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Europe

Terrorism and crime go hand-in-hand in Europe

2006-01-18

Since the early 1990s, Western law enforcement agencies have noted an increasing reliance on criminal activity by terrorist networks around the world. Funding sources from the Persian Gulf, charities and other non-governmental fronts have been placed under pressure. This development, compounded by the arrests of several high-ranking coordinators and financiers of operations in Europe and North America—such as Abu Doha and Fateh Kamel—have compelled jihadi networks to adapt and further diversify their funding sources. Consequently “traditional” criminal activities like drug trafficking, robbery and smuggling are rapidly becoming the main source of terrorism funding. In fact, many recent terrorist attacks have been partly financed through crime proceeds. Throughout the 1990s, European law enforcement officers tasked with combating the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) networks noticed that operatives had penetrated local criminal structures in Europe and North Africa by using ethnic and cultural links. With the jihad in Algeria at its height, the under-funded GIA became actively involved in drugs and weapons trafficking through logistics and financial support cells in Europe. GIA members such as Djamel Lounici and Mourad Dhina also trafficked stolen vehicles and forged documents. Similarly, for years the Fateh Kamel network in Montreal and an affiliated cell in Istanbul benefited from trafficking in stolen vehicles, theft and credit card fraud. One of its Montreal members, the Millennium bomber Ahmed Ressam, had also planned a series of armed robberies to secure funding for his aborted attack on the Los Angeles airport in 1999. While a number of violent crimes involving jihadists have taken place in North Africa and Europe over the last decade, the full synthesis between criminality and terrorism took place in 1996 with a series of deadly armed robberies in the French town of Roubaix, which police initially assumed were perpetrated by criminals motivated solely by money. Following the attempted bombing of a G-7 meeting in Lille, French authorities discovered that the Roubaix gang was in fact a small Islamic militant organization that had also committed robberies in Bosnia to fund the jihad. An added benefit of these actions—from the Roubaix gang’s point of view—may have been that these unconventional “fundraising operations” were, in fact, terrorizing in themselves. In December 2005, co-leader of the Roubaix gang and French convert Lionel Dumont was sentenced to 30 years in prison. Moreover, similar groups have been dismantled in France in the past months, including in a December 13th joint operation involving five French law enforcement agencies that netted over 25 suspects as well as high-grade explosives and weaponry. The group included known jihadists, radicalized delinquents and common criminals. Some of the members of this Zarqawi-linked cell—including presumed leader and ex-convict Ouassini Cherifi—were also involved in a number of armored car robberies that were undertaken to raise funds for the movement of recruits to Iraq. A “triangular trade” is steadily evolving that consists of weapons, stolen/contraband goods and narcotics. New al-Qaeda affiliates, notably the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) and North African branches of Takfir wa al-Hijra (Excommunication and exile) have inherited old GIA networks spread across Europe and are actively involved in various types of trafficking to fund operations, trade in weaponry and explosives and move/shelter militants. In Europe, this nexus is mostly active in France and especially Spain, which because of its geography is a major transit (and destination) point for Moroccan cannabis as well as a hub for forged documents and credit cards (Le Nouvel Observateur, October 7, 2004). While networks were initially involved in drugs-for-weapons exchanges, many eventually shifted to direct drug trafficking. Moroccan sources suspect drug money to be the main source of funding for the May 16, 2003 attacks in Casablanca. Moreover, according to Spanish police, the funding for the March 11, 2004 Madrid train attacks came from drug trafficking, and many of those who took part in the preparation and execution of the attack had been involved in criminal activities such as stolen vehicle trading, jewel thefts and various types of counterfeiting (La Vanguardia, May 24, 2005). Furthermore, over half of the members of the group planning suicide strikes against the Spanish High Court later that year were already in jail on drug-trafficking-related charges. Additionally, in June and November of this year, Spanish police uncovered operational and logistics cells of the GSPC and the Zarqawi networks, and discovered that the suspects had engaged in credit card fraud, robberies, drug trafficking and vehicle theft. At times an operational cell may partially fund itself, as when police found 7 kilograms of hashish in the hideout of the suspects planning to bomb the Strasbourg cathedral in 2000. Although financed by Abu Doha, the group had been raising funds through drug trafficking in Frankfurt and London. Many other Islamist cells dismantled in Europe following September 11, 2001, had engaged in drug trafficking, including an al-Qaeda linked group operating in Antwerp and Brussels and a cell in the Netherlands involved in the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud. Aside from narcotics, militants and sympathizers also traffic in precious stones and metals, mainly because they are easy to transport and