Syria-Lebanon-Iran | |
'David's Corridor': What Role Do the Druze Play in Israel's Plans to Dismember Syria | |
2025-03-04 | |
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Kirill Semenov [REGNUM] The Israeli leadership would like to use the Syrian Druze as its “fifth column” in Syria, but so far the bet on this ethno-confessional minority has not paid off. ![]() Despite the provocative statements of the Israeli leadership, the Syrian Druze continue to claim that their "qibla" (i.e. point of attraction) is Damascus, and they intend to remain Syrians, although tensions in relations with the transitional government continue to mount. On Saturday, following an incident in the Damascus suburb of Jaramana, in which two militants from local Druze groups killed an employee of the Syrian government's Public Security Service (PSS - police), the town was blocked by government forces. Israel decided to intervene in the situation, presenting itself as a "defender of the Druze." The Minister of Defense of the Jewish state, Israel Katz, then said that he had instructed the military to prepare for a march on Jaramana and to support the Druze if Syrian troops began to clear the suburbs. "We will not allow the radical Islamic regime in Syria to harm the Druze. If the regime harms the Druze, we will strike at it," Katz said. The head of the military department also assured that he “commits to our Druze brothers in Israel” to do everything possible to prevent harm from being caused to “their Druze brothers in Syria,” and intends to take all necessary steps to ensure their safety. "DAVID'S CORRIDOR" Israel is trying to take advantage of the unstable situation in Syria to finally destroy the country, which in the future could pose a threat to the Jewish state. The events of October 7, 2023 have changed Israel greatly, primarily in its assessment of its own security and measures to ensure it. And now, perhaps, maintaining chaos in neighboring countries instead of stability seems to be the best option for Tel Aviv to mitigate any future challenges. The Israeli leadership was not interested in the fall of the Assad regime, believing that this would lead to dangerous turbulence at the borders. Now it is doing everything to ensure that the new Syrian authorities are unable to stabilize the situation, and even wants Syria as a state to cease to exist in principle, disintegrating into several entities hostile to each other. Of course, in such a scenario, individual “splashes” of these conflicts may also affect Israel, but these will definitely not be waves like the “Al-Aqsa flood,” and it will be much easier to counteract them. Israel speaks about these plans openly and without embarrassment. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar has publicly voiced the Netanyahu government's preference for a fragmented Syria. In a speech at the EU-Israel summit, Saar called for the country to be divided into separate autonomous states along perceived ethnic and religious lines. This, he said, is important to protect the country's minorities, who are under threat from the new government. The plan to dismember Syria has already received the unofficial name “David’s Corridor” in Israel. It proposes, at the first stage, the creation of a security zone in southern Syria in the provinces of Daraa and Quneitra bordering Israel. The Druze in the neighboring province of Suwayda, where they constitute the majority, would be able to rely on this zone. This would create a continuous strip of Israeli control in southern Syria, and the Druze would become a local support for Israel, just as the Lebanese Christians - the Maronites - once did in the puppet state of southern Lebanon before 2000. The reality of the launch of the first stage of the scenario is indicated by the ultimatum demands voiced by the Netanyahu government regarding the withdrawal of all armed forces of the new Syrian government from the southern regions of Syria. In the second stage, the "David Corridor" is planned to be extended through the desert areas along the border with Iraq, relying on the American base at At-Tanf. This security belt should be provided by Arab tribes that were part of the pro-American "Free Syrian Army" based at At-Tanf, and be extended to the territories controlled by the Kurdish formations of the "Syrian Democratic Forces" in northeastern Syria. Thus, Israel will be cut off from Iraq with its numerous Shiite pro-Iranian groups by a continuous strip of forces allied to it and the US, and the “Islamist” government in Damascus will be isolated. For this purpose, the Alawites in the provinces of Tartus and Latakia, according to this plan, must also separate from Syria, forming their own quasi-state. In connection with this, there have already been rumors in the Western press that Israel would like Russian bases to remain in Syria, and is negotiating this not only with Russia itself, but also with the United States. Obviously, this is a hint that the Russian side should become the curator of the “Alawite state,” while the United States will continue to look after the Kurdish state, and Israel will look after the Druze state, connected by the “David Corridor.” But the aim of these information provocations is also to present Russia as an accomplice in the division of Syria and to spoil the background of Moscow’s relations with Damascus, as well as with other Arab states, as well as Turkey. However, the large number of publications in support of the separation of the Alawites from the Syrian state in the Russian-language segment of various social networks adds credibility to this rumor. DRUZE BETWEEN THE HAMMER OF TEL AVIV AND THE ANVIL OF DAMASCUS Israel's far-reaching plans have met a serious obstacle in the form of the Syrian Druze themselves. The Druze of the southern provinces and the forces of Jaramana quickly rejected any external assistance, reaffirming the unity and indivisibility of Syria. Later, demonstrations under Syrian flags were held in Druze areas against the statements of Netanyahu and Katz. As Alain Saab, a Russian researcher of the Druze community with Druze roots, told Regnum news agency, it is noteworthy that it was the Druze groups and influential political figures from the As-Suwayda region that acted as mediators in resolving the conflict between the population of Jaramana and the Public Security Service (PSS) of the transitional government. In particular, a significant role was played by Laith al-Balous, an influential Druze political figure and leader of the Forces of the Sheikhs of Dignity (Rijal al-Karama) group, who became a de facto mediator between Damascus and Jaramane. Thus, according to the expert, constant contacts between the Druze leaders and the GSS helped to avoid unnecessary bloodshed and escalation: now there is silence in the Jaramana area, the GSS units have fully entered the center of the area and set up checkpoints, and local forces and Damascus are taking further steps to resolve the conflict. In turn, the leader of the Druze in Lebanon, Walid Jumblatt, who also has great influence among the Druze communities in Syria and Israel, said on Sunday that he would soon visit Syria to meet with its interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and help ease tensions in the Druze community in that country and help resolve all disputes between it and Damascus. "Free Syrians must be careful of Israeli plots," he told a news conference on Sunday, accusing Israel and Prime Minister Netanyahu of creating sectarian division and chaos in Syria. On the other hand, as Alain Saab noted, the Druze-populated province of As-Suwayda is indeed playing its own game, enjoying the political support of the Israeli Druze when necessary. The nature of this “game” is to systematically pressure Damascus to obtain some autonomous privileges in the overall Syrian context. However, the connection between the Syrian Druze and the Israelis should not be equated with the connection between the Syrian Druze and Israel itself. Many Syrian Druze do have relatives in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, which Tel Aviv has announced its annexation of. However, it is important to note that the Druze of that part of the Golan Heights retain a Syrian national identity. To this day, the Druze from the Golan do not serve in the Israeli army and most do not have Israeli citizenship. At the same time, one cannot underestimate the activities of the Israeli intelligence services, primarily the Mossad, which uses some Israeli Druze to create pro-Israeli networks among the Druze community in Syria. Obviously, the so-called “Military