 May, 2008. To those who watched the American-led war on Iraq unfold in the spring of 2003, the fighting in most cases seemed distant and confused. No matter which television station one watched or which internet site one monitored, it was very difficult to gain a clear understanding of the events taking place during the American march to Baghdad. Reporters and bloggers could only offer their own limited perspective of the events, and watching and listening to multiple sources (which often contradicted one another) made for a cacophony of noise from which it was very difficult to gain a clear understanding of the situation in Iraq and within the collation military efforts.
For the officers and soldiers of the U.S. military, by contrast, the war made sense. The fog of war was dense at times, sure, but the way the war was fought by armored and infantry units backed by air support and commando operations was entirely logical and in keeping with the warfighting doctrine developed by the U.S. military since the end of the Second World War. The Iraqis played by the rules, and they lost to a U.S.-led military machine far more accomplished at large-scale maneuver warfare than its nearest rivals, much less Saddam Husseins weakened army.
The years that have followed, by contrast, have been fairly confusing for the U.S. military. It took a full three years for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps to adopt the kinds of population-centric counter-insurgency tactics that have helped create a little breathing room for U.S.-led forces and Iraqs politicians in 2007.[i] During that time, the enemy quite often refused, as successful guerrillas usually do, to play by the established rules of maneuver warfare. These same guerrillas also proved more than capable in manipulating the imagery of war to further their political aims, causing General David Petraeuss chief counter-insurgency strategist to remark that the enemys efforts could all to often be described as armed propaganda campaigns.[ii] Not only did the U.S. military have little idea how to fight a proper counter-insurgency campaign in 2003, it also had no real conception of information operations and how such operations fit into the strategy of both the insurgents and the U.S.-led coalition.
Until recently, complains U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, one of the authors of its new counter-insurgency field manual adopted in 2006, information operations was a field of battle completely abandoned to the enemy. The U.S. knew only how to engage the enemy in physical battle it had no plan to exploit or explain such operations in the public sphere. When U.S. forces clashed with the Taliban in Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban contacted Arabic-language satellite channels immediately following the clash to make claims of civilian casualties and, in short, spin the battle in their favor. The U.S. public relations officers, by contrast, valued caution over timeliness and often waited days before issuing a statement confirming or denying the casualties.
What is worse, from the perspective of the U.S. military is that while the ponderous American defense bureaucracy has been slow off the mark, the enemy the insurgent groups against which the U.S. has fought in both Iraq and Afghanistan have proved more than proficient at the art of propaganda, media manipulation and shaping the way operations and events are perceived by enemy, friendly and neutral populations. In the same way, though the U.S. and its allies talk of the comprehensive approach, it is more often than not groups like Hizbullah and Jaish al-Mahdi who best understand military operations as part of a combined effort incorporating political, military, diplomatic, economic and strategic communication efforts.
To a large degree, though, the U.S. military cannot be blamed for being caught off-guard by their enemys sophistication in managing the way battles and campaigns are perceived. In the past two decades, insurgent, terrorist, and guerrilla groups in the Middle East have grown exponentially more sophisticated in the way they use the media available to them in order to affect the way battles are perceived. From the perspective of someone who studies military innovation, it is a remarkable achievement.
This paper focuses on the evolution of insurgent media operations in support of political-military objectives. Groups like the Taliban and Hizbullah did not start off, from the beginning, as sophisticated manipulators of popular perception. They learned, over time, how to shape the way in which military operations are perceived, and in the process, have taught Western militaries a valuable lesson in the nature of war itself.
Hizbullah and al-Manar
The history of contemporary information operations begins with Hizbullah. In 1990, when the Lebanese Civil War finally ended after 15 years of brutal fighting, the first television station to earn a license from the Lebanese government was al-Manar, Hizbullahs own outlet.[iii] The way in which Hizbullah used al-Manar, however, was both innovative and reflected a careful study of their adversary, Israel, against whom they fought for control of southern Lebanon until the Israeli withdrawal in 2000.
One of the founders of al-Manar, Nasser Akhdar, explained to researchers Dina Matar and Farah Dakhlallah that the primary concern of al-Manar was to communicate the daily realities of the occupation of South Lebanon to Lebanese society and the heroic acts of resistance to the occupation in an effort to bolster the resilience of the Community of the Resistance in Lebanon.[iv] Accordingly, 40 per cent of al-Manars daily output in the 1990s was devoted to its coverage of events in southern Lebanon and insurgent attacks on Israel and its Lebanese allies.[v]
Hizbullah soon discovered, though, that its broadcasts had an effect not just on the Lebanese population but on the Israelis as well. On the field, we hit one Israeli soldier, one Hizbullah official explained. But a tape of him crying for help affects thousands of Israelis
we realized the impact of our amateur work on the morale of the Israelis.[vi]
Hizbullah, which employs a small army of Hebrew linguists to monitor the Israeli media, soon learned that for Israeli news outlets, broadcasting images of dead or dying Israeli soldiers was taboo. If a Lebanese outlet were to broadcast such images, though, and those images were then picked up by the international news wire services; the taboo was lifted. The cat was out of the bag, so to speak, and Israeli outlets began to re-broadcast the images most Israelis could watch anyway.
