Recent Appearances...

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Hello !
Recent Appearances...

Abu Al-Walid Al-Ghamdi	Abu Al-Walid Al-Ghamdi	al-Qaeda	Arabia				20040628	Link
Abu Walid	Abu Walid	Chechnya	Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia	Saudi	Deceased	Big Shot	20051211	Link
Abu-al-Walid al-Ghamdi	Abu Al-Walid	Chechnya	Caucasus				20040306
	Abu al-Walid al Ghamdi	Chechnya	Caucasus				20040418	Link
	Abu Al-Walid	al-Qaeda	Terror Networks				20031231
	Abu al-Walid	Chechnya	Caucasus	Saudi	Deceased	Big Shot	20031212
	Abu al-Waleed al-Ghamdi	Chechnya	Caucasus				20040418	Link
	Abu-al-Walid al-Ghamdi	Chechnya	Caucasus				20040208
Abul Walid,	Abul Walid,	Chechnya	Caucasus				20040418	Link
Ahmed Walid Raguib al-Baz	Ahmed Walid Raguib al-Baz	Palestine Liberation Front	Iraq				20030320
Al-Walid	Al-Walid	Chechnya	Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia				20020517
Emir al-Walid	Emir al-Walid	Chechnya	Caucasus				20040418	Link
Hafiz Khalid Walid	Hafiz Khalid Walid	Jamaat-ud-Dawat	India-Pakistan				20020727
	Hafiz Khalid Walid	Lashkar-e-Taiba	India-Pakistan				20020727
Mahfouz Ould Walid	Mahfouz Ould Walid	Supreme Council of Global Jihad	Terror Networks	Mauritanian			20030813
	Mahfouz Ould Walid	al-Qaeda	Axis of Evil	Mauritanian			20020828
Mohammed Othman Abdullah Al-Walidi Al-Shehri	Mohammed Othman Abdullah Al-Walidi Al-Shehri	al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula	Arabia	Saudi	Deceased	Cannon Fodder	20030607
		One of the Riyadh boom perpetrators
Prince Al-Walid bin Talal bin Abdul Aziz	Prince Al-Walid bin Talal bin Abdul Aziz	Saudi Princes	Axis of Evil				20020827
Prince Walid bin Talal	Prince Walid bin Talal	Saudi Princes	Middle East				20030118
Sheikh Walid al-Haj	Sheikh Walid al-Haj	Learned Elders of Islam	Middle East				20021014
Walid Abdel-Al	Walid Abdel-Al	al-Ahbash	Syria-Lebanon-Iran				20051028	Link
Walid Altaraki	Walid Altaraki	Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group	Europe				20040401
	Walid Altaraki	al-Qaeda	Europe				20040401
Walid Ashour	Walid Ashour	Hamas	Israel-Palestine				20040609	Link
Walid Awad Ashor	Walid Awad Ashor	Hamas	Israel-Palestine				20040613	Link
Walid Hamed Tawfiq al-Tikriti	Walid Hamed Tawfiq al-Tikriti	Iraqi Baath Party	Iraq				20030507
Walid Hassan	Walid Hassan	al-Qaeda in Iraq	Israel-Palestine-Jordan				20060315	Link
Walid Khan	Walid Khan	al-Qaeda	Terror Networks				20051207	Link
	Walid Khan	al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula	Arabia				20051130	Link
Walid Manisi	Walid Manisi	Supreme Council of Global Jihad	Terror Networks				20030813
Walid Mutlaq Al-Radadi	Walid Mutlaq Al-Radadi	al-Qaeda	Arabia				20050629
	Walid Mutlaq Al-Radadi	al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula	Arabia				20050906
Walid Naouar	Walid Naouar	al-Qaeda	Europe				20021110
Walid bin Azmi	Walid bin Azmi	al-Qaeda	India-Pakistan				20040123
Walid-Muhammad Scott	Walid-Muhammad Scott	Tablighi Jamaat	Home Front				20030714

Syria-Lebanon-Iran

Who are the Middle East's Druze religious community?

2025-05-07

[NAHARNET] The Druze are a prominent religious community of more than a million people spread mainly across Syria, Leb
Leb

...The Lebs maintain a precarious sectarian balance among Shiites, Sunnis, and about a dozen flavors of Christians, plus Armenians, Georgians, and who knows what else?...
and Israel, who for centuries have sought to preserve a distinct identity.

In Syria, Druze fighters recently clashed with forces loyal to the country's new Islamist rulers, highlighting the struggles they and other minority groups have faced with shifts in regional power dynamics.

"The Druze are a kind of an ultra-tribe which transcends space and geography," said Makram Rabah, assistant professor of history at the American University of Beirut.

Despite being a minority in a majority Sunni Moslem region, the Middle East's Druze have played "a very important role", Rabah said.

Here is a look at the community:

- RELIGION AND CUSTOMS -
The Druze emerged in Egypt in the early 11th century as a branch of the Ismaili sect of Shiite Islam.

They are monotheistic and call themselves "muwahhidun", or unitarians.

The sect is highly secretive and includes mystical elements like reincarnation.

It does not allow new converts and marriage outside the community is strongly discouraged.

A source familiar with Druze rituals, requesting anonymity to discuss matters considered sensitive, said the faith's emergence was influenced by other religious and philosophical teachings, including those of Greek philosopher Plato.

Some Druze religious occasions align with those of other Islamic sects.

Traditional Druze garb is black, with men wearing white caps or turbans and women covering their heads and part of their faces with a flowing white scarf.

- WHERE ARE THEY? -
"The Druze don't really recognize borders," Rabah said.

"You have marriages and you have standing relationships between the Druze across the region," he said, adding that "holy men play a very important role in keeping this relationship alive."

Before Syria's civil war erupted in 2011, the community was estimated at around 700,000 people.

According to "The Druze Faith" by historian Sami Makarem, Druze have been migrating to southern Syria since the 16th century, to an area now known as Jabal al-Druze, meaning Druze Mountain, in Sweida province.

Syria's Druze are now mainly concentrated in their Sweida heartland, as well as nearby Quneitra province, with smaller pockets in the Damascus suburbs, notably Jaramana and Sahnaya, which recently saw sectarian violence.

In Lebanon, an estimated 200,000 Druze are concentrated in the mountainous center as well as in the south near Israel and Syria.

In Israel, some 153,000 Druze are Israeli citizens, living mainly in the north. Unlike other Arab Israelis, Druze serve in the Israeli army.

In the Israeli-annexed Syrian Golan Heights, more than 22,000 Druze hold permanent resident status. Only around 1,600 have become Israeli citizens, while others remain attached to their Syrian identity.

Israel seized much of the Golan from Syria in 1967, annexing the area in 1981 in a move largely unrecognized internationally. The move separated extended families, though Druze in the annexed Golan were often able to cross into Syria to study, attend weddings or sell produce.
[AnNahar] Some Druze from southern Syria also settled in neighboring Jordan, where the community is estimated at 15,000 to 20,000.

Two delegations of Syrian Druze holy men have made pilgrimages to a holy site in Israel this year, even though the two countries are technically at war with each other.

Outside the Middle East, Druze have migrated to regions including the Americas and Australia.

Well-known Druze include prominent human rights
...not to be confused with individual rights, mind you...
lawyer Amal Alamuddin Clooney and Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi.

- LEADING ROLE -
Despite their minority status, Druze "have filled an important and sometimes a leading role in the political and social life" of the Middle East, according to historian Makarem.

In Syria, Druze Sultan Pasha al-Atrash led a nationalist revolt against the French mandatory power which had established a Druze statelet in southern Syria during the 1920s and 1930s.

In Lebanon, Druze leader Kamal Jumblat played a key role in politics from the 1950s until his 1977 liquidation, and his son Walid is a powerful politician.

Jumblat last month urged Syria's Druze to reject "Israeli interference", after Israel warned the Islamist authorities who ousted president Bashir Pencilneck al-Assad
Light of the Alawites...
against harming the minority.

Druze leaders have declared their loyalty to a united Syria, though some have called for international protection following recent sectarian violence.

Israeli Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Mowafaq Tarif has urged Israel to protect Syria's Druze.

Rabah said there was a Druze "power struggle across three states", adding that he believes Syria's community does not aspire to statehood.

The Druze largely stayed on the sidelines of Syria's war after it erupted in 2011, focusing on defending their heartland.

Most Druze gangs have yet to reach a settlement with the new authorities.

Link

Government Corruption

Convicted FBI lawyer spared from prison by Boasberg far more involved in Russia probe than known

2025-04-18

Long and detailed. A taste:

[JustTheNews] The judge who has emerged as a top foe of Trump's deportation efforts previously let a well-known Trump-Russia collusion hoax proponent off the hook. But newly-declassified Crossfire Hurricane records show the FBI's Kevin Clinesmith was deeply involved in in the bogus Russiagate saga.

Convicted FBI lawyer Kevin Clinesmith — whom Judge James Boasberg gave a slap on the wrist for his crimes years before becoming a public foe of President Donald Trump’s deportation policies — was more deeply involved in the deeply flawed Crossfire Hurricane investigation than previously known.

Clinesmith, who worked on both the FBI’s Hillary Clinton email investigation and on the Trump-Russia collusion inquiry, pleaded guilty to falsifying a document during the bureau’s efforts to renew FISA authority to wiretap Carter Page, who was an adviser to Trump's 2016 campaign.

Newly-declassified details about Clinesmith’s involvement include a wide swath of information about his role in the case. He was a key go-to for former FBI lawyer Lisa Page and fired FBI special agent Peter Strzok throughout the debunked collusion saga and a main driver in obtaining a FISA warrant against Page based on the infamous Steele dossier.

Clinesmith also granted his seal of approval on a document describing the FBI’s pretextual briefing of then-candidate Trump, was deeply involved in the investigation into retired Lt. Gen. Mike Flynn, played a role in going after former Trump campaign adviser George Papadopoulos, and more. He also helped the FBI push its “Cross Wind” investigation, which Just the News can confirm related to the targeting of security expert Walid Phares, which resulted in no accusations of wrongdoing and no charges.

KNEE-DEEP IN THE MUD
Clinesmith confessed in August 2020 that he had manipulated a CIA email in 2017 to state that Carter Page was “not a source” for the CIA when that agency had actually told the bureau on multiple occasions that Page was in fact an “operational contact” for the CIA.

Boasberg, the federal judge who is blocking Trump’s efforts to deport Venezuelan gang members, also played a key and controversial role in the aftermath of the Trump-Russia collusion saga as the leader of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. The judge, nominated to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia by then-President Barack Obama in 2011, is currently engaged in an all-out legal battle with the Trump Justice Department.

