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Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Obama Envoy Retired USMC General John Allen May Be Turning The Tide In The Campaign Against The Islamic State
2015-04-28
Not long ago, retired Marine Corps Gen. John Allen was a pretty good argument for the wisdom of the old adage "Be careful what you wish for." As fighters for the so-called Islamic State (IS) rolled through Iraq last summer, sources say Allen was privately furious with the Obama administration's deballed tepid response. As the deputy commanding general of Marine forces in Anbar province back in 2006-08, Allen had participated in the Sunni uprising against al-Qaida in Iraq, commonly known as the "Anbar Awakening." Those kinds of bonds endure, and Allen knew that many of the Sunni sheikhs and tribes that the Marines had fought alongside were in the direct path of the IS juggernaut that captured roughly a third of Iraq.

"It's difficult to describe how desperate the situation was last summer, with ISIL [another term for IS] fighters pouring down the Euphrates River Valley, Iraqi Security Forces crumbling, and cities and towns going down one after another in front of the onslaught," Allen said at the Atlantic Council last month. "All of those Iraqis were exposed to the intolerable evil of ISIL, which operates far beyond the pale of civilized nations. So as the emergency unfolded, my thoughts were with my many friends in Iraq at that time."

And then last September, the Obama administration named Allen as its Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. The privately fuming critic was suddenly very publicly in charge, at least in appearance.

The job of "special presidential envoy" is fraught with ambiguity and bureaucratic tensions. Special envoys typically derive their influence from a direct line to the White House, a relationship that, especially in the case of the Pentagon, bypasses a hierarchal chain of command and short-circuits carefully delineated authorities. Those tensions seemed to come to the fore when Foreign Policy published an article last October suggesting dysfunctional squabbling between Allen's team and the staff of Central Command commander Gen. Lloyd Austin. Quoting unnamed sources, the feature denigrated Allen at length under the blunt heading "Is General John Allen In Over His Head?" Contacted for this article, both the Pentagon and the State Department said that supposed tensions pointed to in the article were normal disagreements over a complex security challenge, and greatly overblown.

Given the stakes involved with the rapid advancement of IS and the obvious bureaucratic tensions, even some Allen admirers questioned the need for a special presidential envoy. "I don't think the problem was personality-driven, because both generals Austin and Allen are great guys, but friction was built into their positions and roles," said former CENTCOM commander Gen. Anthony Zinni (USMC-retired). "If I were still CENTCOM commander and a retired four-star general was brought in to elicit coalition support for operations in my area of responsibility, I would certainly be scratching my head. It just seemed odd to me."

Mounting signs of strategic incoherence in the U.S. campaign to "degrade and defeat" IS only added to concerns thatAllen and Austin were not working from the same page. In January, a delegation of Sunni tribal sheikhs visited Washington, D.C., for instance, and complained that they were not getting the weapons or support from CENTCOM or the Iraqi government that they had been led to expect. In February, a senior CENTCOM official told reporters that a U.S.-trained force of some 20,000 to 25,000 Iraqis would launch an offensive to recapture Mosul from IS defenders in April or May -- comments that were roundly criticized by the Iraqi government as imprudent and premature, and downplayed by Allen as a matter to be decided by the Iraqis.

The U.S. campaign in Iraq looked even more disjointed in early March, when Iraqi forces launched their first major counteroffensive in an attempt to retake the city of Tikrit, symbolic to Sunnis and former Baathists as the hometown of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Not only was the Tikrit operation not coordinated with U.S. military commanders at their Joint Operations Center in Iraq, but it was also ostensibly led by Iranian Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, and dominated by Iranian-backed Shiite militias that many feared would further provoke a sectarian civil war with retribution killings. U.S. commanders in Iraq washed their hands of the operation, withholding U.S. air support. The Tikrit counteroffensive quickly stalled.

With the anti-IS campaign on a razor's edge, U.S. officials finally pushed hard, and seemingly in unison. At a key turning point in the U.S.'s anti-IS campaign in Iraq, officials from Allen's team at the State Department met face to face with Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi numerous times, stressing that he had a critical choice to make. CENTCOM would provide air cover to the Tikrit offensive, but only if all participating units were placed under the direction of the legitimate Iraqi government in Baghdad, and under the command and control of the Iraqi military. The U.S. refused to act as the air force of marauding, Iranian-backed Shiite militias on a mission of revenge.

When al-Abadi finally agreed and imposed control over all participating units, some of the most notorious Iranian-backed Shiite militias abandoned the operation. CENTCOM began launching airstrikes in support of the counteroffensive as promised, and within 96 hours, Iraqi forces broke through IS defenses and recaptured Tikrit. Al-Abadi then traveled to Tikrit and raised the national flag alongside the Sunni governor of the province. When there were initial reports of some looting by Shiite "popular mobilization forces," al-Abadi quickly gathered his security commanders and local officials, and together they stopped the looting.

"The Tikrit operation was very fluid and dynamic, and it did represent an important inflection point," said Ambassador Brett McGurk, the Deputy Special Presidential Envoy to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, told me. Since taking office last year, al-Abadi has articulated a vision for stabilizing Iraq that is fundamentally different from that of his predecessor, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, McGurk noted.

"That vision is of a more decentralized Iraq, with much more autonomy for local governance. Abadi restated that vision in Tikrit, insisting that local security forces would be responsible for stabilizing the city and the surrounding area. So at the end of the day, Abadi and the Iraqi government get very high marks for wresting control of a volatile situation in Tikrit, and stabilizing it."