Council” of Suwayda, created back in December, can be considered an Israel-oriented structure, but it made its presence known most loudly after the announcement of Israel’s plans to divide Syria. However, the influence of this group among the Syrian Druze is insignificant, although its ranks include highly qualified military personnel who were trained at the American base at Al-Tanf back in 2023. The "Mountain Brigade" and "Karam Sheikh Forces" significantly outnumber this faction. Despite its active PR (not without the help of Israeli information resources), at the moment this structure, according to official statements, is supported by four villages and a number of virtually unknown groups. The Military Council also has no support from large armed groups or religious leaders. THE KEY TO THE PROBLEM IS IN DAMASCUS However, which side the Druze end up on will largely depend on the new Syrian authorities themselves. On the one hand, Sunni Arabs and Druze do not have the same antagonism as Sunnis and Alawites, and one can speak of much greater mutual understanding. Most Druze did not support the regime of Bashar al-Assad and did not participate on his side in the civil war. Quite the contrary, in the last stage of the conflict, Druze armed groups openly opposed Assad, advancing towards Damascus, disarming parts of the collapsed government. On the other hand, the Druze certainly remain distrustful of the “Islamist” government in Damascus. The Druze already had negative experiences with the Jabhat al-Nusra* group even before it became Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)*. Thus, under pressure from jihadists, the Druze communities in Idlib were forced to accept Islam (although, by the way, a statement from their leaders was enough for this and no evidence was required from each Druze). And several Druze units fighting in the ranks of the opposition in southern Syria were surrounded and captured by radicals after they were declared “apostates,” and only the intervention of other rebel factions allowed them to save their lives and be free again, but after that the Druze no longer joined the ranks of the armed opposition. Now many problems between the new authorities and the Druze have been resolved. In particular, in January, the Public Security Forces (PSF) of the transitional government were deployed in the province of Suwayda, although the Druze had previously prevented their entry into the region. The Military Operations Department forces are also present in Suwayda, including separating warring Druze factions from local Bedouin tribes. But it is the Druze factions that are still the key guarantor of security in the province, although Damascus is not opposed to some factions helping the security services, as this can speed up their integration and create a barrier to threats from Israel. But mistrust not only remains, but is generally growing. Thus, according to expert Alain Saab, the Druze initially treated HTS* with some apprehension, but also with hope. “Now, in my opinion, everyone is increasingly afraid of HTS,” the expert noted, “ ![]() In general, as Saaba notes, there is still cautious support for the new Syrian authorities among the Druze, but after the creation of the “Military Council” and the conflict in Jaramana, calls for a forceful solution to the Druze issue can be heard from the most radical elements of HTS*, “and this is seriously damaging support for Damascus among the Druze.” According to the expert, if the new government can somehow stop all this disinformation and fakes, then a warming will occur. If not, then on one side Israel, and on the other the radicals themselves will “construct a conflict.” But in any case, Israel will continue to put pressure on Syria, using the information space to incite hatred towards the Druze on the part of Sunni Arabs and, conversely, with the aim of expanding the ethno-confessional conflict and further dividing Syria.
Members of Syria's new authorities security forces deploy in the mostly Druze and Syrian forces have entered a majority Druze and Christian suburb on the outskirts of Damascus and stabilized the situation, a local source said on Monday, after deadly clashes with Druze gunmen. “The situation in Jarmana is stable. Yesterday, the General Security Forces and police entered the city with the cooperation of the city’s people, and there is good cooperation between the people and the police,” Rabie Munther, a member of the Jarmana Civil Action Group, told Rudaw’s Nalin Hassan. He said that Syrian forces entered the town on Sunday night following 48 hours of tensions and following mediation between dignitaries and Syrian government authorities. Security is now being maintained jointly by the police and the area’s residents, according to Munther. “We have not stopped basic services and institutions for even a second since the fall of the regime until now,” he stressed. Jaramana, a mostly Druze and Christian suburb of the capital Damascus, has witnessed tensions for days following a fatal shooting at a checkpoint. Clashes ensued between security forces and local gunmen, resulting in another death and nine others injured. Munther explained that what happened was a “personal matter,” where unknown gunmen attacked a car. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) led the rebel coalition that toppled Bashar al-Assad’s regime in early December. Its then leader and now Syria’s interim President, Ahmad al-Sharaa, has repeatedly pledged to protect the rights of all Syrians. In December, the rebel coalition, including the HTS, agreed to merge into the Syrian defense ministry. The international community has expressed concern that the new Islamist authorities in Damascus may impose strict Islamic rule in Syria, threatening the country’s minority groups such as Kurds, Druze, Christians, and Alawites. On Saturday, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned the Damascus administration to “not harm the Druze,” stressing that Syrian authorities would “suffer the consequences” if they harmed the community. In Syria’s southern Druze-majority Suwayda province, both armed and political factions have refused to disband their forces. | |
Link |
The Grand Turk |
Erdogan will have to try very hard to remain Syria's main partner |
2025-02-07 |
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Kamran Gasanov [REGNUM] In 2011, the Turkish and Syrian governments went their separate ways, like ships at sea, and for more than ten years they had no contact, except for meetings at the level of heads of the Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, and intelligence services, mediated by Russia. In the last two years, Damascus and Ankara have been preparing to restore ties, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan wanted to meet with Bashar al-Assad. However, to the delight of the Turkish leader, this was no longer necessary. ![]() Now the Turks do not have to negotiate for a long time on unfavorable conditions for establishing diplomatic relations, which depended on the demands to withdraw troops from the northern territories of Syria. If earlier Turkey, with certain exceptions in the form of Kurdish zones, had control only over a thin corridor from the Mediterranean to the border with Iraq, now Ankara can lay claim to broad influence in the capital of Syria. The head of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT), Ibrahim Kalin, was praying at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus just four days after the change of power, and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan became the first diplomat to visit the Syrian capital. Turkey's leadership in Syria, it must be said, was deserved. After all, after the introduction of Russian troops in 2015 and subsequent operations by Assad's army, the armed opposition lost significant territories. Its former sponsors, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, withdrew, and after Turkish military operations in the north against ISIS* and the Kurdish YPG, the rebels either came under full Turkish control (as the Free Syrian Army, later renamed the Syrian National Army) or were heavily dependent on it (as was the case with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham* and smaller groups in Idlib). The Americans and Europeans have shifted their focus from the fight against Assad to the fight against Iran and the protection of the Kurds, settling in the Euphrates region. It is therefore not surprising that the first foreign guests in Damascus are Turks, and one of the top priority destinations for the representatives of the