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Terror Networks
Jihadi Groups Subcontract Attacks to Each Another
2010-12-30
The War in Afghanistan Is Part of the Larger Struggle Against Global Terrorism
by Max Boot

When I recently participated in an Intelligence Squared US debate about Afghanistan, my debate partner, terrorism expert Peter Bergen (who, like me, argued that it's not a lost cause), was practically hooted off the stage by a skeptical audience when he said there was not much difference between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. Now his insight is confirmed by U.S. intelligence reporting.

As described in the New York Times, "New intelligence assessments from the region assert that insurgent factions now are setting aside their historic rivalries to behave like 'a syndicate,' joining forces in ways not seen before." The elements of the "syndicate" cited are the Quetta Shura Taliban led by Mullah Omar, the Haqqani Network, and HiG (Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin), which are increasingly cooperating to stage attacks in Afghanistan from their safe havens in Pakistan. But all three have close links to other jihadist groups based in Pakistan, including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Tehrik-i-Taliban (aka the Pakistan Taliban), and, lest we forget, al-Qaeda. An American officer quoted by the Times does a good job of summing up the state of play among the jihadists:
"This is actually a syndicate of related and associated militant groups and networks, Trying to parse them, as if they have firewalls in between them, is really kind of silly. They cooperate with each other. They franchise work with each other."

If that's the case -- and the preponderance of intelligence reporting certainly points in that direction -- then it's silly to disassociate the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan, as so many critics of the war effort do, from the broader struggle against jihadist groups bent on inflicting serious harm on America and on our allies. There are real differences among the jihadist groups, but there is also a growing commonality of tactics and purpose. The war in Afghanistan is part of a broader struggle -- a global war -- that we must win not only to safeguard distant allies but also our own territory.
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Afghanistan
Obama’s Two Generals (Pak Opinion)
2009-12-04
We kind of know what Obamas new strategy for Afghanistan means for that country: hes squared the differences between two of his generals. Gen Stanley McChrystal will get most of what he asked for (though its worth bearing in mind that he apparently asked for half of what he thought he needed). ‘Gen Rahm Emmanuel has got his war plan for politics back home.

McChrystal gets the first shot: he has 18 months to see what can be achieved from the COIN bible, FM 3-24. Meanwhile, back in the US, watching the poll numbers like a hawk will be White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel.

The Democratic Party will go into the mid-term elections next year with a comfortable majority in the two houses of Congress, so Emmanuel can take the risk of alienating the anti-war camp in the party base then. But July 2011, the date when Obama has suggested the troops may start to return home from Afghanistan, is when the big show begins, the US presidential election season.

If things are still going badly in Afghanistan at that point, you can bet your bottom dollar that ‘Gen Emmanuel will unleash his legendary anger until he gets his way and the US scampers out of Afghanistan.

Here in Pakistan, we should all be praying that Gen McChrystal succeeds and Emmanuel is kept on a leash.

Heres why. Cut through the rhetoric and public posturing of American officials and you begin to see an understanding of the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan that is perhaps not as removed from the Pakistani security establishments view as many may think.

First, Pakistan has argued vehemently that the insurgency in Afghanistan is self-sustaining and that while it may get some support from tribal badlands along the Pak-Afghan border, the contribution is not decisive.

And guess what? McChrystal himself agrees: ‘While the existence of safe havens in Pakistan does not guarantee Isaf failure, Afghanistan does require Pakistani cooperation and action against violent militancy, particularly against those groups active in Afghanistan, he wrote in his now-public assessment of the situation in Afghanistan.

Strikingly, in the two short paragraphs devoted to Pakistan in the section ‘External influences, McChrystal also thought it fit to point out this: ‘Nonetheless, the insurgency in Afghanistan is predominantly Afghan. By defending the population, improving sub-national governance, and giving disenfranchised rural communities a voice in their government, [the Afghan government] — with support from Isaf — can strengthen Afghanistan against both domestic and foreign insurgent penetration.

For those predisposed to focusing on differences and disagreements, this may not mean much, but in terms of a counter-insurgency strategy in which no side gets all that it wants, it isnt all doom and gloom.