difficult to trace. This was the case with a Tunisian man charged in Germany with planning attacks against Western targets, who had used a travel agency as a front for gold and silver trafficking (Agence France-Presse, November 30, 2004). Front companies are ideal vehicles to transfer illicit funds and since the mid-1990s, dozens of terrorist front companies have been dismantled in Europe. Recent arrests in France uncovered a GICM support cell (linked to the Madrid bombings) operating various business ventures, just as Ould Slahi—involved in major al-Qaeda plots and closely linked to al-Qaeda financier Khaled Al Shanquiti—was first arrested in 1999 for laundering drug money through his import-export firm. Following the arrests of several key players in the GIA’s European operations in the mid-1990s, networks reorganized themselves around contraband and arms-smuggling rings influenced by elements of the Russian and Sicilian mafia (the latter has also laundered money for the GIA) [1]. These types of relationships arise from mutual benefit, with the terrorists seeking entry into established trafficking/money laundering channels and traditional criminal groups taking advantage of profit opportunities. Ethnic or religious links are not necessarily essential for collaboration to take place; for example, the Madrid bombings were facilitated by members of local criminal groups and petty thieves. When in 2001 the Spanish police conducted a counter-narcotics operation, which netted, among other items, hashish, explosives and detonators, they initially arrested the procurer of explosives for 3/11, José Suárez. Furthermore, the arrests of Marc Muller and Stephen Wendler in the mid-1990s were two of many examples where arms traffickers knowingly supplied terrorist groups with weapons from ex-soviet bloc states. In a case of direct barter, two Pakistanis and a U.S. citizen were detained in Hong Kong in 2002 in an attempt to exchange 600kg of heroin and five tons of hashish for four Stinger missiles, which they intended to sell to al-Qaeda. Since traffickers and terrorist organizations have similar logistical needs, there is ample room for collaboration in money laundering and even facilitating illegal immigration. Recent evidence from Morocco strongly suggests that jihadists are increasingly reliant on outsourcing to specialized migrant smuggling networks to infiltrate or exfiltrate targeted countries (La Gazette du Maroc, February 9, 2004). There are additional concerns that trafficking channels can be used to move heavy weaponry and even weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and WMD components. In December 2004 members of Takfir were arrested in Barcelona for allegedly trying to purchase over 400kg of industrial explosives and material from a Czech source to build a “dirty bomb” (MAP Maghreb Arebe Presse, October 28, 2005). Moreover, in a recent case of arms smuggling from Russia, traffickers attempted to sell high-powered arms—and reportedly uranium—to an FBI informant posing as a middleman for al-Qaeda. To retain legitimacy, contemporary terrorist groups are particularly concerned about providing religious justification for their acts, criminal or otherwise. The writings of a 13th century Islamic jurist, Ibn Taymiyya, are an important source of authorization in regard to seizing the enemy’s property during jihad. During the Algerian jihad, Ali Benhadj (a leader of the Islamic Salvation Front—FIS) quoted Ibn Taymiyya in declaring a fatwa authorizing GIA groups to assassinate and seize the property of all Muslims who opposed them. Terrorist mastermind Sheik Abdel Rahman had also authorized robbery against “the miscreants and the apostate state,” while in 1998 Osama bin Laden echoed this in his call to kill Americans and “plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.” In January 2004 a member of the Moroccan group, Salafiya Jihadiya admitted being shown videos that legitimized and promoted robbing “infidels and hypocrite Muslims,” suggesting that encouraging criminal behavior is emerging as an integral feature of al-Qaeda’s internal propaganda. While Islamists are widely viewed as uncompromising literalists, pragmatism in the search for funds is evident in the religious decree by Salafist ideologue Nasreddine El Eulmi, which authorized the use and sale of drugs during the Algerian jihad. The most radical of contemporary terrorist groups, the Takfir, explicitly encourages robbery and drug trafficking as long as a fifth of the proceeds are used to fund the Islamist cause (Le Parisien, September 8, 2002). Arrests in Morocco in 2002 confirmed that its members were encouraged by their emir to steal “jewels, credit cards and money” from their victims (Maroc-Hebdo, August 3, 2002). For terrorist organizations, the source of funding is irrelevant and only matters because it procures weapons, facilitates movement and produces propaganda. Even major operations cost relatively small sums when compared with the vast revenues of organized crime groups. For example, major operations like the Madrid bombings cost anywhere between $15,000 to $35,000, while the annual profits from cannabis trafficking in Europe alone are estimated at $12 billion. The incorporation of organized criminality into terrorist ideology and operations shows the flexibility of terrorist organizations in adapting to dynamic fundraising environments. The border between the two worlds is ever more porous, with terror suspects now often imprisoned on multiple charges, both criminal and terrorist. This poses significant challenges to law enforcement agencies, which have traditionally targeted terrorism and criminality separately.

