India-Pakistan | |||
No one will be permitted to sabotage madrassas: Ejaz | |||
2007-10-27 | |||
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India-Pakistan |
Status quo and insurrection |
2007-04-15 |
Najam Sethi The outlook is bleak. After four weeks of inspired dithering, the government has succumbed to the Lal Masjid-Jamia Hafsa jihadis. Chaudhry Shujaat, whose political career rests on alliances with the mullahs, has been tasked to neutralize them. Apparently, the intelligence agencies, various ministries and even some well-meaning columnists are wringing their hands in despair because they are opposed to sorting them out. But they are all wrong in their prescriptions because their diagnosis of the problem is wrong. The official diagnosis/prescription formula goes like this: These are a couple of mad maverick mullahs who have little public support but great nuisance value; therefore, there is no need to use force because that would only give them media headlines and public sympathy in the run-up to elections, with the judicial crisis still simmering and anti-government fronts boiling over in Balochistan and FATA. Instead, the prescription is to engage them in talks and make some concessions land and money to build new mosques and promises to uproot brothels and other un-Islamic ills from Islamabad and other cities . But will this concession suffice to appease Islamic revolutionaries wired for suicide bombing? Logically speaking, the government should then prepare to make the same concessions to copycat blackmailing mullahs and madrassahs all over the country. Already, the Islami Jamiat i Tulaba has been emboldened into beating up un-Islamic students at the Punjab University in Lahore (where the vice-chancellor is a retired general) and openly proclaiming the Islamisation of the campus. In Peshawar, Maulana Qureshi, head of the 17th century Mohabat Khan Mosque and president of the Muttahida Shariat Mahaz (MSM), has warned the government to close down brothels or else the Mahaz will launch a jihad against them. More mullahs are likely to follow suit if this issue is not closed swiftly. Brothels, billboards, veils, music, film, haircuts, dress, schools there is no end to the concessions that will be demanded in the name of jihad and Islam. Indeed, if the threat of provoking militant resistance and suicide bombing by the Jamia Hafsa students has unnerved the government it should step down and hand over power to the FATA mullahs and Taliban who have raised not one but many brigades of suicide bombers to resist the governments war against terrorism. One variant of this opportunist approach is to say that, while force is not the answer, a dialogue coupled with the threat of force may be the right way to handle the issue. But this is a non-starter. If force as an option is already ruled out then the threat of force in any context is meaningless. In fact, herein lies the answer. In many situations, the threat of the use of force is more effective than the use of force itself. But that strategy requires a credible demonstration of the mental will and physical ability to deploy and use massive force. In this situation, General Musharraf was required to show the iron fist of the police and military, not proffer the velvet glove of Ejaz ul Haq or Chaudhry Shujaat. There were a hundred ways of doing that at the outset. But when the government leaked word that force was not an option, the mavericks were emboldened to extend their agenda from seizing a library to forming vigilante groups for the enforcement of virtue in the twin cities and establishing an Islamic space in the heart of Islamabad. The situation is so pathetic that this high and mighty government cannot even block the mullahs website on the internet. So if the government wants Chaudhry Shujaat to succeed in his negotiations, it should physically and mentally demonstrate its ability to sort them out immediately. One way to do that would be to cordon off the area, deploy troops and make ready to smoke them out. Then negotiations might succeed in disarming them. But, of course, the problem is much deeper than that. The maverick mullahs of Islamabad are just one outcrop of a developing countrywide jihadi resistance to a cynical state establishment that once trained and nurtured them and now wants to put a lid on them. For a variety of well known reasons, this is unfortunately happening in the context of rising anti-Americanism (which is a political sentiment) and anti-Westernisation (which is a cultural sentiment). Both these sentiments are stimulating a return to religious faith as a symbol of measuring and stating identity in an alienating, insecure and globalizing world. The failure of the nation-state and nationalism in Pakistan is increasingly manifest. So what is the way out? Clearly, we need a fresh restatement and refurbishment of the nation-state so that it truly reflects the aspirations, hopes and dreams of ordinary Pakistanis, a state that is based on democratic institutions that inspire popular confidence and are able to productively channel the energies of the people, a state whose writ is accepted as a measure of the social contract between rulers and the ruled rather than forcibly imposed from above and therefore liable to be resisted. But the rub is that, despite an early promise of radical reform of state and society, General Pervez Musharraf seems to be digging in for the status quo which is actually a recipe for Islamist insurrections. |
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Afghanistan/South Asia |
One of the detained Paks is a JeM explosives expert |
2005-07-19 |
Addressing a youth conference in Islamabad, Musharraf said nothing in the Holy Qurâan justified the July 7 attacks that killed at least 55 people. âLaunching bomb attacks in London in the name of Islam is not Islam,â he said. He accused banned militant organisations Jaish-e-Mohamed (Army of Mohammad) and Sipah-e-Sahaba (Soldiers of Mohammadâs Companions) of forcing their ideology upon others, although he did not link them to the London bombings. He also took aim at Islamic schools that have been accused of helping to inspire the London attacks. Musharraf himself has been accused of failing to stick to a pledge to rein them in. âYes, today, some Chennaisas are involved in extremism and terrorism,â he said. Religious Affairs Minister Mohamed Ejaz ul Haq said the government is concerned after the London bombings that some madrassas might be violating government rules against preaching militancy. Those found to have done so would be closed down, he said. Musharrafâs comments came after an intelligence official named one of five militants detained by security forces at the weekend as Qari Usman, a Jaish-e-Mohamed bomb expert who may have been involved in a plot to kill Musharraf in 2003. The militants were detained in the central city of Faisalabad as part of a crackdown launched after the London bombings, although no link had been established. âThese people have been arrested because they are militants,â the official said. âWe are trying to establish if they had any links with those involved in the London blasts.