new Syria is Ankara and Istanbul. On January 15, a large delegation headed by Foreign Minister Asad Hassan al-Shibani arrived in the Turkish capita . He was also accompanied by Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Kasra and General Intelligence Director Anas Hassan Khattab. Given that Turkey is Syria's main military supporter, it was expected that the most important person in the Syrian leadership, Ahmad al-Sharaa, would choose Turkey as his first country to visit. But before arriving in Ankara, al-Sharaa left for a two-day visit to Riyadh. This circumstance, on the one hand, is surprising. After all, the KSA has not been the main player in Syria for a long time, and moreover, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, together with his colleagues from the League of Arab States, has actually legitimized the "dictator" by returning Assad to the LAS. However, in politics, such steps are called diversification. Al-Sharaa does not want to fall under complete dependence on Turkey and be Erdogan's puppet, like the president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Therefore, he needs to pursue a policy of multipolarity. High-level Europeans, including the heads of the French and German Foreign Ministries, as well as EU representatives, have come to Damascus, but they demand too much in return – democracy, inclusiveness, an agreement on the creation of Kurdish autonomy. And from the general experience of the Middle East, it follows that the “Westerners” are dangerous and unreliable allies. Al-Sharaa remembers the history of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi well. The Gulf monarchies do not lobby for human rights and democracy, but they have fat wallets that the UK and the US, especially Donald Trump, covet. Half-destroyed Syria needs money. And what about Syria - Erdogan himself went on a tour of the Gulf to save the lira, which was falling into the abyss. Where there is money, there is politics. Damascus wants to have the support of Arab countries, whose leader Saudi Arabia is trying to position itself not without success. Syria is aiming even wider, hoping to legitimize itself and gain weight in the Islamic world through bin Salman. Such support will strengthen Damascus's independence from Ankara, and at the same time will become, albeit light, but still a bulletproof vest against Israel, which has expanded its occupation of Syrian lands. What the parties actually agreed on in Riyadh is still unclear. In general, during this transition period there are almost no specifics on any international issue, including the fate of the Russian bases. At the same time, having flown to Ankara after Riyadh, the interim president of Syria appeared before Erdogan as a much more authoritative leader than he had been just a few days ago. Negotiations with Erdogan are a recognition of both al-Sharaa and the realities “on the ground”. And Turkey is now the most influential of the bordering countries. And al-Sharaa is not averse to monetizing the potential offered by its northern neighbor. It is clear from the content of the speeches of the two leaders that the special relations between Syria and Turkey stem not only from the former's great dependence on the latter. Al-Sharaa and Erdogan are also linked by relative ideological closeness. The Syrian oppositionists who came to power, including armed ones, and various militant groups set the task of establishing an Islamist regime in the country in one form or another. Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party are their model and guide in this direction. From the very first days of the change of power, Ankara made it clear that it was ready to help Damascus build state institutions. And Erdogan said at a meeting with his guest that he attached "great importance to the creation of the country's administration." Al-Sharaa, for his part, appreciated "Turkey's efforts to ensure the political and economic success of the current Syrian administration." The Syrian authorities also cannot ignore the fact that Turkey supported the anti-Assad forces almost alone and until the very end. “Turkey did not leave the Syrian people alone in their most desperate and difficult days,” Erdogan said. His guest did not skimp on words of gratitude in response, saying that he would never forget how Erdogan let millions of Syrian refugees into his country, and how “Syrian and Turkish blood mixed in the liberation struggle.” The refugee issue will also remain a common point of contact for a long time. Türkiye would like to bring millions of Syrians home so as not to burden its economy and reduce social tensions. For Al-Sharaa, this is a big burden. It is not that Erdogan will terrorize Syria, like Europe, with a “migration baton,” but Damascus will still be obliged to take Ankara’s opinion into account. But money will also be needed to support the refugees, and in this regard, the help of the Arab monarchies becomes even more relevant. The most painful issue for Erdogan, perhaps even more than refugees, remains the YPG, the Kurds and their separatism. Since Assad's fall, Turkish troops have carried out several operations against them in Manbij and Tel Rifaat, but Ankara wants the complete destruction, disarmament or evacuation of YPG and SDF fighters, the lead structure in the northeast. Al-Sharaa is negotiating with Kurdish representatives, the Kurds themselves initiated the talks. However, there are no specifics yet. The Kurds sometimes raise green-white-black flags, sometimes demand autonomy for their political institutions and armed forces. Erdogan and al-Sharaa share a position on the territorial integrity and unity of Syria, hinting that there will be no independent Syrian Kurdistan. However, the Turkish president wants more practical steps in this direction. "We discussed the steps that need to be taken against the separatist terrorist organization and its supporters occupying northeastern Syria. I told him that we are ready to provide Syria with the necessary support in the fight against all forms of terrorism, be it Daesh or PKK," Erdogan said after the talks, expressing satisfaction with al-Sharaa's "firm will" in the fight against terrorism. Ash-Sharaa himself is in no hurry to drive the horses to the east. He speaks of interest in a strategic partnership with Turkey in all areas. He also noted that Ankara and Damascus are working on "creating a common strategy to counter security threats in the region" and discussing issues of Syria's integrity in the northeast. However, there is still no clarity regarding a military solution to the issue or ultimatums to the Kurds. What explains such caution? Perhaps, the hope for a diplomatic solution to the issue, fear of Turkey's strengthening after the next military operations, in which the key player will be the SNA, not HTS*. Also, al-Sharaa is forced to look back at the US and the EU, from which he needs the lifting of international sanctions, without which Arab rials and dirhams will not flood the Syrian market. In terms of the economy, Turkey depends, firstly, on the lifting of sanctions under the US Caesar Act, and secondly, on funding from the Gulf Cooperation Council. Turkey understands the scale of the upcoming reconstruction work and is ready to participate in the construction of infrastructure facilities. "Turkey is ready to provide the necessary support for the reconstruction of Syria," Erdogan said, adding that the Arab and Islamic world should provide material support to the Syrians. To sum up, we can say that Turkey holds the lead in terms of geopolitical influence in Syria. Western countries have only opened embassies, Arab countries can buy Syria, but they need permission from the West. Turkey has a presence on the ground in the form of military bases and under certain conditions (if Al-Sharaa does not decide to go to war with the YPG) it can increase it. Incidentally, according to media reports, the construction of two permanent Turkish military bases in Syria is currently being discussed. At the same time, it is worth noting that the competition for influence over the new Syrian leadership has already begun and will only intensify. Al-Sharaa invited Erdogan to visit Syria "as soon as possible", but Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani has already been there. Someone else may appear there before Erdogan arrives. In short, Ankara has a good starting position, but to play its cards successfully, it needs to take into account a number of other factors, including the West's sanctions toolkit, the Gulf's financial advantages, Arab solidarity, and Israeli pressure. And, of course, one should not discount Ahmed al-Sharaa's still underestimated desire for independence. |