But in his role as the head of the FISA Court he made a number of divisive decisions, including a slap on the wrist for a member of the FBI’s Crossfire Hurricane team, the appointment of officials who had defended the FBI’s actions during the Russiagate saga, the renewal of the FBI’s FISA powers, and more.

BOASBERG DEFENDS CLINESMITH
Boasberg ruled this week that “probable cause exists” to hold Trump administration officials in criminal contempt after they violated his orders by continuing deportation flights. But his ruling follows the Supreme Court holding that Boasberg's court was in an improper venue for the case altogether.

Boasberg, in his role as a federal judge, denied the Justice Department’s efforts to seek up to six months behind bars for Clinesmith, who pleaded guilty in Special Counsel John Durham’s Trump-Russia investigation — instead giving Clinesmith a year of probation, 400 hours of community service, and no fine.

The remaining subheds:

Collaboration on the Carter Page FISA
Clinesmith altered docs, hid information from FISA court
Sign off on doc detailing pretextual briefing of Trump
Clinesmith Targets Flynn
Leaks and unmasking
"Out to get Trump"
Steele Dossier dissemination
Clinesmith and Papadopoulos
Strzok establishes a pattern of untruths
“Cross Wind”
Clinesmith: "Viva le resistance"
Comey arranges leaks to media
The Crossfire docs a profitable venture

Link

Syria-Lebanon-Iran

Syrian authorities arrest the retired general, accused of orchestrating high-profile assassinations

2025-03-08

[PUBLISH.TWITTER]

Syrian authorities arrest the retired general, accused of orchestrating high-profile assassinations, including the 1977 killing of Lebanese leader Kamal Jumblatt. #Syria https://t.co/SCcRBjysil
— NORTH PRESS AGENCY - ENGLISH (@NPA_English) March 7, 2025

The Internal Security Agency of the Syrian caretaker government announced on Thursday evening the arrest of retired Major General Ibrahim Huweija, the former head of the Syrian Air Force Intelligence Directorate, who is accused of orchestrating multiple liquidations during the rule of former President Hafez al-Assad, in the coastal city of Jableh.

According to the official Syrian news agency
... and if you can't believe the Official Syrian News Agency who can you believe?
SANA, a source within the General Security Administration confirmed the arrest, stating: "The criminal Major General Ibrahim Huweija, former head of Syrian Air Force Intelligence from 1987 to 2002, has been detained in the city of Jableh."

Huweija is accused of being involved in "hundreds of liquidations" under the Assad family’s rule, including the 1977 liquidation of Lebanese Druze leader Kamal Jumblat. Reports indicate that Jumblat’s vehicle was intercepted in the town of Baakline, where he was shot and killed.

During a 2015 hearing before the Special Tribunal for Leb
Leb

...The Lebs maintain a precarious sectarian balance among Shiites, Sunnis, and about a dozen flavors of Christians, plus Armenians, Georgians, and who knows what else?...
, Kamal Jumblat’s son, Walid Wally Jumblat
...Druze politician, head of the Progressive Socialist Party, who's been on every side in Leb at least four times. He'll sell you his friends for a dollar, but family comes higher because of shipping and handling...
, testified that the Syrian intelligence office in Beirut—under Huweija’s authority—was responsible for his father’s liquidation.

Born in the village of Ain Shaqaq in the countryside of Jableh in Latakia Governorate, Huweija hails from a region close to Beit Yashout, the hometown of Major General Mohammed al-Khouli, the first director of the Syrian Air Force Intelligence Directorate.

Huweija began his military career in the 1970s and later became one of Syria’s most influential intelligence officers.

In 1987, he was appointed as head of the Air Force Intelligence Directorate, succeeding al-Khouli. He remained in the position until 2002, when he was dismissed by President Bashir Pencilneck al-Assad
Horror of Homs...
.

Link

Syria-Lebanon-Iran

Assad remnants launch deadly attacks on Damascus forces in western Syria, 16 HTS turbans toes up UPDATE: Vicious HTS response

2025-03-07

[Rudaw] More than a dozen security personnel affiliated with the new Syrian leadership were killed in Latakia, west Syria, by supporters of the toppled Syrian dictator Bashir Pencilneck al-Assad
Before going into the family business Pencilneck was an eye doctor. If he'd stuck with it he'd have had a good practice by now...
on Sunday, a war monitor reported, anticipating the number of fatalities to rise.

Rami Abdulrahman, head of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), told Rudaw that 16 members of the security forces, mostly from the predominantly Sunni province of Idlib were killed in "attacks and ambushes" carried out by Assad loyalists in his former stronghold of Jableh and Latakia countryside.

The UK-based Observatory described the assault as "the deadliest attack on security and military forces since the fall of the [Assad] regime."

Following a swift offensive, a coalition of rebel groups led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, formerly al-Nusra, before that it was called something else

Tahrir al-Sham, formerly al-Nusra, before that it was called something else

...al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, from which sprang the Islamic State...
(HTS) on December 8 toppled the regime of Assad, who fled to Russia with his family.

SOHR added on Thursday that "at least three members of the gangs were killed in festivities" as well. It quoted Syrian security forces as stating that they were engaged in festivities with "gangs affiliated with Suhail al-Hassan, a prominent military commander during Assad’s rule."

For its part, the state-run Syrian news agency (SANA) cited the head of Latakia’s General Security Directorate, Mustafa Knaifati as describing the attack as "planned and premeditated." He added that "several" gangs affiliated with Assad "attacked our positions and checkpoints, targeting many of our patrols in the Jableh and its countryside."

SANA quoted another unnamed security source in Latakia as stating that "the remnants" of Assad’s regime "are targeting personnel and vehicles of the Ministry of Defense near the town of Beit Aana in the Latakia countryside."

The fighting marks a sharp escalation of tensions along Syria’s coast often regarded as the heartland of the Alawite sect, which Assad descends from.

Courtesy of badanov:

Clashes between Assad supporters and police in Latakia
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
[Regnum] Clashes between supporters of former President Bashar al-Assad and government forces occurred in Syria's Latakia. The Defense Ministry of the transitional government of Syria sent armed forces to the region, Al Hadath TV channel reported,citing sources.

According to the channel, 28 protesters loyal to Assad were killed in clashes with security forces in Latakia province, while authorities imposed a curfew in the area.

Moreover, according to Al Hadath, at least 16 security personnel were killed in clashes with Assad supporters. It is noted that security forces took control of the clash areas in Jableh, where supporters of the former president attacked one of the checkpoints of the Internal Security Directorate of the new Syrian administration.

As reported by the Regnum news agency, in December 2024, armed groups of the Syrian opposition launched a large-scale offensive against government forces. On December 8, the Syrian army left Damascus, and the militants announced the transfer of power into their hands. Shar Assad resigned and left the country, receiving political asylum in Russia. Ahmed al-Sharaa became the head of the interim government.

On February 12, 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin held telephone talks with Ahmed al-Sharaa. They discussed the situation in Syria and issues of cooperation in trade, economic, educational and other areas. The Russian President emphasized that Moscow takes a principled position in support of the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria.

On February 25, the press secretary of the Russian president Dmitry Peskov reported that Russia is in contact with the Syrian authorities on the issue of maintaining Russian bases in Syria. The working process is underway, including the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry Sergey Lavrov visited Turkey, where he also raised this issue for discussion.

What the Times of Israel saw:

Over 70 said killed in fighting between Syrian government forces, Assad loyalists
[IsraelTimes] War monitor describes clashes in coastal province of Latakia as ‘the most violent’ since former regime was toppled, with new authorities reportedly launching helicopter strikes

More than 70 people were killed and dozens more maimed in Syria in fighting between government security forces and ~~bandidos~~ turbans loyal to deposed ruler Bashir Pencilneck al-Assad
Supressor of the Damascenes...
, a war monitor said Friday.

"More than 70 killed and dozens maimed and captured in bloody festivities and ambushes on the Syrian coast between members of the Ministry of Defense and Interior and ~~bandidos~~ turbans from the defunct regime’s army," the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said in a post on X.

It said earlier that fighting Thursday between government forces and Assad loyalists had killed 48 people in the coastal town of Jableh and adjacent villages, saying they were "the most ~~violent~~ mostly peaceful attacks against the new authorities since Assad was toppled" in December.

The overall toll during this week’s unrest was not immediately clear.

Pro-Assad fighters killed 16 security personnel while 28 fighters aligned with the ousted president and four civilians were also killed, the Observatory said Thursday.

The earlier fighting was in the Mediterranean coastal province of Latakia, the heartland of Assad’s Alawite minority who were considered bastions of support during his rule.

Mustafa Kneifati, a security official in Latakia, said that in "a well-planned and premeditated attack, several groups of Assad militia remnants attacked our positions and checkpoints," targeting patrols in the Jableh area.

The attacks resulted in "numerous deaders and injured among our forces," he added without providing the number of casualties.

Kneifati said security forces would "work to eliminate their presence."

"We will restore stability to the region and protect the property of our people," he declared.of our people," he declared.

TOP OFFICER ARRESTED
The UK-based observatory said most of the security personnel killed were from the former rebel bastion of Idlib in the northwest.

During the operation, security forces captured and arrested a former head of air force intelligence, one of the Assad family’s most trusted security agencies, state news agency SANA reported.

"Our forces in the city of Jableh managed to arrest the criminal General Ibrahim Huweija," SANA said.

"He is accused of hundreds of liquidations during the era of the criminal Hafez al-Assad," Bashir al-Assad’s father and predecessor.

Huweija, who headed air force intelligence from 1987 to 2002, has long been a suspect in the 1977 murder of Lebanese Druze leader Kamal Bek Jumblat.

His son and successor Walid Wally Jumblat
...Druze politician, head of the Progressive Socialist Party, who's been on every side in Leb at least four times. He'll sell you his friends for a dollar, but family comes higher because of shipping and handling...
retweeted the news of his arrest with the comment: "Allahu Akbar (God is Greatest)."

The provincial security director said security forces clashed with button men loyal to an Assad-era special forces commander in another village in Latakia, after authorities reportedly launched helicopter strikes.

"The gangs that our security forces were clashing with in the Latakia countryside were affiliated with the war criminal Suhail al-Hassan," the security director told SANA.

Nicknamed "The Tiger," Hassan led the country’s special forces and was frequently described as Assad’s "favorite soldier." He was responsible for key military advances by the Assad government in 2015.

HELICOPTER STRIKES
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights had earlier reported "strikes launched by Syrian helicopters on gunnies in the village of Beit Ana and the surrounding forests, coinciding with artillery strikes on a neighboring village."

SANA reported that militias loyal to the ousted president had opened fire on "members and equipment of the defense ministry" near the village, killing one security force member and wounding two.