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Africa North

GSPC losing ground in Algeria but active internationally

2006-01-10

Government authorities achieved a recent success in the battle against jihadists in Algeria, but the development comes at a time when the threat posed by the group may be more significant outside the country's borders. The Algerian daily Le Jeune Independant (www.jeune-independant.com) reported on January 2 that three high-ranking militants in the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) surrendered to the Algerian security services on December 26, in Médéa province, south of Algiers. The surrender provides further evidence of the increasing pressure the government forces are placing on the GSPC. The three militants are Abu Bilal al-Albani, responsible for the group's external relations, Abu Omar Abd al-Bir, who headed the media wing, and a third unidentified man. The paper went on to report that the men vowed to encourage other militants to give up armed struggle. The incident is a severe blow to the GSPC, leaving the group's leadership in disarray. The figures were close to the current commander, Abu Mus'ab Abd el-Wadoud, who confirmed the news of the loss "with most grievous sadness and despair" on a January 4 posting carried on the al-Safinat jihadi forum (www.al-saf.net/vb). Yet, Abd el-Wadoud portrayed the loss as the result of an ambush by security forces and a forced arrest of the leaders. Whatever the circumstances, the loss of Abu Bilal complicates coordination with fellow GSPC leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, currently in the Sahara desert organizing weapons smuggling to the group's hideouts in the north. The GSPC, as the above arrests indicate, is fast losing ground in Algeria, and its ability to strike is becoming more circumscribed. For example, a December 24 statement trumpeting an attack by the GSPC on the port of Dellys, posted on the group's own website (http://salafia.balder.prohosting.com), said that "the total number of victims was indeed high." In reality, according to the Algerian Arabic daily El-Khabar, the attack resulted in the death of one and some damage to a coastguard vessel (http://elkhabar.com). Yet the GSPC is not for want of funds: more than USD $22 million was found in the vehicle carrying the three leading arrestees. As elaborate fundraising networks and activities abroad have demonstrated—most recently through the arrests in late December of Algerians in Spain accused of crimes from which the proceeds were funneled to Algerian mujahideen elsewhere such as Afghanistan—investigators are now turning their attention to the European arena. GSPC members continue to be picked up all over Europe—in Spain, Italy, France, the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium. The GSPC, for its part, has openly demonstrated its broader intentions, declaring France its principal foreign target. Algerian militants are linking up with mujahideen in Morocco, Syria and Iraq, and seeking an alliance with bin Laden (Terrorism Focus, Volume 2, Issue 23). With a GSPC cell dismantled last November in Toronto, which included an explosives expert, and earlier U.S. experience with Algerian terrorism (Ahmed Ressam's alleged attempt to blow up the Los Angeles airport in 1999), U.S. officials will be viewing these GSPC or GSPC-affiliated groups as the new frontline in the war on terrorism.