U.S. and Iraqi officials clearly hope to capitalize on the momentum from the successful Tikrit operation. After his recent visit to Washington, al-Abadi launched an operation by Iraqi forces in the Sunni heartland of Anbar province, where he traveled to meet with the Anbar governor and to personally hand out more than 1,500 rifles to Sunni fighters. U.S. Special Operations forces have trained roughly 2,000 Sunni fighters, and the Seventh Iraqi Army Division, at Al Asad Air Base in Anbar province. Backed by U.S. airpower, those forces were able to successfully fend off recent IS counterattacks in the Anbar capital, Ramadi, and at the Baiji Oil Refinery. In recent days, Iraqi security forces have secured the center of Ramadi and pushed IS fighters out of some neighborhoods, while recapturing a key bridge in the capital of western Anbar.

Close observers believe those recent battlefield successes have healed whatever rift still existed between Allen's team and CENTCOM. "I think most of the aggravation and tension between General Allen and General Austin has gone away, and in the recent fighting in Anbar we saw CENTCOM working very closely with Sunni tribes who are close to and have a lot of respect for John Allen," said a former senior official with close ties to Allen. "I mean, who would have thought we'd see a Shiite prime minister of Iraq handing out rifles to Sunni fighters? I know from my recent communications with Gen. Allen that his camp is cautiously optimistic about recent events in Iraq."

Al-Abadi's efforts to stitch back together Iraq's shredded sectarian mosaic, however, remains a work in progress. U.S. officials have supported his proposal to create local National Guard units to maintain local security, a potential solution to the fundamental problem of overwhelmingly Shiite Iraqi security forces or militias operating in Sunni areas. But they concede that the idea has met resistance in the Iraqi Parliament, where Shiite and Kurdish lawmakers worry about the law's impact on their own militias. In the meantime, the al-Abadi government passed a budget a few months ago requiring that all "popular mobilization forces" be under the control of the government, with a proportional representation of Sunni volunteers from Anbar. Roughly 7,500 Anbari fighters have joined popular mobilization units to date.

Until Sunni participation in the armed forces is institutionalized with the formation of official National Guard units, however, some experts worry that the current level of cooperation from Sunni tribes might prove fleeting. In the meantime, many experts credit Allen and CENTCOM for an outreach to the Sunni tribes in Anbar that has put IS on the defensive in the region.

"The recent fighting in Anbar around Ramadi shows that a good number of Sunni tribes and Sunni elites are now fighting on the side of the United States and the Iraqi government," says James Jeffrey, a former U.S. ambassador to Iraq, and currently a distinguished visiting fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He adds: "I still think the United States should get them more weapons, quicker, but the fact that they are fighting on our side is a pretty good indication that Gen. Allen and Ambassador McGurt are doing a great job."
No mention made of U.S. Army Infantry and Special Forces trainers and advisors.
Link


Home Front: WoT
George W. Bush Is Intervening in Iraq - Again
2015-02-14
[POLITICO] Yet after they arrived in Washington the tribal leaders found themselves thwarted at every turn in their efforts to meet with high-level administration officials. They were told they would have to take up these matters with new Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and would have to rely for weapons on those provided to them by Abadi’s ministry of defense.

That’s when George W. Bush called Abu Risha at his hotel in Washington.

It’s startling enough for a Sunni tribal leader to get a call from a former U.S. president—and even more so from Bush, who has been especially reluctant to interfere in world affairs since leaving office. But Iraq, after all, was Bush’s baby. He knew about the tribesmen’s difficulties as Islamic State fighters continued to make inroads against the Iraqi military, and he had been alerted to the delegation’s visit in Washington by his contacts in the U.S. policymaking community.

Abu Risha, the president of the powerful Anbar Awakening Council, said Bush listened carefully as the sheik explained in a 20-minute conversation that the Anbar tribesmen were unlikely to get any weapons from the Iraqi government, which, as Abu Risha claimed, is notoriously corrupt, beholden to Tehran and more interested in arming Shia militias than Sunni tribesmen. Bush urged Abu Risha to extend his stay and meet with retired Gen. David Petraeus, as well as with Republican Sens. John McCain and Lindsey Graham. According to Abu Risha, Bush pledged that he would “do everything I can” to help him get a hearing in Washington.
Link


Iraq
Washington raises its support for Iraq to 8.8 billion dollars
2015-02-10
[IraqiNews.com] Chief of Anbar Awakening Conference, Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha said that the Anbar delegation, which he headed during its visit to Washington, had changed a lot in the United States' convictions, and made great achievements that are crucial for Iraq.

In a brief statement followed by IraqiNews.com, Abu Risha said that Washington has decided to increase its support for Iraq from $1.6 billion to $8.8 billion.
Is that a President Obama promise, or was a bill actually passed by both Houses of Congress and duly signed by the official presidential signing machine?
On January 30th, Sheikh Abu Risha stated that the former US President George Bush called him during the delegation's stay in Washington. Bush was briefed on the security situation and the most important developments on the ground.
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Iraq
Iraqi sheik threatens boycott over ballot purge
2010-01-30
A prominent sheik and U.S. ally is weighing whether to urge fellow Sunnis to boycott upcoming elections in protest of the government's ballot purge of hundreds of candidates suspected of links to Saddam Hussein's regime.