Link |
The Grand Turk | ||||
Erdogan has gained a trump card in Syria and will certainly use it in Ukraine | ||||
2024-12-12 | ||||
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Kamran Gasanov [REGNUM] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan considers the change of power in Syria his political victory, although yesterday he was ready to shake hands with former President Bashar al-Assad. Erdogan's mood is so elevated that he decided to compliment his Russian colleague, saying that there are two real leaders left in the world - he and Vladimir Putin. ![]() The success of the opposition combat groups and the Turkish-led Syrian National Army has actually caused surprise in Ankara. After all, at the very beginning of their offensive, Turkish diplomats behaved extremely restrainedly. They assured the world community that Turkey had nothing to do with the storming of Aleppo, and even allowed for dialogue between the opposition and Assad, that is, a peaceful solution to the issue. When Hama and Homs were taken, Erdogan realized that Assad was finished. For the sake of appearances, he, of course, sent his Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to Doha for a forum on the Syrian settlement, so that he could meet with representatives of Russia and Iran. However, on December 6, he openly supported the offensive of the armed opposition. While Fidan was talking with Sergey Lavrov and Abbas Araghchi, Damascus fell. Fortunately for Turkey, it did not have time to officially restore relations with Assad before he lost power, unlike the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Arab League countries. As they say, everything is for sale in the east, but the new Syrian authorities are unlikely to ignore the fact that after the defeat of the armed opposition in Aleppo, Eastern Ghouta, Daraa and other provinces, all the former sponsors of the Free Syrian Army have remained on the sidelines, as if resigned to Assad's victory with the support of Iran and Russia. Only Ankara continued to support the opposition and took it under its wing as part of its operations against ISIS* and the Kurdish YPG/PYD. And at the same time, Erdogan managed to maintain the threads of dialogue with its opponents from Moscow and Tehran: the two Sochi deals and the Moscow deal on Idlib are clear proof of this. Although Turkey distanced itself from the attack on Aleppo, it is clear that it is also responsible for the subsequent collapse of the Assad regime. Inaction is also an action. There were Turkish military posts in the southern de-escalation zone that could have stopped the advancing troops. Why didn't they do this? Why did Erdogan deliberately violate the agreements with Russia? THE REJECTED HAND Turkey has long tried to take control of all resistance to Assad. It formed the SNA, but lost the competition to Abu Muhammad al-Julani's group.
Disliking HTS (the organization, by the way, is on the terrorist list not only in Russia, but also in Turkey), Erdogan still did not take any decisive action to eliminate it. Political methods did not work. Therefore, Ankara decided to leave this "abscess" in its side, since it does not directly threaten Turkey. Ankara did not want to start a war with them because of the risk of an influx of refugees, large losses, a worsening of the image among Syrian Islamists and Arabs in general. And, of course, in order not to help Assad. Moreover, the Turks were effectively covering HTS* from the government Syrian Arab Army with their backs, since an attack on Idlib would again lead to new crowds of refugees. Turkey is already home to 3 million Syrians, who are having a negative impact on the country's social situation and budget, which is already melting away amid the lira crisis. At the same time, discontent with the terrible economic situation was growing among the population in Idlib itself. The successful offensive of Idlib groups against Syrian government forces solved these problems at once. Assad's intransigence also played a role. In 2023–2024, Erdogan significantly softened his rhetoric towards Assad, and Turkish media abandoned the derogatory name Esad, but Ankara did not want to recognize him “just like that.” The Syrian ex-president was required to agree to the return of millions of refugees and progress in dialogue with the opposition within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 2254. Assad was constantly setting some conditions, demanding the withdrawal of Turkish troops, and Erdogan probably considered this behavior arrogant.
But when Assad started to raise the stakes, Erdogan felt humiliated. It was like this: you are guilty, you ask for forgiveness, but it is not given. That is why in one of his recent statements, as if justifying his tacit consent to the armed opposition operation, Erdogan said that the regime in Damascus “did not realize the significance of Turkey’s outstretched hand.” Fidan, however, stated that the Assad government needed to use the pause in military action to “reconcile” with its people, read: that same opposition. Overall, Turkey is the winner all around. Against the backdrop of Iran's defeat and the uncertainty surrounding the fate of Russia's military bases in Tartus and Khmeimim, the Turks feel like they are in control. They retained their status as the main sponsor of the opposition that came to power. Of all the possible players in Syria, Turkey's position is currently stronger than anyone else's. Only their troops can move freely throughout Syrian territory, with the exception of the Kurdish Euphrates region. TWO MAIN PROBLEMS In Damascus, a government will be formed in the coming months. Turkey has its own trump card in the form of the FSA, but whether their representatives will be able to occupy key posts is a big question. After all, Julani plays the leading role in the victorious armed opposition. Having escaped from the "Idlib cage", they feel much more independent. Moreover, almost all the strong players, even Iran, want to establish relations with the new government in Damascus. Julani needs to ensure economic growth and reduce Syria's dependence on Turkey, so he will try to get HTS* removed from the US terrorist list. Money for the new Syria could come from Europe and the rich Gulf states. Turkish construction companies, whose shares have soared since December 8, are ready to take part in the reconstruction of Syria, and Julani will not refuse such support. But it is premature to say that Syria will turn into another vilayet of neo-Ottoman Turkey.
Firstly, the refugees. On the day of the fall of the Assad regime, December 8, local publications paid attention first of all to Hakan Fidan’s phrase that “millions of Syrian refugees in Turkey will soon be able to return to their homeland.” Later, Erdogan also spoke on this topic. Having stated the importance of guarantees for the territorial integrity of Syria and “brotherly relations with the Syrian people,” the Turkish president pointed to the “expectations” of the return of Syrians to their homeland. The task is urgent for Ankara, but not easy. Will Julani or anyone else be able to provide everything that millions of people need? Following Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and the EU countries will want to return refugees. Without significant financial injections, the task becomes impossible for Damascus. Secondly, Turkey’s main task in the new Syria is to fight the Kurdish groups from the SDF and YPG. On December 10, Erdogan assured that they would be defeated “in the near future.” Even before the HTS* offensive on Aleppo began, the Turkish president warned that he was going to complete Operation Peace Spring, which was stopped in 2019, and clear the entire 600-kilometer border of Kurdish militants, pushing them back 30 km to the south. After the HTS offensive began, the actions entered an active phase. The Turkish military together with the SNA have already taken Tel Rifaat and Manbij. There is an obvious attempt to use the "interregnum" to eliminate the Kurdish units. And one of the versions of the non-intervention of Turkish troops during the attack on Aleppo suggests that Ankara used this operation to cover up its own actions against the YPG. MASTER OF PR Despite the difficult transition of power in Washington, the Pentagon is still resisting the Turkish plans. Recently, according to CENTCOM, the American military struck 70 ISIS targets. And it is possible that some were actually aimed at the SNA, which is storming Kurdish positions.