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Africa North

Moroccan arrests demonstrate expansion of al-Qaeda network

2005-12-01

A wave of arrests that took place in early November in Morocco is illuminating for two reasons: the expansion of al-Zarqawi's influence outside Iraq, and the interconnection between jihadist activities on both shores of the Mediterranean. Zark had influence outside Iraq before the Iraq war, when al-Tawhid was active in Europe and probably North Africa. We've known the jihadist activities were connected, as demonstrated by the Madrid bombings, but also by the movement of the Takfiri back and forth. The series of arrests, beginning on November 11 in the cities of Rabat and Casablanca, has netted 17 Islamists suspected of links to al-Qaeda. Official sources claim that they have "dismantled a terrorist structure as it was being formed." According to the Moroccan Arabic daily al-Alam, the terrorist network uncovered by the 17 arrests, Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad fil-Maghrib (‘the Monotheism and Jihad group in Morocco'), has connections with small groups operating near the Iraqi border that maintain close ties with senior members of the al-Qaeda. I don't believe al-Tawhid has actually gone out of business. It's an al-Qaeda affiliate, but it looks like it still has its own independent organization, with interlocking directorates. Like al-Qaeda, it's organized by country, so there's probably an al-Tawhid wal-Jihad for Europe, another for Britain, another for Turkey, another for Egypt, etc, paralleling the al-Qaeda organizations and/or affiliates in the same areas. Tawhid is Zark's creation, in the same manner as Qaeda is Binny's, which means it probably also has its own sources of funding and a slightly different, Takfir-based, ideology. If we were to catch and kill Binny, Ayman, and Seif al-Adel tomorrow, the WoT would go on, with al-Tawhid as the primary enemy. You heard read it here first. A security source quoted by the paper indicated the existence of a secret organization outside Morocco headed by an Iraqi and made up of 20 members, which entertained a plan to attack a Dutch intelligence HQ. Their plans were subsequently altered by the addition of a new Moroccan member to the group who planned a larger operation in his home country: the targeting of a casino in Tangiers, the U.S. consulate in Casablanca and a number of Jewish synagogues. Others arrestees spoke of the production of poisons and explosives for subsequent use in Morocco. An interesting detail from the arrests was the indication of the al-Qaeda "radicalization course" undertaken by the new members, which included viewing jihadi films such as Jahim al-Rus, Badr al-Riyadh and Jahim al-Murtaddeen ("The Russian Inferno" the "Battle of Badr at Riyadh" and "the Apostates' Inferno"), as well as the productions of Iraqi networks on the Internet, such as Ansar al-Sunna, the Islamic Army and (al-Zarqawi's) al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (www.alalam.ma). One of the fundamental activists behind the group's planned campaign in Morocco, according to al-Alam, is an Algerian national named Abu Baseer. He is considered to be an ‘emir' (commander) of al-Qaeda in Europe working under the authority of al-Zarqawi. One of the 17 arrestees is believed to have handed over letters addressed to Osama bin Laden "focusing on the mujahideen in Saudi Arabia and Algeria and on the creation of an al-Qaeda organization in the North African states." (www.alalam.ma). In this sense, the pattern follows closely what is known from strategy documents concerning the next stages of the development of jihad: the preparation of support bases for al-Qaeda in Algeria and Morocco through the joining of forces of the mujahideen following their recruitment. Following this is their dispatch to military camps run by the Algerian Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), and then their training in the first phase for jihad in Iraq (or Syria in the event of American strikes). The second phase consists of their repatriation to Morocco in order to create sleeper cells, "to await the formation of a strong base from