Such a call by Ahmed Abu Risha (Sons of Iraq/Anbar Awakening honcho) risks derailing Obama administration hopes that the March 7 parliamentary elections will bring stronger reconciliation between Iraq's majority Shiites and minority Sunnis who want to reclaim more political power.
Link


Iraq
"Fusion Cells" are systematically dismantling al-Qaeda in Iraq.
2008-09-08
By the time he was captured last month, the man known among Iraqi insurgents as "the Tiger" had lost much of his bite. Abu Uthman, whose fierce attacks against U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians in Fallujah had earned him a top spot on Iraq's most-wanted list, had been reduced to shuttling between hideouts in a Baghdad slum, hiding by day for fear neighbors might recognize him.

In the end, a former associate-turned-informant showed local authorities the house where Uthman was sleeping. On Aug. 11, U.S. troops kicked in the door and handcuffed him. They quietly ended the career of a man Pentagon officials describe as the kidnapper of American journalist Jill Carroll and also as one of a dwindling number of veteran commanders of the Sunni insurgent group known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

Uthman, whose given name is Salim Abdallah Ashur al-Shujayri, was one of the bigger fish to be landed recently in a novel anti-insurgent operation that plays out nightly in Baghdad and throughout much of Iraq. U.S. intelligence and defense officials credit the operation and its unusual tactics -- involving small, hybrid teams of special forces and intelligence officers -- with the capture of hundreds of suspected terrorists and their supporters in recent months.

The "fusion cells" are being described as a major factor behind the declining violence in Iraq in recent months. Defense officials say they have been particularly effective against AQI, which has lost 10 senior commanders since June in Baghdad alone, including Uthman.

Aiding the U.S. effort, the officials say, is the increasing antipathy toward AQI among many ordinary Iraqis, who quickly report new terrorist safe houses as soon as they're established. Fresh tips are channeled to fast-reaction teams that move aggressively against reported terrorist targets -- often multiple times in a single night.

"Wherever they go, they cannot hide," said a senior U.S. defense official familiar with counterterrorism operations in Iraq. "They don't have safe houses anymore."

The rapid strikes are coordinated by the Joint Task Force, a military-led team that includes intelligence and forensic professionals, political analysts, mapping experts, computer specialists piloting unmanned aircraft, and Special Operations troops. After decades of agency rivalries that have undermined coordination on counterterrorism, the task force is enjoying new success in Iraq with its blending of diverse military and intelligence assets to speed up counterterrorism missions.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Michael Mullen said in a recent interview that the cells produce intelligence that nets 10 to 20 captures a night in Iraq.

"We're living in a world now where targets are fleeting," Mullen said. "I don't care if they're on the ground, in the air, on the sea or under the sea -- you don't get much of a shot, and you've got to be able to move quickly."

Fusion cell teams have helped collect and analyze intelligence not only against AQI and Sunni insurgents but also against Shiite militias and foreign fighters, say U.S. military officials.

Headquartered in an old concrete hangar on the Balad Air Base, which once housed Saddam Hussein's fighter aircraft, about 45 miles north of Baghdad, the Joint Task Force in Iraq runs fusion cells in the north, west and south and in Baghdad, U.S. officials said.

The headquarters bustles like the New York Stock Exchange, with long-haired computer experts working alongside wizened intelligence agents and crisply clad military officers, say officials who have worked there or visited.

Huge computer screens hang from the ceiling, displaying aerial surveillance images relayed from Predator, Schweizer and tiny Gnat spycraft. The Bush administration's 2009 supplementary budget request included $1.3 billion to fund 28 unmanned aircraft, officials said, and all will go to the interagency teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, not the Air Force.

For the Joint Task Force, the CIA provides intelligence analysts and spycraft with sensors and cameras that can track targets, vehicles or equipment for up to 14 hours. FBI forensic experts dissect data, from cellphone information to the "pocket litter" found on extremists. Treasury officials track funds flowing among extremists and from governments. National Security Agency staffers intercept conversations or computer data, and members of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency use high-tech equipment to pinpoint where suspected extremists are using phones or computers.

Fusion cells remain one of the least-known aspects of U.S. operations in Iraq, U.S. officials said, but they have produced significant captures. In March, a fusion cell team captured Hajji Mohammed Shibl, whom U.S. authorities had linked to a string of gruesome attacks on U.S. and Iraqi forces. His Shiite militia group has ties to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and Lebanon's Hezbollah.

"The capabilities for high-end special joint operations that exist now only existed in Hollywood in 2001," said David Kilcullen, a terrorism expert and adviser to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

Data gathered in a raid at midnight -- collected by helmet-mounted cameras that can scan rooms, people, documents and cellphone entries and relay the pictures back to headquarters -- often lead to a second or third raid before dawn, according to U.S. officials.

"To me, it's not just war-fighting now but in the future," Mullen said. "It's been the synergy, it's been the integration that has had such an impact."

Defense officials said Uthman's capture reflected the success of the program and also sent a powerful message to remaining AQI members, who are now surrounded by foes even in regions once regarded as friendly. While AQI remains capable of staging deadly suicide bombings, its leaders are becoming reviled throughout the country and are hard-pressed to find sanctuary anywhere in Iraq, according to U.S. defense and intelligence officials.

The progress has somewhat eased concerns among military analysts about an al-Qaeda resurgence in Iraq after U.S. combat troops draw down, Pentagon and intelligence sources said.

The shift also is tacitly acknowledged inside al-Qaeda's base on the Afghan-Pakistan border, as Osama bin Laden has begun retooling his propaganda campaign to emphasize the conflict in Afghanistan instead of the failing effort in Iraq, the officials said. While there is little evidence that al-Qaeda is attempting to move fighters and resources from Iraq to Afghanistan, the Iraq conflict is no longer driving recruitment and donations for al-Qaeda as it did as recently as nine months ago, they said.

