Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
Geo Will: Obama's Arrogance May Placate Iran, But Not The U.S. Senate |
2015-07-30 |
[Investors Daily] It came two days after the announcement of the nuclear agreement with Iran, yet little mention was made on July 16 of the 70th anniversary of the first nuclear explosion, near Alamogordo, N.M. The anniversary underscored the agreement's attempts to thwart proliferation of technology seven decades old. Nuclear-weapons technology has become markedly more sophisticated since 1945, but not so sophisticated that nations with sufficient money and determination cannot master or acquire it. Iran's determination is probably related to America's demonstration, in Iraq and Libya, of the perils of not having nuclear weapons. Critics who think more severe sanctions are achievable and would break Iran's determination must answer this: When have sanctions caused a large nation to surrender what it considers a vital national security interest? Critics have, however, amply demonstrated two things: First, the agreement comprehensively abandons President Obama's original goal of dismantling the infrastructure of Iran's nuclear weapons program. Second, as the administration became more yielding with Iran, it became more dishonest with Americans. For example, John Kerry says that we never sought "anywhere, anytime" inspections. But on April 6, Ben Rhodes, Obama's deputy national security adviser, said that the agreement would include them. Kerry's co-negotiator, Wendy Sherman, breezily dismissed "anywhere, anytime" as "something that became popular rhetoric." It "became"? This is disgraceful. Verification depends on U.S. intelligence capabilities. And as Reuel Marc Gerecht says in the Weekly Standard: "The CIA has a nearly flawless record of failing to predict foreign countries' going nuclear (Great Britain and France don't count)." In the 1960 campaign, John Kennedy cited "indications" that by 1964 there would be "10, 15 or 20" nuclear powers. As president, he said that by 1975 there might be 15 or 20. It is a law of arms control: Agreements are impossible until they are unimportant. The U.S.-Soviet strategic arms control "process" was an arena of maneuvering for military advantage until the USSR died of anemia. Might the agreement with Iran buy sufficient time for Iran to undergo regime modification? Although Kerry speaks of the agreement "guaranteeing" that Iran will not become a nuclear power, it will. But what will Iran be like 15 years hence? Since 1972, U.S. policy toward China has been a worthy but disappointing two-part wager. One part is that involving China in world trade will temper its unruly international ambitions. The second is that economic growth, generated by the moral and institutional infrastructure of markets, will weaken the sinews of authoritarianism. The Obama administration's comparable wager is that domestic restiveness will subvert the Iranian regime. The median age in Iran is 29.5 (in the U.S., 37.7; in the European Union, 42.2). More than 60% of Iran's university students, and 70% of medical students, are women. Ferment is real. In 1951, Hannah Arendt, a refugee from Hitler's Germany, argued bleakly that tyrannies wielding modern instruments of social control (bureaucracies, mass communications) could achieve permanence by conscripting the citizenry's consciousness, thereby suffocating social change. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution changed her mind: No government can control human nature or "all channels of communication." Today's technologies make nations, including Iran, porous to outside influences; intellectual autarky is impossible. The best that can be said for the Iran agreement is that by somewhat protracting Iran's path to a weapon, it buys time for constructive churning in Iran. Although this is a thin reed on which to lean hopes, the reed is as real as Iran's nuclear ambitions are apparently nonnegotiable. The best reason for rejecting the agreement is to rebuke Obama's long record of aggressive disdain for Congress -- recess appointments when the Senate was not in recess, rewriting and circumventing statutes, etc. Obama's intellectual pedigree runs to Woodrow Wilson, the first presidential disparager of the separation of powers. Like Wilson, Obama ignores the constitutional etiquette of respecting even rivalrous institutions. The Iran agreement should be a treaty; it should not have been submitted first to the U.N. as a studied insult to Congress. Wilson said that rejecting the Versailles Treaty would "break the heart of the world." The Senate, no member of which had been invited to accompany Wilson to the Paris Peace Conference, proceeded to break his heart. Obama deserves a lesson in the cost of Wilsonian arrogance. Knowing little history, Obama makes bad history. |
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Syria-Lebanon-Iran | |
What else is Iran hiding? | |
2015-03-31 | |
By Ali Alfoneh and Reuel Marc Gerecht
In his memoirs, the bulk of which is composed of journal entries, Rafsanjani openly discusses Iran’s arms and missile procurement from North Korea. However, from 1989 forward, his entries on Pyongyang become more opaque — a change, we believe, indicating emerging nuclear cooperation. By 1991, Rafsanjani discusses “special and sensitive issues” related to North Korea in entries that are notably different from his candid commentary on tactical ballistic missiles. Rafsanjani mentions summoning Majid Abbaspour, who was the president’s technical adviser on “chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear industries,” into the discussions. Rafsanjani expresses his interest in importing a “special commodity” from the North Koreans in return for oil shipments to Pyongyang. He insists that Iran gain unspecified “technical know-how.” | |
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Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
'Kill One of Us, We Will Kill Dozens,' Iran Chief Warns U.S. |
2011-11-09 |
[An Nahar] Iran will kill "dozens" of U.S. military commanders for each Iranian commander murdered, if covert hits urged by two U.S. defense analysts last month are carried out, a senior Iranian military chief warned on Tuesday. "If you kill one of us, we will kill dozens of yours," the Fars news agency quoted Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the head of the elite Revolutionary Guards' aerospace division, as saying. In remarks directed to the U.S. military, he stressed "you must not forget that American commanders are present and travel around in Afghanistan, Iraq and regional countries." His comments referred to October 26 testimony by two hawkish U.S. military experts to a U.S. congressional committee looking at possible ways to hit back at Iran for an alleged plot by Iranian officials to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Washington. In that session, a retired four-star general who helped plan the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, Jack Keane, and a former CIA agent, Reuel Marc Gerecht, argued for the targeted, covert murders of Revolutionary Guards officers. "Why don't we kill them? We kill other people who are running terrorist organizations against the United States," Keane told the panel. The U.S. congressmen listening to them did not endorse that proposal. But several said they were not excluding any measures against Iran. Iran made a formal protest over the experts' comments via the Swiss embassy in Tehran, which handles U.S. interests in the absence of Iran- U.S. diplomatic ties. |
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Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