Second, the US dislike of Pakistans prioritisation approach to fighting militants here isnt necessarily fatal to relations between the two countries.

This is what McChrystal has written: ‘The major insurgent groups in order of their threat to the mission [in Afghanistan] are: the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), the Haqqani Network (HQN) and the Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG).

None of those groups have been the focus of counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency operations by the Pakistani security forces and that remains a source of a good deal of tension between the US and Pakistan.

But we need to zoom out a bit. Heres what Obama said on Tuesday: ‘Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.

Add to this the fact that ‘stability is a key concern of the Americans in Pakistan and you really have three broad clusters of militants that the US is worried about in this region: the Afghan-centric Taliban (the cluster of the so-called Quetta shura and the Haqqani and Hekmatyar networks), the Pakistan-centric Taliban (TTP and its affiliates) and of course Al Qaeda.

Pakistan is seriously fighting two of those clusters: the Pakistani Taliban attacking the state and Al Qaeda. Despite the occasional prickly American statements about Pakistan ‘knowing where Al Qaeda leaders are, few would seriously argue that Pakistan has any interest in keeping Al Qaeda active in the region.

So two out of three isnt a terrible situation, and the Americans know this. Moreover, they know something about our limitations in attacking the third group, the Afghan-centric militants.

First, there is the problem of opening too many fronts simultaneously and over stretching the security forces. Second, there are some very real questions about the so-called Quetta shura. Does it exist in the shape and form the Americans claim? And if it does, what exactly can Pakistan do about it?

To the extent that Afghan Taliban are hiding out in Balochistan, they are doing so in the refugee camps that have been there for years. Do you bomb the camps or send in troops? Why not just pack up the camps and send the refugees back to Afghanistan, where the Afghan and American forces can deal with them, instead?

And to those Americans obsessing over Pakistans lack of action against the Afghan Taliban, why not throw their own commanders words back at them — ‘the existence of safe havens in Pakistan does not guarantee Isaf failure?

So the McChrystal phase of Obamas new strategy in Afghanistan should not lead to an immediate worsening of relations between the US and Pakistan.

But if it doesnt succeed — not least because of the narrow window McChrystal has been given to produce results — we here in Pakistan should be very worried about the Rahm Emmanuel phase.

McChrystals plan is the last chance saloon. If it fails, the Americans will only see a few very unsettling things in the region from afar: an unstable Afghanistan with the Afghan Taliban resurgent; a Pak-Afghan border that is the stamping ground of all kinds of militants, headlined by Al Qaeda, and the source of ‘reverse strategic depth for penetration into Pakistan proper; and a nuclear-armed Pakistan beset by perennial political instability, racked by militant violence and paranoid about Indian designs in the region.

Bomb em, squeeze em, bury em — whatever the Americans will choose to do then, it wont be pretty and it definitely will not enhance Pakistans interests or stability.

Few anywhere have reacted with confidence that the McChrystal phase will work. So if youre a Pakistani who believes in miracles, now is the time to be fervently praying for one. Because chances are you wont want to see what the Emmanuel phase will look like.
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Afghanistan
Bill Roggio on 'Invasion' of Pakiwakiland
2007-03-09
Deputy Taliban commander in Waziristan captured by Task Force 145; Taliban commander arrested in Kandahar; Tora Bora Front cell broken up; Achilles update

As NATO and Afghan forces are on the offensive in northern Helmand province, U.S. special forces have conducted a cross border raid in Pakistan and nabbed the deputy Taliban commander in Waziristan, according to a report by Al Jazeera Television. The Taliban leader is identified as Mullah Hakimallah Mansub, however the likelihood is the Romanization of the name is mistake. 'Mansub' may well be of the Mehsud tribe, of which Baitullah and Abdullah Mehsud are the two leading Taliban commanders in South Waziristan.

This raid would have been conducted by Task Force 145, the specialized hunter-killer team designed to detain or kill senior al-Qaeda leaders in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Task Force 145 was behind the strike in Danda Saidgai against Osama bin Laden's praetorian Black Guard in the spring of 2006, among other operations in western Pakistan.