Attacks inside Iraq by AQI, meanwhile, have dropped sharply, with 28 incidents and 125 civilian deaths reported in the first six months of this year, compared with 300 bombings and more than 1,500 deaths in 2007.

"Iraq will always be a target that resonates for al-Qaeda, but we believe it will never again be the central front," said a U.S. counterterrorism analyst who was not authorized to speak on the record. "Their ability to affect what is going on in Iraq has been greatly diminished."

AQI's decline can be traced to several factors, the officials said. Last year's troop increase helped stabilize Baghdad and other major cities, freeing combat forces to take on AQI strongholds throughout the country.

Even before the "surge," the much-celebrated Anbar Awakening movement signaled a rift between tribal leaders of Iraq's Sunni minority and AQI. Since 2006, defense officials have described a deepening revolt by Sunnis repelled by al-Qaeda's brutal attacks against civilians and forced imposition of sharia, or Islamic law. Sunni leaders also objected to AQI's takeover of smuggling routes and black-market enterprises long controlled by local chiefs.

"We don't see the Sunni community going back to al-Qaeda under any circumstances," the senior defense official said.
Link


Iraq
What If Iraq Works?
2008-07-31
There is a growing confidence among officers, diplomats, and politicians that a constitutional Iraq is going to make it. We don't hear much anymore of trisecting the country, much less pulling all American troops out in defeat.

Critics of the war now argue that a victory in Iraq was not worth the costs, not that victory was always impossible. The worst terrorist leaders, like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Muqtada al-Sadr, are either dead or in hiding.

The 2007 surge, the Anbar Awakening of tribal sheiks against al-Qaeda, the change to counterinsurgency tactics, the vast increase in the size and competence of the Iraqi Security Forces, the sheer number of enemy jihadists killed between 2003 and 2008, the unexpected political savvy of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and the magnetic leadership of Gen. David Petraeus have all contributed to a radically improved Iraq.
Link


Home Front: Politix
CSM: When talking with terrorists makes sense
2008-06-01
The ossified conventional wisdom among much of America's political class is that talking to terrorists is always and everywhere a bad idea. The ghosts of the 1938 Munich Agreement – forever linked with capitulation to Nazi Germany – aren't allowed any rest, busy as they are being hurled at the target of the day.

Sen. Barack Obama felt he was the target when President Bush criticized the "false comfort of appeasement" in a speech before the Israeli Knesset earlier this month. Recalling Hitler's march across Europe, Mr. Bush mocked those who "believe that we should negotiate with the terrorists and radicals, as if some ingenious argument will persuade them they have been wrong all along." Sen. John McCain quickly echoed the sentiment.

While many politicians are willing to engage with "rogue states" such as Iran and North Korea, they draw the line at terrorists, who are seen as intrinsically ruthless and radical. That's why "I will not negotiate with terrorists" is a refrain heard across the political spectrum – and why Jimmy Carter took such flak recently for visiting with Hamas.

But this knee-jerk rejection of negotiation with radicals is deeply misguided and likely to do more harm than good. The smart question is not whether to talk to terrorists, but, instead, which terrorists to talk to and how to talk to them.

Many nonstate militants are weak and peripheral; they can be quickly squashed or contained without any need for negotiation. For instance, violent left-wing groups such as the Red Brigades in Italy and Weather Underground in the US were eliminated in the 1970s without negotiation.

But some terrorist and insurgent groups are very powerful. They are embedded in robust social networks, generate revenues from areas under their control, and have enough military power to impose serious costs on governments. They cannot be easily crushed, nor can they be wished away.Negotiations and cease-fire talks, or their offer, should be seen as one of a range of tools for overcoming militancy. Indeed, there are three good strategic reasons to talk to these kinds of armed organizations.

First, and most ambitiously, it is possible that an arrangement can be made with militant groups to end violence. The Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland, African National Congress in South Africa, and Mizo National Front in northeastern India have all been fully brought into the political system. The Maoist rebels in Nepal, meanwhile, may be heading in this direction.

One of the most striking, if tentative, recent examples comes from Iraq, where the US military has come to understandings with Sunni armed groups to cooperate against Al Qaeda in Iraq. Washington initially denounced these groups in the most vitriolic terms as ruthless and blood-thirsty terrorists, yet engaging with them has provided some measure of peace and stability in a troubled society. Second, the prospect of negotiation can weaken armed groups, leading to splits and internal dissension that reduce the threat they pose. Most terrorist and insurgent groups are not monolithic – they have multiple factions, competing leaders, and a diversity of individual motivations for fighting.

The possibility of cease-fires or a peace settlement often brings these internal contradictions and disagreements to the fore. Even the extraordinarily disciplined Tamil Tigers suffered a major split in 2004 during a peace process, as internal tensions intensified that had been submerged during full-scale war.

In Kashmir, the largest insurgent group, Hizbul Mujahideen, fractured into rival factions between 2000 and 2003 due to internal disagreement about a cease-fire. In both cases, talking – or even just its possibility – weakened highly cohesive and motivated insurgents. Extending an invitation to talk can give governments the space and leverage to identify and isolate the truly irreconcilable militants, and to reach out to more-moderate factions.

Third, cease-fires and negotiations can provide breathing room to a hard-pressed government to refit and rearm. This represents a purely tactical use of talking, but still a valuable one. The British government used a 1975 cease-fire in Northern Ireland to prepare its intelligence and security services for a long-term struggle. Periodic cease-fires between the US and Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army have reduced the pressure on American troops in times of intense strain.