Iran Summons Swiss Envoy to Protest over U.S. 'Threats' |
2011-11-04 |
[An Nahar] Iran made a formal protest Thursday over military experts' remarks to a U.S. Congressional committee last week urging the targeted liquidation of members of its elite Quds Force military special operations unit. Iran's foreign ministry summoned the Swiss ambassador to Tehran, Livia Leu Agosti, to condemn the Congressional committee session "on the issue of assassinating Iranian officials," the website of Iran's state broadcaster said. The Swiss embassy handles U.S. diplomatic matters in the absence of diplomatic ties between Iran and the United States. "Considering the threats made against the Iranian officials in this session, in case of any kind of terrorist action against Iranian officials, the American government will be held responsible," an unnamed foreign ministry official reportedly told Leu Agosti. Iran was complaining about testimony given to the U.S. Congress' Homeland Security Committee on October 26 by two military analysts invited to speak as expert witnesses. The first, a U.S. retired four-star general who helped plan the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, Jack Keane, called for the killing of leaders of Iran's Quds Force in retaliation for their alleged role in a plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to Washington. "Why don't we kill them? We kill other people who are running terrorist organizations against the United States," he said. The other witness, Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former CIA officer who is now a senior fellow at the neo-conservative think-tank the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, agreed. "I don't think that you are going to really intimidate these people, get their attention, unless you shoot somebody," he said, arguing that an attempt should be made to capture or kill the head of the Quds Force, Qassem Suleimani. Several U.S. congressmen on the committee said they were not excluding any measures against Iran, but they did not explicitly endorse Keane and Gerecht's advice. The Iranian foreign ministry official who spoke to the Swiss ambassador reportedly said however that the argument for liquidations "contradicts Washington's legal obligations in combatting terrorism." Iran has fiercely denied No, no! Certainly not! any involvement in the alleged liquidation plot against the Saudi ambassador and sent a letter to Washington demanding an apology. It has called the accusations an attempt by the United States to distract attention from domestic economic problems and a failed foreign policy in the Middle East. |
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Syria-Lebanon-Iran | ||
House OK's possible Israeli raid on Iran (not quite) | ||
2010-07-25 | ||
Resolution 1553 provides explicit support for military strikes against Iran, stating that Congress backs Israel's use of 'all means necessary' against Iran, "including the use of military force," BBC Persian reported. The introduction of the measure coincides with a pattern of renewed calls for military strikes that have escalated since President Obama signed Congressional Iran sanctions into law. Neoconservatives who were instrumental in orchestrating the Iraq War, such as Bill Kristol and Reuel Marc Gerecht, have led the stepped up calls for military action. Hawkish former Bush administration official John Bolton recently laid out the game plan to prod Israel into attacking Iran, arguing that outsiders can "create broad support" for a strike by framing it as an issue of Israel's right to self-defense. Supporters for military strikes, Bolton says, should "defend the specific tactic of pre-emptive attacks" against Iran. He said that Congress can 'make it clear' that it supports such strikes and that 'having visible congressional support in place at the outset will reassure' Israel. In spite of support from the neocons, top US military leaders have warned of the many dangers of military strikes against Iran. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has argued "Another war in the Middle East is the last thing we need. In fact, I believe it would be disastrous on a number of levels." Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has expressed his own serious reservations about an attack on Iran. The US, which is already providing billions of dollars worth of arms to Israel every year, describes Tel Aviv's military edge in the region as being in America's interest. | ||
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Iraq |
Iraq's Jihad Myths |
2008-02-18 |
By Reuel Marc Gerecht Among Democrats and even many Republicans, it is by now accepted wisdom that the war in Iraq brought huge numbers of holy warriors to the anti-American cause. But is it true? I don't think so. Muslim holy warriors are a diverse lot, reacting with differing intensity to the hot-button issues that define contemporary Islamic militancy. For many fundamentalists, what is seen as an unrelenting Western assault on Muslim male honor and female virtue is the core infuriating offense. For others it may be the alienation that second-generation young Muslim men encounter in an immigrant-unfriendly Europe. And for still others, Iraq, Afghanistan, the tyranny of U.S.-backed Muslim rulers and the Palestinian resistance can all come together to convert individual indignities into a holy-warrior faith. |
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Iraq |
Change the Course in Iraq |
2006-10-17 |
![]() Quite a wide range of options are available to the Bush administration. None of them guarantee victorymore precisely, they try to minimize the effects of defeatand all are fraught with risk. According to the New York Sun, leaked accounts of Bakers commission on Iraqwhose official report is not due before Decembersuggest the White House has two main options. The first is to focus on establishing security in Baghdad while striking political accommodation with Iraqi insurgents. The goal of nurturing a democracy in Iraq is dropped, reports the Sun. The second option calls for the phased redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq but leaves open the difficult question of where and when these soldiers should be deployed. Cordesman divides his options into the almost good, the bad, and the ugly. He suggests conditioning military and civilian aid packages on political effectiveness in Baghdad, particularly within Iraqs ministries of defense and interior. He says efforts to disband militias should coincide with aid programs to provide their members with jobs. Putting tens of thousands of young Iraqi men into the streets has already been a disaster once, after the collapse of the Iraqi Army, he writes. Cordesman says President Bush must defuse fears and conspiracy theories, by making clear that the United States has no ambitions for a lasting presence in Iraq or ambitions relating to Iraqi oil. One way to do this, he says, is to transfer security duties to an international body like the United Nations, although Security Council authorization of a blue-helmeted mission to Iraq would be difficult. A recent CFR symposium weighed different options for leaving Iraq as well as the impact of the incursion upon U.S. policymaking. Bush reiterated to reporters this month that defeat, which ostensibly means a pullout of U.S. forces before Iraq is secure, would prompt the terrorists [to] take control of Iraq and establish a new safe haven from which to launch new attacks on America. Yet CFR President Emeritus Leslie H. Gelb argues in TIME that events may be sliding in that direction and we need to shrink the fallout. Meanwhile, Reuel Marc Gerecht of the American Enterprise Institute looks at the larger implications of concluding the war short of outright victory. If the United States gets driven from Iraq, the soul-searching necessary to combat Islamic extremism will also suffer a rout, he writes in the Weekly Standard. Finally, Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution tells CFR.orgs Bernard Gwertzman the Bush administration has proven unwilling to make changes aside from incremental ones that have mostly come in the form of too little, too late. President Bush disputes such charges. We're constantly changing tactics to achieve a strategic goal, he told reporters. |