Qatar
...an emirate on the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula. It sits on some really productive gas and oil deposits, which produces the highest per capita income in the world. They piss it all away on religion, financing the Moslem Brotherhood and several al-Qaeda affiliates. Home of nutbag holy manYusuf al-Qaradawi...
i broadcaster Al Jazeera reported that its photographer Riad al-Hussein was maimed in the festivities but that he was doing well.

A defense ministry source later told SANA thon the lam military reinforcements were being deployed to the Jableh area.

Alawite leaders later called in a statement on Facebook for "peaceful protests" in response to the helicopter strikes, which they said had targeted "the homes of civilians."

The security forces imposed overnight curfews on Alawite-populated areas, including Latakia, the port city of Tartus and third city Homs, SANA reported.

In other cities around the country, crowds gathered "in support of the security forces," it added.

Tensions erupted after residents of Beit Ana, the birthplace of Suhail al-Hassan, prevented security forces from arresting a person wanted for trading arms, the Observatory said.

Security forces subsequently launched a campaign in the area, resulting in festivities with button men, it added.

Tensions erupted after at least four non-combatants were killed during a security operation in Latakia, the monitor said on Wednesday.

Security forces launched the campaign in the Daatour neighborhood of the city on Tuesday after an ambush by "members of the remnants of Assad militias" killed two security personnel, state media reported.

Salafist tough guys led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, formerly al-Nusra, before that it was called something else

...al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, from which sprang the Islamic State...
launched a lightning offensive that toppled Assad on December 8.

The country’s new security forces have since carried out extensive campaigns seeking to root out Assad loyalists from his former bastions.

Residents and organizations have reported violations during those campaigns, including the seizing of homes, field executions and kidnappings.

Syria’s new authorities have described the violations as "isolated incidents" and vowed to pursue those responsible.

NEW -- a day of *very* serious hostilities in #Jableh, #Latakia, triggered by attacks by #Assad loyalists.

13 interim gov't forces killed, plus loyalists. A helicopter gunship deployed & DMO forces dispatched from #Damascus tonight as fighting continues. pic.twitter.com/lbvf9wFQOG
— Charles Lister (@Charles_Lister) March 6, 2025

Sarah Adam’s twitter/X feed is blowing up with ugly tweets on the viciously thorough HTS response to Assad remnant rebelliousness here. Those of you who happily swim in those waters might want to bring back some key tweets to help us keep up with events — it’s beyond my ability.
My thanks in advance.

— tw at 1:55 a.m. ET

Link

Syria-Lebanon-Iran

Clashes between Assad supporters and police in Latakia

2025-03-07

Direct Translation via Gogle Translate. Edited.
[Regnum] Clashes between supporters of former President Bashar al-Assad and government forces occurred in Syria's Latakia. The Defense Ministry of the transitional government of Syria sent armed forces to the region, Al Hadath TV channel reported,citing sources.

What the Times of Israel saw:

NEW -- a day of *very* serious hostilities in #Jableh, #Latakia, triggered by attacks by #Assad loyalists.

13 interim gov't forces killed, plus loyalists. A helicopter gunship deployed & DMO forces dispatched from #Damascus tonight as fighting continues. pic.twitter.com/lbvf9wFQOG
— Charles Lister (@Charles_Lister) March 6, 2025

Link

Syria-Lebanon-Iran

'David's Corridor': What Role Do the Druze Play in Israel's Plans to Dismember Syria

2025-03-04

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Kirill Semenov

[REGNUM] The Israeli leadership would like to use the Syrian Druze as its “fifth column” in Syria, but so far the bet on this ethno-confessional minority has not paid off.

Despite the provocative statements of the Israeli leadership, the Syrian Druze continue to claim that their "qibla" (i.e. point of attraction) is Damascus, and they intend to remain Syrians, although tensions in relations with the transitional government continue to mount.

On Saturday, following an incident in the Damascus suburb of Jaramana, in which two militants from local Druze groups killed an employee of the Syrian government's Public Security Service (PSS - police), the town was blocked by government forces.

Israel decided to intervene in the situation, presenting itself as a "defender of the Druze." The Minister of Defense of the Jewish state, Israel Katz, then said that he had instructed the military to prepare for a march on Jaramana and to support the Druze if Syrian troops began to clear the suburbs.

"We will not allow the radical Islamic regime in Syria to harm the Druze. If the regime harms the Druze, we will strike at it," Katz said.

The head of the military department also assured that he “commits to our Druze brothers in Israel” to do everything possible to prevent harm from being caused to “their Druze brothers in Syria,” and intends to take all necessary steps to ensure their safety.

"DAVID'S CORRIDOR"
Israel is trying to take advantage of the unstable situation in Syria to finally destroy the country, which in the future could pose a threat to the Jewish state.

The events of October 7, 2023 have changed Israel greatly, primarily in its assessment of its own security and measures to ensure it. And now, perhaps, maintaining chaos in neighboring countries instead of stability seems to be the best option for Tel Aviv to mitigate any future challenges.

The Israeli leadership was not interested in the fall of the Assad regime, believing that this would lead to dangerous turbulence at the borders. Now it is doing everything to ensure that the new Syrian authorities are unable to stabilize the situation, and even wants Syria as a state to cease to exist in principle, disintegrating into several entities hostile to each other.

Of course, in such a scenario, individual “splashes” of these conflicts may also affect Israel, but these will definitely not be waves like the “Al-Aqsa flood,” and it will be much easier to counteract them.

Israel speaks about these plans openly and without embarrassment.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar has publicly voiced the Netanyahu government's preference for a fragmented Syria. In a speech at the EU-Israel summit, Saar called for the country to be divided into separate autonomous states along perceived ethnic and religious lines. This, he said, is important to protect the country's minorities, who are under threat from the new government.

The plan to dismember Syria has already received the unofficial name “David’s Corridor” in Israel.

It proposes, at the first stage, the creation of a security zone in southern Syria in the provinces of Daraa and Quneitra bordering Israel. The Druze in the neighboring province of Suwayda, where they constitute the majority, would be able to rely on this zone. This would create a continuous strip of Israeli control in southern Syria, and the Druze would become a local support for Israel, just as the Lebanese Christians - the Maronites - once did in the puppet state of southern Lebanon before 2000.

The reality of the launch of the first stage of the scenario is indicated by the ultimatum demands voiced by the Netanyahu government regarding the withdrawal of all armed forces of the new Syrian government from the southern regions of Syria.

In the second stage, the "David Corridor" is planned to be extended through the desert areas along the border with Iraq, relying on the American base at At-Tanf. This security belt should be provided by Arab tribes that were part of the pro-American "Free Syrian Army" based at At-Tanf, and be extended to the territories controlled by the Kurdish formations of the "Syrian Democratic Forces" in northeastern Syria.

Thus, Israel will be cut off from Iraq with its numerous Shiite pro-Iranian groups by a continuous strip of forces allied to it and the US, and the “Islamist” government in Damascus will be isolated.

For this purpose, the Alawites in the provinces of Tartus and Latakia, according to this plan, must also separate from Syria, forming their own quasi-state.

In connection with this, there have already been rumors in the Western press that Israel would like Russian bases to remain in Syria, and is negotiating this not only with Russia itself, but also with the United States.

Obviously, this is a hint that the Russian side should become the curator of the “Alawite state,” while the United States will continue to look after the Kurdish state, and Israel will look after the Druze state, connected by the “David Corridor.”

But the aim of these information provocations is also to present Russia as an accomplice in the division of Syria and to spoil the background of Moscow’s relations with Damascus, as well as with other Arab states, as well as Turkey.

However, the large number of publications in support of the separation of the Alawites from the Syrian state in the Russian-language segment of various social networks adds credibility to this rumor.

DRUZE BETWEEN THE HAMMER OF TEL AVIV AND THE ANVIL OF DAMASCUS
Israel's far-reaching plans have met a serious obstacle in the form of the Syrian Druze themselves.

The Druze of the southern provinces and the forces of Jaramana quickly rejected any external assistance, reaffirming the unity and indivisibility of Syria. Later, demonstrations under Syrian flags were held in Druze areas against the statements of Netanyahu and Katz.

As Alain Saab, a Russian researcher of the Druze community with Druze roots, told Regnum news agency, it is noteworthy that it was the Druze groups and influential political figures from the As-Suwayda region that acted as mediators in resolving the conflict between the population of Jaramana and the Public Security Service (PSS) of the transitional government.

In particular, a significant role was played by Laith al-Balous, an influential Druze political figure and leader of the Forces of the Sheikhs of Dignity (Rijal al-Karama) group, who became a de facto mediator between Damascus and Jaramane.

Thus, according to the expert, constant contacts between the Druze leaders and the GSS helped to avoid unnecessary bloodshed and escalation: now there is silence in the Jaramana area, the GSS units have fully entered the center of the area and set up checkpoints, and local forces and Damascus are taking further steps to resolve the conflict.

In turn, the leader of the Druze in Lebanon, Walid Jumblatt, who also has great influence among the Druze communities in Syria and Israel, said on Sunday that he would soon visit Syria to meet with its interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and help ease tensions in the Druze community in that country and help resolve all disputes between it and Damascus.

"Free Syrians must be careful of Israeli plots," he told a news conference on Sunday, accusing Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu of creating sectarian division and chaos in Syria.

On the other hand, as Alain Saab noted, the Druze-populated province of As-Suwayda is indeed playing its own game, enjoying the political support of the Israeli Druze when necessary. The nature of this “game” is to systematically pressure Damascus to obtain some autonomous privileges in the overall Syrian context.

However, the connection between the Syrian Druze and the Israelis should not be equated with the connection between the Syrian Druze and Israel itself.

Many Syrian Druze do have relatives in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, which Tel Aviv has announced its annexation of. However, it is important to note that the Druze of that part of the Golan Heights retain a Syrian national identity. To this day, the Druze from the Golan do not serve in the Israeli army and most do not have Israeli citizenship.

At the same time, one cannot underestimate the activities of the Israeli intelligence services, primarily the Mossad, which uses some Israeli Druze to create pro-Israeli networks among the Druze community in Syria.

Obviously, the so-called “Military Council” of Suwayda, created back in December, can be considered an Israel-oriented structure, but it made its presence known most loudly after the announcement of Israel’s plans to divide Syria.

However, the influence of this group among the Syrian Druze is insignificant, although its ranks include highly qualified military personnel who were trained at the American base at Al-Tanf back in 2023.

The "Mountain Brigade" and "Karam Sheikh Forces" significantly outnumber this faction. Despite its active PR (not without the help of Israeli information resources), at the moment this structure, according to official statements, is supported by four villages and a number of virtually unknown groups.

The Military Council also has no support from large armed groups or religious leaders.