Opponents of talking to terrorists often argue that negotiations will offer legitimacy and credibility to militants. This represents a profound and self-absorbed misunderstanding of the roots of militancy. Armed groups do not emerge and disappear in response to the dictates of the United States. Fighters in the back alleys of Gaza, jungles of Sri Lanka, or mountains of Kashmir wage war for their own reasons, not to gain the approval of American political elites.

Furthermore, as with the "Anbar Awakening" in Iraq or the peace process in Northern Ireland, successful engagement with armed groups is likely to be seen as smart strategic adaptation rather than appeasement. It will often fail to bring peace, but even then can still weaken armed groups by fostering internal dissension or provide valuable breathing room to government forces.

Talking with terrorists doesn't always make sense. And political leaders who want to sound tough on national security can surely score points by promising they'll never negotiate with them. But taking this tool off the table makes it far harder to keep America and its allies safe.

• Paul Staniland is a PhD candidate in political science at MIT and a member of the MIT Security Studies Program. He will be a predoctoral research fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government in 2008-09.
Ahh. Now it all makes sense. Aren't you glad you read everything all the way to the bottom? :-)
Link


Iraq
U.S. Cites Gaps in Planning of Iraqi Assault on Basra
2008-04-03
BAGHDAD — Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker first learned of the Iraqi plan on Friday, March 21: Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki would be heading to Basra with Iraqi troops to bring order to the city.

But the Iraqi operation was not what the United States expected. Instead of methodically building up their combat power and gradually stepping up operations against renegade militias, Mr. Maliki’s forces lunged into the city, attacking before all of the Iraqi reinforcements had even arrived. By the following Tuesday, a major fight was on.

“The sense we had was that this would be a long-term effort: increased pressure gradually squeezing the Special Groups,” Mr. Crocker said in an interview, using the American term for Iranian-backed militias. “That is not what kind of emerged.”

“Nothing was in place from our side,” he added. “It all had to be put together.”

The Bush administration has portrayed the Iraqi offensive in Basra as a “defining moment” — a compelling demonstration that an Iraqi government that has long been criticized for inaction has both the will and means to take on renegade militias.

The operation indicates that the Iraqi military can quickly organize and deploy forces over considerable distances. Two Iraqi C-130s and several Iraqi helicopters were also involved in the operation, an important step for a military that is still struggling to develop an air combat ability.

But interviews with a wide range of American and military officials also suggest that Mr. Maliki overestimated his military’s abilities and underestimated the scale of the resistance. The Iraqi prime minister also displayed an impulsive leadership style that did not give his forces or that of his most powerful allies, the American and British military, time to prepare.

“He went in with a stick and he poked a hornet’s nest, and the resistance he got was a little bit more than he bargained for,” said one official in the multinational force in Baghdad who requested anonymity. “They went in with 70 percent of a plan. Sometimes that’s enough. This time it wasn’t.”

As the Iraqi military and civilian casualties grew and the Iraqi planning appeared to be little more than an improvisation, the United States mounted an intensive military and political effort to try to turn around the situation, according to accounts by Mr. Crocker and several American military officials in Baghdad and Washington who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Two senior American military officers — a member of the Navy Seals and a Marine major general — were sent to Basra to help coordinate the Iraqi planning, the military officials said. Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division were pressed into service as combat advisers while air controllers were positioned to call in airstrikes on behalf of beleaguered Iraqi units. American transport planes joined the Iraqis in ferrying supplies to Iraqi troops.

In Baghdad, Mr. Crocker lobbied senior officials in the Iraqi government, who complained that they had been excluded from Mr. Maliki’s decision-making on Basra, to back the prime minister’s effort there.

“I stressed the point that this was a moment of national crisis, and they had to think nationally,” Mr. Crocker said. “Because nobody should think that failure in Basra is going to benefit any element of the Iraqi community. The response was good. I have not found any element of the Iraqi government that will admit to being consulted.”

Basra, Iraq’s second-largest city, lies atop vast oil reserves and is a strategically situated port on the Shatt al-Arab waterway controlling Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf. Predominantly Shiite, it has suffered from fighting among numerous Shiite militias, tribal forces and criminal gangs struggling for control of its lucrative smuggling and oil revenues. Even some of the Iraqi police are believed to be under the influence of militia groups.

British troops, who provided the main allied military presence in the province after the 2003 invasion, withdrew from the city center last September and formally handed Basra over to Iraqi control on Dec. 16, moving to an “overwatch” position at the airport outside the city center.

There has been growing concern with the Iraqi government about the disorder in the city. In recent weeks, Lt. Gen. Mohan al-Fireji, a senior Iraqi commander in Basra, proposed that additional forces be sent.

Prompted by this suggestion, a detailed plan was being developed by American and Iraqi officials, which involved the establishment of combat outposts in the city and the deployment of Iraqi SWAT teams, Iraqi Special Forces and Interior Ministry units, as well as Iraqi brigades.

That plan was the subject of a March 21 evening meeting that Gen. David H. Petraeus, the senior American commander in Iraq, convened with Mowaffak al-Rubaie, Mr. Maliki’s national security adviser. At the end of that session, General Petraeus was asked to meet with Mr. Maliki the next morning. The prime minister, it seemed, had his own ideas on how to deal with Basra and planned to travel to the city to oversee the implementation of his plan.