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Iraq |
US planning new battle for Baghdad |
2006-04-16 |
THE American military is planning a second liberation of Baghdad to be carried out with the Iraqi army when a new government is installed. Pacifying the lawless capital is regarded as essential to establishing the authority of the incoming government and preparing for a significant withdrawal of American troops. Strategic and tactical plans are being laid by US commanders in Iraq and at the US army base in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, under Lieutenant- General David Petraeus. He is regarded as an innovative officer and was formerly responsible for training Iraqi troops. The battle for Baghdad is expected to entail a carrot-and-stick approach, offering the beleaguered population protection from sectarian violence in exchange for rooting out insurgent groups and Al-Qaeda. Sources close to the Pentagon said Iraqi forces would take the lead, supported by American air power, special operations, intelligence, embedded officers and back-up troops. Helicopters suitable for urban warfare, such as the manoeuvrable AH-6 Little Birds used by the marines and special forces and armed with rocket launchers and machineguns, are likely to complement the ground attack. The sources said American and Iraqi troops would move from neighbourhood to neighbourhood, leaving behind Sweat teams an acronym for sewage, water, electricity and trash to improve living conditions by upgrading clinics, schools, rubbish collection, water and electricity supplies. Sunni insurgent strongholds are almost certain to be the first targets, although the Shiite militias such as the Mahdi army of Moqtada al-Sadr, the radical cleric, and the Iranian-backed Badr Brigade would need to be contained. President George W Bush and Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary, are under intense pressure to prove to the American public that Iraq is not slipping into anarchy and civil war. An effective military campaign could provide the White House with a bounce in the polls before the mid-term congressional elections in November. With Bushs approval ratings below 40%, the vote is shaping up to be a Republican rout. The Iraqi government, when it is finally formed, will also need to demonstrate that it is in charge of its own seat of government. It will be the second liberation of Baghdad, said Daniel Gouré, a Pentagon adviser and vice-president of the Lexington Institute, a military think tank. The new government will be able to claim it is taking back the streets. Larry Wilkerson, former chief of staff to Colin Powell at the State Department, said a crackdown in Baghdad was one of the few ways in which a fresh Iraqi government could bind the new national army and prove its mettle. They have to show they can liberate their own capital, he said. Baghdad is the key to stability in Iraq. Its a chance for the new government to stand up and say, Here we are. They cant do that if they are hunkered down in bunkers. The operation is likely to take place towards the end of the summer, giving the newly appointed government time to establish itself. If all goes to plan, US troop withdrawals could take place before the end of the year. In the absence of progress by then, the war may come to be seen by the American public as a lost cause. There are 140,000 US troops in Iraq. Lieutenant-General John Vines, who stepped down as commander of ground forces in Iraq at the beginning of this year, said it was essential to reduce the numbers. There is an incredible amount of stress and Im worried about it, said Vines. He added that soldiers were on their third or fourth tours of duty in Iraq: The war has been going on nearly as long as the second world war and were asking a lot of the forces. Vines said there was an enormous amount of work in Baghdad under way but cautioned that any onslaught against insurgents would be fiendishly complicated. The approach would have to be locale by locale. He added: Ultimately we want a police solution in Baghdad. US forces would try to avoid the all-out combat that was used to subdue Falluja in 2004. If you cut up the city into pieces neighbourhood by neighbourhood, you can prevent it from becoming a major urban fight, said Gouré. According to defence sources the Americans could augment their forces with heavily armed AC-130 aircraft and F-16s. But close air support is more likely to be provided by Cobra and Little Bird helicopters to minimise casualties. The generals involved in planning the battle are architects of the clear, hold and build strategy in Iraq, designed to isolate insurgents from the population and prevent them regrouping in urban strongholds as soon as the militarys back is turned. Viness replacement as commander of ground forces is Lieutenant-General Peter Chiarelli, who pioneered the use of force with Sweat to subdue Sadr city, a working-class Shiite district of Baghdad, in 2004. On the eve of his return to Iraq this year he described how the tactics had worked and vowed to repeat them. It was not uncommon for the 1st Calvary Division to be engaged in intense urban combat in one part of the city, while just a few blocks away we had units replacing damaged infrastructure, helping to foster business growth or facilitating the development of local government, Chiarelli said. The general is close to Petraeus, who won praise for his sensitive handling of communities in northern Iraq when he was in charge of the 101st Airborne Division, known as the Screaming Eagles, at the start of the war. Another model for operations in Baghdad is an American-led Iraqi-backed military campaign at Tal Afar, a rebel town on the Syrian border. In a speech last month Bush hailed the campaign as an extraordinary success and brandished a letter from the towns Iraqi mayor praising US forces as our lion-hearted saviours. But Tal Afar remains far from secure and the military tactics cannot be copied wholesale. Baghdad is a swirling mess of competing Sunni and Shiite militias and Al-Qaeda fighters, and the city has been sliding into chaos at an alarming rate. My brother was killed by somebody who told us he was paid $10 for the job, said a Baghdad victim of the violence. A man met him in the street, pointed to my brother and said he was a bad guy and had to die. He never knew why. Kidnappings have risen to 50 a day in Iraq. Abu Ali, whose 12-year-son was kidnapped in Baghdad last month, said he had received a demand for $250,000 for his release. Sometimes they let me hear him begging or crying for me to help him, he said. At other times they threaten me and say his brothers will be next. Anybody connected, however remotely, with the administration is seen as a target; 18 traffic police officers have been killed in the past two months. They were simply doing their duty and trying to prevent traffic jams. There are no traffic