At the crack of dawn, December 15, 2003, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck unleashed his small military machine to expel an excess of 3,000 heavily armed Indian separatist rebels belonging to three different groups - the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the National Democratic Front of Boroland (NDFB) and the Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO). These rebels had made the Himalayan kingdom their home for the past 12 years, and from here they launched murderous hit-and-run strikes on security forces, other symbols of Governmental authority, as well as civilians, on Indian soil.
After years of vacillation, why did Thimphu decide to act now? The ULFA has been operating in Bhutan ever since the Indian Army launched Operation Bajrang in November 1990. The NDFB joined the ULFA later. It is, in fact, the relatively smaller and rag-tag group, the KLO, and its affiliations and linkages, more than the ULFA or the NDFB, that provide the key to the question as to why Thimphu chose to act now. Security circles in both India and Bhutan had been rattled by news of the launching of the Bhutan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist) on April 22, 2003, the 133rd birth anniversary of Lenin. Pamphlets widely circulated by this new group in the Bhutanese refugee camps in Nepal and in areas inside Bhutan itself revealed that the new partyâs objective was to "smash the monarchy" and establish a "true and new democracy" in Bhutan. That was enough for the Indian and Bhutanese security establishment to put the ULFA, NDFB and the KLO under intensive surveillance and scrutiny.
It didnât take long for New Delhi and Thimphu to identify the KLO as the group with a far greater nuisance value than perhaps the ULFA or the NDFB. The KLO is active and has pockets of influence in the strategic North areas of West Bengal and could act as a bridge between the Maoist guerrillas in Nepal (the Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist, or CPN-M) and the newly emerging Maoist force in Bhutan. Indian intelligence agencies were also aware of the fact that the KLO had provided sanctuary to fleeing Maoist rebels from Nepal, that the outfit has acted as a link between the Nepalese Maoists and radical left-wing activists in the Indian State of Bihar, and that it had received help from the Maoists in setting up a number of explosives manufacturing units in North Bengal. It was these deepening linkages that forced both New Delhi and Thimphu to agree that it was time to launch a direct assault on the rebels in Bhutan before the situation went out of hand.
Maoist groups seem to be growing quite large in India, Nepal, and now Bangladesh, so similar groups emerging in Bhutan was probably just a matter of time. Although the King might have saved his country by acting now, rather than latter.
| But it takes quite a bit of money to run a serious insurgency. I wonder where that's coming from? |
As far as the rebels are concerned, they need alternative bases as soon as possible, to cool their heels and plan their next course of action. The jungles of Myanmar, across Arunachal Pradesh, are one favoured destination. According to Khagen Sarma, Assam Police Inspector General (Special Branch), there are an estimated 400 ULFA rebels in a number of camps inside Myanmar. However, if the 1995 joint operations by the Indian and Myanmarese Armies, codenamed âOperation Golden Bird,â are any indication, Myanmar may not be a safe resting place, and still less a secure staging area, for the Indian insurgents. Dozens of ULFA and other Northeast Indian rebels were either killed or captured by troops of the two nations in a pincer attack during Operation Golden Bird along the Mizoram border.
That leaves two main options for the rebels to look for as an alternative destination: Bangladesh or Nepal. Neither, however, is going to be as easy as it had been in Bhutan. Contacts in Bangladesh will certainly be able to provide the rebels some more safe-houses (top ULFA leaders have been operating from safe houses in Bangladesh for years now), but that will not be enough to maintain a strike force of several hundred, or even several thousand, people. Areas within Nepal that are currently dominated by the Maoists, and where the Governmentâs presence is weak, may provide a temporary safe haven. However, considering Kathmanduâs friendly ties with New Delhi, this could at best serve as a transit base for the Northeast Indian rebels, and they would eventually be targeted by Nepalâs security forces. There has long been dissatisfaction among the ULFA cadres based in Bhutan on the hardship they have had to suffer, while the top leadership lives in relative security and significant luxury in Bangladesh.
| That's certainly unusual, isn't it? |
The ongoing Bhutanese assault could push these strains to breaking point. And to the extent that NDFB and KLO depend overwhelmingly on ULFA for their own survival and operational capacities, the weakening of the principal insurgent group in the region can only leave them deeply debilitated as well. While the precise direction of the future can hardly be predicted with certainty, Bhutanâs determined action against Indian insurgents on its soil will surely be a turning point in the history of several insurgencies in Indiaâs Northeast. |
Bhutan has proposed a two-party political system to wield power in place of King Jigme Singye Wangchuck as it unveiled its first constitution on Saturday in public ceremonies across the country. The proposed constitution will replace a royal decree of 1953 giving the monarchy absolute power and transform the majority Buddhist nation of 534,000 people into a parliamentary democracy, officials said.