Consequently, Hizbullah invested much effort and blood in videotaping their attacks on Israeli columns and positions. As soon as the attack had taken place, the cameramen would race back to Beirut to make sure footage of the attack went up on al-Manar in time for the next news cycle. Footage of these attacks had a galvanizing effect on a portion of the Israeli population but also fueled the growing movement against the war and occupation in Israel.
Timur Goksel, the UNs longtime spokesman in southern Lebanon, explained in 1993 that Hizbullah knows theyre not going to win the war on the battlefield, so theyre not taking on Israels military might on the ground. Theyre taking on the Israelis psychologically.[vii]
Hizbullah pressed their advantage. They understood, correctly, that the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon was only possible so long as it was tolerated by the Israeli populace. Consequently, much of Hizbullahs propaganda was not just aimed at the Lebanese population but at Israelis as well. One of al-Manars daily news broadcasts, even today, is in Hebrew. During the occupation, Hizbullah ran a constantly updated photo gallery of Israeli casualties with the phrase Whos Next? written in Hebrew at the end.[viii] We arent doing this to show off, said one Hizbullah official We want to get into every [Israelis] mind and affect Israeli public opinion.[ix]
When the occupation finally ended in 2000 as Israel and its Lebanese allies retreated back behind the Blue Line in humiliating and chaotic fashion, one UN official was moved to remark that 75% of Hizbullahs war against Israel was those videotapes.[x]
America in Iraq and Afghanistan
When the U.S. Army and Marine Corps were writing the new counter-insurgency manual currently in use in Iraq and Afghanistan, the authors of the manual borrowed as an example of proper counter-insurgency operations the operational design used by the 1st Marine Division under the command of then-Major General James Mattis in 2004. The motto of the 1st Marine Division under Mattis, one of the most respected counter-insurgency practitioners in the U.S. military, borrowed heavily from the Hippocratic Oath: first, do no harm.
Maj. Gen. Mattis sketched out the goals of the 1st Marine Division: to promote effective local governance; promote economic development; provide essential services; and develop Iraqi security forces. All of this would undermine the insurgency, Mattis believed, and all of this was to be made possible by Marine combat operations. In turn, everything done by Mattiss Marines the entire strategy of the 1st Marine Division rested upon effective information operations.[xi]
Information operations is defined by the U.S. Department of Defense as the integrated employment of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.[xii]
If that definition sounds confusing, that is because information operations is a field of military study around which the U.S. military is still trying to wrap its head. It has become clear to the U.S. military, though, is that perception matters as much as reality in contemporary combat. The approach to warfare adopted by the 1st Marine Division in 2004 and its subsequent inclusion in American counter-insurgency doctrine represents a mini-revolution in the way of war for Western militaries. The way military operations were perceived by the enemy and by the neutral population was now viewed as being as important the material results of the operations themselves.
It should surprise no one that insurgent groups tend to learn from the experiences of other insurgent groups. Political scientist Robert Pape argues that tactics such as suicide bombing are adopted from Hizbullah by groups such as the Tamil Tigers and Hamas largely because they are perceived as being successful.[xiii] Insurgency scholars Michael Horowitz and Erin Simpson, meanwhile, argue a functionalist explanation only goes so far to describe the diffusion of tactics among insurgencies.[xiv] Horowitz and Simpson highlight the importance of close ties between groups, noting that suicide bombing is no where to be found in the insurgencies of Latin America yet has flourished as a tactic in the Middle East and South Asia.
You cannot, in short, simply examine the strategic environment to determine why certain tactics are adopted. As Horowitz writes, Networks of religiously-motivated groups, through the direct diffusion of knowledge from group to group and demonstration effects that influenced non religiously-motivated groups, distributed suicide terrorism around the world.[xv]
Indeed, the spread of suicide bombing as a tactic to both Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories is an interesting case study, one that highlights both long-standing ties between Hizbullah and Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups and also the way in which Hizbullah emerged as a model for successful resistance against Israeli occupation.
In the same way that insurgent groups borrow tactics such as suicide bombing, insurgent groups in Iraq and Afghanistan have learned from the way in which Hizbullah used psychological warfare to great effect against the IDF and have applied such tactics to their resistance struggles against the American-led occupying armies. In Iraq and Afghanistan, however, there are two key differences between Hizbullahs media and propaganda strategy against the IDF and that of insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.
