India-Pakistan |
LeT commander furious at JuD chief |
2009-01-16 |
Chief operational commander of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LT) Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, arrested on December 10 by the Pakistani authorities in the wake of the Mumbai attacks, is furious at the Jamaat-ud-Daawa (JuD) leadership's decision to publicly disown him in his hour of trial instead of trying to bail him out. According to circles close to the Pakistani authorities, involved in grilling Lakhvi to ascertain whether the LT is actually involved in the Mumbai mayhem, the commander is extremely hurt by a recent statement from a JuD spokesman that both the arrested Lashkar leaders Zakiur Rehman and Zarar Shah never had any link with either Hafiz Mohammad Saeed or the JuD. In a bid to shield Saeed, JuD spokesman Abdullah Muntazir told the Times of India on January 9, 2008: "In any case, Lakhvi and Zarar, the two men India is talking about, were never associated with the JuD, which has always been into charity work only." It had been conveyed by Hafiz Saeed himself in the wake of the Mumbai terror strikes, the spokesman said, adding there were elements in the Pakistan government that wanted to target religious organisations. Circles close to Hafiz Saeed say there was nothing new in the JuD spokesman's stance as its leadership had repeatedly denied any link with them. But a former LT office-bearer -- now a part of the JuD -- confirmed on condition of anonymity that Lakhvi was extremely upset over the U-turn taken by his former close associates and complains they had abandoned him at a time when he desperately needed their backing. Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, alias Abu Waheed Irshad Ahmad, comes from the Okara district of the Punjab province. Ajmal Amir Kasab, the lone Mumbai attacker caught alive by the Indian authorities, belongs to the same area. Born on December 30, 1960 to the lower middle class family of Hafiz Azizur Rehman in Chak No. 18 of Rinala Khurd in Okara, Lakhvi is considered to be a close associate of Hafiz Saeed and has been named by Ajmal Kasab as his trainer as well as the planner of the Mumbai carnage. While Pakistan has already turned down an Indian demand for Lakhvi's extradition despite American pressure, the JuD has deemed it fit to disown him. In 1988, Abu Abdur Rahman Sareehi, a Saudi national and allegedly a close associate of Osama bin Laden, founded in Afghanistan's eastern province of Kunar an organisation which recruited Afghan youths and Pakistanis from the Bajaur Agency to fight Soviet occupation troops in the Central Asian country. Sareehi, the brother-in-law of Zaki Lakhvi, is believed to have contributed a hefty amount of Rs10 million to the construction of the Muridke headquarters of the Lashkar-i-Taiba, called the Markaz Daawa Wal Irshad, way back in 1988. The organisation flourished in Kunar and Bajaur areas as thousands of youths from Pakistan belonging to the Deobandi Salafi school of thought instantly joined its camps set up in Afghan provinces of Kunar and Paktia, both of which had a sizable number of Ahle Hadith (Wahabi) followers of Islam, besides hundreds of Saudis and Afghans. International media reports say Zaki Lakhvi was one of the main trainers at the Kunar camp of anti-Soviet militants. As the Lashkar had joined the Afghan jihad at a time it was winding down, the group did not play a major part in the fight against the Soviet forces, which pulled out in 1989. However, the participation of the Lashkar cadres in the Afghan jihad helped its leaders, particularly Hafiz Saeed and Zaki Lakhvi, win the trust of the Pakistani establishment. The insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, beginning in 1989, came at an appropriate time to provide an active battleground for the Lashkar fighters when its leadership was made to divert its attention from Afghanistan and devote itself to the jihad in Kashmir, where it gained fame. As Lakhvi was subsequently made the supreme commander of the military operations in Jammu and Kashmir, his prime responsibility was to identify young men and indoctrinate them in jihad. In an April 1999 interview to an English daily from Muzzaffarabad, Lakhvi said: "We are extending our Mujahideen networks across India and preparing the Muslims of India against India. When they are ready, it will be the start of the break-up of India." A few months later, at the three-day annual congregation of the LT held at its Muridke headquarters, 30 kilometres from Lahore, Lakhvi justified the launching of fidayeen missions in Jammu and Kashmir. He continued: "Following