“Effectively, much of the city was under militia control and had been for some time,” Mr. Crocker said. “Maliki kept hearing this along with some pretty graphic descriptions of militia excesses and just decided, ‘I am going to go down there and take care of this.’ I think for him it was a Karbala moment.” Last August, Mr. Maliki rushed to Karbala after an outbreak of Shiite-on-Shiite violence, fired the police commander and oversaw the successful effort to restore order to the city.

One American intelligence officer in Washington, however, had a somewhat different interpretation of the prime minister’s motivations. While restoring order was his stated goal, he asserted, the Iraqi leader was also eager to weaken the Mahdi Army and the affiliated political party of the renegade cleric Moktada al-Sadr before provincial elections in the south that are expected to be to be held this year. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, a Shiite political party and militia that are rivals to Mr. Sadr, his party and his militia, form a crucial part of Mr. Maliki’s political coalition.

When Mr. Maliki met with General Petraeus on the morning of March 22, he indicated that his goal was to take on the “criminals and gang leaders” in Basra, according to an account of the meeting by an American official. Mr. Maliki explained that the operation would be an Iraqi affair but that he might need air support from the Americans.

He said that he was going to meet with sheiks, religious figures and other local leaders, taking advantage of the additional leverage he hoped to gain by sending in troops, fostering economic development programs and sending teams of judges to try to punish corrupt and violent behavior.

“It was a unilateral decision by Maliki,” said an American official familiar with the session. “It was a fait accompli.”

For the Americans, the timing was not good. The American military had little interest in seeing a hastily conceived operation that might open a new front and tempt Mr. Sadr to annul his cease-fire, which had contributed to the striking reduction in attacks over the past several months. Mr. Crocker and General Petraeus were also scheduled to testify to Congress the next month on the fragile political and security gains achieved in Iraq.

According to one American official, General Petraeus conveyed the message that while the decision was in the hands of the Iraqi government, “we made a lot of gains in the past six to nine months that you’ll be putting at risk.”

But if Mr. Maliki was determined to act, General Petraeus advised him not to rush into a fight without carefully sizing up the situation and making adequate preparations, the official said. Sending a couple of brigades of the Iraqi Army, Special Forces and Interior Ministry forces was a complicated undertaking that under the best of circumstances would test the Iraqi logistical and command and control system.

The Iraqi forces started to arrive March 24. The attack into Basra began just a day later. Reports from Basra indicated that the militias were deeply entrenched. Adding to the problems, the Iraqis did not trust the British and were not including them in their planning, according to a senior American officer.

Faced with a fight that had escalated far beyond what the United States had anticipated, American commanders took several steps to support the Iraqis. Rear Adm. Edward G. Winters, a member of the Seals with experience in special operations, was sent March 25 to lead a lower-ranking American liaison team that had gone to Basra with Mr. Maliki.

Lt. Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III, the day-to-day commander of American and allied forces in Iraq, went to Basra on March 27 to survey the situation. The next day, his senior deputy, Maj. Gen. George J. Flynn, was sent to the Basra Operations Center, a command center that was supposed to oversee the military operations. General Flynn, a Marine officer, commanded a team of American planners and other personnel.

The United States also sent air controllers to call in airstrikes on behalf of Iraqi units and moved additional helicopters and drones down to Basra and nearby Tallil.

There were not enough military advisers for all the Iraqi reinforcements who were rushed south. So the United States took a company from the First Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division. It was divided into platoons, which were augmented with Air Force controllers and assigned to help the Iraqi forces.

The United States helped the Iraqis ferry in supplies by C-130. The Iraqis, however, also began to fly in supplies and troops using their two C-130s. More than 500 Iraqi replacement soldiers were moved by air while an additional brigade was sent by ground. The Iraqis also flew Huey and Hip multimission helicopters.

Taking a page out of the American counterinsurgency doctrine, the United States encouraged the Iraqis to distribute aid and mount job programs to try to win over the Basra population.

To ease the distribution of supplies, American officials from the Agency for International Development flew with Iraqi officials to Basra to work with United Nations officials. The Americans also encouraged Mr. Maliki to proceed with his plan to seek an alliance with the Shiite tribes, as the Americans had done with Sunni tribes in the so-called Anbar Awakening.

“We strongly encouraged him to use his most substantial weapon, which is money, to announce major jobs programs, Basra cleanup, whatnot,” Mr. Crocker said. “And to do what he decided to do on his own: pay tribal figures to effectively finance an awakening for Basra.”

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Home Front: Politix
Democrats Dig In for Defeat (Krauthammer)
2008-02-25
"No one can spend some 10 days visiting the battlefields in Iraq without seeing major progress in every area. . . . If the U.S. provides sustained support to the Iraqi government -- in security, governance, and development -- there is now a very real chance that Iraq will emerge as a secure and stable state." -- Anthony Cordesman, "The Situation in Iraq: A Briefing From the Battlefield," Feb. 13, 2008

This from a man who was a severe critic of the postwar occupation of Iraq and who, as author Peter Wehner points out, is no wide-eyed optimist. In fact, in May 2006 Cordesman had written that "no one can argue that the prospects for stability in Iraq are good." Now, however, there is simply no denying the remarkable improvements in Iraq since the surge began a year ago.

Unless you're a Democrat. As Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.) put it, "Democrats have remained emotionally invested in a narrative of defeat and retreat in Iraq." Their Senate leader, Harry Reid, declares the war already lost. Their presidential candidates (eight of them at the time) unanimously oppose the surge. Then the evidence begins trickling in.