Erdogan needs to hurry to confront Trump with the new reality. At the same time, some Turkish observers believe that Ankara, with its operations, is actually helping the new American president fulfill his promise to withdraw troops from Syria. As for Russia, recalling the history of our relations in recent years, we can say that Syria made Turkey and Russia both enemies and friends overnight. Under the pretext of various Syrian topics, Erdogan met with Putin constantly, second only to Lukashenko in their frequency. The two countries managed to find a common language and come to an agreement in the most difficult moments. But the situation and circumstances have changed. If earlier Türkiye supervised the Syrian minority, and Russia the majority, now everything is exactly the opposite. Turkish media outlets are proudly reporting that Russia allegedly asked their country to help safely evacuate Russian troops. Memes and videos exploiting the image of the Ottoman Sultan outplaying the Russian Tsar are multiplying on social media. Now Turkey, as the de facto winner in the Syrian campaign, may be tempted to act condescendingly. And who knows, maybe the Turks are already dreaming of taking the place of Russian sailors and pilots in Latakia and Tartus? But it is still too early for them to celebrate: it is still unclear how relations between Turkey and the future authorities will develop. Will they be as “tame” as the SNA and other groups that Erdogan supervised? For now, he is keeping his cool, as his latest statement about Putin shows. But the Turks are masters of PR and will never miss an opportunity to use their success to bolster their image. Now Turkey has an extra trump card to offer mediation on Ukraine not just as a platform for negotiations, but as a great power and leader of the Middle East. And Erdogan will certainly use this trump card. | ||||
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Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
What Syria is made of. How a bomb planted by the French exploded 80 years later |
2024-12-11 |
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Artemy Sharapov [REGNUM] The flags flying over the Syrian embassies in Istanbul, Stockholm, Yerevan, and Moscow are being changed — a visible symbol of the fact that “power has changed.” The flag of the armed opposition that took control of the country was already the state flag — until 1958. ![]() In a sense, time has turned back in Syria to the times before the rise to power of the secular Arab socialists, from whose ranks emerged the Assad “dynasty” that ruled the country from 1970 to 2024. In order to understand the rapidly unfolding events now (after all, after 13 long years of civil war, the situation has changed dramatically in just 12 days), it is necessary to at least briefly glance at the recent history of Syria. FOUR IN ONE The word "Syria" ("Suriyya" in Arabic) is ancient, but the state with this name is only 78 years old. Until the end of World War I, this part of the Levant, that is, the Eastern Mediterranean, belonged to the Ottoman Empire. The Turks drew the borders of the provinces (vilayets) based on the convenience of governance, without regard for the diversity of ethnic groups and religions. Present-day Syria, Lebanon and the southern part of Turkey proper were divided between the vilayets of Damascus, Aleppo, Beirut and Deir ez-Zor. When the Entente defeated Germany and its allies (including the Ottoman Empire) in 1918, the victorious powers divided up the Turkish Sultan's possessions. France — formally, under a League of Nations mandate — got the territories of modern Syria, Lebanon, and the Turkish province of Hatay. All of this was called Greater Syria. Syrian centenarians – there are almost a quarter of a million of them in the country – can remember the times when the French assembled the country and drew its borders as they saw fit. Initially, the Mandatory authorities divided their possessions into six “states” along ethnic lines. Thus, in the north, the state of Aleppo was allocated to the Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Turks and their relatives, the Turkomans. On the Mediterranean coast (in the present-day province of Latakia, where the Russian Khmeimim base and the Tartus base are now located) there was the Alawite state. It was intended for the compactly living Alawite religious community, whose religion is so different from orthodox Islam that many Sunnis and Shiites do not consider them to be true believers, as well as for Shiites and Christians. Another unorthodox community, the Druze, living in southern Syria, was given the state of Jabal Druze. The Sunnis and Shiites of the southwest were given the state of Damascus. Finally, Greater Syria included what is now Lebanon. But in 1926, the French separated Lebanon (which was distinguished by its high ethno-religious diversity, even by Middle Eastern standards) into a separate mandated territory. The Hatay region, after long interethnic clashes and complaints to the League of Nations, was given to the Turks (Syria, however, did not recognize Turkey's sovereignty over this territory until 2005). And from the remaining lands, the French authorities, for the sake of convenience of governance, cobbled together a country that had never existed before. In one territory there were Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs, Alawites, Ismailis, Christian Arabs, Armenians, Druze, Kurds, Turkomans and Assyrians. There is nothing special about this, however: the British authorities created the never-existent state of Iraq on the same principle. When leaving, the Europeans sought to ensure that their former colonies would always have ethnic and confessional tensions that would periodically “explode” into wars. And, it must be admitted, they succeeded. ONE COUNTRY, TWO STARS, MANY REVOLUTIONS Since gaining independence in 1947, Syria (like Iraq) has experienced a series of military coups, uprisings and has intervened in several wars with Israel. The optimal way to keep ethnic groups, confessions, clans and influence groups in line (and to keep the interests of these warring groups in balance) was an army dictatorship. However, this type of government was traditionally unstable for the Middle East. Between 1946 and 1956, the country saw 20 governments and 4 constitutions. In 1958–1961, the country lost its independence, becoming part of the United Arab Republic (UAR) for a time, the brainchild of the ambitious Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. At that time, instead of the previous green-white-black flag, Syria adopted the black-white-red pan-Arab flag of the UAR with two green stars (the two stars originally symbolized the two "union republics", Egypt and Syria). In 1961, another coup took place in Syria, this time against Nasser. The country left the UAR, but the flag remained. In 1963, the military changed power again. Now the country is "ruled" by the regional branch of the Baath Party - the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (in the same year, Baath comes to power in Iraq). The word "Arab" was added to the name "Syrian Republic", which is unlikely to be to the taste of non-Arab ethnic groups, primarily the Kurds inhabiting the northeast of the country. Three years later, in 1970, another coup takes place, this time within the Baathist leadership, and the leader of the country is the former commander of the Air Force, a native of the influential Alawite clan, Hafez al-Assad. LIONS ON THE THRONE The father