THE KEY TO THE PROBLEM IS IN DAMASCUS
However, which side the Druze end up on will largely depend on the new Syrian authorities themselves.

On the one hand, Sunni Arabs and Druze do not have the same antagonism as Sunnis and Alawites, and one can speak of much greater mutual understanding.

Most Druze did not support the regime of Bashar al-Assad and did not participate on his side in the civil war. Quite the contrary, in the last stage of the conflict, Druze armed groups openly opposed Assad, advancing towards Damascus, disarming parts of the collapsed government.

On the other hand, the Druze certainly remain distrustful of the “Islamist” government in Damascus.

The Druze already had negative experiences with the Jabhat al-Nusra* group even before it became Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)*.

Thus, under pressure from jihadists, the Druze communities in Idlib were forced to accept Islam (although, by the way, a statement from their leaders was enough for this and no evidence was required from each Druze). And several Druze units fighting in the ranks of the opposition in southern Syria were surrounded and captured by radicals after they were declared “apostates,” and only the intervention of other rebel factions allowed them to save their lives and be free again, but after that the Druze no longer joined the ranks of the armed opposition.

Now many problems between the new authorities and the Druze have been resolved.

In particular, in January, the Public Security Forces (PSF) of the transitional government were deployed in the province of Suwayda, although the Druze had previously prevented their entry into the region.

The Military Operations Department forces are also present in Suwayda, including separating warring Druze factions from local Bedouin tribes. But it is the Druze factions that are still the key guarantor of security in the province, although Damascus is not opposed to some factions helping the security services, as this can speed up their integration and create a barrier to threats from Israel.

But mistrust not only remains, but is generally growing.

Thus, according to expert Alain Saab, the Druze initially treated HTS* with some apprehension, but also with hope.

“Now, in my opinion, everyone is increasingly afraid of HTS,” the expert noted, “

but Julani (al-Sharaa) is perceived as being separate (from the group he led. — Ed.) and more positive.”

In general, as Saaba notes, there is still cautious support for the new Syrian authorities among the Druze, but after the creation of the “Military Council” and the conflict in Jaramana, calls for a forceful solution to the Druze issue can be heard from the most radical elements of HTS*, “and this is seriously damaging support for Damascus among the Druze.”

According to the expert, if the new government can somehow stop all this disinformation and fakes, then a warming will occur.

If not, then on one side Israel, and on the other the radicals themselves will “construct a conflict.”

But in any case, Israel will continue to put pressure on Syria, using the information space to incite hatred towards the Druze on the part of Sunni Arabs and, conversely, with the aim of expanding the ethno-confessional conflict and further dividing Syria.

Update from Rudaw, with a local perspective, at 11:30 a.m. ET:

Syrian forces enter Damascus suburb, situation stable: Source

Members of Syria's new authorities security forces deploy in the mostly Druze and Syrian forces have entered a majority Druze and Christian suburb on the outskirts of Damascus and stabilized the situation, a local source said on Monday, after deadly clashes with Druze gunmen.

“The situation in Jarmana is stable. Yesterday, the General Security Forces and police entered the city with the cooperation of the city’s people, and there is good cooperation between the people and the police,” Rabie Munther, a member of the Jarmana Civil Action Group, told Rudaw’s Nalin Hassan.

He said that Syrian forces entered the town on Sunday night following 48 hours of tensions and following mediation between dignitaries and Syrian government authorities.

Security is now being maintained jointly by the police and the area’s residents, according to Munther.

“We have not stopped basic services and institutions for even a second since the fall of the regime until now,” he stressed.

Jaramana, a mostly Druze and Christian suburb of the capital Damascus, has witnessed tensions for days following a fatal shooting at a checkpoint. Clashes ensued between security forces and local gunmen, resulting in another death and nine others injured.

Munther explained that what happened was a “personal matter,” where unknown gunmen attacked a car.

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) led the rebel coalition that toppled Bashar al-Assad’s regime in early December. Its then leader and now Syria’s interim President, Ahmad al-Sharaa, has repeatedly pledged to protect the rights of all Syrians. In December, the rebel coalition, including the HTS, agreed to merge into the Syrian defense ministry.

The international community has expressed concern that the new Islamist authorities in Damascus may impose strict Islamic rule in Syria, threatening the country’s minority groups such as Kurds, Druze, Christians, and Alawites.

On Saturday, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned the Damascus administration to “not harm the Druze,” stressing that Syrian authorities would “suffer the consequences” if they harmed the community.

In Syria’s southern Druze-majority Suwayda province, both armed and political factions have refused to disband their forces.

Link

Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

'Half an Hour's Respite - and Again the Attack.' How 90 'Greenhorns' Turned the Tide of the 2nd Chechen War

2025-03-02

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Daniil Pelymov

[REGNUM] "The battalion was carrying out a blocking mission. Intelligence discovered the caravan. The battalion commander moved to the battlefield and commanded the unit. The soldiers fulfilled their duty with honor. I am proud of my people." These few words of Colonel Sergei Melentyev, commander of the 104th regiment of the 76th Pskov Airborne Division, at a briefing on March 5, 2000, became the first official testimony of the bloody battle that took place several days earlier in the Argun Gorge of Chechnya.

Only later, from the words of the survivors, it became clear that this was an event that would forever enter the history of the Russian army.

Exactly twenty-five years ago, 90 young fighters of the 6th company of the 104th regiment found themselves in the path of militants who were many times superior in force – and at the cost of their lives, they thwarted the breakthrough through the mountains of a large group of Shamil Basayev and the international terrorist Khattab. At the same time, the feat of the “Spartans from the Airborne Forces” revealed the systemic problems of the Russian army of that time, which had to be solved already in the new century.

ENEMY BREAKTHROUGH IN TWO DIRECTIONS
The last year of the 20th century, 2000, was a leap year, so the last battle of the 6th company of the Pskov landing force fell on a rare date - February 29.

Leap years are considered difficult years – and in this case it was not just a matter of popular superstition. It was the last war that Russia had waged this century – the Second Chechen War.

Since September 1999, the army, at the cost of heavy losses, but steadily corrected the mistake made in 1996 - when the First Chechen War was ended by the Khasavyurt Peace. The conflict was supposedly stopped, but the "deal" only extended the life of the criminal-terrorist enclave that called itself the "Chechen Republic of Ichkeria". The regime that captured Chechnya quickly drifted from separatism to Islamism and could not help but begin "exporting jihad" - the invasion of Khattab and Basayev's gangs into Dagestan without the knowledge of the "President of Ichkeria" Aslan Maskhadov was inevitable.

By the end of 1999, the militants' attack was repelled by the regular army and Dagestani militias, and the war continued on enemy territory. The cities of Gudermes, Achkhoy-Martan, Argun, Shali, and the village and airfield of Khankala had already been liberated, and the battle for Grozny was underway (November 1999 - February 2000).

During the retreat from the Chechen capital, the "Ichkerians" lost many fighters who were blown up in their own minefields. Unable to confront the regular army in open combat, the enemy retreated to the mountains of the Shatoi and Itum-Kalinsky districts, where they felt more confident.

The absence of problems with food, the support and training of Arab professional terrorists (who were supervised by the “Black Arab” Khattab and the main “specialist” in airborne and subversive operations Abu al-Walid ), knowledge of the terrain - all this contributed to the effective operations of the Wahhabis and the difficulties of the advancement of the “federalists”.

The gang of "division general" Ruslan Gelayev moved towards the village of Komsomolskoye (Urus-Martanovsky district), trying to gain a foothold in this strategically important point of mountainous Chechnya. Gelayev hoped for the effectiveness of the tactics of the first war, when Salman Raduyev's terrorists successfully held Pervomayskoye together with the hostages. The battles for Komsomolskoye (March 5-20, 2000) became the last major battle of the Second Chechen War and require a separate story. We will turn our attention to another group.

The formation under the dual command of Basayev and Khattab concentrated in the area of the village of Ulus-Kert in the Shatoi district and the adjacent mountains along the Argun gorge. From here, the enemy planned to wage a sabotage war and wait for spring to begin full-scale guerrilla operations. Ulus-Kert became a "stronghold" for the separatists.

The goal of our army was to encircle and eliminate the remaining large groups in the Argun Gorge. The enemy hoped to break out of the encirclement being formed and, possibly, break through the mountains into Dagestan again.

YOUNG, INEXPERIENCED
In this difficult situation, the 6th Company of the 2nd Battalion of the 104th Regiment, consisting mainly of young, “green” soldiers (many were only 19 years old), was ordered to occupy the dominant height 776 in the Argun Gorge.

The problems began even before the operation. The better prepared and equipped 4th company was originally planned to be assigned to fortify the heights, but due to problems with transport, the "green" 6th company was sent on the mission.

It is worth adding that right before being sent to the combat zone, the company was staffed from different units, which affected its coherence and combat training. The commanders were able to get to know the fighters only at the front. This is exactly the situation that Guards Major Sergei Molodov, appointed as the group leader, found himself in. Together with him, the battalion commander, Guards Lieutenant Colonel Mark Yevtyukhin, took command.

The concept of the operation was quite simple. By this time, the 3rd company of the same 104th regiment, already occupying a fortified height, successfully held off the onslaught of superior enemy forces, using machine gun fire and artillery support with a smaller staff. Therefore, the "youngsters" from the 6th company were given a similar task.

A major problem in planning the operation was the lack of proper information about the enemy's forces and movements. There was a lack of technical equipment and scale of reconnaissance operations, and Basayev's men themselves skillfully camouflaged themselves in the mountain forests and carried out large-scale regroupings only at night.

"NO, THEY'RE GOBLINS."
On the afternoon of February 29, the paratroopers encountered a small enemy reconnaissance group. After a short firefight, the militants retreated, and then Major Molodov was tragically killed by a sniper shot, which was a blow to the morale of the personnel.

It was an alarming signal, but no one realized the scale of the impending threat. They thought everything was all right. The separatists, noting that the detachment was small, had a lot of cargo, and was poorly trained in moving in the mountains (the company was scattered in a long chain along the mountains), decided to break through the chain right here, sensing what they thought was a weak bleeding spot.

Khattab was confident of success, but Basayev still initially doubted the success of the fight even with such an advantage.

A recording of their radio communications from February 29, intercepted by our intelligence, has been preserved.

Basayev: If there are dogs in front (in militant jargon - soldiers of the internal troops), we can come to an agreement.

Khattab : No, they are goblins (paratroopers)

Basayev: Listen, maybe we should go around? They won't let us in, as soon as we reveal ourselves...

Khattab: No. We will cut them down.

