeda conspirator in Sept. 11 attacks (former roommate of one of the hijackers). 9. Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (or Abdulrahim Mohammad Abda al-Nasheri, aka Abu Bilal al-Makki or Mullah Ahmad Belal) Reportedly arrested in November 2002, United Arab Emirates. Saudi or Yemeni, suspected al-Qaeda chief of operations in the Persian Gulf, and suspected planner of the USS Cole bombing, and attack on the French oil tanker, Limburg. 10. Mohammed Omar Abdel-Rahman (aka Asadullah) Reportedly arrested in February 2003, Quetta, Pakistan. Egyptian, son of the Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, who was convicted in the United States of involvement in terrorist plots in New York. See Agence France Presse, March 4, 2003: "Pakistani and US agents captured the son of blind Egyptian cleric Omar Abdel Rahman. . . a US official said Tuesday. Muhamad Abdel Rahman was arrested in Quetta, Pakistan, the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity." David Johnston, New York Times, March 4, 2003: "On Feb. 13, when Pakistani authorities raided an apartment in Quetta, they got the break they needed. They had hoped to find Mr. [Khalid Sheikh] Mohammed, but he had fled the apartment, eluding the authorities, as he had on numerous occasions. Instead, they found and arrested Muhammad Abdel Rahman, a son of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind Egyptian cleric. . ." 11. Mustafa al-Hawsawi (aka al-Hisawi) Reportedly arrested on March 1, 2003 (together with Khalid Sheikh Mohammad), Pakistan. Saudi, suspected al-Qaeda financier. 12. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Reportedly arrested on March 1, 2003, Rawalpindi, Pakistan. Kuwaiti (Pakistani parents), suspected al-Qaeda, alleged to have "masterminded" Sept. 11 attacks, killing of Daniel Pearl, and USS Cole attack in 2000. 13. Majid Khan Reportedly arrested on March-April 2003, Pakistan. Pakistani, alleged link to Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, alleged involvement in plot to blow up gas stations in the United States. Details about Khan's arrest were revealed in several media reports, especially in Newsweek: Evan Thomas, "Al Qaeda in America: The Enemy Within," Newsweek, June 23, 2003. U.S. prosecutors provided evidence that Majid Khan was in U.S. custody during the trial of 24-year-old Uzair Paracha, who was convicted in November 2005 of conspiracy charges, and of providing material support to terrorist organizations. 14. Yassir al-Jazeeri (aka al-Jaziri) Reportedly arrested on March 15, 2003, Pakistan. Possibly Moroccan, Algerian, or Palestinian, suspected al-Qaeda member, linked to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. 15. Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (aka Ammar al Baluchi) Reportedly arrested on April 29, 2003, Karachi, Pakistan. A Pakistani, he is alleged to have funneled money to September 11 hijackers, and alleged to have been involved with the Jakarta Marriot bombing and in handling Jose Padilla's travel to the United States. U.S. Judge Sidney Stein ruled that defense attorneys for Uzair Paracha could introduce statements Baluchi made to U.S. interrogators, proving that he was in U.S. custody. Former Deputy Attorney General James Comey also mentioned Baluchi during remarks to the media about the case of Jose Padilla on June 1, 2004 16. Waleed Mohammed bin Attash (aka Tawfiq bin Attash or Tawfiq Attash Khallad) Reportedly arrested on April 29, 2003, Karachi, Pakistan. Saudi (of Yemeni descent), suspected of involvement in the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, and the Sept. 11 attacks. See Afzal Nadeem, "Pakistan Arrests Six Terror Suspects, including Planner of Sept. 11 and USS Cole Bombing," Associated Press, April 30, 2003. His brother, Hassan Bin Attash, is currently held in Guantanamo. 17. Adil al-Jazeeri Reportedly arrested on June 17, 2003 outside Peshawar, Pakistan. Algerian, suspected al-Qaeda and longtime resident of Afghanistan, alleged "leading member" and "longtime aide to bin Laden." (Possibly transferred to Guantanamo.) 18. Hambali (aka Riduan Isamuddin) Reportedly arrested on August 11, 2003, Thailand. Indonesian, involved in Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaeda, alleged involvement in organizing and financing the Bali nightclub bombings, the Jakarta Marriot Hotel bombing, and preparations for the September 11 attacks. 19. Mohamad Nazir bin Lep (aka Lillie, or Li-Li) Reportedly arrested in August 2003, Bangkok, Thailand. Malaysian, alleged link to Hambali. 20. Mohamad Farik Amin (aka Zubair) Reportedly arrested in June 2003, Thailand. Malaysian, alleged link to Hambali. 21. Tariq Mahmood Reportedly arrested in October 2003, Islamabad, Pakistan. Dual British and Pakistani nationality, alleged to have ties to al-Qaeda. 22. Hassan Ghul Reportedly arrested on January 23, 2004, in Kurdish highlands, Iraq. Pakistani, alleged to be Zarqawi's courier to bin Laden; alleged ties to Khalid Sheikh Mohammad. 23. Musaad Aruchi (aka Musab al-Baluchi, al-Balochi, al-Baloshi) Reportedly arrested in Karachi on June 12, 2004, in a "CIA-supervised operation." Presumably Pakistani. Pakistani intelligence officials told journalists Aruchi was held by Pakistani authorities at an airbase for three days, before being handed over to the U.S., and then flown in an unmarked CIA plane to an undisclosed location. 24. Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan (aka Abu Talaha) Reportedly arrested on July 13, 2004, Pakistan. Pakistani, computer engineer, was held by Pakistani authorities, and likely transferred to U.S. custody. (Possibly in joint U.S.-Pakistani custody.) 25. Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani Reportedly arrested on July 24, 2004, Pakistan Tanzanian, reportedly indicted in the United States for 1998 embassy bombings. U.S. and Pakistani intelligence officials told UPI that Ghailani was transferred to "CIA custody" in early August. 26. Abu Faraj al-Libi Reportedly arrested on May 4, 2005, North Western Frontier Province, Pakistan. Libyan, suspected al-Qaeda leader of operations, alleged mastermind of two assassination attempts on Musharraf. Col. James Yonts, a U.S. military spokesman in Afghanistan, "said in an email to The Associated Press that al-Libbi was taken directly from Pakistan to the U.S. and was not brought to Afghanistan."

Link

Terror Networks

The hunt is on for Abu Faraj

2004-08-24

Pakistani officials are seeking a man they and U.S. officials believe has taken over responsibility for planning al-Qaida attacks on the United States. They say he is the new No. 3 man in the terrorist network and may know the general whereabouts of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri — al-Qaida's No. 2 man. Abu Faraj al Libi, a Libyan citizen who has long worked with bin Laden, is believed to have taken over the No. 3 job with the capture of his mentor, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, in March 2003, a senior U.S. official told NBC News. Like all of the officials interviewed for this story, the official spoke on condition of anonymity. As Mohammed's top deputy, Abu Faraj is believed to have played a role in organizing the 9/11 attacks. Today, he is believed to be in charge of all al-Qaida's U.S. and United Kingdom operations, including any current plots. Abu Faraj is also believed to know at least the general whereabouts of bin Laden and al Zawahiri, and to be the mastermind of the Dec. 14 and 25 assassination attempts against Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. Pakistani officials told NBC News that Musharraf has told confidantes in the past few days, "We will get him."

Link

Warning: Undefined property: stdClass::$T in /data/rantburg.com/www/rantburg/pgrecentorg.php on line 132
-10 More