Pakistani withdrawal from the Kargil heights and the Nawaz-Clinton statement in Washington, it was important to boost the morale of the Kashmiri people... These fidayeen missions have been initiated to teach India a lesson as they were celebrating Pakistani withdrawal from Kargil. And let me tell you very clearly that our next target would be New Delhi." Incidentally, the Indian parliament was attacked later on December 13, 2001. Subsequently, the US State Department declared the Lashkar a terrorist outfit, followed by a similar decision by the Musharraf regime. The LT later renamed itself as Jamaat-ud-Daawa (JuD) in a bid to separate its military actions in Kashmir from its religious undertakings in Pakistan. While stepping down as the Lashkar ameer at a press conference in Lahore on December 23, 2001, Hafiz Saeed appointed Maulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri as his successor. But Lakhvi was retained as the supreme operational commander of the LT. However, differences soon erupted between Saeed and Lakhvi over distribution of the organisation's assets, prompting the latter to revolt against Saeed and launch his own splinter group with the name of Khairun Naas (KuN). Their animosity grew to the extent that some of the Zaki-led rebel group members -- largely consisting of LT fighters -- reportedly took oath to assassinate Hafiz Saeed. According to Saeed's aides, he first came under fire from Zaki when he decided to launch JuD and separated the LT infrastructure from the Jamaat. Lakhvi, being the chief operational commander of the LT, disapproved of the decision, saying it was meant to put the JuD in control of all the funds collected locally and abroad. He was of the view that as heavy donations were being collected in the name of the Kashmir jihad from all over Pakistan as well as abroad, the JuD leadership had no right to the money because it was only a preaching organisation. Sources close to Lakhvi revealed many of the dissident aides to Saeed were basically annoyed at his second marriage with a fallen mujahid's 28-year-old widow. Saeed was 58 at the time of his marriage and had justified his act by saying the wedding was only meant to provide shelter to the widow of the fighter, who had lost his life in Jammu and Kashmir and had left behind two kids. However, a year later, Saeed and Lakhvi were made to mend fences and the two were the best of friends at the time of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks. But Zaki Lakhvi had already moved the LT headquarters from Muridke to Muzaffarabad by then. In July 2006, the Indian authorities alleged that Azam Cheema, a LT operative accused of being the ring leader in the 2006 bombing of the Mumbai rail network [that killed over 200 people] was trained and sent to the Indian port city by Lakhvi. The Mumbai police commissioner then claimed that an arrested militant, Abu Anas, has confessed to being the bodyguard of Lakhvi. In May 2008, the US Treasury Department announced freezing the assets of four LT leaders including Lakhvi. In October, 2007, Lakhvi's 20-year-old son Mohammad Qasim was reportedly killed in an encounter with the security forces at the Gamaroo village in Jammu and Kashmir's Bandipora area. In the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, the Indian authorities alleged Zaki Lakhvi, usually based in Muzaffarabad, had moved to Karachi in August 2008, the port city from where LT militants set off, so he could direct operations. The sole survivor of the Mumbai attacks, Ajmal Kasab, apparently told police Lakhvi had helped indoctrinate all the attackers. On December 3, 2008, India finally named him as one of four major planners behind the Mumbai terror attacks. And that he had allegedly offered to pay the Kasab family Rs150,000 for his participation in the assaults. On December 7, 2008, the Pakistani security forces arrested Lakhvi after raiding the JuD headquarters in Muzaffarabad. The Indian dossier handed over to Pakistan on January 5 includes transcription of intercepted telephonic conversation between the Mumbai attackers and Lakhvi. However, circles close to the arrested LT chief operational commander reject the Indian dossier as a pack of lies and insist Lakhvi has nothing to do with the Mumbai strikes. |
Link |
Afghanistan/South Asia |
Hafiz Saeed - Professor Terror |
2005-07-15 |