The separatists were counting on success, as they outnumbered the paratroopers, outsold them in experience and mobility. As veteran of the 104th regiment Andrei Lobanov noted, the field commanders were far from being "schoolchildren", they were experienced, trained people with disciplined fighters. Also, unlike the "federals", who carried all their belongings, including potbelly stoves, the militants could leave most of their equipment and provisions in Ulus-Kert and actively used pack animals.

TWO DAYS IN HELL
During the day, the jihadists secretly approached the army positions and began to dig in. In the evening, a fierce battle began. The exact number of attackers is unknown, but according to various estimates, up to 2,500 people. Only the first waves of attacks involved 300-400 militants armed with mortars, machine guns, and sniper rifles.

“They were simply coming at us like a wall, their eyes bulging, shouting: ‘Allahu Akbar!’” Guards Sergeant Andrei Porshnev, one of the six who survived the battle at Height 776,told Rossiyskaya Gazeta in 2014.

“We’d shoot one wave, have a half-hour break, and then attack again... There were a lot of them,” the soldier recalled.

The battle flared up with incredible force. The paratroopers, despite the enemy's numerical superiority, put up a desperate resistance. Every meter on the approach to the dominant height was drenched in blood.

By midnight on March 1, the shooting had died down. The unit, previously stretched out along the heights, began to regroup, help the wounded and remove the dead. Artillery support was ineffective due to inaccurate calculations, poor intelligence and the stressed state of the gunners. Nevertheless, according to enemy information, at least 30 "mujahideen" were killed by artillery fire.

On the night of March 1, the 1st company of Guard Major Sergei Baran tried to break through to help: only they had the opportunity to cover the distance to the heights in the shortest time and help their comrades. But, probably, the fighters encountered a blocking detachment of militants while crossing the Abazulgol River and were forced to retreat.

At the same time, the paratroopers, tired and having lost a third of their number, were unable to dig trenches in the frozen ground, despair gripped everyone, and the only hope was for dawn, which would dispel the darkness for artillery and reinforcements. Around 6 a.m., the enemy made a final attempt to break through.

The wounded paratroopers continued to fight, covering the retreat of their comrades. When their ammunition ran out, not wanting to surrender, they blew themselves up with grenades, taking their enemies with them to the grave. By order of Captain Viktor Romanov, who took command after Yevtyukhin's death, the heights were covered with artillery fire.

By morning, the 6th company had practically ceased to exist. Only six remained alive. The enemy's loss figures vary. Colonel General Gennady Troshev, who commanded the united federal forces during the Second Chechen War, wrote in his memoirs about 400 "Ichkerians" killed, while the newspaper " Krasnaya Zvezda " wrote about half a thousand fighters in an article for the first anniversary of the battle.

LESSONS OF TRAGEDY AND HEROISM
In any case, at the cost of its life (and at the cost of tragic mistakes), the 6th Company greatly influenced the outcome of the war. The active combat phase of the Second Chechen War - with the capture of cities and large-scale battles "in the field" - ended by April 2000.

On the other hand, the tragedy at the 776th height stirred up all of Russia. A mass of legal proceedings followed, connected with the death of soldiers, in every corner of the country they knew about the battle for the 776th height.

The unit was able to delay the advance of the militants, but in the future the shortcomings of the old military system (understaffing, sending "green" conscripts to the front lines, the quality of planning operations and coordination between units) will lead to tragic episodes and a number of military failures. It is enough to recall the destruction of a column of Perm OMON near the village of Dzhani-Vedeno in March 2000. And some of Basayev's and Khattab's men managed to break through from the Argun Gorge in other areas. The "Black Arab" himself was liquidated in 2002, Basayev was "gotten" only in 2006.

But, be that as it may, the experience of mistakes, successes and exploits of the Second Chechen Campaign - completed successfully, but at a high price - was laid as the basis for the military reform of 2001-2004 and, in general, became the beginning of the revival of the Russian Armed Forces, which distinguished themselves during the five-day war in South Ossetia, and in the Syrian operation, and on the fields of the North Caucasus Military District.

The special operation added new pages to the annals of the Airborne Forces' history (it is enough to recall the defense of the airport in Gostomel in February 2022), but the paratroopers do not forget the feat of the generation of fathers and older brothers. The whole of Russia remembers them, which is especially important now, when, on the initiative of the president, 2025 has been declared the Year of the Defender of the Fatherland.

Link

Israel-Palestine-Jordan

IDF says 50 terrorists killed in West Bank since offensive started two weeks ago

2025-02-03

[IsraelTimes] More than 100 wanted Palestinians detained, some 40 weapons seized and 80 explosives neutralized during ‘Operation Iron Wall’ in Jenin, Tulkarem, and Tamun in northern West Bank

The Israel Defense Forces said Sunday that it has killed over 50 Paleostinian terror operatives in the northern West Bank since launching a major counterterrorism offensive nearly two weeks ago.

Over 35 button men were killed by troops during operations in Jenin, Tulkarem, and the Tamun area, while another 15 were killed in dronezaps, the military said.

The IDF has acknowledged mistakenly killing several civilians amid the operation, including a toddler.

More than 100 wanted Paleostinians have been detained, and troops have seized some 40 weapons and neutralized over 80 bombs during the operation, according to the IDF.

The offensive, dubbed Operation Iron Wall, was launched on January 21, and the military expects it to last several more weeks.

The operation, which has primarily focused on the city and refugee camp of Jenin, was expanded to Tulkarem last week, and to Tamun on Saturday night.

The IDF says it demolished 23 buildings in the West Bank’s Jenin refugee camp which were used by terror operatives.

Troops have scanned hundreds of buildings in Jenin during an ongoing raid there, locating bomb-making labs, caches of weapons, and command centers, the military says.

The army publishes footage showing the detonation.

Huge columns of smoke billowed over the surrounding area following the blasts.

The Paleostinian official news agency, WAFA, said Israeli forces "simultaneously detonated about 20 buildings" in the eastern part of Jenin refugee camp, adding that the "explosions were heard throughout the city of Jenin and parts of the neighboring towns."

Witnesses reported a "large" deployment of Israeli forces in the morning around the towns of Tubas and Tamun, southeast of Jenin.

The Palestinian health ministry said that an elderly man — named as Walid Lahlouh, 73 — was killed by Israeli fire in Jenin on Sunday. There was no immediate comment from the IDF.

DRONE STRIKES IN QABATIYA, JENIN
The IDF also confirmed Sunday that it had targeted Palestinian terrorists in three separate aerial strikes, within several hours, in the northern West Bank, on Saturday night, including a cell that was on its way to carry out an imminent attack, confirming that it took out a prisoner set free as part of a 2023 deal with Hamas.

The military said the strike on the cell on its way to carry out a terror attack occurred in Qabatiya, with secondary explosions observed as a result of bombs that were in the car going off.

That strike, the IDF said, killed terror operatives Salah Zakarneh and Abd al-Hadi Kamil, the latter of whom was released as part of a hostage deal in November 2023.

The IDF published footage of the Qabatiya strike.

The two other strikes occurred in Jenin, the army said, adding that they targeted two armed terror cells.

The Paleostinian Authority health ministry reported two killed in the Qabatiya strike, two killed in one of the Jenin strikes, and 16-year-old Ahmad al-Sadi killed in the other Jenin strike along with others critically maimed.

SETTLERS SAID TO TORCH MOSQUE
Israeli settlers set fire to a mosque overnight Saturday-Sunday in the Bedouin village of Arab al-Mleihat northwest of the West Bank city of Jericho, according to Paleostinian media reports.

A group of settlers poured a flammable liquid inside the building in the early hours of Sunday morning, setting it ablaze and destroying it completely, according to Hassan Mleihat, an official from the local al-Baydar Organization for the Defense of Bedouin Rights, speaking to The Times of Israel.

No casualties were reported in the incident, and no evidence was presented for the accusation against settlers.

However,
the hip bone's connected to the leg bone...
a video circulating on social media of a large burning structure purported to show the incident.

Mleihat said that the Bedouin hamlet has been exposed to harassment by settlers in the past three years. Last September, 50 goats were poisoned there, the man recounts. The community is situated in a remote location and is far from the reach of fire trucks and rescue services, he added.

The Israel Police did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Since October 7, 2023, troops have arrested some 6,000 wanted Paleostinians across the West Bank, including more than 2,350 affiliated with Hamas
Hamas

..not a terrorist organization, even though it kidnaps people, holds hostages, and tries to negotiate by executing them,...
According to the Paleostinian Authority health ministry, more than 858 West Bank Paleostinians have been killed in that time. The IDF says the vast majority of them were button men killed in exchanges of fire, rioters who clashed with troops or forces of Evil carrying out attacks.

During the same period, 46 people, including Israeli security personnel, have been killed in terror attacks in Israel and the West Bank. Another eight members of the security forces were killed in festivities with terror operatives in the West Bank.

Since October 7, the IDF has carried out more than 100 ~~Arclight~~ airstrike
...KABOOM!...
s in the West Bank, using drones, attack helicopters, and fighter jets.

Link

Home Front: WoT

9/11 terrorists to be spared death penalty after judge shoots down Pentagon''s bid to nix plea deals

2025-01-01

[NYPOST] Plea deals for three murderous Moslems behind the 9/11 attacks are back in play after Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin lost his bid to nix the disturbing agreements that would spare them the death penalty

A military appeals court on Monday night ruled against Austin's order this summer nullifying plea deals reached with Khalid Sheikh Mohammad

...Mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. He was captured in Faisalabad, Pakistain in 2002 and interned at Guantanamo...
, Walid bin Attash and Mustafa al-Hawsawi.

The terrorists' defense attorneys argued that the secretary did not have the authority to overturn the agreements after they were already approved by the top authority of the Guantanamo Bay courts in July.

They further claimed that Austin's order was unlawful interference in the case.

The move clears the way for Mohammad, the criminal mastermind of the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks, and his co-conspirators to plead guilty in a hearing next week.

However,
Caliphornia hasn't yet slid into the ocean, no matter how hard it's tried...
Austin retains the ability to appeal the decision. Reps for the Pentagon did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Prosecutors offered the deal to bring about an end to the pretrial court proceedings that have dragged on for more than a decade.

The decision comes after a lower court in November ruled that Austin's order came too late — and that the act was beyond his scope of authority.

''We agree with the military judge that the secretary did not have authority to revoke respondents' existing PTAs because the respondents had started performance of the PTAs,'' the three-judge panel said.

The agreements were originally signed by Pentagon official Susan K. Escallier, whom Austin appointed to be in charge of military commissions.

While the initial blow of the plea deals shook many 9/11 victims' loved ones and survivors, some have told The Post that the on-off nature of their status has put them through an emotional roller coaster.

Courtesy of badanov, Regnum adds:

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

According to the publication, on December 30, the military appeals court overturned the order of US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who in August canceled a pre-trial deal between the prosecution and three terrorists - Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Walid bin Attash and Mustafa al-Hawsawi - to plead guilty in exchange for a life sentence.