Today's raid in South Waziristan follows the capture of Mullah Mahmood, a Taliban commander running away like a girlie fleeing the fighting in southern Afghanistan. Mahmood was captured by Afghan soldiers after he tried to pass through a checkpoint while wearing a burka and a totally HOT pair of Manolos.

In Nangarhar province in northen Afghanistan NATO forces captured the leader of an IED cell of the newly formed Tora Bora Front. The Tora Bora Front is an al-Qaeda linked organization and offshoot of Hizb-i-Islami Khalis fighters led by Anwarul Haq Mujahid. Mujahid is the spawn son of Maulvi Yunis Khalis, who hosted Osama bin Laden after he entered Afghanistan in 1996.

Meanwhile, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of the Taliban and al-Qaeda allied Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), has claimed he has broken with the Taliban and is willing to negotiate with the Afghan government. "Look at Me! ME! MEEE!!! The jihad went into high gear but later it gradually went down as certain elements among the Taliban rejected the idea of a joint struggle against the aggressor," Hekmatyar told AFP "He said his forces were now mounting only restricted operations, partly because of a lack of young boys for the jihadis resources." Hekmatyer has always been an opportunist in Afghan affairs, but this might be a sign that the Taliban and al-Qaeda no longer see any use in Hekmatyer's services as they are now secure in Western Pakistan.
I don't think either the Talibs or Qaeda were particularly fond of Hek from the start. He's out for himself and nobody else. When he could pretend to command the entire Hezb he was of some value, though never as much as he thought. But his end of the Hezb has been tossed by the rest of the party and there's not much room for the politicking he's so much better at than he is at military operations. It's doubtful he's actually got a big-time sponsor like he did way back when. In short, he's an idea whose time has gone.
The raids against Taliban leaders occur as NATO and Afghan forces enter the third day of Operation Achilles in Northern Helmand province. Over 4,500 NATO and 1,000 Afghan troops are battling Taliban forces in the Taliban infested districts. Mullah Abdul Qassim, a "topman Taliban commander in Helmand province," according to The Associated with Terrorists Press, claims to have 4,000 fighters in northern Helmand and up to 9,000 fighters in the entire province.
Oooooo, scary. Better hide the boys, but the men of the Angloshere (and a some Dutch) will be ready to turn these 'fighters' into corpses. Many corpses.
"All of them are well-equipped with turbans and pointy-toed slippers and we have the magic rocks you insert in your anus weapons to target helicopters," Qassim told The Associated Press. "The Taliban are able to fight for 15 or 20 years against NATO and the Americans."
Yeah, right. Unlike Iraq, there aren't 1M tons of munitions scattered about the country. Every round must be hauled from Pakiwakistan via Donkey, Toyota truck or whatever. Typical muzzie wild threats without any ability to back it up.
The fighting over the past 24 hours has focused around the Garmsir district. "[The NATO led International Security Assistance Forces] consisting of the British 45 Commando Royal Marines, supported by Afghan National Army troops, have successfully engaged Taliban extremist strongholds as well as compounds being used by the enemy as arms and ammunition storage facilities in the general area of Garmsir," according to the ISAF press release. Afghan artillery has been firing in support of the operation, and U.S., British and Dutch close air support has been called in as well.
The ANA has arty? And the Dutch F-16s fight? Who knew?
Elements from the Royal Canadian Regiment and the U.S. 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division appear to be conducting blocking operations at the Kandahar and Helmand provincial boundaries.
1000 or so first-class infantry with a wide-range of supporting arms is an excellent block. And with the hammer on it's way, that means a whole lotta dead talibunnies.
The Taliban control the districts of Muckistan, Shitholistan, Musa Qala and Washir, and claimed to have captured Nawzad.
"Today Nawzad, tomorrow the caliphate".
The Sangin, Kajaki and Grishk districts have also been been the scene of heavy Taliban activity this winter. ISAF is attempting to secure the region around the Kajaki Dam in northren Helmand province to push forward with reconstruction projects in the region.
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Terror Networks
U.S. Adds 11 Islamist Groups to Annual Blacklist
2003-04-30
The United States on Wednesday added 11 militant Islamist organizations to its lists of "terrorist groups," reflecting closer attention paid by U.S. policy-makers to the Muslim world in the war on terrorism. The new second tier list of 38 "other terrorist groups" issued by the State Department also included two new non-Islamic groups -- the Communist Party of Nepal and the New Red Brigades in Italy.
Second tier = Triple-A clubs all trying for the majors.
The list of secondary groups acts as a watch list for the first-tier list of "foreign terrorist organizations" (FTOs) on which the United States imposes sanctions. The annual Patterns of Global Terrorism report did not change the list of FTOs, which now has 36 groups.
The majors, see above
The State Department removed one group from the second-tier list -- the Orange Volunteers, a pro-British group in Northern Ireland which appears to be dormant.
They're sitting in the pubs crying in their beer; "I used to be a contender, now I'm just a bum."
Two groups were promoted to the list of "foreign terrorist organizations" during 2002 -- the communist New People's Army in the Philippines and Jemaah Islamiya in Indonesia, which has been linked to a bombing on the resort island of Bali.
Jemaah Islamiya is wishing they stayed in the minors where nobody paid attention to them.
The 11 new militant Islamist groups are:
(drum roll)The envelope, please!