which to strike at economic and tourism targets, and Western institutions" (www.alalam.ma). Funding and logistical support comes from Europe, as the Moroccan arrests demonstrated, mostly from channels in Spain and the United Kingdom, which funnel money acquired through voluntary contributions or petty crime. The current Moroccan investigations focused in particular on the role of Belgium. One of the leaders of the arrested group is considered to be Mohamed Rha, a Belgian national of Moroccan ancestry, one of the operatives who had returned from ideological training in Syria to recruit members. On November 17 the trial in Brussels opened of Belgian and Moroccan nationals accused of belonging to a terrorist organization and providing logistical support to the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (Groupe islamique combattant marocain—GICM). This group was founded in 1997 by Moroccan veterans of the jihad training camps in Afghanistan and is held responsible for recruiting the dozen suicide bombers who carried out the multiple bombings at Casablanca in May 2003, which left 44 dead. The GICM is also suspected of carrying out the Madrid train explosions that killed 191 people in March 2004. This second atrocity prompted Belgian police to close in on a GICM network based in the provincial town of Maaseik, which served as a logistics center and meeting place for the group's European leadership, where, according to the Flemish daily Het Nieuwsblad, discussions on the GICM organization took place on three occasions [www.nieuwsblad.be]. According to the prosecution case, as reported by De Standaard, one of the prominent members of this group, the Moroccan Abdelkader Hakimi, was designated by a fellow member imprisoned in France as the leader of the GICM. The 19-year old Hakimi is believed to have spent half his life on the run, spending ten years in Algeria, journeying with false papers to Libya, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, producing false identity papers for himself and for Afghan militant veterans and to have fought in Bosnia during the civil war [www.standaard.be]. Ummm... He's only 19? He spent half his life on the run? That means he started at 8 1/2... The activities of Hakimi illustrate the skills and strengths of North African militant groups in Europe. The GICM is believed to number some few hundred committed radicals, supported by 1,000 to 2,000 sympathizers operating on both shores of the Mediterranean. Cells have operated in Italy, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Spain, the last of which announced on November 23 the arrest of 10 Moroccans and Algerians suspected of financing and giving logistical support to counterparts from the Algerian GSPC resident in Germany, the Netherlands, Britain, Belgium and Denmark. The revelation of the ideological training of Moroccans taking place on the borders with Iraq has added urgency to Moroccan security concerns since the November 9 bombings in the Jordanian capital Amman. Following the arrests of the 17 Moroccans, one Abu Musab al-Iraqi (styling himself as the "al-Qaeda correspondent") denounced on November 23 the events on the al-Firdaws jihadi forum and at the same time deplored the activities of Morocco's "secular" Channel Two TV broadcaster. His objection was to the vox pop interviews in the wake of the Amman bombings, addressed to "the ignorant, weak and base people 
 who spoke of Zarqawi inventing a new religion, and referred to his ‘bankrupt mind' " [http://alfirdaws.org/forums]. According to al-Alam, Moroccan intelligence is convinced that their country lies third on al-Qaeda's list of targets, after Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and remain on the lookout for al-Qaeda operatives crossing over from Algeria, and for senior members entering the country from Belgium [www.alalam.ma]. Coincidentally, both Morocco and Jordan have relatively liberal regimes that have charted course toward democracy. Also coincidentally, the kings of both countries claim descent from the Profit, and in the event of the establishment of a caliphate could lay claim to the Seat of All Power and its attendant dancing girls, &c.