lights, said Major Hussein Khadem of the transport police. Residents have taken to carrying two ID cards and ostentatiously religious CDs because of fears of sectarian violence. If you are stopped at a Shiite checkpoint, you have to show you have a Shiite name, and if it is a Sunni insurgent checkpoint, it is good to show that your name is Omar, said a Baghdad resident who had recently obtained a new ID. The power of sectarian militias could prove to be a dangerous and unpredictable component of the battle for Baghdad. The Iraqi army and police who will be expected to take over areas once the army has left are largely Shiite dominated. The battle could be a key test for Iraqi forces. Ultimately we have to see whether the Iraqi army is a national army or a sectarian army, Goure added. Reuel Marc Gerecht, an expert on Iraq at the neo-conservative American Enterprise Institute, said that while it was essential to bring Baghdad under control, he feared the Americans would leave the bulk of the fighting to the Iraqis and that a showdown could misfire. You would have to come down like a hammer on the Sunni areas of Baghdad and go house to house and nobody wants to do that, Gerecht said. Its inevitably going to come and its going to be convulsive. The Americans will be there, but not in the numbers needed because American casualty rates will go up. |
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Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
US studying military options for Iran |
2006-04-09 |
The Bush administration is studying options for military strikes against Iran as part of a broader strategy of coercive diplomacy to pressure Tehran to abandon its alleged nuclear development program, according to U.S. officials and independent analysts. No attack appears likely in the short term, and many specialists inside and outside the U.S. government harbor serious doubts about whether an armed response would be effective. But administration officials are preparing for it as a possible option and using the threat "to convince them this is more and more serious," as a senior official put it. According to current and former officials, Pentagon and CIA planners have been exploring possible targets, such as the uranium enrichment plant at Natanz and the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan. Although a land invasion is not contemplated, military officers are weighing alternatives ranging from a limited airstrike aimed at key nuclear sites, to a more extensive bombing campaign designed to destroy an array of military and political targets. Preparations for confrontation with Iran underscore how the issue has vaulted to the front of President Bush's agenda even as he struggles with a relentless war in next-door Iraq. Bush views Tehran as a serious menace that must be dealt with before his presidency ends, aides said, and the White House, in its new National Security Strategy, last month labeled Iran the most serious challenge to the United States posed by any country. Many military officers and specialists, however, view the saber rattling with alarm. A strike at Iran, they warn, would at best just delay its nuclear program by a few years but could inflame international opinion against the United States, particularly in the Muslim world and especially within Iran, while making U.S. troops in Iraq targets for retaliation. "My sense is that any talk of a strike is the diplomatic gambit to keep pressure on others that if they don't help solve the problem, we will have to," said Kori Schake, who worked on Bush's National Security Council staff and teaches at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. Others believe it is more than bluster. "The Bush team is looking at the viability of airstrikes simply because many think airstrikes are the only real option ahead," said Kurt Campbell, a former Pentagon policy official. The intensified discussion of military scenarios comes as the United States is working with European allies on a diplomatic solution. After tough negotiations, the U.N. Security Council issued a statement last month urging Iran to re-suspend its uranium enrichment program. But Russia and China, both veto-wielding council members, forced out any mention of consequences and are strongly resisting any sanctions. U.S. officials continue to pursue the diplomatic course but privately seem increasingly skeptical that it will succeed. The administration is also coming under pressure from Israel, which has warned the Bush team that Iran is closer to developing a nuclear bomb than Washington thinks and that a moment of decision is fast approaching. Bush and his team have calibrated their rhetoric to give the impression that the United States may yet resort to force. In January, the president termed a nuclear-armed Iran "a grave threat to the security of the world," words that echoed language he used before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Vice President Cheney vowed "meaningful consequences" if Iran does not give up any nuclear aspirations, and U.N. Ambassador John R. Bolton refined the formula to "tangible and painful consequences." Although Bush insists he is focused on diplomacy for now, he volunteered at a public forum in Cleveland last month his readiness to use force if Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad tries to follow through on his statement that Israel should be "wiped off the map." "The threat from Iran is, of course, their stated objective to destroy our strong ally, Israel," Bush said. "That's a threat, a serious threat. . . . I'll make it clear again that we will use military might to protect our ally Israel." Bush has also been privately consulting with key senators about options on Iran as part of a broader goal of regime change, according to an account by Seymour M. Hersh in the New Yorker magazine. The U.S. government has taken some preliminary steps that go beyond planning. The Washington Post has reported that the military has been secretly flying surveillance drones over Iran since 2004 using radar, video, still photography and air filters to detect traces of nuclear activity not accessible to satellites. Hersh reported that U.S. combat troops have been ordered to enter Iran covertly to collect targeting data, but sources have not confirmed that to The Post. The British government has launched its own planning for a potential U.S. strike, studying security arrangements for its embassy and consular offices, for British citizens and corporate interests in Iran and for ships in the region and British troops in Iraq. British officials indicate their government is unlikely to participate directly in any attacks. Israel is preparing, as well. The government recently leaked a contingency plan for attacking on its own if the United States does not, a plan involving airstrikes, commando teams, possibly missiles and even explosives-carrying dogs. Israel, which bombed Iraq's Osirak nuclear plant in 1981 to prevent it from being used to develop weapons, has built a replica of Natanz, according to Israeli media, but U.S. strategists do not believe Israel has the capacity to accomplish the mission without nuclear weapons. Iran appears to be taking the threat seriously. The government, which maintains its nuclear activity is only for peaceful, civilian uses, has launched a program to reinforce key sites, such as Natanz and Isfahan, by building concrete ceilings, tunneling into mountains and camouflaging facilities. Iran lately has tested several missiles in a show of strength. Israel points to those missiles to press their case in Washington. Israeli officials traveled