and grandfather of the presidents of Syria, Ali Suleiman, the leader of a mountain clan in Latakia, changed his former nickname al-Wahsh (the savage) to a more harmonious one and one corresponding to his social status back in the 1920s: al-Assad (the lion). Hafez al-Assad, who held the presidency from 1971 until his death in 2000, was called "the Sacred One" ("al-Muqaddas") and "the Immortal Leader." His son and successor, Bashar al-Assad, was titled a little more modestly upon ascending to the "throne" - "the Hope of the People." It is hardly possible to reproach the Assads for a cult of personality: this was typical of Middle Eastern secular regimes - Baathist Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Egypt from Nasser to Hosni Mubarak, the Libyan Jamahiriya of Muammar Gaddafi, etc. There is an opinion that the years of the Assad family in power were a dictatorship of the Alawite religious community, to which Hafez and his son Bashar belonged. According to a slightly more complex version, the Assads relied on a coalition of ethno-religious minorities: Alawites, Shiites, Druze, Christians, etc. In fact, a regime was created in the country that was in many ways similar to Saddam's government: a group of authoritative military men in power, united by common interests with a division of spheres of influence. ON THE BRINK OF SPRING And it was this system that largely allowed the Syrian government to successfully repel the first onslaught of Islamists – the Muslim Brotherhood* uprising of 1976–1982. The storming of the city of Hama, which was commanded by the president’s younger brother Rifaat al-Assad, was considered a model for restoring order (it was this battle that pacified the radical jihadists for a long time). Syria's loss of the Yom Kippur War with Israel did not shake the regime's position. Especially since the Assads waged a successful proxy war with the same Israel in Lebanon. Compared to Saddam Hussein’s regime, which essentially fell victim to its own foreign policy adventures, the Assad “dynasty” demonstrated stability. But Soviet specialists who worked in the country in the 1970s and 1980s recalled that the situation was consistently unsettled. Explosions and shootouts “somewhere on the outskirts” were commonplace, and even family members of civilian specialists were trained in case of a terrorist attack. The stability gained at such a high price allowed the country's economy to develop until the crisis caused by the US invasion of neighboring Iraq in 2001 erupted. The constant influx of refugees and the growth of radical sentiments in the region could not help but affect Syria. At the same time, discontent grew among a part of Syrian society and the army, who had been removed from key positions. The political opposition demanded democratic reforms (essentially, a redistribution of power and property), while the Islamists demanded the introduction of Sharia law. Therefore, the wave of unrest throughout the Arab world (the so-called Arab Spring) and the fall of governments in Yemen, Egypt and Tunisia in 2011–2012 and the outbreak of war in Libya could not but lead to similar events in Syria. BEGINNING OF HALF-LIFE In 2011, protests began across the country, quickly escalating into fighting. Some of the armed forces broke away from government control, forming the Free Syrian Army (FSA). They were joined by local Islamist militias known as the Islamic Front and a number of other groups. The country, first assembled by the French and then by the Damascus military regimes, began to fall apart at the seams. A number of regions in the north, near the border with Turkey (where the Turkmen tribes live), and in the south, in the regions adjacent to Jordan and Israel, where the Druze live, have left the government's control. At the same time, in the northwest, in areas of ethnic Kurdish residence, a local administration and armed structures were created that were equally hostile to the government in Damascus and the opposition. By the beginning of 2012, the revolution and “democratization” were forgotten – a full-scale civil war broke out in the country. WAR OF THE ENCLAVES Unlike traditional wars, where the sides are divided by a front line and strive to break through it, the map of the war in Syria quickly took shape into a bizarre mosaic of several colors. After the authorities managed to suppress the opposition and Islamists in most major cities, they were pushed out to the outskirts, where they strengthened their positions. For example, in Aleppo, the armed opposition retained part of the central districts of the city and the northwestern outskirts, in Homs – the northern districts of the city and the suburb of al-Rastan, in the vicinity of Damascus – entire oases of dozens of settlements, closely adjacent to the city quarters. In one of these enclaves – Eastern Ghouta, there were up to ten thousand armed people. On the other hand, the successful opposition offensive led to the capture of large territories in the provinces of Raqqa, Idlib and Hama. But even here there remained enclaves that remained loyal to the government. First of all, areas inhabited by religious minorities. For example, the cities of Fua and Kafariya in Idlib province; Nubl and Zahraa in Aleppo province have been fighting in complete encirclement for several years. The reason is simple: Shiites live here, “heretics” from the point of view of the militants who consider themselves devout Sunnis. The history of the city of Deir ez-Zor stands apart, its garrison, together with local militia units, was able to withstand several years of siege and wait for help to arrive. Several airbases also remained completely surrounded, the garrison of which did not surrender and continued to resist. The Tabqa, Abu Duhur and Menang airfields were eventually taken by storm, and their garrison was killed. However, the garrison of the Kweires air base, consisting mainly of cadet pilots, was able to repel attacks for several years and eventually received outside help. Such tenacity and sometimes, without exaggeration, heroism seem even more incredible against the backdrop of the events of 2024, when the army simply refused to participate in military operations. In other words, military operations were conducted on dozens of fronts at once, and the decisive role was often played not by regular armed formations, but by local forces. DIVERSITY VS. GENOCIDE The semi-collapse of the Syrian state after 2011 went hand in hand with the internationalization of the conflict. Since 2013, Al-Qaeda* and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant* (ISIS, later the Islamic State*) have been actively involved in the war. The Wahhabi IS*, which by definition does not recognize existing state borders, included part of the territory of Syria with the cities of Idlib and Raqqa into its “caliphate,” which continued further to the east, capturing part of Iraq. It is noteworthy that even in a state of simultaneous war on ten fronts throughout the country, the Damascus government of Bashar al-Assad has not lost control of the situation. Over the course of several years of military action, the troops managed to fully or partially hold all major settlements. This was partly possible due to the actions of the armed opposition itself, in whose leadership former politicians and military personnel were often replaced by radicals. Those groups that swore allegiance to the terrorist international directly stated that they were bringing death to representatives of other religious communities: Christians, Shiite Muslims, Alawites and Ismailis. For example, in March 2014, Islamist units stormed the Armenian city of Kessab, carrying out ethnic cleansing in it. And in this case, the thesis about the “coalition of minorities” opposing the Islamists and situationally supporting Bashar al-Assad is correct. Thus, a pro-government Druze militia was formed in the province of Suwayda, a Christian militia in the city of Maharda in the province of Hama (later one of the most combat-ready formations of the government forces), and an Ismaili militia from Salamiyah and Masyaf. These formations were created primarily for the survival of their communities. They waged war on the side of the Assad government as long as they considered this government capable of protecting the interests of communities and ethnic groups. Also on the government's side were representatives of local businesses and/or criminals, who simply did not want to give up their positions to new people and created militia units with their own money. The most famous example of such formations is the "Desert Falcons", financed by the Jaber clan from the Latakia province. One should also not forget about the loyalty of some army commanders who refused to go over to the opposition for one reason or another. Among them are the commander of the defense of the encircled Deir ez-Zor, General Issam Zahreddine, and the hero of the defense of Aleppo, Suheil Hassan. Therefore, Bashar al-Assad managed to avoid the fate of Gaddafi and retain power, albeit having lost control over part of the country's territories. But this could not go on forever. START FROM SCRATCH With access to almost inexhaustible human, financial and military resources from abroad, the Islamists have organized a series of successful military operations. Government forces, on the contrary, began to gradually “run out of steam” and give up their positions by the mid-2010s. In the circumstances, the Syrian government turned to foreign military assistance. Russia's involvement in ending the Syrian conflict since 2015, including support for the government army and other anti-ISIS forces "on the ground" and in the air, has radically changed the course of the long-standing war. Russia's peacekeeping efforts require a separate description. For now, several important points should be noted The Russian leadership has always supported the Assad government in its fight against terrorism, while emphasizing that intra-Syrian reconciliation, the restoration of the balance of interests of the various communities, faiths and ethnic groups living here is the business of the Syrian people themselves. As President Vladimir Putin noted back in 2015, “we are not going to be more Syrian than the Syrians themselves.” Moscow has always advocated for the normalization of dialogue between Syria’s political and religious forces and organizations, speaking about the need to conduct the most fruitful negotiations under the auspices of the UN. Now that the government has collapsed, the danger of the conflict becoming "Somalizatsi" is growing, with a complete collapse of statehood and intercommunal wars. Therefore, now more than ever, dialogue is needed between the constituent parts of Syria, from the Kurds to the Druze and from the Alawites to the Sunnis. |
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US forces attack ISIS targets in Syria | |
2024-12-09 | |
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. [Regnum] On December 8, the US military struck 75 Islamic State (IS, a terrorist organization banned in Russia) targets in Syria. This was reported by the US Central Command (CENTCOM). ![]() “The US military has carried out dozens of targeted airstrikes against… ISIS camps and fighters in central Syria… The strikes were carried out to disrupt the terrorist group’s ability to conduct external operations and to prevent the terrorist group from exploiting the current situation to rebuild in central Syria,” the statement said. During the military operation, the US Armed Forces hit 75 militant targets. As reported by Regnum News Agency, on December 8, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Daniel Shapiro said at the Manama Dialogue forum in Bahrain that US troops will remain in eastern Syria to continue the fight against the ISIS group. In the current circumstances, the US will continue close consultations with partners affected by the crisis in the region to help them ensure their security, he added. In Syria, militant groups have been advancing on the positions of the government army, which was forced to retreat from Aleppo, Hama and Homs, since November 27. Various Syrian opposition forces are involved in the operation.
"We are taking very prudent measures about this [and] doing everything we can to ensure that those materials are not available to anyone and are cared for... We want to make sure that chlorine or things that are far worse are destroyed or secured. There are several efforts in this regard with partners in the region," the senior US official said in a briefing. The official didn’t specify which countries were involved in the effort. More from regnum.ru Pentagon says US troops will remain in eastern Syria The US military will remain in eastern Syria to continue the fight against the Islamic State group (a terrorist organization banned in Russia). This was stated by US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Daniel Shapiro on December 8 at the Manama Dialogue forum in Bahrain. He noted that the situation in Syria, where the government has entered into negotiations with militant leaders, is rapidly developing. In these circumstances, the United States will continue close consultations with partners affected by the crisis in the region to help them ensure their security. "Our commitment to them is stronger than ever. We will also maintain a presence in eastern Syria - solely for the purpose of the final defeat of ISIS, it has nothing to do with other aspects of the conflict," Shapiro said. The Pentagon spokesman said the United States would continue to take steps to prevent ISIS from resurging in eastern Syria and would protect its forces and its partners in the region. As reported by Regnum News Agency, on December 8, Syrian Prime Minister Mohammed Ghazi Al-Jalali said that the government was negotiating with the leaders of the Syrian militants who had entered Damascus in the morning. He added that he and some of the ministers remain in the country, while the whereabouts of President Bashar al-Assad and Defense Minister Ali Mahmoud Abbas are unknown. In Syria, militant groups have been advancing on the positions of the government army since November 27, which was forced to retreat from Aleppo, Hama and Homs. Various Syrian opposition forces are involved in the operation, from Islamist groups to the moderate Free Syrian Army, which was previously supported by Turkey and the United States. On December 8, Al Jazeera reported that the Syrian military was leaving central Damascus, and militants had reached the central Umayyad Square and seized the headquarters of Syrian state television. According to media reports, Damascus International Airport had ceased operations, and all prisoners had been released from Seidnaya Prison. | |
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Damascus Falls. Assad regime is no more, Assad may be dead in plane crash while fleeing Homs | ||
2024-12-08 | ||
[X] 48 hour rule in effect
tired reporter didn't post the color code with this map
A 48 hour Special Military Operation?