â The intelligence official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said Usman was a close associate of Amjad Farooqi, a key planner of a December 2003 attempt on Musharrafâs life and an associate of its Al Qaeda mastermind, Abu Faraj Farj al Liby. Another intelligence official said other detentions in Faisalabad last week were based on information from Jaishâs Osama Nazir, who was arrested in December for a 2002 church bombing and met London bomber Shehzad Tanweer in Faisalabad in 2003. Intelligence sources have said Tanweer visited madrassas in Pakistan, possibly including one linked to Jaish, in 2004. However, some diplomats say any Jaish involvement in the London attacks is still far from clear. While Pakistan has yet to confirm officially that three of the London bombers, Britons of Pakistani descent, visited Pakistan before the attacks, Pakistani immigration officials said they entered Pakistan via Karachi last year. They said Tanweer, 22, and Mohammad Sidique Khan, 31, entered Karachi on November 19, 2004 and left for London from Karachi on on February 8, while Hasib Hussain, 18, entered Karachi from Riyadh on July 15, 2004. The Daily News newspaper reported that Tanweer and Khan stayed at a hotel in Karachiâs central Saddar area for a week before leaving for Lahore by train. Pakistani Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed told reporters Musharraf would address the nation some time this week on the London bombings and the crackdown on militants. |
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Afghanistan/South Asia | ||
Pak Establishment trying to make peace with the Deobandis? | ||
2005-06-02 | ||
Fighting Words, Hidden Pacts The Pakistani military establishment's fondness for Islamist fundamentalists, jihadists and rightwing groups remains as strong as ever, and the May 15 Convocation of Deeni Madaris (religious seminaries), as well as the May 18 edict against suicide attacks provide the latest evidence to this effect. On May 15, Wafaqul Medaris Al Arabia (a coalition of more than 9,000 Deobandi seminaries that claims to be the original patron and creator of the Taliban) organized a grand convocation in the immediate vicinity of the Parliament, Presidency and the Prime Minister's House at the state-owned Convention Center, with the full patronage of the present regime. Venomous speeches against the US were made on the occasion; jihad was glorified; government policies in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kashmir were condemned. The May 15 Convocation was both unusual and, in many respects, incredible. The state owns and runs the majestic Convention Center that is used for high-profile activities like South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Conventions. It is the most elite venue in Islamabad. Securing access for a programme is no easy matter, and it is not the kind of place that has often lent itself to extremist political or religious outburst. This is the first time that this facility was extended to such an organization, and to give vent to their fury against the US. It is clear that two powerful players continue to dominate Pakistani politics - the Army and the mullahs (clerics). The mullahs, it appears, are the Army's 'B' team, and are bound to become stronger in future with the establishment's patronage. The May 15 Convocation brought together thousands of Deobandi clerics from all over the country including the self-proclaimed 'spiritual leaders' of the Taliban - Maulana Samiul Haq, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, former Inter Services Intelligence Chief (ISI) Hamid Gul, and Qazi Hussain Ahmad. Former Prime Minister Shujaat Hussain, Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmad and Minister for Religious Affairs Ejaz ul Haq represented the government.
Insisting that it was not the seminaries that were extremist or terrorists, he declared, "What the US has done in Afghanistan and Iraq sufficiently proves the fact that there is no terrorist/extremist bigger than America. The inhuman policies of the US are pushing the Muslims to extremism." The convocation passed a 14-point resolution, which included: * The five wafaq (coalitions) of religious seminaries should be given the status of a board and their degrees/certificates should be recognized at the national level.The May 15 Convocation was extraordinarily well-organised. A media cell, equipped with computers, internet connectivity and photocopiers had been established at Lal Masjid; security was tight, and nobody was allowed entry without invitation. The proceedings of the Convocation were transmitted live through the internet at Defenders of Islam. Some clerics who could not make it to the Convention Center participated online. Several observers were inclined to some skepticism regarding the administrative skills of the clerics, and suspicions were voiced that the 'ISI has sponsored this show.' Arif Jamal - a prolific writer on jihad and rightwing politics - observed: "The Convocation marks a new beginning of relations between the Musharraf government and the Deobandi ulema. The conflict between the Musharraf government and the Pakistani Deobandi ulema that started with the fall of the Taliban government in Afghanistan and reached its climax with the attempts on the life of General Musharraf appears to be over. The Musharraf government's reconciliatory efforts towards the ulema in general and friendly acts towards the Deobandi ulema in particular have finally convinced them that the government is not hostile towards ulema. Jamal notes, further, "The government has been going slow on its reform agenda for the madaris for the last one year. It has considerably reduced its interference in the affairs of the madaris. It has also stopped issuing any hostile statements against the ulema and madaris. It has also exempted them from mandatory registration under the Deeni Madaris (Voluntary Registration and Regulation) Ordinance, 2002, which was an important demand of the madaris. It withdrew cases against some of the leading Deobandi ulema as a part of its reconciliation effortsâŠ" The regime's efforts to secure support from the Islamist right were also at least partially visible in the fatwa (edict) of May 18, issued by a group of 58 ulema, against suicide attacks in the country. Significantly, the fatwa exempted the masterminding of suicide attacks against 'foreign occupation', including such attacks in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Kashmir.
"The edict will benefit unbelief. The entire world knows the motives behind the edict. The greatest benefit will reach to the murderers of the Muslims - India, Israel and the US. At the moment, the Muslims are being massacred all over the world. Instead of issuing the edict of jihad against the butchers of the Muslims, Musharraf has bribed the ulema to get an edict against suicide attacks. The suicide attacks are not haram [forbidden in Islam] but are the supreme form of jihad. There should have been an edict against Bush - that whoever will kill him will go to the heaven." | ||
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