The case of conspiracy with the hijackers has been in the pre-trial stage since 2012.

The defendants are suspected of helping the terrorists who carried out the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York on September 11, 2001.

As reported by the Regnum news agency, the two towers of the World Trade Center collapsed after terrorists flew two hijacked passenger planes into them. As a result, over 2.6 thousand people died.

A previously unknown video of the destruction of the World Trade Center towers on September 11 has emerged. The footage was published by Japanese photographer Kei Sugimoto.

In September 2023, two more victims of the terrorist attacks were identified. The total number of identified victims of the terrorist attacks is 1,649 people. Another 1,104 victims remain unidentified. The names of the identified victims, a man and a woman, are kept secret at the request of their relatives. The victims were identified through DNA analysis of their remains.

Link

Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

War Without Victory Day: How Russia Almost Lost Chechnya

2024-12-12

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

Back in the good old days, I read Lester Grau's narrative on the Battle of Grozny from the website of the US Army's Office of Foreign Military Studies. You can find one of his works published in 1996 here. Not the same as the article I read, but it is engaging if interested in this period of Russian military history.

Like me, Grau is a student of Russian military history, and has a number of books published on the matter.
by Andrey Zvorykin

[REGNUM] "Our war began on the morning of December 11, 1994... And we don't have our own Victory Day," these words of Andrei Palachev, a veteran of the first Chechen war and participant in the battles in Grozny, are perhaps typical for memoirs about the events of thirty years ago. In any case, the expression "a war without a Victory Day" is often found in the testimonies of veterans who, in the mid-nineties, were on average about twenty years old, like the Primorsky OMON fighter Palachev.

"As the poet said: "You can't make drums out of our skin - it's thin. Napoleonic plans are often pulled out of thin air," - these are already lines from the memoirs of General Gennady Troshev, who during the years of the first Chechen campaign was the commander of the Joint Group of Forces of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

The war began with the failed December assault on Grozny, cost the lives of 5 to 14 thousand “federals,” as the Russian press called Russian soldiers at the time, and ended with the Khasavyurt Peace Treaty in August 1996, which effectively handed victory to the Islamists and separatists of “Ichkeria”*.

"DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES"
"Any war is started and ended by politicians. Can the political decision to send troops in December 1994 be considered an adventure? To some extent, yes," admitted General Troshev, for whom Grozny was no stranger - he spent his childhood there. "To some extent" - because by the end of 1994 there were clearly no other ways, except military ones, to liquidate the criminal-terrorist regime that had seized power in Chechnya. But seized it at least with the connivance of the federal center.

In June 1991, even before the GKChP putsch, the leader of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People (ANCP), former Soviet Air Force Colonel General Dzhokhar Dudayev took control of part of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. In July of the same year, Dudayev announced the secession of the "Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-cho" from the RSFSR and the USSR.

The federal leadership of the time — President Boris Yeltsin, Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi, and Supreme Council Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov — clearly had other things on their minds. On the eve of the collapse of the USSR, for example, the redistribution of Union property seemed more important. Radicals from the “general democratic forces of Chechnya” were seen as allies in the fight against the “reactionary party bureaucrats.”

When on September 6, 1991, Dudayev’s “guard” stormed the building of the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, the television center and the radio house (during these events, the first blood of this conflict was shed, the head of the Grozny city council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window), Khasbulatov sent a telegram to his small homeland:

“A favorable political situation has finally arisen, in which the democratic processes taking place in the republic are being freed from overt and covert shackles…”

In November 1991, the federal government tried to solve the Dudayev problem with a cavalry charge. Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in Chechnya, and to pacify the separatists, not even the notorious "two parachute regiments" were sent, but one "transport plane" with special forces of the Airborne Forces. At the Grozny airport, Dudayev's men blocked the plane and "offered" the fighters to return in a friendly manner.

THE KINGDOM OF THE "COCKROACH MUSTACHE"
While the rest of Russia was experiencing the shock of Gaidar’s reforms and was drawn into the confrontation between Yeltsin and the same Khasbulatov and Rutskoi, in Chechnya the process of the semi-disintegration of the state (which was also evident in Tatarstan, the Urals, and other parts of the weakened country) had gone too far.

By June 1992, de jure, the Russian Armed Forces had left the region, leaving the militants with a huge amount of military equipment and ammunition depots. According to the agreement signed with Dudayev by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, the "Ichkerians" were to receive half of the arsenal - but in reality, our officers could only take their service weapons.

This is how the separatists got their army.

At the same time, the federal center continued to financially support Chechnya, which had not signed the federal treaty. Thus, in 1993, the republic was allocated 11.5 billion rubles for social payments. The money did not reach the recipients, but ended up in the pockets of the leadership of "Ichkeria", including the military leaders of the separatists.

Dudayev "stopped paying pensions to old people, teachers' salaries... Schools closed. It was enough of a primary education for us, if only they could count money," recalled a builder from Grozny, Gunki Khukiev. Only criminal elements could count money in the "independent state." The center "did not notice" the notorious Chechen avisos - the execution of a fake transaction with the subsequent "disappearance" of the swindlers. According to experts, more than 4 trillion rubles of the then rubles were received from these avisos.

They also failed to notice the displacement of the non-Chechen population - essentially, ethnic cleansing. If according to the 1989 census, 294 thousand Russians lived in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR (with a total population of 1 million 270 thousand), and 270 thousand Russians out of a population of 397 thousand lived in Grozny, then in the 21st century, about 1.9% of ethnic Russians live in the Chechen Republic, about 24 thousand people. About 250 thousand people left the republic even before the start of the first campaign.

Already in the first half of the 1990s, the rampant banditry (including armed banditry) sobered up many residents of the "sovereign state", especially city dwellers. "My brother... got nothing from the revolutionary pie, now he called his idol Dudayev nothing other than "ts1eza mekhash" (cockroach mustache). There were tens of thousands of such repentants," Khukiev recalled.

But the leaders of Ichkeria already felt strong enough to suppress any discontent. On June 4, 1993, field commander Shamil Basayev made his presence known for the first time - his fighters stormed the headquarters of the anti-Dudayev opposition, which was headed by the mayor of Grozny Bislan Gantamirov (who had previously had a falling out with Dudayev over the income from the oil business).

The Ichkerians were making plans to "export the revolution." It was not for nothing that Dudayev gave shelter to the ousted former President of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia and simultaneously supported the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, whose militias had recently fought against the Georgians in Abkhazia.

PROLOGUE TO THE WAR. THE "GANTAMIROV" ASSAULT
The federal center, having “blown away” Chechen separatism, decided to play its own subtle game, overthrowing Dudayev with the hands of the opposition, which became a more or less organized force after the “president of Ichkeria” dissolved the Chechen parliament.

The opposition was supported by the urban population (which was gathered under the wing of Dudayev's personal enemy, Gantamirov) and some clan leaders who did not fit into Dudayev's system. An example is the former head of Dudayev's security, Ruslan Labazanov, who spoke out against Dudayev's men on the side of the Russian Armed Forces, but was not much different from them in essence.

In the summer of 1994, a civil war broke out in Chechnya between the "president of Ichkeria" and the militants loyal to him (led by Basayev and Ruslan Gelayev ) on one side and the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic on the other. Several "federal" tank crews appeared at the disposal of the opposition. Gantamirov and Labazanov's militia took control of the cities of Urus-Martan and Argun and on November 26, 1994, they moved on Grozny.

After the first shelling from Dudayev's men, the opposition infantry scattered, the tank crews, left without cover and not knowing the terrain, found themselves in a hopeless situation, 28 of them were taken prisoner, about 18 (data based on lists of names) were killed.

This event had a decisive impact on Yeltsin's decision to send in troops. On December 9, he signed a decree "On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict zone." A few days before, on December 1, a Russian air raid completely destroyed the planes that had been captured and bought by the separatists.

“THEY DIDN’T EVEN HAVE TIME TO COME UP WITH A NAME”
Finally, on December 11, 1994, units of the Russian Armed Forces, in accordance with Yeltsin’s decree, entered the Russian region of Chechnya.

The troops advanced in three groups. The first, under the command of Lieutenant General Vladimir Chilindin, advanced from the northwest, from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia. The second, from Vladikavkaz, under the command of Lieutenant General Alexander Chindarov, moved from the northwest through Ingushetia. The third, from Kizlyar, under the command of Lieutenant General Lev Rokhlin, headed from the northeast from the territory of Dagestan.

The overall command of the operation to restore constitutional order was entrusted to Defense Minister Grachev. "Pavel Grachev brought the army to a terrible state," Rokhlin later lamented. This concerned supplies, weapons, and the level of training of conscripts. However, it is unlikely that the problem was solely Grachev's, since he did not possess such outstanding abilities to destroy the mighty army organism to its foundations in just a few years. Structural problems in the armed forces arose much earlier.

An important point: it was difficult to talk about broad public support for the military operation. The media, controlled by media oligarchs Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky, broadcast if not a pro-Dudaev, then a "neutral" position. Not only liberals, but also the left opposition, including the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, criticized the operation.

Meanwhile, our group's problems began almost immediately: only the Mozdok group achieved relative success, reaching the village of Dolinskoye (10 kilometers from Grozny) the next day. The Vladikavkaz and Kizlyar groups were soon blocked and forced to either break through with a fight or bypass enemy-controlled settlements along a longer route.

Finally, 16 days after the start of the march (according to the plan, 3 days were given for the advance), all groups reached Grozny, blockading it from three sides. General Troshev later noted :

"According to some generals, the initiative for the "festive" New Year's assault on Grozny belonged to people from Pavel Grachev's inner circle, in order to coincide the capture of the city with the birthday of the Russian Minister of Defense (January 1). I don't know how serious this is. Another thing is that the operation was prepared hastily, without a real assessment of the enemy, his forces and resources, without careful preparation. This is a fact. They didn't even have time to come up with a name for this operation!"

"GOD, HELP ME BREAK FREE..."
The southern outskirts of Grozny remained unblocked. It was assumed that civilians would be evacuated this way, but in fact the militants were receiving supplies from here throughout the assault. On December 19, the first bombing attack was carried out on the city center, and on the 31st, the bloodiest battle of the war began - the storming of Grozny.

According to General Troshev, "many commanders with big stars, federal-level chiefs, believed that it was enough to go to Grozny, fire a couple of times in the air, and that would be the end of it." The military leader believed that it was precisely this method of intimidation that was the basis for the hastily approved plan to take Grozny, and, Troshev believed, it was approved "at the very top."