here recently to convey more urgency about Iran. Although U.S. intelligence agencies estimate Iran is about a decade away from having a nuclear bomb, Israelis believe a critical breakthrough could occur within months. They told U.S. officials that Iran is beginning to test a more elaborate cascade of centrifuges, indicating that it is further along than previously believed. "What the Israelis are saying is this year -- unless they are pressured into abandoning the program -- would be the year they will master the engineering problem," a U.S. official said. "That would be a turning point, but it wouldn't mean they would have a bomb." But various specialists and some military officials are resisting strikes. "The Pentagon is arguing forcefully against it because it is so constrained" in Iraq and Afghanistan, said Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former CIA Middle East specialist. A former defense official who stays in touch with colleagues added, "I don't think anybody's prepared to use the military option at this point." As the administration weighs these issues, two main options are under consideration, according to one person with contacts among Air Force planners. The first would be a quick and limited strike against nuclear-related facilities accompanied by a threat to resume bombing if Iran responds with terrorist attacks in Iraq or elsewhere. The second calls for a more ambitious campaign of bombing and cruise missiles leveling targets well beyond nuclear facilities, such as Iranian intelligence headquarters, the Revolutionary Guard and some in the government. Any extended attack would require U.S. forces to cripple Iran's air defense system and air force, prepare defenses for U.S. ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and move Navy ships to the Persian Gulf to protect shipping. U.S. forces could launch warplanes from aircraft carriers, from the Diego Garcia island base in the Indian Ocean and, in the case of stealth bombers, from the United States. But if generals want land-based aircraft in the region, they face the uphill task of trying to persuade Turkey to allow use of the U.S. air base at Incirlik. Planners also are debating whether launching attacks from Iraq or using Iraqi airspace would exacerbate the political cost in the Muslim world, which would see it as proof that the United States invaded Iraq to make it a base for military conquest of the region. Unlike the Israeli air attack on Osirak, a strike on Iran would prove more complex because Iran has spread its facilities across the country, guarded some of them with sophisticated antiaircraft batteries and shielded them underground. Pentagon planners are studying how to penetrate eight-foot-deep targets and are contemplating tactical nuclear devices. The Natanz facility consists of more than two dozen buildings, including two huge underground halls built with six-foot walls and supposedly protected by two concrete roofs with sand and rocks in between, according to Edward N. Luttwak, a specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "The targeteers honestly keep coming back and saying it will require nuclear penetrator munitions to take out those tunnels," said Kenneth M. Pollack, a former CIA analyst. "Could we do it with conventional munitions? Possibly. But it's going to be very difficult to do." Retired Air Force Col. Sam Gardiner, an expert in targeting and war games who teaches at the National Defense University, recently gamed an Iran attack and identified 24 potential nuclear-related facilities, some below 50 feet of reinforced concrete and soil. At a conference in Berlin, Gardiner outlined a five-day operation that would require 400 "aim points," or targets for individual weapons, at nuclear facilities, at least 75 of which would require penetrating weapons. He also presumed the Pentagon would hit two chemical production plants, medium-range ballistic missile launchers and 14 airfields with sheltered aircraft. Special Operations forces would be required, he said. Gardiner concluded that a military attack would not work, but said he believes the United States seems to be moving inexorably toward it. "The Bush administration is very close to being left with only the military option," he said. Others forecast a more surgical strike aimed at knocking out a single "choke point" that would disrupt the Iranian nuclear program. "The process can be broken at any point," a senior administration official said. "But part of the risk is: We don't know if Natanz is the only enrichment facility. We could bomb it, take the political cost and still not set them back." Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said a more likely target might be Isfahan, which he visited last year and which appeared lightly defended and above-ground. But he argued that any attack would only firm up Iranian resolve to develop weapons. "Whatever you do," he said, "is almost certain to accelerate a nuclear bomb program rather than destroy it." |
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Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
Military Strikes and a Democratic Future for Iran |
2006-01-25 |
The Khomeinist regime in Iran is finally baring its teeth to the world, in the public appearances of the little fanatic, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Irans nuclear build-up has been going on for two decades, and the regime is now openly laughing at diplomatic efforts by the Europeans to make it stand down its nuclear development. In addition to a dozen smuggled Ukrainian cruise missiles, the regime is now in possession of some 25 North Korean missiles with a 2,500 km range. Paris is well within range of Tehrans WMDs, as Jacques Chirac acknowledged last week when he told Iran that terror attacks in France could lead to a nuclear response. The paradox is that the regime is most vigorously hated by its own people, who have suffered the most. The most attractive outcome, therefore, would be a Iranian Glastnost - a quiet overthrow of the mullocracy by its own figurative children, the people of Iran, especially the educated urban dwellers. The USSR crumbled when the children of the elite stopped believing. The children of the mullahs, most of them, have long ago stopped believing. Yet they are now being governed by a creature of the Basij and the Revolutionary Guard, who proclaims himself as a true believer in a Shiite Armageddon. Ahmadinejad is not Gorbachev, but rather Stalin or Hitler. A peaceful revolt will not work by itself, but it can be a crucial ingredient. Iranian Glastnost will therefore not happen without external military actions to render the regime visibly impotent before its people. When the US and UK invaded Saddams Iraq, his army crumbled in the face of a brilliant ground and air assault. The Kurds had in fact already rebelled after the Gulf War a decade before, and created their own autonomous region. A decade of US air attacks, combined with famously leaky sanctions, rendered Saddams military demoralized and unable to resist coherently. Unbeknownst to us, Saddam was bluffing, putting up a creaky but intimidating front, terrorizing his own people, and hyping his goal of getting WMDs and missiles enough to fool the CIA and every other western intelligence agency. Saddams real plan was to fall back on the insurgency we see today. But today the insurgency is on its last legs, led by Sunni Baathists who can hope for no mercy from the new Iraq, and by al Qaeda terrorists rejected by even the Baathist terror-brothers, and prepared for martyrdom. Zarqawi, it was just reported, sleeps with a bomb belt, so as