We get news of the Anbar Awakening, which has now spread to other Sunni areas and Baghdad. The sectarian civil strife that the Democrats insisted was the reason for us to leave dwindles to the point of near disappearance. Much of Baghdad is returning to normal. There are 90,000 neighborhood volunteers -- ordinary citizens who act as auxiliary police and vital informants on terrorist activity -- starkly symbolizing the insurgency's loss of popular support. Captured letters of al-Qaeda leaders reveal despair as they are driven -- mostly by Iraqi Sunnis, their own Arab co-religionists -- to flight and into hiding.

After agonizing years of searching for the right strategy and the right general, we are winning. How do Democrats react? From Nancy Pelosi to Barack Obama, the talking point is the same: Sure, there is military progress. We could have predicted that. (They in fact had predicted the opposite, but no matter.) But it's all pointless unless you get national reconciliation.

"National" is a way to ignore what is taking place at the local and provincial level, such as Shiite cleric Ammar al-Hakim, scion of the family that dominates the largest Shiite party in Iraq, traveling last October to Anbar in an unprecedented gesture of reconciliation with the Sunni sheiks.

Doesn't count, you see. Democrats demand nothing less than federal-level reconciliation, and it has to be expressed in actual legislation.

The objection was not only highly legalistic but also politically convenient: Very few (including me) thought this would be possible under the Maliki government. Then last week, indeed on the day Cordesman published his report, it happened. Mirabile dictu, the Iraqi parliament approved three very significant pieces of legislation.

First, a provincial powers law that turns Iraq into arguably the most federal state in the entire Arab world. The provinces get not only power but also elections by Oct. 1. U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker has long been calling this the most crucial step to political stability. It will allow, for example, the pro-American Anbar sheiks to become the legitimate rulers of their province, exercise regional autonomy and forge official relations with the Shiite-dominated central government.

Second, parliament passed a partial amnesty for prisoners, 80 percent of whom are Sunni. Finally, it approved a $48 billion national budget that allocates government revenue -- about 85 percent of which is from oil -- to the provinces. Kurdistan, for example, gets one-sixth.

What will the Democrats say now? They will complain that there is still no oil distribution law. True. But oil revenue is being distributed to the provinces in the national budget. The fact that parliament could not agree on a permanent formula for the future simply means that it will be allocating oil revenue year by year as part of the budget process. Is that a reason to abandon Iraq to al-Qaeda and Iran?

Despite all the progress, military and political, the Democrats remain unwavering in their commitment to withdrawal on an artificial timetable that inherently jeopardizes our "very real chance that Iraq will emerge as a secure and stable state."

Why? Imagine the transformative effects in the region, and indeed in the entire Muslim world, of achieving a secure and stable Iraq, friendly to the United States and victorious over al-Qaeda. Are the Democrats so intent on denying George Bush retroactive vindication for a war they insist is his that they would deny their own country a now-achievable victory?
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Iraq
Al Qaeda using children as Iraq suicide bombers
2008-01-28
Al Qaeda is using children as suicide bombers in Iraq, with at least two attacks in the past week committed by 15-year-olds, a US military commander claimed.
Picked right up on that, didn't they? Once the military pointed it out to them...
"We are not sure whether one of these children even knew he was being used to deliver a bomb," Rear Admiral Gregory Smith said.
[KABOOM!]
"Surprise!"
One attack was carried out at a funeral ceremony near Tikrit, executed dictator Saddam Hussein's home town 180 kilometres north of Baghdad and the other was at a school in the northern city of Mosul, Rear Admiral Smith said. He gave no details of the two bombings.
Necessary details: Krowd. Kid. Kaboom. What else do you kneed?
Iraqi police said 17 people died in a January 21 suicide blast at the funeral ceremony near Tikrit for relatives of an Iraqi police colonel.

"Al Qaeda in Iraq is trying to brainwash children with hate and death... they seek to create a culture of violence, hate and despair," he said. "[They] are sending 15-year-old boys on suicide missions to spread death and helplessness." Rear Admiral Smith quoted Sheikh Ahmed Abu Reesha, leader of the "Anbar Awakening" that has ended much of Al Qaeda's hold over western Iraq, as saying that the jihadists were using suicide bombers as a last resort. "When we attack Al Qaeda they flee, hide and come back with new tactics. The only tactic that is left for them now is to commit suicide," he quoted the sheikh as saying.

Ninety per cent of "suicide murders inflicted on Iraqi people are committed by foreign fighters brought in by Al Qaeda in Iraq to spread destruction," he said.
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Iraq
Claim Gadhafi Son Linked to Iraq Attack
2008-01-26
BAGHDAD (AP) - A devastating explosion in northern Iraq was spearheaded by foreign fighters under the sponsorship of Seif al-Islam Gadhafi, son of the Libyan leader, a security chief for Sunni tribesmen who rose up against al-Qaida in Iraq said Saturday.

Col. Jubair Rashid Naief, who also is a police official in Anbar province, said the Anbar Awakening Council had alerted the U.S. military to the possible arrival in the northern city of Mosul of the Seifaddin Regiment, made up of about 150 foreign and Iraqi fighters, as long as three months ago. The U.S. military did not immediately respond to an e-mail request for comment about Naief's claim.

"They crossed the Syrian border nearest to Mosul within the last two to three months. Since then, they have taken up positions in the city and begun blowing up cars and launching other terror operations," Naief told The Associated Press.

Naief did not explain why the younger Gadhafi would be sponsoring the group of fighters. Seif Gadhafi, however, was quoted by the Austrian Press Agency last year as warning Europeans against more attacks by radical Islamists. "The only solution to contain radicalism is the rapid departure of Western troops from Iraq as well as Afghanistan, and a solution to the Palestinian question," Gadhafi was quoted as saying.

