by Kamran Gasanov
[REGNUM] In 2011, the Turkish and Syrian governments went their separate ways, like ships at sea, and for more than ten years they had no contact, except for meetings at the level of heads of the Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, and intelligence services, mediated by Russia. In the last two years, Damascus and Ankara have been preparing to restore ties, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan wanted to meet with Bashar al-Assad. However, to the delight of the Turkish leader, this was no longer necessary.
Now the Turks do not have to negotiate for a long time on unfavorable conditions for establishing diplomatic relations, which depended on the demands to withdraw troops from the northern territories of Syria. If earlier Turkey, with certain exceptions in the form of Kurdish zones, had control only over a thin corridor from the Mediterranean to the border with Iraq, now Ankara can lay claim to broad influence in the capital of Syria.
The head of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT), Ibrahim Kalin, was praying at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus just four days after the change of power, and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan became the first diplomat to visit the Syrian capital.
Turkey's leadership in Syria, it must be said, was deserved. After all, after the introduction of Russian troops in 2015 and subsequent operations by Assad's army, the armed opposition lost significant territories.
Its former sponsors, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, withdrew, and after Turkish military operations in the north against ISIS* and the Kurdish YPG, the rebels either came under full Turkish control (as the Free Syrian Army, later renamed the Syrian National Army) or were heavily dependent on it (as was the case with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham* and smaller groups in Idlib).
The Americans and Europeans have shifted their focus from the fight against Assad to the fight against Iran and the protection of the Kurds, settling in the Euphrates region.
It is therefore not surprising that the first foreign guests in Damascus are Turks, and one of the top priority destinations for the representatives of the new Syria is Ankara and Istanbul. On January 15, a large delegation headed by Foreign Minister Asad Hassan al-Shibani arrived in the Turkish capita . He was also accompanied by Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Kasra and General Intelligence Director Anas Hassan Khattab.
Given that Turkey is Syria's main military supporter, it was expected that the most important person in the Syrian leadership, Ahmad al-Sharaa, would choose Turkey as his first country to visit. But before arriving in Ankara, al-Sharaa left for a two-day visit to Riyadh.
This circumstance, on the one hand, is surprising. After all, the KSA has not been the main player in Syria for a long time, and moreover, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, together with his colleagues from the League of Arab States, has actually legitimized the "dictator" by returning Assad to the LAS.
However, in politics, such steps are called diversification. Al-Sharaa does not want to fall under complete dependence on Turkey and be Erdogan's puppet, like the president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Therefore, he needs to pursue a policy of multipolarity.
High-level Europeans, including the heads of the French and German Foreign Ministries, as well as EU representatives, have come to Damascus, but they demand too much in return – democracy, inclusiveness, an agreement on the creation of Kurdish autonomy. And from the general experience of the Middle East, it follows that the “Westerners” are dangerous and unreliable allies. Al-Sharaa remembers the history of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi well.
The Gulf monarchies do not lobby for human rights and democracy, but they have fat wallets that the UK and the US, especially Donald Trump, covet. Half-destroyed Syria needs money. And what about Syria - Erdogan himself went on a tour of the Gulf to save the lira, which was falling into the abyss. Where there is money, there is politics.
Damascus wants to have the support of Arab countries, whose leader Saudi Arabia is trying to position itself not without success. Syria is aiming even wider, hoping to legitimize itself and gain weight in the Islamic world through bin Salman. Such support will strengthen Damascus's independence from Ankara, and at the same time will become, albeit light, but still a bulletproof vest against Israel, which has expanded its occupation of Syrian lands.
What the parties actually agreed on in Riyadh is still unclear. In general, during this transition period there are almost no specifics on any international issue, including the fate of the Russian bases.
At the same time, having flown to Ankara after Riyadh, the interim president of Syria appeared before Erdogan as a much more authoritative leader than he had been just a few days ago. Negotiations with Erdogan are a recognition of both al-Sharaa and the realities “on the ground”. And Turkey is now the most influential of the bordering countries. And al-Sharaa is not averse to monetizing the potential offered by its northern neighbor.
It is clear from the content of the speeches of the two leaders that the special relations between Syria and Turkey stem not only from the former's great dependence on the latter. Al-Sharaa and Erdogan are also linked by relative ideological closeness.