![]() Lashkar has emerged as the deadliest terror outfit operating out of Pakistan in the last decade. Indian intelligence agencies attribute most of the recent terrorist strikes in India to Lashkar, including the one in Ayodhya on July 5. It has virtually unlimited access to funds, thanks to Pakistanâs Inter-Services Intelligence and sponsors in Europe and the middle east, and a never-ending supply of troops, thanks to the schools managed by the MDI. The pattern of Lashkar attacks in India following Saeedâs statement proves that he was indeed serious about his intent. Though the outfit entered Kashmir to wage jihad rather lateâin 1993âit soon pushed the other big organisations, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Muhammad, to the fringes. After the Kargil war of 1999, during which Saeedâs boys rubbed shoulders with the Pakistan army fighting the Indians, Lashkar made its name organising fidayeen (suicide) attacks in Kashmir. Even as the civilians and the security forces in the Valley reeled under the new mode of terror, Saeed set his sights outside the state. Delhi was the first target. Lashkar militants attacked the Red Fort in December 2000 and a year later they mounted a daring assault on Parliament with help from JeM. In 2002, the Akshardham Temple in Gandhinagar, belonging to the Swaminarayan sect, was the target. Last year, there were reports that Lashkar was training its guns on important personalities, including cricketers Sachin Tendulkar and Sourav Ganguly. In March 2005, the Delhi Police killed three Lashkar militants and captured two others who were apparently planning to target software companies in Bangalore. Then came the Ayodhya attack, the fourth on temples since 1996. So what makes Saeed order these daring strikes? One, the publicity they garner; two, the fear they generate in the minds of the people and; three, the way they "arouse the Muslims". Saeed, it seems, has taken a leaf out of Osama bin Ladenâs book. He has a habit of making bold statements that cause superpowers to shiver. In fact, bin Laden was said to be the main inspiration for the three professors who founded MDIâSaeed, his colleague Zafar Iqbal and Abdullah Azzam of the International Islamic University, which is allegedly funded by bin Laden. When the MDI, which belongs to the conservative Ahle-Hadith (aka Salafi or Wahabi) school of Islam, was formed in 1987, bin Laden provided the seed money. Its headquarters was set up on a sprawling 190 acres in Muridke, 45km from Lahore. Besides a huge mosque, the building of which was financed by bin Laden, the heavily guarded campus houses a guest houseâwhich was used by the al Qaeda chief before America started snapping at his heelsâa madrasa, a hospital, a market, a fish farm, agricultural tracts and residential area for scholars and the faculty. MDI has five Islamic institutions, more than a hundred schools and five madrasas besides ambulance services, blood banks and clinics across Pakistan. A year after the MDI was launched, Azzam got killed in an explosion. In July 2004, Iqbal broke away and launched Khairun Naas after Saeed anointed his brother-in-law, Maulana Abdul Rehman Makki, a former teacher, as his second-in-command and head of foreign affairs. Charges of nepotism are nothing new to Saeed. His son, Talha, looks after the affairs of the Lashkar in Muzaffarabad, while Waleed, despite being accused of having links with car smugglers, continues to be powerful. All these Jihadi outfits are family businesses, the precedent of the Prophet getting one fifth of the booty collected in raids has been used by these people to excuse their money grabbing, although in truth they probably grap a hell of a lot more than 20% of the funds that head their way. Lashkar, MDIâs armed wing, was launched in 1990 in the Afghan province of Kunar with the specific aim of fighting the Najibullah regime in Afghanistan. After the Taliban captured Kabul in 1992, the attention turned to Kashmir. Meanwhile, Lashkar had become a big hit with the ISI and the government, particularly because Saeed and his men had no interest in local politics unlike other outfits. Patronage meant that the MDI as well as Lashkar prospered. Lashkar trains recruits in two phases. The basic, Daura Aam, lasts 21 days and recruits are motivated to pursue jihad as a mission. The special phase, Daura Khaas, is of three months and involves training in weapons, ambush and survival. Saeed has combined Islamic education and modern knowledge in his institutions, in a bid to make his wards motivated and innovative. His dream run continues to this day, despite the split in 2004 and resentment over his second marriage to the widow of a slain associate. Back before 9/11 the Lashkarâs English website openly discussed how to enrol in these two training courses, I remember reading them at the time and being surprised by how blatant it all was, but this was back when the world was