to blow himself up if he is caught. He may get his chance very soon. The conventional story peddled by the antique media is that US action in Iraq is a failure. On the contrary, by historical standards it is an extraordinary success, as successful as the liberation of Europe in World War Two. The Iraq action therefore provides many useful lessons for a policy to isolate, contain, and undermine the Tehran regime. Lesson One: It is essential to encourage revolution and division in Iran, with military strikes against the regimes most dangerous assets. One way to do that is to bomb only nuclear and missile facilities, most obviously the enrichment facilities now being built up in Natanz and Isfahan. If the civilian population is untouched, the Iranian people, who have many sources of news through the internet and satellite television (including Farsi-language broadcasts from a Los Angeles-based station run by Iranian refugees), will learn to understand who is their real enemy. The domestic opponents of the regime will rejoice. No doubt the Ahmadinejad regime will continue to disperse its WMD capabilities, but as it does so, it also must lose some control. When Saddam told one of his nuclear scientists to bury centrifuge parts in his garden, that equipment was rendered useless for the time being. Saddams WMD capacity could have been reconstituted any time the pressure came off his regime, so that the threat was only slowed, not stopped. But an aggressive US policy against Saddam actually worked much better than was generally thought at the time. The foremost aim of military strikes against nuclear and missile facilities would be to buy time. That is what US air strikes did against Saddam, over a decade after the Gulf War. They wore down his power, often in subtle ways, but very effectively. And they gave hope to his sworn enemies the Shiites, Marsh Arabs, Kurds, expatriate Iraqis and reform-minded elements among the Sunnis. Lesson Two: The Tehran regime should be put on notice that proxy terror attacks will evoke a direct response aimed at its centers of power and ideology. Jacques Chirac did so effectively last week, by warning that state-sponsored terror attacks could evoke a nuclear response from France. That was the right thing to say. The political aim of nuclear weapons is not necessarily to wipe out Israel, which Ahmadinejad must know would unleash the end of his regime by massive counterstrikes. Rather, the immediate aim is to shield Tehran from retaliation when it stirs up terrorist proxies to attack Israel. The most successful Israeli strategy has always been to find the right return address, and make the sponsors of violence pay a stiff personal price. A major aim of Tehrans nuclear policy is to make the regime invulnerable to any large-scale attack, allowing it to stir up terrorist proxy assaults at will. A major strategic aim of US policy should therefore be to prevent nuclear capability in Tehrans hands, so that it must play the proxy strategy with constant concern for its own survival. Ahmadinejads ideological roots are among the most radical mullahs in Qom, who cannot therefore be left off a target list. Iran is dangerous not just because it will soon have nukes, but because it has the ideological will to use them. That ideology, which may be a minority view among the mullahs themselves, could be attacked directly, if necessary without leaving American fingerprints. The recent plane crash that killed the top commander of the Iranian military may be a case in point. Lesson Three: In addition to striking military facilities, the US should encourage widespread resistance among anti-regime factions and tribal groups, and consider special ops attacks on command and control centers of the regime. Liberal commentators say that any military action against Iran would unify the people in support of the regime. But one lesson of war is that the event is less important than the public interpretation of the event. If local military strikes on the Natanz enrichment facilities are interpreted to mean that Ahmadinejad is helpless, he will begin to lose control. If they are interpreted as a blow against Irans national pride, he may gain adherents. It is therefore essential to spread the message that the goal of any strikes is to empower the people of Iran, even as the Iraqis have been empowered by the overthrow of Saddam. Since a foolish and politicized US Democratic Party and its sympathizers in the media and government will leak any propaganda effort at CIA or State, the agency best qualified to do this would be the Pentagon Special Ops Command. Lesson Four: Allied assets should be used to encourage dissent, no matter what the source. During the Iraq invasion the German government under Herr Schroeder helped the US with intelligence, while screaming at us in public. Under Socialist President Mitterand, French intelligence helped the US against the USSR. The French gave Israel vital information needed to bomb Saddams Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, though they had helped build it themselves. As fear of the Tehran regime spreads, more hidden allies will appear. The threat is serious enough for us to consider the enemy of our enemy our friend, just as we did in supporting Stalin against Hitler. Iranian expatriates are by far our best resource in persuading the people of the true aims of US and allied policy: Iranian democracy. But even countries like Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia will find it in their interest to promote revolt among Sunni tribes in Iran. None of these allies will trust others with their most vital secrets. But they might agree on weakening this fanatical and deadly regime, whether by splitting the mullahs themselves, or by encouraging tribal rebellions. As Reuel Marc Gerecht wrote in the Weekly Standard, The regime in Tehran constantly tells us what it fears most: clerical dissent. Why cant American officials give speeches defending religious freedom in Iran? Ali Khameneis Achilles heel is that he is a politicized, pathetic religious scholar ruling over a theocratic state where accomplished clerics, who dont believe at all in the political rule of religious jurisconsults, are silenced. This is the issue between Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Iraq, and the school of Najaf behind him, and the clerical regime in Iran. Perhaps Sistani owes us a favor or two for bringing his Shiite followers to power in Iraq. Perhaps he would like to control the Iranian clerics, rather than vice versa. This game can be played both ways. There is a widespread belief that the upper grades of the CIA are useless, devoting more of their efforts to undermining the war on terror than on supporting it. The same may be true in the State Department and even the Pentagon. The administration has apparently responded by isolating useless segments of the bureaucracy, carrying out its real policies by means of smaller groups within those agencies, like the new Special Ops Command. An aggressive policy against the threat of Iranian nuclear weapons will have to rely on trustworthy US government assets. The key therefore is to isolate the regime, showing it to by helpless against pinpoint military assaults on its most dangerous assets, while at the same time signalling the Iranian people that the West stands for their freedom. A democratic Iran is a much safer Iran. But as Thomas Jefferson famously wrote, The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is a sad necessity, never to be chosen lightly. But we can get Jeffersons message out to the Iranian people, because they already know it from their own experience. James Lewis is a frequent contributor. |