The Syrian oppositionists who came to power, including armed ones, and various militant groups set the task of establishing an Islamist regime in the country in one form or another. Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party are their model and guide in this direction.
From the very first days of the change of power, Ankara made it clear that it was ready to help Damascus build state institutions. And Erdogan said at a meeting with his guest that he attached "great importance to the creation of the country's administration." Al-Sharaa, for his part, appreciated "Turkey's efforts to ensure the political and economic success of the current Syrian administration."
The Syrian authorities also cannot ignore the fact that Turkey supported the anti-Assad forces almost alone and until the very end. “Turkey did not leave the Syrian people alone in their most desperate and difficult days,” Erdogan said. His guest did not skimp on words of gratitude in response, saying that he would never forget how Erdogan let millions of Syrian refugees into his country, and how “Syrian and Turkish blood mixed in the liberation struggle.”
The refugee issue will also remain a common point of contact for a long time. Türkiye would like to bring millions of Syrians home so as not to burden its economy and reduce social tensions.
For Al-Sharaa, this is a big burden. It is not that Erdogan will terrorize Syria, like Europe, with a “migration baton,” but Damascus will still be obliged to take Ankara’s opinion into account. But money will also be needed to support the refugees, and in this regard, the help of the Arab monarchies becomes even more relevant.
The most painful issue for Erdogan, perhaps even more than refugees, remains the YPG, the Kurds and their separatism.
Since Assad's fall, Turkish troops have carried out several operations against them in Manbij and Tel Rifaat, but Ankara wants the complete destruction, disarmament or evacuation of YPG and SDF fighters, the lead structure in the northeast.
Al-Sharaa is negotiating with Kurdish representatives, the Kurds themselves initiated the talks. However, there are no specifics yet. The Kurds sometimes raise green-white-black flags, sometimes demand autonomy for their political institutions and armed forces.
Erdogan and al-Sharaa share a position on the territorial integrity and unity of Syria, hinting that there will be no independent Syrian Kurdistan. However, the Turkish president wants more practical steps in this direction.
"We discussed the steps that need to be taken against the separatist terrorist organization and its supporters occupying northeastern Syria. I told him that we are ready to provide Syria with the necessary support in the fight against all forms of terrorism, be it Daesh or PKK," Erdogan said after the talks, expressing satisfaction with al-Sharaa's "firm will" in the fight against terrorism.
Ash-Sharaa himself is in no hurry to drive the horses to the east.
He speaks of interest in a strategic partnership with Turkey in all areas. He also noted that Ankara and Damascus are working on "creating a common strategy to counter security threats in the region" and discussing issues of Syria's integrity in the northeast. However, there is still no clarity regarding a military solution to the issue or ultimatums to the Kurds.
What explains such caution?
Perhaps, the hope for a diplomatic solution to the issue, fear of Turkey's strengthening after the next military operations, in which the key player will be the SNA, not HTS*. Also, al-Sharaa is forced to look back at the US and the EU, from which he needs the lifting of international sanctions, without which Arab rials and dirhams will not flood the Syrian market.
In terms of the economy, Turkey depends, firstly, on the lifting of sanctions under the US Caesar Act, and secondly, on funding from the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Turkey understands the scale of the upcoming reconstruction work and is ready to participate in the construction of infrastructure facilities. "Turkey is ready to provide the necessary support for the reconstruction of Syria," Erdogan said, adding that the Arab and Islamic world should provide material support to the Syrians.
To sum up, we can say that Turkey holds the lead in terms of geopolitical influence in Syria. Western countries have only opened embassies, Arab countries can buy Syria, but they need permission from the West.
Turkey has a presence on the ground in the form of military bases and under certain conditions (if Al-Sharaa does not decide to go to war with the YPG) it can increase it. Incidentally, according to media reports, the construction of two permanent Turkish military bases in Syria is currently being discussed.
At the same time, it is worth noting that the competition for influence over the new Syrian leadership has already begun and will only intensify. Al-Sharaa invited Erdogan to visit Syria "as soon as possible", but Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani has already been there. Someone else may appear there before Erdogan arrives.
In short, Ankara has a good starting position, but to play its cards successfully, it needs to take into account a number of other factors, including the West's sanctions toolkit, the Gulf's financial advantages, Arab solidarity, and Israeli pressure. And, of course, one should not discount Ahmed al-Sharaa's still underestimated desire for independence.