still asleep concerning Jihadis. Saeed had a strictly religious upbringing in Janubi village in Mianwali district, where his landlord father, Kamaluddin, had set up base after Partition, having migrated from Hyderabad. His mother taught her seven children the Quran and Saeed took to the holy book in a big way. After his graduation, he did his masters in Islamic Studies from King Saud University, Riyadh. His first job was as research officer at the Islamic Ideological Council in Pakistan. Even after he launched the MDI, he continued to teach till his retirement a couple of years ago. Saeed, who has never been to the west despite the fact that his two brothers live in the US, dislikes being photographed and has banned TV in his headquarters. He hates âHindu rulersâ, from whose clutches he wants to liberate Junagadh and Hyderabad, apart from Kashmir. And he has a good reason to hate India: 36 members of his extended family were killed during Partition. That also explains why he has been so vehemently opposed to the peace process and proves that he would go any length to achieve his mission: disintegrate India. |
Link |
Afghanistan/South Asia |
The Jihad Lives On |
2005-03-09 |
Edited for length and split into two Contrary to the General Pervez Musharraf-led Government's much-touted claims of having taken concrete measures to uproot the extremist jehadi mafia and its terror network in Pakistan, a cursory glance over the activities of four 'banned' militant organizations in the country shows they are once again back in business, with changed names and identities, operating freely and advocating jehad against infidels to defend Islam. While banning six leading jehadi and sectarian groups in two phases - on January 12, 2002, and November 15, 2003 - General Musharraf had declared that no organization or person would be allowed to indulge in terrorism to further its cause. However, after the initial crackdown, the four major jehadi outfits operating from Pakistan - Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), resurfaced and regrouped effectively to run their respective networks as openly as before, though under different names. Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, Maulana Masood Azhar, Maulana Fazalur Rehman Khalil and Syed Salahuddin - the respective leaders of these organizations - are again on the loose. The pattern of treatment being meted out to these leading lights of jehad by the Musharraf-led administration shows that they are being kept on the leash, ostensibly to wage a controlled jehad in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). After the 9/11 terror attacks, the four jehadi leaders were placed under house arrests in their respective home towns in Punjab, since they were becoming increasingly vocal in their condemnation of General Musharraf's policy of 'slavery to the Americans'. Groaning under American pressure, Islamabad also had to temporarily stop cross-border infiltration into J&K, which eventually reduced violence levels in the Valley. Though most of the jehadi groups accepted the establishment's advice and adopted a 'lie low and wait and see' policy, the fact remains that no concrete step was taken by the authorities to dismantle the jehadi infrastructure. This was chiefly due to the fact that the unholy alliance between the state agencies and the jehadi groups was quite old and had an ideological basis. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) Although the ongoing peace talks between India and Pakistan are being taken as a bad news by most of the militant outfits waging armed struggle against the Indian forces in J&K, the leadership of one of the most feared jehadi groups, the LeT and its parent organization, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, are keeping their fingers crossed. Sources close to the Jamaat-ud-Dawa chief, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, say he has been persuaded by the establishment to go low key and to abstain from issuing statements criticizing the Indo-Pak peace parleys. In return, however, Saeed has been given assurance that no action would be taken against the Jamaat-ud-Dawa and its militant wing, the Lashkar-e-Toiba, and no restrictions on activities including collection of funds, holding of public rallies or the recruitment of jehadi cadres and their training. The result is that, after a year of hibernation under official pressure, Saeed, who founded the Lashkar in 1988, is again activate and making fiery speeches across Punjab. Saeed's close associates claim that young jehadis from various parts of the country continue to throng the Lashkar camps at