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Africa North

Arrests in Morocco Highlight the Expanding Jihadi Nexus

2005-11-29

A wave of arrests that took place in early November in Morocco is illuminating for two reasons: the expansion of al-Zarqawi's influence outside Iraq, and the interconnection between jihadist activities on both shores of the Mediterranean. The series of arrests, beginning on November 11 in the cities of Rabat and Casablanca, has netted 17 Islamists suspected of links to al-Qaeda. Official sources claim that they have "dismantled a terrorist structure as it was being formed." According to the Moroccan Arabic daily al-Alam, the terrorist network uncovered by the 17 arrests, Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad fil-Maghrib (‘the Monotheism and Jihad group in Morocco'), has connections with small groups operating near the Iraqi border that maintain close ties with senior members of the al-Qaeda. A security source quoted by the paper indicated the existence of a secret organization outside Morocco headed by an Iraqi and made up of 20 members, which entertained a plan to attack a Dutch intelligence HQ. Their plans were subsequently altered by the addition of a new Moroccan member to the group who planned a larger operation in his home country: the targeting of a casino in Tangiers, the U.S. consulate in Casablanca and a number of Jewish synagogues. Others arrestees spoke of the production of poisons and explosives for subsequent use in Morocco. An interesting detail from the arrests was the indication of the al-Qaeda "radicalization course" undertaken by the new members, which included viewing jihadi films such as Jahim al-Rus, Badr al-Riyadh and Jahim al-Murtaddeen ("The Russian Inferno" the "Battle of Badr at Riyadh" and "the Apostates' Inferno"), as well as the productions of Iraqi networks on the Internet, such as Ansar al-Sunna, the Islamic Army and (al-Zarqawi's) al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (www.alalam.ma). One of the fundamental activists behind the group's planned campaign in Morocco, according to al-Alam, is an Algerian national named Abu Baseer. He is considered to be an ‘emir' (commander) of al-Qaeda in Europe working under the authority of al-Zarqawi. One of the 17 arrestees is believed to have handed over letters addressed to Osama bin Laden "focusing on the mujahideen in Saudi Arabia and Algeria and on the creation of an al-Qaeda organization in the North African states." (www.alalam.ma). In this sense, the pattern follows closely what is known from strategy documents concerning the next stages of the development of jihad: the preparation of support bases for al-Qaeda in Algeria and Morocco through the joining of forces of the mujahideen following their recruitment. Following this is their dispatch to military camps run by the Algerian Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), and then their training in the first phase for jihad in Iraq (or Syria in the event of American strikes). The second phase consists of their repatriation to Morocco in order to create sleeper cells, "to await the formation of a strong base from which to strike at economic and tourism targets, and Western institutions" (www.alalam.ma). Funding and logistical support comes from Europe, as the Moroccan arrests demonstrated, mostly from channels in Spain and the United Kingdom, which funnel money acquired through voluntary contributions or petty crime. The current Moroccan investigations focused in particular on the role of Belgium. One of the leaders of the arrested group is considered to be Mohamed R'ha, a Belgian national of Moroccan ancestry, one of the operatives who had returned from ideological training in Syria to recruit members. On November 17 the trial in Brussels opened of Belgian and Moroccan nationals accused of belonging to a terrorist organization and providing logistical support to the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (Groupe islamique combattant marocain—GICM). This group was founded in 1997 by Moroccan veterans of the jihad training camps in Afghanistan and is held responsible for recruiting the dozen suicide bombers who carried out the multiple bombings at Casablanca in May 2003, which left 44 dead. The GICM is also suspected of carrying out the Madrid train explosions that killed 191 people in March 2004. This second atrocity prompted Belgian police to close in on a GICM network based in the provincial town of Maaseik, which served as a logistics center and meeting place for the group's European leadership, where, according to the Flemish daily Het Nieuwsblad, discussions on the GICM organization took place on three occasions [www.nieuwsblad.be]. According to the prosecution case, as reported by De Standaard, one of the prominent members of this group, the Moroccan Abdelkader Hakimi, was designated by a fellow member imprisoned in France as the leader of the GICM. The 19-year old Hakimi is believed to have spent half his life on the run, spending ten years in Algeria, journeying with false papers to Libya, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, producing false identity papers for himself and for Afghan militant veterans and to have fought in Bosnia during the civil war [www.standaard.be]. The activities of Hakimi illustrate the skills and strengths of North African militant groups in Europe. The GICM is believed to number some few hundred committed radicals, supported by 1,000 to 2,000 sympathizers operating on both shores of the Mediterranean. Cells have operated in Italy, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Spain, the last of which announced on November 23 the arrest of 10 Moroccans and Algerians suspected of financing and giving logistical support to counterparts from the Algerian GSPC resident in Germany, the Netherlands, Britain, Belgium and Denmark. The revelation of the ideological training of Moroccans taking place on the borders with Iraq has added urgency to Moroccan security concerns since the November 9 bombings in the Jordanian capital Amman. Following the arrests of the 17 Moroccans, one Abu Mus'ab al-Iraqi (styling himself as the "al-Qaeda correspondent") denounced on November 23 the events on the al-Firdaws jihadi forum and at the same time deplored the activities of Morocco's "secular" Channel Two TV broadcaster. His objection was to the vox pop interviews in the wake of the Amman bombings, addressed to "the ignorant, weak and base people 
 who spoke of Zarqawi inventing a new religion, and referred to his ‘bankrupt mind' " [http://alfirdaws.org/forums]. According to al-Alam, Moroccan intelligence is convinced that their country lies third on al-Qaeda's list of targets, after Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and remain on the lookout for al-Qaeda operatives crossing over from Algeria, and for senior members entering the country from Belgium [www.alalam.ma].