First, the enemys propaganda has not been aimed to any great extent at undermining the support for the Iraq War in the United States or in allied nations. And second, whereas Hizbullah used traditional media a television station, primarily, but also radio stations and newspapers for its psychological operations, the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan have more often made use of the new media.[xvi] For Hizbullah, broadcasting a video of attacks against Israelis meant putting the video on television. But who needs al-Manar or television in general when you have the internet and YouTube?
The most effective insurgent propaganda in Iraq has made use of the internet and slick sites such as BaghdadSniper.com. On BaghdadSniper, the internet viewer who could be anywhere from Iraq to London to Indonesia is greeted with the option of viewing the site in one of six languages: English, Arabic, Urdu, Italian, French, Spanish, Chinese, or German. (But not Persian as the site is affiliated with the Sunni resistance groups.) Viewers can then watch videos of (alleged) attacks on U.S. soldiers and Marines in Iraq by the anonymous Baghdad Sniper.[xvii]
As interesting as the videos are, however, the claims made by the site are just as interesting. The site makes three main contentions: One, in harsher conditions than those in which the American soldiers and Marines operate, insurgents out-perform the American soldiers. Two, unlike the Americans, they are moral never targeting innocent women or children, whereas the Americans often kill innocent civilians. And three, they, the resistance, have the technical and tactical know-how and skill to challenge the mighty American army on the field of battle. This boast is particularly telling:
Our snipers are superior to those in the U.S. army. Our men have only minutes to stop, scope, shoot and retreat while American snipers always shoot from a safe place under American control. us snipers hit easy targets. You hardly ever hear that they killed a fighter. [emphasis added] Our men only ever hit armed enemies.
It is not in the character of a U.S. Marine Corps sniper commonly regarded as among the worlds most skilful to brag about their confirmed kills. But that is exactly what the Baghdad Sniper does because he understands the claim to have killed an American and, better, a video showing the act is more important than the act itself.
A key difference between the kind of insurgent propaganda broadcast by Hizbullah in the 1990s and the kind broadcast by the insurgents of Iraq is that whereas the propaganda broadcast by Hizbullah was often aimed at its enemy, Israel, the propaganda broadcast by the insurgents of Iraq is neither aimed at the Americans nor, for the most part, Iraqis. As evidenced by the languages in which BaghdadSniper is available, much of this propaganda is aimed at inflaming young Muslims spread from Lahore to London. Its having an effect, too. A recent study by al-Qaeda expert Jason Burke demonstrated that insurgent propaganda videos on the internet had played a significant role in the radicalization process of young British Muslims convicted of planning or carrying out attacks on civilian targets in the UK.[xviii]
Audrey Kurth Cronin describes the process by which young Muslims are radicalized via insurgent propaganda on the internet, a kind of cyber-mobilization revolutionizing warfare to the degree that Napoleons levée en masse revolutionized continental warfare at the end of the 18th Century.[xix] When the armies of Napoleon marched across Europe, Frances enemies were caught off-guard by the size of the armies and the way in which they were quickly raised from the whole of the population. In the same way, the militaries and security services of traditional nation-states in the West and Middle East could be surprised by the way in which jihadist armies are raised and deployed, drawn as they are from the disaffected children of the Egyptian middle class and the residents of the slums of Paris and London both. For both, the insurgent propaganda functions as a kind of empowering call to arms. British journalist Amil Khan, who has worked extensively with radicalized youths in the UK, says the following:
These videos give you an alternative narrative. Instead of feeling like your community is powerless or weak, they give you the sense that your people can be strong and even stronger than the worlds leading powers. Its a seductive alternative to the self-image many Muslims, you and old, have that their community, the umma, couldnt organize a picnic much less challenge the worlds only superpower.
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[SHAFAQ] "The Promised Day Brigade", PDB, (al-Yawm al-Maw'oud), affiliated with the Peace Companies of the Sadrist movement, executed a show of force in the streets of Najaf ahead of its participation in securing the annual pilgrimage in Muharram.
BAGHDAD Staff Sgt. Robert Smith, a buff 31-year-old from North Carolina, strides down a narrow alley in the northwest Baghdad neighborhood of Shula. He has just spent 10 minutes sequestered in a room with an interpreter and an Iraqi homeowner, trying to convince the man to give up what he knows about the militias.
Iran has secretly paid Iraqi insurgents hundreds of thousands of American dollars to kill British soldiers, according to a leaked government document obtained by The Telegraph. The allegations are contained in a confidential "field report" written by a British officer who served in Basra during one of the most dangerous periods of the conflict. The report, which has never been made public, shows the full level of Iran's involvement in the insurgency for the first time.
The attitudes of commanders such as Abu Baqr would seem to confirm U.S. accusations of Iranian meddling in Iraq. Although the extent of their relationship remains unclear, the commanders have embraced a hardened stance that may bode ill for the U.S. military.