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Ciao, CIA. Your'e FUBAR. Time to start over. |
2005-12-11 |
On Aug. 2, Dafna Linzer of the Washington Post reported that "a major U.S. intelligence review has projected that Iran is about a decade away from manufacturing the key ingredient for a nuclear weapon, roughly doubling the previous estimate of five years." On Dec. 5, the Jerusalem Post reported that Mohammed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, "confirmed Israel's assessment that Iran is only a few months away from creating an atomic bomb." My, how time flies. It hasn't seemed as if 10 years have elapsed since last summer. The CIA could be right, and the Israeli intelligence service Mossad and the IAEA could be wrong. But given the CIA's forecasting record -- it missed the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Islamic revolution in Iran, the warning signs of 9/11 and Saddam's WMD -- that's not the way to bet. Intelligence analysis isn't the only thing the CIA does sloppily. The Bush administration suffered major embarrassment when it was disclosed that the United States was holding top al-Qaida suspects in "secret prisons" in eastern Europe and North Africa. A Swedish journalist who prepared one of the first stories on the CIA flights that transported al-Qaida captives told Josh Gerstein of The New York Sun the CIA did a poor job of covering its tracks. "I would say they didn't give a damn," Fredrik Laurin told Mr. Gerstein. "If I was an American taxpayer, I'd be upset." For a show broadcast in May of last year, Mr. Laurin traced the tail number of a Gulfstream jet used to transport captives to a clearly phony company in Massachusetts. "You weren't able to trace the name to any living individual," Mr. Laurin said. "They were all living in post office boxes in Virginia. "If that's all the imagination they can drum up at Langley, I'd fire the bunch," Mr. Laurin added. But if the CIA hasn't been very good at ferreting out the secrets of our enemies, or keeping our own, it has shown a talent for playing politics. "The CIA's war against the Bush administration is one of the great untold stories of the past three years," wrote lawyer and Web logger John Hinderaker in The Weekly Standard. The CIA has used its budget to fund criticism of the Bush administration by former Democratic officeholders, and permitted a serving analyst, Michael Scheuer, to publish and promote a book bashing the president. The principal CIA weapon has been the leak. Reporters for ABC, The New York Times and The Washington Post didn't have to do even the minimal legwork Mr. Laurin did to out the CIA's clandestine "rendition" program. It was handed to them by "current and former intelligence officials." "So the CIA established policies that it knew would be controversial and would damage American interests if revealed, and then leaked the existence of those policies to The Washington Post for the purpose of damaging the Bush administration," Mr. Hinderaker wrote. A rogue CIA that subverts American democracy has long been a staple of moonbat mythology. How ironic that the rogues in the CIA should turn out to be leftists who harm America to benefit Democrats. Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former CIA operative in the Middle East, sees little hope the agency can be reformed: The CIA's "muscle-bound bureaucratization, combined with the failure of the press to accurately represent to the public the Agency's actual problems ... holds out little hope that we will see the innovation needed to combat bin-Ladenism," he wrote last year. "For almost a decade now the CIA put a low priority on recruiting human sources abroad," agreed Robert Baer, another former CIA Middle East operative and author of "See No Evil." "The CIA was more concerned about being politically correct." "The problem with the CIA is that the senior executives responsible for production of intelligence just aren't good enough," said Herbert Meyer, assistant to legendary CIA Director William Casey. In the 1990s, the late Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan proposed abolishing the CIA. That seemed far out then. It doesn't seem so far out now. It might be easier to start from scratch than to clean up the mess the CIA has become. "The CIA is in deep crisis," Mr. Hinderaker said. "It is not at all clear that its survival is in the national interest." |
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Should the US support Islamists? |
2005-12-03 |
A debate between Daniel Pipes and Reuel Marc Gerecht. âTo give freedom is still more easy. It is not necessary to guide; it only requires to let go the rein. But to form a free government; that is, to temper together these opposite elements of liberty and restraint in one consistent work, requires much thought, deep reflection, a sagacious, powerful, and combining mind.â âEdmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France. Penguin Books: London, 1986, p. 374 [Orig. 1790] âDemocracy is the worst form of government, except for all others that are tried from time to time.â âParaphrase of Winston S. Churchill quote Now more than ever, the question of whether to invite Islamists or curtail their participation in budding Arab democratic elections is critical to the debate over the War on Terror. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has scored stunning victories, gaining â29 more seats in weekend parliamentary runoff electionsâ and as a result âthe organization will control at least five times more seats in the new legislature than it does now.â We are at a crossroads and it is this vital juncture that was addressed last month in a debate between Daniel Pipes and Reuel Marc Gerecht. --Michael Lopez-Calderon The question, âShould the United States support Islamists?â is counterintuitive to conservatives; indeed, it is a question we expect from the defeatist voices of the American Left which makes it all the more astonishing that it was the topic of a debate between Dr. Daniel Pipes and Reuel Marc Gerecht that took place October 24, 2005. Moderated by Ms. Zeyno Baran of The Nixon Center, the debate between the men was civil, informative, and marked by a few moments of profound clarity. One such moment occurred when Marc Plattner of the National Endowment for Democracy asked Dr. Pipes if he considered Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Husaini Sistani an Islamist. âSistani is not an Islamist,â according to Dr. Pipes. However, Dr. Pipes warned that the Islamist threat is one that cannot be remedied by a rush to democracy in the Middle East. A different perspective was offered by Mr. Gerecht, who argued that America must be prepared to accept the occasional unacceptable effects of unfettered democratic elections in the Middle East, and we must be prepared to countenance such outcomes now. Mr. Gerecht left a few of us stunned when he stated that should democratic elections in Egypt lead to a legitimately-elected Islamist government, the United States and the West would have to bear this outcome as part of the âdifficult growing painsâ process of democracy.