About 250 units of equipment entered the city with infantry cover, but the fallacy of this plan soon became apparent. The number of militants, their wide variety of anti-tank weapons, and their completely fanatical resistance were unexpected.

The units of the northern group were the most unlucky.

The fighters of the 131st Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (better known as the Maikop brigade) received an order from the commander of the "North" group, Konstantin Pulikovsky : together with the motorized riflemen and tankers of the 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment (who had 10 tanks at their disposal), reach the city center and fortify themselves in the railway station building.

The combined group of "Maikopts" and fighters of the 81st regiment carried out the order, but by 19:00 the station they had occupied was surrounded by superior forces of militants. When reinforcements broke through here on the evening of January 1, no more than a third of the defenders remained alive. The commander of the 131st brigade, Colonel Ivan Savin, was also killed in the battle.

Captain Vyacheslav Mironov, a participant in subsequent battles in Grozny, testifies in his book I Was In This War: “As we approached the railway station, we began to come across burnt, mutilated equipment and many corpses. Our corpses, our Slavic brothers, were all that remained of the Maikop Brigade, the one that was burned and shot by the “spirits” on New Year’s Eve from 1994 to 1995. God, help us escape…”

HARD VICTORIES AND STRANGE DEFEATS
War plans had to be changed on the fly and "in the field," Troshev noted. The troops held up in other directions changed their tactics by January 7, focusing on maneuverable groups, which gradually yielded results. On January 9, the Grozny Oil Institute and airport were occupied with heavy fighting, and on the 19th, the city center and the presidential palace. The militants retreated behind the Sunzha River.

It was only on February 3 that the decision was made to close off the southern direction and completely blockade Grozny. The city was surrounded only by February 9. The Chechen capital was completely occupied by March 6, when Shamil Basayev's fighters retreated from Chernorechye, the last district in the hands of forces loyal to Dudayev.

With the fall of Grozny, the actions of the Ichkerians finally acquired a partisan character - and our army was not ready for this.

Although the entire flat part of Chechnya and most of the mountainous regions were occupied over the following months, the army was unable to actually ensure control over the territory. On the one hand, ambushes and raids by militants became frequent occurrences, and on the other, our troops repeatedly occupied the same "inhabitants", which were again captured by the separatists after the redeployment of the "federals".

"One of the peculiarities of this strange war, which literally drove us crazy, is that we passed through and cleared the same villages several times. In the end, I studied the area so well that I could fight there blindfolded," the publication "Chelyabinsk Segodnya" cited the testimony of Alexander Berezovsky, who during the first Chechen war was the head of the reconnaissance group of the 17th detachment of the special forces of the internal troops "Edelweiss".

A NEW TYPE OF ENEMY
Thus, simultaneously with the exhaustion – moral and physical – of the Russian troops, the actions of the militants became ever bolder. Beginning in March 1996, raids on Grozny became an everyday reality. In addition to guerrilla warfare, the enemy used a method of warfare for which we were even less prepared – terror.

On June 14, 1995, about two hundred of Basayev's militants broke through the border of Chechnya and Stavropol Krai and seized a hospital in Budyonnovsk. About 1,200 city residents were taken hostage, herded into the hospital buildings. After negotiations, Basayev's men were allowed to leave. At that time, 143 Russian fighters were killed (including 46 special forces), 415 were wounded, with enemy losses of 19 killed and 20 wounded.

In January 1996, Salman Raduyev's group attacked the Dagestani city of Kizlyar. At the captured helicopter base, the bandits destroyed several units of equipment and took hostages. While security forces were approaching the city, the militants captured a hospital and a maternity hospital, driving about 3 thousand more residents there. During negotiations, the terrorists, along with some of the hostages, were released from the encirclement. Retreating, Raduyev's men also captured the village of Pervomayskoye. As a result, the terrorists were released.

Also, in parallel with the military actions, the Ichkerians captured airplanes, buses, and attacked railways.

In response, Russia took the first – and sometimes successful – steps in the fight against terrorism.

Thus, on April 21, 1996, our special services managed to track the mobile communication channels of the "Generalissimo of Ichkeria" Dudayev. During a conversation with the State Duma deputy, liberal Konstantin Borovoy, two Su-24s struck the location of the separatist leader.

Dudayev's successors as "presidents of Ichkeria" - Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev and Aslan Maskhadov - could no longer effectively control the "brigadier generals" and other field commanders. This defect in the system, however, would come back to haunt him in 1999, when the gangs of Basayev and Khattab attacked Dagestan without Maskhadov's knowledge.

THE SECOND "OBSCENE WORLD"
On August 6, 1996, the militants "turned the tide" of military operations: another attack on Grozny allowed them to take control of the city. At the same time, the separatists captured the large cities of Gudermes and Argun. The loss of three key centers, ongoing terrorist attacks, the shadow of Budyonnovsk and Kizlyar - all this demoralized the army.

Yeltsin (who had recently narrowly escaped defeat in the elections) was threatened by the political consequences of continuing the conflict. Everything was pushing the federal center of that time to conclude peace on terms unfavorable for Russia.

On August 31, in the Dagestani city of Khasavyurt, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Lieutenant General Alexander Lebed, and the "Chairman of the Government of Ichkeria" Aslan Maskhadov signed a ceasefire agreement. Russia was obliged to withdraw its troops from Chechen territory, and the decision on its political status was postponed until 2001.

Later, the Khasavyurt agreements were compared with another “shameful peace” – the Brest peace.

The Chechen people suffered first and foremost from the “peace”.

The "Ichkeria" of 1996-1999 plunged into chaos and became not only a "hub" for drug trafficking and a sanctuary for criminals, but also a springboard for international terrorism. Instead of national separatists like the "Minister of Culture and Brigadier General" Akhmed Zakayev or the "Chechen Goebbels" Movladi Udugov, the leading role was played by supporters of Sharia rule and a worldwide caliphate.

Maskhadov, elected president in 1997, not only failed to control his "prime minister" - the convinced Wahhabi Basayev, but also increasingly fell under the influence of foreign emissaries such as Khattab, Abu al-Walid and Abu Hafs al-Urdani. The transformation of the "Republic of Ichkeria" into the "Caucasus Emirate"*, which eventually swore allegiance to the "Islamic State"*,

…first Al Qaeda then later ISIS, but do go on…

was entirely expected. Just as the "export of jihad" was a matter of time, resulting in the attack on Dagestan in August 1999.

THREE BOGATYRS SQUARE
To correct political mistakes (which had been accumulating since the early 1990s and, in fact, led to the war) and miscalculations of the military command, whose Napoleonic plans did not always correspond to their capabilities, the Second Chechen Campaign was needed, no less difficult, but ended in success.

A change in political leadership, a clear national policy and a change in the quality of military planning played their role. During the second campaign, the Russian army proved its combat capability, which it has repeatedly confirmed subsequently - in the defense of South Ossetia, in peacekeeping operations - and is confirming now, in the SVO zone, where units from Chechnya are also proving themselves.

General Troshev died in 2008, having witnessed the beginning of the restoration of the republic under Akhmad-hadji and Ramzan Kadyrov — the military leader writes about the beginning of reconciliation in the finale of his memoirs. The afterword contains a vivid image. In one of the squares of Grozny in the 1970s, a monument was erected to three heroes of the Civil War: the Russian Odessan Nikolai Gikalo, the Chechen Aslanbek Sheripov and the Ingush Gapur Akhriev. "The people immediately nicknamed this place "the square of the three heroes," the general recalled.

Under Maskhadov, there was a slave market here, near the monument, and executions were carried out here according to Sharia law. “The war destroyed the monument to the representatives of three nations. But the pedestal remained. Maybe the monument will be restored, or maybe a new one will be erected?” Troshev wondered and added, “I believe that nothing will ever destroy the surviving foundation, not even the war, which left a deep mark on people’s souls.”

In 2008, Friendship of Nations Square was opened in Grozny after reconstruction, with a restored monument to the “three heroes”.

Link

Syria-Lebanon-Iran

Lebanese remember bloody past after Assad fall — Naharnet

2024-12-10

[NAHARNET] Across Leb
Leb

...an Iranian satrapy until recently ruled by Hassan Nasrallah situated on the eastern Mediterranean, conveniently adjacent to Israel. Formerly inhabited by hardy Phoenecian traders, its official language is now Arabic, with the usual unpleasant side effects. The Leb civil war, between 1975 and 1990, lasted a little over 145 years and produced 120,000 fatalities. The average length of a ceasefire was measured in seconds. The Lebs maintain a precarious sectarian balance among Shiites, Sunnis, and about a dozen flavors of Christians, plus Armenians, Georgians, and who knows what else? It is the home of the original Hezbollah, which periodically starts a war with the Zionist Entity, gets Beirut pounded to rubble, and then declares victory and has a parade. The Lebs have the curious habit of periodically murdering their heads of state or prime ministers...
, the Middle East, and beyond, the fall of Syria's authoritarian government at the hands of Islamist-led rebels set off waves of jubilation, trepidation and alarm.

Many Lebanese exulted at the overthrow of the Syrian leader while others worried about more instability rocking a region in turmoil.

Caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati called for a strict control of the border with Syria and for distancing Lebanon from the developments there. He urged the Lebanese "of all affiliations" to be "wise" and "avoid emotional reactions."

Mikati also asked Secretary-General of Council of Ministers Judge Mahmoud Makiya to communicate with the National Commission for the Missing and Forcibly Disappeared Persons in Lebanon and with the relevant authorities regarding the release of Lebanese prisoners from Syrian prisons.

- LEBANESE IN SYRIAN PRISONS -
During 15 years of civil war in Lebanon, an estimated 17,000 people went missing. Many were held captive or were killed in detention centers operated by Syrian forces in Lebanon and Syria, but their fates remain unknown.

Since a Lebanese man, who was missing for 40 years, was freed by Syrian rebels from a prison in Hama last week, many Lebanese families are demanding to know the fate of their loved ones who are thought to be detained in Syrian prisons since Lebanon's civil war when Syrian troops were in Lebanon.

- GEAGEA SAYS 'NOTHING WORSE THAN ASSAD' -
Lebanese Forces
A Christian political party founded by Bashir Gemayel, who was then bumped off when he was elected president of Leb...
leader Samir Geagea
....Geagea was imprisoned by the Syrians and their puppets for 11 years in a dungeon in the third basement level of the Lebanese Ministry of Defense. He was released after the Cedar Revolution in 2005....
congratulated all Lebanese on the fall of Bashir al-Assad's regime, saying that "over the past 50 years, the regime of Hafez and Bashir al-Assad was the biggest obstacle to the building of a state in Lebanon."

"It's impossible for the situation in Syria to be worse than Assad. There is noting worse," Geagea said.