Muzaffarabad in Azad Kashmir before being pushed into J&K, though at a limited scale now. The Lashkar is the only jehadi group operating from Azad Kashmir that still keeps a comparatively large group of activists at its Khairati Bagh camp in the Lipa Valley. Another Lashkar camp is functional at Nala Shui in Muzaffarabad from where young militants are launched after being given initial training at the Jamaat-ud-Dawa's Muridke headquarters in Punjab. Unlike the past strategy of launching large groups comprising of 25 to 50 militants on a regular basis from the camps located on the LoC, Lashkar sources disclose, it has now been decided to keep training militants in limited numbers to launch smaller groups of not more than five to fifteen people, that too, at intervals. Despite the official ban, banners can easily be seen in the urban and rural areas of Punjab, urging young boys to enroll with the Lashkar for jehad. These banners usually carry telephone numbers of the area offices. Similarly, Lashkar and Dawa activists can be seen outside mosques after Friday prayers distributing pamphlets and periodicals preaching the virtues of jehad in Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya, Kosovo and Eritrea, besides vowing that the Lashkar would plant the flag of Islam in Washington, Tel Aviv and New Delhi. The donation boxes of the Lashkar and the Dawa, which had initially disappeared after the January 2002 ban, have reappeared on public places as well as mosques all over the Punjab. Over the past two years, Hafiz Saeed has taken a number of steps to camouflage his jehadi agenda and to assume a role for the Dawa which could help evade the category of terrorism. The Dawa has increasingly shifted its focus on khidmat-e-khalq (social welfare) which is part of its dawat (Islamic mission) just like jehad. While giving more importance to taking its dawat to all sections of the populace, it has considerably expanded the base of its operations. Giving greater importance to college students as well, the Dawa leadership recently launched Tulaba Jamaatul Dawa, its student wing, which is working aggressively to take its dawat to youngsters across Punjab. Saeed's close circles say the changing focus of the Dawa activities coupled with the caution exercised by him have helped their organization survive the fresh ban Musharraf imposed on several extremist outfits in November 2003. However, explaining Musharraf's decision to spare Saeed's organization, well-informed intelligence sources say the Dawa chief was more amenable to the establishment's control than the leaders of any other jehadi outfit, as he can readily agree to wage a controlled jehad in the Valley whenever required to do so. Further, his vulnerability has increased manifold after a split in Jamaat-ud-Dawa over distribution of the group's assets, that gave birth to a breakaway faction - Khairun Naas (Peoples' Welfare), led by Professor Zafar Iqbal. The ISI have invested a lot of time and money in developing the Lashkar's skills. Given the organizations obedience and the presence of its cells all over the world, it represents an extremely useful striking arm for deniable operations. |
Link |
Afghanistan/South Asia |
Split in Lashkar-e-Taiba: a charade |
2004-07-19 |
The Pakistani media has reported a split in the Jamaatud Dawa (JD), the political wing of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET), reminiscent of the split in the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) in 2000, which led to a large number of its members led by Maulana Masood Azhar leaving the organisation due to disputes over property and the sharing of the funds collected and forming a separate organisation called the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM). While operating separately since then, the HUM and the JEM continue to accept Osama bin Laden's ideology and to be members of his International Islamic Front (IIF), whose activties are being co-ordinated for over a year now by the LET due to the logistic and other difficulties faced by Al Qaeda in continuing to act as the co-ordinator. The most detailed account of the split in the JD has been carried by the usually reliable "Daily Times" of Lahore in its issue of July 18, 2004. To quote from its report: The Jamaatud Dawa (JD), believed to be Pakistan's largest pro-jihad party, has split, with violent clashes likely over party assets. |
Link |
Afghanistan/South Asia | |||||
Jamaatud Dawa splits | |||||
2004-07-18 | |||||
The Jamaatud Dawa (JD), believed to be Pakistan's largest pro-jihad party, has split, with violent clashes likely over party assets.
| |||||
Link |