â His central point is that the pro-American Arab governments lack legitimacy, and should elections that bar Islamists occur under the auspices of the U.S., they will be viewed by discontented majorities as illegitimate. Dr. Pipes placed his faith in Middle Eastern strongmen committed to gradual democratic reforms over a twenty- to twenty-five year process; Mr. Gerecht considered delay untenable, counterproductive, and doomed to bitter failure. Distinctions of time and process became the central points of contention between these two men. Mr. Gerecht opened the debate after Ms. Baranâs introductory statements, and he argued that while the U.S. government should not support Islamists, it is inevitable that Islamists are going to triumph in some, perhaps most Middle Eastern countries should full-fledged democratic elections be permitted. He stated âDemocracy in the Middle East is going to be frontloaded, that is, elections first, organic democratic institutions second.â President George W. Bush, though lacking Middle Eastern âexpertise,â was credited by Mr. Gerecht for understanding that the status quo in the Middle East had become dangerously dysfunctional; political extremism necessitates a fundamental change in the U.S. âbusiness as usual approachâ toward undemocratic Arab regimes. Mr. Gerecht warned that the business of building democracy in the Middle East was going to be messy and at times unsatisfactory to U.S. interests; however, we had to accept these possible outcomes â trauma and anti-Americanism â as part of the âfever-breakingâ process of moving from decades of tyranny to lawful, democratically-elected, representative governments. âYou donât get Thomas Jefferson unless youâve had Martin Luther,â said Mr. Gerecht, although he was quick to disclaim Luther as a role model, given the Christian reformerâs legacy of religious wars. Still, according to him, we have to accept the risks and Egypt is one of the linchpins of change. Legitimacy is central to successful electoral processes and the slow formation of democratic culture. A recent AP story of an Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood female candidate, Makarem Eldery Ph.D., 55, campaigning for office, reveals the prevailing sentiment among large sectors of Egyptians: ââWe draw our legitimacy from the people. We don't need a despotic regime to recognize us,â she said. âIt's the regime that lacks legitimacy.â" In Gerechtâs view, restricting the participation of Islamists only further endangers Middle Eastern stability as emerging democratic ideas mixed in with older forms of Islamic identity vie to compete in the open market. Driving out Islamists will drive them underground as well as lead large Arab majorities to conclude the electoral process a fraud. âThe Genie is out of the bottle,â said Mr. Gerecht, and if we encourage an Algerian solution âholding elections and then negating their results when they result in the election of Islamic parties, we risk driving Islamists further away from the political process and into armed struggle or terrorism. He added, âAnd we will hit a dead end if we do not open up the process now.â Dr. Pipes cautioned against unfettered democratic elections in which the result could be âone person, one vote, one time.â He outlined the four goals of the radical Islamist agenda: Implement Shariâa as an exclusive system of law; the transformation of personal faith into a radical Utopian ideology, similar to Fascism and Communism; rejection of Western influence by dividing the world into two mutually exclusive camps; the drive to power. The Islamist movement is a unitary one and uses both the violent and nonviolent components as a means to power, said Dr. Pipes. Similar to Italian communists who did the Sovietsâ bidding while posing as nonviolent alternatives to revolutionary communism, the so-called âpeacefulâ Islamists adopt to their immediate environment, argued Dr. Pipes. He made no distinction between the two sides of the same Islamist coin. âAll Islamists are bad,â said Dr. Pipes while the anti-Islamists are fractured and weak. âIslamists are the ones dominating the agendaâ and âBetween 10 to 15 percent of Muslims worldwide are actively Islamists,â according to Dr. Pipes. However, like the German Nazis, the Islamistsâ will to power, their effectiveness, and the overall weakness of moderate Muslims gives the radicals a level of power that exceeds their actual numbers. Only moderate Muslimsâ resistance to Islamism can lead to a victory over radical Islam, but a premature move to democracy is not the solution, according to Dr. Pipes. He opposed Mr. Gerechtâs proposition by arguing, âYes democracy, but not democracy now.â He invoked a Burkean argument for slow, gradual change declaring that people traumatized by decades of tyranny could not possibly develop democracies while simultaneously under assault by Islamo-fascism. âDemocracy is counter-intuitive. Democracy takes time to learnâŠit is a slow, long deliberative process. By jumping too fast, Islamists âŠgain and we will unfortunately assist our worst enemies to power,â concluded Dr. Pipes. The audience, which included Clifford May (Foundation for the Defense of Democracies), Arnaud de Borchgrave (CSIS), Ambassador Martin Indyk (The Brookings Institution), Daniel Kimmage (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), Stephen Schwartz (Center for Islamic Pluralism), Fatiha Remh (Embassy of Morocco) and Paul Marshall (Center for Religious Freedom), engaged both men in a question and answer session that lasted nearly ninety minutes. Afterwards I asked Mr. Gerecht about his article âThe Struggle for the Middle East,â (The Weekly Standard, January 10, 2005) that warned that American failure to secure major roadways in Iraq would lead to disaster. He has since become more hopeful, pointing out that the vital Baghdad International Airport road to the capital is safer today than it was six months ago. A recent Washington Post article confirms Mr. Gerechtâs optimism. Dr. Pipes answered my two-fold question about what I call the âX-factorâ, namely, the skittish American public. While both men debated the Middle Eastern response to change, I asked Dr. Pipes if he believed the American public had the patience to endure a potentially decadesâ long conflict, and if American leadership has sufficiently steeled the publicâs resolve. He answered that the American people had the resolve although he acknowledged that âthey do not see the threat the way they saw the Soviet oneâ and that American leadership had done an inadequate job in conveying to the American public the threat posed by radical Islam. Both men agreed on the need to establish democratically-elected, representative governments in the Middle East that are built upon the solid foundations of a written constitution, and that these governments will reflect Middle Eastern and Islamic traditions which the West need not fear nor oppose. As I departed The Nixon Center, Mr. Gerechtâs proposition that we may have to accept an Islamist Egypt bothered me deeply. Islamists in control of the Suez Canal and inheriting fairly modern American weaponry are not comforting thoughts, to say the least. Egyptâs air force alone consists of over 500 combat aircraft including âsixty-seven multi-mission F-16 A/Cs and thirty-three F-4Es from the United States, as well as sixteen Mirage 2000s from France.â Recall that just three years ago, the Bush Administration floated the possibility that Iraqi Unmanned Aerial Vechicles (U.A.V.) could be launched perhaps from terror cargo ships and that these aerial devices could spray a major U.S. city with anthrax, for example. Much of the public scoffed at such views but few would laugh at the prospects of the high-performance F-16, one of the worldâs leading fighter-planes, in the hands of Islamist Kamikaze pilots. After all, the last time Jihadis manned the controls of modern aircraft, they sent an entire nation into shock. Michael Lopez-Calderon is a freelance writer who lives near Washington, D.C. |
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