- JUMBLAT SAYS 'JUSTICE ACHIEVED' -
Former Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Wally Jumblat
...Druze politician, head of the Progressive Socialist Party, who's been on every side in Leb at least four times. He'll sell you his friends for a dollar, but family comes higher because of shipping and handling...
saluted the Syrian people and celebrated Assad's ouster "after a lengthy wait."

Jumblat also called former PM Saad Hariri
...Second son of Rafik Hariri, the Leb PM who was assassinated in 2005. He has was prime minister in his own right from 2009 through early 2011. He was born in Riyadh to an Iraqi mother and graduated from Georgetown University. He managed his father's business interests in Riyadh until his father's assassination. When his father died he inherited a fortune of some $4.1 billion, which won't do him much good if Hizbullah has him bumped off, too....
and told him that by Assad's fall "justice was achieved" for his slain father Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and other March 14 figures.

Al-Mustaqbal
... the Future Movement, political party led by Saad Hariri...

... the Future Movement, political party led by Saad Hariri...
Movement, founded by Hariri, for its part, congratulated the Syrian people in a statement and called on the Lebanese to preserve national unity.

- ASSASSINATIONS BLAMED ON SYRIA -
Hariri was assassinated in 2005 by a bomb in Beirut, blamed on Syria and Hezbollah. His liquidation sparked protests that ousted Syrian troops from Lebanon. Following Hariri's killing, several anti-Syrian figures were assassinated, including Samir Qassir, George Hawi, Gebran Tueni, Pierre Amine Gemayel, Antoine Ghanem and Walid Eido. Others escaped liquidation attempts including Elias Mur, May Chidiac, and Samir Shehade.

Jumblat's father, Kamal Jumblat was assassinated in 1977 in his car near Baakline by unidentified button men suspected to be members of the pro-Syrian faction of the Lebanese Syrian Social Nationalist Party, in collaboration with the Ba'ath Party.

In 1982, President Bashir Gemayel was killed with 26 other politicians by a member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party who detonated a bomb from a few miles away using a remote detonator. He said he killed Gemayel because of his collaboration with Israel, which invaded Lebanon in 1982.

- GEMAYEL HAILS 'TYRANT FALL' -
Kataeb leader and Bashir's nephew Sami Gemayel wrote on X that "the criminal tyrant has fallen". "But Lebanon remains and the Kataeb remains."

He added that the names of his uncle Bashir, his brother Pierre Gemayel, and other deaders "stand tall, pulsating with freedom, illusory sovereignty and independence."

- BASSIL HOPES IT'S FOR THE GOOD OF LEBANON AND SYRIA -
Free Patriotic Movement
Despite its name a Christian party allied with Hizbullah, neither free nor particularly patriotic...
leader Jebran Bassil hoped that the developments would be for the good of Syria and Lebanon and lead to a swift return of displaced Syrians to their country and to "positive and balanced relations" between the two countries.

- SYRIA STABILITY IMPACTS LEBANON -
Son of Hezbollah's presidential candidate and Assad's friend Suleiman Franjieh, Marada MP Tony Franjieh hoped, in a statement posted on the X platform, for a peaceful transfer of power that would preserve the country's stability and protect the rights of all Syrians.

"The stability of Lebanon has always been deeply affected by the stability of Syria," Franjieh said.

- BLOW TO HEZBOLLAH -
For Hezbollah, who had long used Syria as its key conduit for weapons and supplies from Iran, Assad's fall could further weakens the group, after the staggering losses it suffered in its own recent war with Israel.

"What's happening in Syria is a major, dangerous and new transformation," Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah said.

"No one can downplay its impact but we draw our presence and strength from God, from our faith before anything else, and from our people — and the existence, presence, formations, capabilities and high competencies of the resistance, despite everything that has been inflicted on it in this war," Fadallah added.

Early in Syria's civil war, when it appeared Assad might be tossed, Iran
...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneously taking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militias to extend the regime's influence. The word Iran is a cognate form of Aryan. The abbreviation IRGC is the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA). The term Supreme Guide is a the modern version form of either Duce or Führer or maybe both. They hate ~~Jews~~ ~~Zionists~~ Jews. Their economy is based on the production of oil and vitriol...
and its ally, Hezbollah, rushed fighters to support him. Russia later joined with a scorched earth campaign of ~~Arclight~~ airstrike
...KABOOM!...
s.

For Israel, breaking Iran's regional network has been a major goal, though it is wary over jihadi fighters among the hard boyz who toppled Assad. Israel on Sunday moved troops into a demilitarized buffer zone with Syria by the Israel-held Golan Heights in what it called a temporary security measure.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called Assad's fall a "historic day," saying it was "the direct result of our forceful action against Hezbollah and Iran, Assad's main supporters."

Link

Israel-Palestine-Jordan

Eliminating Hezbollah's Voice Will Be a Problem for the Trump Administration

2024-11-22

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Leonid Tsukanov

[REGNUM] The IDF recently reported the elimination of another high-ranking Hezbollah official. The target was Mohammed Afif, the head of the information service and a close associate of several secretaries general of the movement, also known by the informal nickname "The Voice of Hezbollah."

Despite the fact that Afif's killing has seriously complicated the search for a compromise between Israel and Hezbollah, the US continues to rush them to cease fire. However, such haste may eventually lead to even greater problems for Washington.

There’s not much longer to rush — President Trump’s priorities are very different than those of the current team.

THE MOST VALUABLE FUNCTIONARY
Mohammed Afif belonged to the generation of the “founding fathers” of Lebanese Hezbollah; at the time of its liquidation, he had been in the movement for more than 40 years, more than half of which were spent in the information block.

He received his nickname "The Voice of Hezbollah" for his significant contribution to the formation and development of the movement's information strategy. It was Afif who brought the information coverage of Hezbollah's activities beyond the "party" media.

Official comments from the movement's functionaries began to appear in authoritative regional and international publications. Under his leadership, representatives of the Hezbollah press service began to hold full-fledged press conferences.

In addition, over the past decade, Afif has consistently served as a liaison between Hezbollah and the Lebanese population, providing detailed explanations of the movement's policies and goals.

“Here’s what you need to shut up about and accept from the Master Branch of the Master Religion, guys. Off you go and practice that while we attack the Zionist Entity to protect you from them.”

With the start of the IDF's limited operation in southern Lebanon, this part of its authority has acquired critical importance, especially in the context of responding to the increasing frequency of Israeli attacks on Lebanese population centers.

"You don't win your war by air superiority, bombing, or killing civilians, including women and children," he said.

That’s standard doctrine. And why the IDF has entered southern Lebanon on foot and in tanks.

It should be noted that Afif often acted not only as one of the key spokesmen for Hezbollah, but also as the Secretary General's envoy for special assignments. Active interaction with Lebanese and Syrian politicians, as well as with representatives of other groups of the pro-Iranian "Axis of Resistance" took place through him.

All this made Afif one of Hezbollah's most valuable functionaries.

ISRAEL IS LOOKING FOR FRIENDS
The elimination of Afif opened a new page in the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah.

For the first time in a long time, the Israelis chose as a target not a field commander or a top official, but a representative of a “related” structure not directly involved in military operations. Although the IDF Spokesperson’s Service tried to gloss over this point, indicating that the liquidated Hezbollah spokesman, due to his closeness to the movement’s top leadership, “made a significant contribution” to the planning and organization of operations against Israel.

Such actions are intended not only to decapitate key Hezbollah structures, but also to disrupt its interaction with other loyal forces in Lebanon. In particular, with the Shiite Amal party, which joined the “united front” against Israel in December 2023, but has lost its enthusiasm over the past year.

Israel is also trying to take advantage of Hezbollah's temporary absence of a new spokesman to sow distrust between the movement and other forces in Lebanon and beyond.

Thus, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar regularly calls on “oppressed minorities in the Middle East” to come closer to Israel in order to jointly confront Iran and its proxy groups. And the most convenient way to test such a strategy is within the framework of the current limited ground operation against Hezbollah, since Israel has sufficient resources to conduct such experiments without compromising the overall effectiveness of the campaign.

Among Tel Aviv's potential allies in the Lebanese direction, they see the Druze (more than 280 thousand of them live in Lebanon). The Israeli side is unobtrusively trying to win over the leader of the Lebanese Druze, Walid "Wally" Jumblatt, to its side, appealing, among other things, to the negative precedent of a Hezbollah rocket hitting the Druze village of Majd al-Shams in July 2024.

Although there has been little progress in the dialogue so far, tensions between Hezbollah and Jumblatt's supporters continue to mount.

EVERYONE IS STALLING FOR TIME
Despite the general complication of the negotiating environment caused by Afif’s death, the United States – as the key mediator in the dialogue between Hezbollah and Israel – continues to adhere to the previous settlement strategy.

US President Joe Biden's special envoy to the Middle East, Amos Hochstein, who is overseeing these negotiations, believes that a ceasefire agreement is "within reach" and that new rounds of escalation of the conflict do not affect the parties' intention to reach an agreement.

He keeps saying that, and technically it’s true — a small distance contains infinite points inside it.

He visited Lebanon the day before, and then met with Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel on November 21.

This conviction is dictated by the need for the Biden administration to obtain at least one successful example of a Middle East settlement before leaving office in January 2025.

Need and get are not necessarily the same. Oh well.

It is possible that, in pursuit of this goal, Washington will try to force both parties to conclude a formal agreement. This is indicated, in particular, by the White House's readiness to include in the draft treaty a clause on the parties' right to self-defense. Just a couple of months ago, this was considered an unacceptable step.

It still is unacceptable to Hezbollah, no matter what the Lebanese politicians and people might be willing to accept.

On the other hand, the question of the sustainability of the security guarantees offered by Washington remains open - especially in light of the imminent change of administration in the White House. Both Israel and Hezbollah understand this well, and therefore they are in no hurry to agree to the conditions put forward, although they do not reject them completely.

Each side is stalling for time as much as possible.

At the same time, Hezbollah still intends to respond proportionately to the death of its press secretary, as its high-ranking officials regularly remind us. As Secretary General Naim Qassem previously stated, a “blow to the heart of Beirut” will be followed by a counterblow “to the heart of Tel Aviv.”

Uh huh. But who will bell the Israeli cat?

And although Hezbollah does not disclose the details of the planned operation, the revenge action (given Afif's weight in the apparatus) will hardly be of a smaller scale than in memory of the previously liquidated Hassan Nasrallah. And this, in turn, threatens a new round of escalation between Israel and Hezbollah, with a rejection of previous agreements and guarantees.

However, the Democrats in the US are not too worried about this: it will most likely be Donald Trump’s team that will have to deal with the crisis.

It’ll be the Israelis regardless, if any of Hezbollah’s efforts actually get beyond the annoyance level.

Link

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