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Africa: North

Hassan Hattab trying to reclaim position as GSPC supremo

2005-11-24

Following the referendum on the amnesty for Islamist militants still holding out in the mountains, Hassan Hattab, the former leader of the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), gave a unique interview to the pan-Arab newspaper al-Hayat (www.daralhayat.com). The information he provides clears up some obscurities in our knowledge of the Algerian jihadist movement, and complements the analysis of the previous edition of Terrorism Focus (see “Algerian Magazine Rebuts the Amnesty”). Hassan Hattab founded the GSPC in 1998. According to his interview, after serving as “emir” (commander) under Djamel Zitouni in a sector to the east of Algiers for a few years during the 1990s, Hattab formed his breakaway group. The group was formed, he says, due to revulsion at the GIA’s “deviation from the salafist doctrine to that of al-Takfir wal-Hijra (excommunication and exile),” a doctrine that licensed the “killing of innocents and denunciation of scholars unjustly,” in particular the denunciation of the leading shaykhs of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhadj. Having served as leader for three years, news began to emerge of Hattab’s resignation from the GSPC in 2001 over ideological differences. During the interview, Hattab referred to the increasing influence of bin Laden over the movement at that time as causing rifts in the membership, and one of the factors behind his own decision to leave (these rifts were likely behind the confusion surrounding the GSPC’s support, or criticism, of bin Laden at the time of the 9/11 attacks). In general, Hattab emphasized bin Laden’s influence on strategy, such as the decision to inaugurate activity in the African sahel, and post-dated his involvement with the group. “What had made things worse,” Hattab claims, “was that I had decided to place limits on the [form the] struggle [should take].” Disappearing subsequently from the scene, in summer 2003, reports from mujahideen “penitents” began to emerge saying that he had been killed in confrontations either with the Mali military or with members of the GSPC, who by August of that year had officially appointed Nabil Sahraoui as its new leader. In the interview Hattab explains his disappearance as a deliberate decision “to organize my affairs to facilitate activity and communicate with the brothers in the mountains.” He maintains that far from difficulties with former colleagues, he was “not confronted with anything unpleasant, and was able to circulate among them.” The point Hattab appears to be making here is one of continuity in his role in contradistinction to the lack of continuity demonstrated by the present leadership. This conflict came out into the open at the beginning of this year when, following a trenchant criticism of the group by leading militant strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, the current GSPC leader Abu Mus’ab Abd al-Wadoud posted a fatwa on February 9 on the GSPC website [www.jihad-algeria.com] against Hattab and his “prostration to the tyrants” (see Terrorism Focus, Volume II, issues 7 and 20). Hattab responded on February 17 via the Algerian Arabic daily El-Khabar, accusing Abd al-Wadoud of policies reminiscent of former GIA leaders Djamel Zitouni and Antar Zouabri [www.elkhabar.com]. The accusation Hattab made at the time, of GIA infiltration into the GSPC, he expanded in the al-Hayat interview, arguing the domination of infamous GIA group figures “who carry the ideas of the GIA, using taqiyya [dissimulation] due to their numerical inferiority.” Despite the February 9 declaration, Hattab maintains that he is still the official leader of the GSPC: “I consider myself its founder and leader, since the leadership is conferred as a duty
 the brothers have entrusted me this task.” As for the resignation reports, Hattab maintains, despite the August 2003 declaration by Nabil Sahraoui, that “the GSPC has no document or audio tape to confirm it.” Since his 2001 withdrawal from the GSPC, Hattab has been gaining a progressively higher profile as a campaigner for an end to the armed struggle. In the interview he openly admits communicating with Algiers and to exchanging mutual aid in ensuring the success of the amnesty project initiated by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. He justifies his position by referring to “guarantees” received from Algiers, and to optimistic “developments in the authorities’ treatment of elements of the Islamist armed groups.” Although at the time of the September 29 referendum on the proposal the number of recorded “penitents” hardly topped two dozen, Hattab maintained that Bouteflika’s initiative “actually has wide support among the activists in the mountains.” As to the threats voiced by Abd al-Wadoud against members taking up the offer, Hattab remains unfazed: “GSPC does not have the means to liquidate the overwhelming majority who are convinced of the initiative.” The delay, he maintains, is due simply to some reservations on details of the proposal, notably the rejection of “the accusation of terrorism to the brothers who took up arms against the revolution,” and objections to “the removal of the FIS from the political arena.” The interviewer, Muhammad Muqaddam, spoke of Hattab’s judicious caution in his responses, in order to avoid any mistakes at a delicate stage in what he termed “historic” negotiations. This may account for Hattab’s carefully sketched chronology on his own—and bin Laden’s—mutually exclusive involvement in the GSPC, as an attempt to present a “clean record” vis-à-vis the war on terror. It may also account for an interesting omission, namely his earlier accusations of GIA infiltration by the Algerian secret services. His role as catalyst for the surrender of Algerian militants leaves Hattab highly exposed, but up in the hills near Tizi Ouzou from where he is co-ordinating his work, there is no more talk of the “militancy option,” which he retained even up to a year ago. Meanwhile, Abd al-Wadoud maintains his irredentist struggle up in the mountains of the Akfadou region of Bejaïa province “not for the restoration of their economic circumstances [under the amnesty], nor for the restoration of social rights or confiscated political gains, nor to return to the year 1991 [before the suspension of the election results that sparked the civil war], but for a return to the first three centuries, for nothing less than the [establishment of] the Caliphate.”