Touted as a reformer, 36-year-old Gadhafi has increasingly been sharing his father's spotlight and reaching out to the West to soften Libya's image and return it to the international mainstream. He has no official government post, but many see him as the man most likely to take power in the North African country when his father steps down or dies.
I think we need to have a 'talk' with Seif ...
The massive explosion in Mosul on Wednesday and the suicide attack assassination of a top police official the next day have prompted obvious concern among Iraq's leaders. On Friday, the government said it would dispatch several thousand more security forces to Mosul in a "decisive" bid to drive al-Qaida in Iraq from its last major stronghold.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki gave no details on troop strength or timing, but his announcement added to growing signs that Mosul could represent a pivotal showdown with insurgents chased north by U.S.-led offensives. "Today, our troops started moving toward Mosul ... and the fight there will be decisive," al-Maliki said during a speech in the Shiite holy city of Karbala.

The challenge, however, is whether the Iraqi forces have the firepower and training to lead an offensive into Iraq's third-largest city. The U.S. military is relatively thin across northern Iraq and has signaled no immediate plans to shift troops from key zones in and around Baghdad.

Mosul is now considered the main logistical hub for al-Qaida in Iraq because of its size and location—sitting at crossroads between Baghdad, Syria, Turkey and Iran. Many extremists fled north as U.S.- led forces began gaining ground in former insurgent strongholds last year, aided by Sunni tribes that rose up against al-Qaida and its backers.

Interior Ministry spokesman Maj. Gen. Abdul-Karim Khalaf told The Associated Press that 3,000 police were being sent to the Mosul region to augment the understaffed force. Ninevah province, whose capital is Mosul, has about 18,000 policemen. But only about 3,000 of those operate in the city of nearly 2 million, according to police spokesman Saeed al-Jubouri.

A Defense Ministry official said several thousand Iraqi soldiers would be moved from Baghdad and Anbar province. He spoke on condition of anonymity because the information is sensitive.

"We have asked the prime minister to send us fresh units because we cannot defeat the terrorists with the weak units we have now in the city," Maj. Gen. Riyad Jalal, a senior Iraqi officer in the Mosul area. "We need new equipment and stronger weapons because most of our security members have only rifles."

Mosul, 225 miles northwest of Baghdad, has become a fulcrum on two fronts. First the United States is trying to keep Iraqi security forces in the lead as a major test of Washington's long-range plans, which seek to keep a smaller American force in Iraq as backup for local soldiers and police. Second, U.S. officials say Mosul has become the only remaining major city in Iraq where al-Qaida is able to operate with any freedom. Major centers of al-Qaida activity in the past—including the western Anbar province, Baghdad and Baqouba north of the capital—no longer offer easy refuge.

Al-Maliki announced reinforcements for Mosul two days after an abandoned apartment building, believed to be used as a bomb-making factory, was blown apart as the Iraqi army was investigating tips about a weapons cache. At least 34 people were killed and 224 wounded when the blast tore through surrounding houses in the Zanjili neighborhood, a poverty- ridden district on the west bank of the Tigris River. No soldiers were reported killed.

A suicide bomber then killed a police chief and two other officers Thursday as they toured the devastation. Residents taunted the chief and pelted him with rocks moments before he was killed.
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Iraq
Some Sunni Muslims won't salute Iraq's new flag
2008-01-26
Officials in Iraq's mostly Sunni Muslim Anbar province are refusing to raise Iraq's new national flag, which the parliament approved earlier this week. "The new flag is done for a foreign agenda and we won't raise it," said Ali Hatem al Suleiman , a leading member of the U.S.-backed Anbar Awakening Council, "If they want to force us to raise it, we will leave the yard for them to fight al Qaida."

The dispute over the flag is a more accurate symbol of Iraq today than the flag itself is. "On nothing we are completely united," said Mahmoud Othman, an independent Kurdish lawmaker.

Although parliament speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani said the new flag would be raised immediately across Iraq after the parliament approved it Tuesday, it is nowhere to be seen. In fact, when the parliament met Wednesday, the old flag was still behind the speaker and his two deputies.

While the Anbar Awakening Council vowed never to raise the new flag, U.S.-backed Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki praised the council for standing against al Qaida in Iraq. In a speech in Karbala, Maliki also pledged a new fight against Sunni militants in Ninevah province, where at least 40 people were killed in a bombing this week and a suicide bomber killed the police chief.

Suleiman of the Anbar Awakening Council, however, said he was angry that the parliament and government toiled away on a new flag rather than dealing with the country's lack of services.

Many Iraqis, including some lawmakers who rejected the flag, were angered at what they considered a change to the flag in order to please the Kurdish north and its president, Massoud Barzani. "We don't want to handle the problem of the Kurdistan region by causing problems with other regions that might refuse the new flag," said Nassar al Rubaie, the head of radical Shiite Muslim cleric Muqtada al Sadr's bloc in parliament, who voted against the new flag.

The new flag is temporary. According to Iraq's Constitution, the parliament must pass a new law that issues a permanent flag and a national anthem.

Othman, the Kurdish lawmaker, said he expected people to reject the latest change in the flag but hoped that when a new, permanent flag was chosen, people would salute it. "Just as the Kurds were not raising the flag all these years, others also will not raise the new flag," he said. "I hope with time it will ease away, and I think everyone should look forward to the permanent flag."
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