-- al-Badhr Mujahidin, said to have several hundred members in Kashmir, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The State Department described it as an offshoot from Hizb ul-Mujahidin, a Pakistani-based group that operates mainly in Kashmir.

-- Ansar al-Islam, the small group which was based in Iraqi Kurdistan until the U.S. invasion of Iraq and which may no longer exist after U.S. and Kurdish forces attacked its base. The United States said it had links with al Qaeda.
"Had" being the operative word. Rumored to be relocating to a country to be named later.
-- the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement, a small Uighur separatist group based in China's Xinjiang province. China had pressed the United States to take a stand against the group.

-- Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin, founded by Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who opposes the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. It operates mainly in eastern Afghanistan.
Hek's group made the list! Pity mom didn't live to see it, she would have been so proud of her boy.
-- Hizb ul-Mujahedin, described as the largest Kashmiri militant group and the political wing of Pakistan's largest political party, the Jamaat-i-Islami. The State Department said it may have several thousand members in Kashmir and Pakistan.

-- the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade, one of three groups affiliated with Chechen guerrillas who took over a Moscow theater and took hundreds of hostages in October 2002.
Having both "Islamic" and "Peacekeeping" in their name costs them style points.
-- the Jamiat ul-Mujahidin, a small pro-Pakistani militant group formed in Indian-controlled Kashmir in 1990.

-- the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, which emerged in the late 1990s and had members train in Afghanistan. Members have trafficked in falsified documents and possibly guns, the State Department said.
Having false documents and guns is a requirement for being a islamic combatant, it sez so in the union rules.
Note: This may be the same organization as Moroccan Salafi Jihad.

-- Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs, another of the Chechen groups which took over the Moscow theater in October 2002. It is led by Chechen guerrilla chief Shamil Basayev.
Extra points awarded for longest name.
--Sipah-i-Sahaba, a Pakistani group that is violently opposed to Pakistan's Shi'ite community. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf banned the group in 2002.
Sipah, and most other Bad Guy groups, was recently authorized by the Pak government to change its name and go back into business, with a promise to be good. Maulana Azam Tariq, Sipah's supremo, has announced that he's open for business again as 'Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan'. It should take five or six years for the Millat to make it to State's terror list, which is the whole idea behind changing the names and putting on false noses and moustaches.
-- the Special Purposes Islamic Brigade, the third of the three Chechen groups implicated in the 2002 theater attack. The State Department said it probably had no more than 100 fighters at any given time.
Cuz ya got to be "Special" to get in.
Most of the those groups are already subject to financial sanctions under an executive order issued by President Bush after the September 2001 attacks on the United States.
Let's all give a big hand to this year's winners!
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