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Africa: North

GSPC publications becoming increasingly shrill

2005-10-02

Despite the high-profile June 4 attack on a Mauritanian military outpost (see Terrorism Focus, Volume II, Issue 11), evidence exists of increasing exasperation among the Algerian jihadis. The reaction to the al-Qaeda murder of two Algerian diplomats in Iraq on July 27 demonstrated how out of touch the mujahideen are with the Algerian population, which reacted negatively to Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) leader Abu Musaab Abd al-Wadoud's support for the assassinations. A recent series of announcements and publications has underlined, with growing shrillness, the threat posed by creeping ‘secularization' in Algeria, against which the group is powerless. At the beginning of August the GSPC issued a plea to Algerians in France to do what the mujahideen in Algeria cannot—get close enough to assassinate Algerian leaders. But the message also underlined the real problem facing the mujahideen, when it listed their true enemies: "Not just the military leadership, but [secularizing bodies such as] the media 
 cultural institutes and diplomatic missions. The danger of these civilian bodies is several times greater than the generals 
 since these direct campaigns against [Islamic principles in] the Family Law and the education system." [www.salafia.ne1.net] The issue of secular education merited a particular declaration addressed to those of university age. The communiqué dated August 1, Shahdh al-Himma li-Shabab al-Umma, (Whetting the Will of the Nation's Youth) expressed its frustration at the lack of response by young Algerians to the news of the jihads in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and ascribed the torpor to conspiratorial measures to distract and corrupt these youths—which it lamented as successful. The tone of the posting is resentful: "where did you vanish to in these [last] years?" it complains. "Has your desire to gain a university diploma and a future and a better life distracted you from studying what Allah has to offer you?" Instead, is it not time, it continues, "to leave children's playgrounds and the coffee shops of the penniless unemployed and instead join the battlefields of the heroes?" [www.salafia.ne1.net] The message was reinforced in the fourth edition of the GSPC magazine al-Jama'ah released September 2005. It quotes bin Ladin as saying "if I were a student among you I would leave my studies 
 to follow the squadrons of the mujahideen." The call to arms forms the cover theme of the edition. The essay "Youths of the Islamic Maghreb, This is your Day" outlines the latest developments in the growing U.S. presence in Northwest Africa. Deploring the numbers of "doomed individuals" who have responded to the amnesty, the essay addressed to all youth of the Islamic Maghreb (understood to mean all of North and Northwest Africa) and put forward the offer of joining "an elite group of young men driven by faith" to aid their eastern brothers and fight the "American cowboys" ("a vicious fool that crumbles after the first strike") nearer to home in the northern and western desert zones. In particular it highlights the strategic advantages of opening up a new front against the enemy and makes a call to jihad-minded members of the Algerian military, whose expertise now "is desperately sought by the training camps of jihad." [Al-Jama'ah IV, pp. 25-29] The pressure on the mujahideen has increased this month with the latest amnesty proposal scheduled for September 29. Among its provisions are the controversial offers to drop charges against rebels who laid down their arms after the January 13 2000 civil concord deadline, and re-establish the rights of Islamists who lost their jobs in the crackdown carried out during the 1990s. But the jihad has some way to go. Algeria's Prime Minister Ahmad Ouyahia has said some 1,000 armed Muslim fundamentalists are still at large, and that while some hundreds are likely—based on past performance—to respond to the latest amnesty, "there will always be the hard core who will never take up the offer of peace."

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Terror Networks & Islam

Zarqawi's endorsement of the GSPC hit on Mauritania

2005-06-27

On June 15 the "Media Department of al-Qaeda Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers," the Iraqi affiliate of al-Qaeda, issued a statement that included an endorsement of the Algerian mujahideen. Its statement "May Allah bless the work of those heroes who took upon themselves to fight the apostates in Mauritania" in particular fixes the object of the endorsement as the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), which claimed responsibility for an attack upon a Mauritanian military outpost on June 3-4. This, the GSPC claimed, was an act of "revenge for our brothers who were arrested by the apostate Mauritanian regime over the recent period, and as a support for the oppressed Muslims there." That attack was later established as having been carried out by the GSPC sub-group led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, termed the Groupe salafist libre, which operates independently of the GSPC (See Focus Vol II, issue 11). The endorsement opens up a number of issues relating to the coherence of the jihadist groups in the region. Last December an Algerian group announced on the al-Ma'sada jihadist forum how it was transferring its allegiance to Osama bin Laden, calling itself "TheOrganization of al-Qaeda in the Land of the Berbers" [www.alm2sda.net]. More recently, on May 8, the Qa'idat al-Jihad fi al-Jaza'ir (al-Qaeda [base] of the Jihad in Algeria) announced its appearance on the jihadist Kalimat al-Haqq site [www.rightword.net], citing the demoralization of the jihadist groups in Algeria, their bad name through association with massacres of civilians, and the questionable motivation and loyalty of the leaders to the cause. The statement encouraged the irredentist remnants to join ‘a new cause.' The present endorsement may be a positive response to attempts by GSPC remnants to restore credibility. Indeed the attack on the Mauritanian outpost may be partly seen in this light. The Mauritanian attack came after pressure from the government at Nouakchott against camps training mujahideen for the Iraqi theatre. In Algeria the number of foreign Islamist militants arrested has increased in recent months, an unusual development which has worried the authorities. On the same day of the endorsement by al-Qaeda, six Yemeni students were arrested in eastern Algeria, suspected of belonging to an unnamed network linked to al-Qaeda. This incident, and the message from al-Qaeda in Iraq, suggest that a greater degree of co-ordination is being attempted, either in the form of direct links between the groups, or at least as an attempt to re-package the activities as part of one ‘global jihad' movement. Whatever the exact explanation, the Algerian jihadi theatre, as proclaimed by the GSPC statement on the Mauritanian attack, looks set to expand. Attacks in Algeria, despite a net decline, have peaked recently, and there have been renewed clashes on June 12-13 between GSPC militants and the Mauritanian military in the desert area near the border with Mali. Soldiers are now to be deployed in greater strength along the border areas with Mali and Algeria [www.mapeci.com].

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