''Around 2,000 Syrian troops cross to Iraq'' despite govt denies falling back [GEO.TV] Around 2,000 Syrian troops have crossed the border into Iraq and sought refuge, the mayor of al-Qaim border town Turki al-Mahlawi, told Rooters on Saturday. Some of the troops were maimed and are currently receiving medical treatment, he added. Rebels on a lightning advance through Syria said they were nearing Damascus on Saturday, although Bashir al-Assad's government denied that the army had withdrawn from areas around the capital. "Our forces have begun the final phase of encircling the capital," said rebel commander Hassan Abdel Ghani. The leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, formerly al-Nusra, before that it was called something else ![]() (HTS) told fighters to prepare to take the seat of Assad's government, just over a week into a renewed rebellion in the long dormant conflict. "Damascus awaits you," said HTS's Ahmed al-Sharaa in a statement on Telegram, using his real name instead of his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani. Rumint: Assad may have been shot down and killed in his plane while fleeing Homs
CaucasusWarReport @Caucasuswar Personal opinion: Bashar al-Assad probably fled with his family over the past two days, during his trips to Iran and Russia. The individuals on the IL-76 plane that crashed tonight were likely high-ranking members of the regime. Be aware that Russia and Iran may attempt to frame the situation as if Assad was on the plane to prevent people from tracking him and his family down. And then this link Russian S-300 at Tartus might have just shot Assad's plane out of the sky Altitude when contact was lost 1750~ ft IVO Khirbet Tin Nur Syria which has an elevation is 1739 ft. link to video of burning plane that some are claiming had Assad on it From the Times of Israel liveblog as of 1:00 a.m. ET: On state TV, Syrian rebels declare Damascus taken, Assad regime ousted, prisoners freedSyrian rebels announce in a televised statement that they have freed Damascus and overthrown President Bashar al-Assad’s 24-year regime, adding that all prisoners have been released. Assad, who had crushed all forms of dissent and jailed thousands, flew out of Damascus for an unknown destination earlier today, two senior army officers have told Reuters, as rebels entered the capital with no sign of army deployments. Syrian army command tells officers Assad rule has ended — source Reports claim Israeli tanks crossing into Syria buffer zone After the collapse of the Assad regime overnight, Syrian reports claim that Israeli tanks have crossed the border into Syria from the Golan Heights. The unconfirmed reports say that Israeli forces pushed into the buffer zone in the Quneitra area, and launched artillery shelling in the area. Offering olive branch, Syrian PM says he’ll work with any leader backed by citizens Syrian Prime Minister Mohammed al-Jalali says he is ready to “cooperate” with any leadership chosen by the people and for any handover process, after the apparent fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime. “This country can be a normal country that builds good relations with its neighbors and the world… but this issue is up to any leadership chosen by the Syrian people. We are ready to cooperate with [that leadership] and offer all possible facilities,” Jalali says in a speech broadcast on his Facebook account. Assad rule in Syria has ended, rebels say, as army appears to disband Syria’s army command has notified officers that President Bashar al-Assad’s rule has ended following a lightning rebel offensive, a Syrian officer who was informed of the move tells Reuters. Syrian rebels also say Damascus is “now free of Assad,” calling on Syrians abroad to return to their newly freed country. An Associated Press journalist in Damascus reports seeing groups of armed civilians along the road in the outskirts of the capital and hearing sounds of gunshots. The city’s main police headquarters appeared to be abandoned, its door left ajar with no officers outside, they say. Another AP journalist shoots footage of an abandoned army checkpoint where uniforms are discarded on the ground under a poster of Assad’s face. Hezbollah pulling forces out of Damascus outskirts and from Homs, sending some to Latakia, others to Hermel area in Lebanon Hezbollah retreats from key city on Syria-Lebanon border, in major blow to group Lebanon’s pro-Iranian Hezbollah terror group has withdrawn from the Syrian city of Qusayr along the border with Lebanon shortly, before rebel forces seized it, Syrian army sources say.The city had been a key holding for Hezbollah, which relies on a nearby crossing to smuggle Iranian weapons into Lebanon and fighters in and out of Syria since the terror group seized Qusayr in 2013 at the early phase of the Syrian conflict. The Syrian sources tell Reuters at least 150 armored vehicles carrying hundreds of Hezbollah fighters left Qusayr in phases. Israel, which has repeatedly hit Hezbollah weapons depots and underground fortifications it had built in the city, hit one of the convoys that was leaving, one source says, without elaborating. Earlier, the Hezbollah-linked al-Manar network reported that Israeli planes had carried out an attack in the area Qusayr. The Israel Defense Forces said Friday it had bombed several roads in the Qusayr area as part of a concerted campaign to stymie attempts to smuggle Iranian weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. As the rebels advanced this past week, Syrian forces appeared to melt away, putting up no resistance, with several reports of defection. Russian forces carried out occasional airstrikes. Aron Lund, a Syria expert with Century International, a New York-based think tank, and a researcher with the Swedish Defense Research Agency, said the developments in Syria are a geopolitical disaster for Russia and Iran. “They too were surely surprised by what happened, and they have all sorts of resource constraints,” including Russia’s war in Ukraine and Hezbollah’s losses in Lebanon and Syria. EXHAUSTED AND BROKEN While Syria’s conflict lines have been largely stalemated since 2020, the country’s economic woes have only multiplied in the past few years. The imposition of US sanctions, a banking crisis in neighboring Lebanon, and an earthquake last year contributed to the fact that almost all Syrians face extreme financial hardship. That has caused state institutions and salaries to wither. “If you can’t pay your soldiers a living wage, then maybe you can’t expect them to stay and fight when thousands of Islamists storm” their cities, Lund said. “It is just an exhausted, broken and dysfunctional regime” to start with. Part of the insurgents’ attempt to reassert their grip on Aleppo, the city where they were ousted in 2016 after a grueling military campaign, was to issue a call to government soldiers and security agencies to defect, granting them what they called “protection cards,” which offer some sort of amnesty and assurances that they won’t be hunted down. The spokesman for the insurgents, Hassan Abdul-Ghani, said more than 1,600 soldiers have applied for the cards over two days in Aleppo city. Hundreds of defectors lined up outside city police stations Thursday to register their details with the insurgents. Hama native Hossam al-Bakr, 33, who served in Damascus and defected four years earlier to Aleppo, said he came to “settle his position” and get a new ID. The laminated card handed out to each defector was titled the “defection card.” It showed the name, ID number, and place of service of each defector. It is issued by “The General Command: Military Operations Room.” On Thursday, Maj. Mohamed Ghoneim, who was in charge of registering the defectors, said more than 1,000 soldiers or police officers came to register. Some who had their official guns handed them over, he added. “There are thousands who want to apply,” he said.
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After Hama: New Militant Strike Threatens to Cut Off Russian Bases in Syria | |
2024-12-07 | |
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Leonid Tsukanov [REGNUM] The advance of anti-government forces in Syria continues. Despite the fact that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allied pro-Turkish groups have somewhat slowed down the pace of their offensive, the Syrian army has not yet been able to stabilize the front line. ![]() The militants managed to break into Hama - the battles for it lasted three days, but the government troops were unable to hold their positions. The republic's Defense Ministry reluctantly admitted to withdrawing from the city - citing the decision as "unwillingness to endanger the lives of civilians." The front line lay beyond the city blocks. The fall of a major city (and also a transport hub) is a blow to the Syrian government and is creating a network of “anti-Assad centers” in the north of the country. Returning Hama back will be problematic, especially given the difficult relations between its residents and official Damascus. DARK SHADOWS OF HAMA Relations between Damascus and Hama have been rocky. Since the mid-1960s, the city has been dominated by supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood*, who were in opposition to the Baathist government. And with the rise to power of Hafez al-Assad, the father of the current Syrian president, an underground war began between the Brotherhood and the Syrian government, with Hama at its epicenter. The confrontation culminated in the storming of Hama by Syrian troops (1982). After massive bombings, Assadist forces launched a hunt for rebels. According to various sources, between 20,000 and 40,000 people were killed and captured, most of whom were city residents. It should be noted that over the next 30 years, unspoken restrictions were imposed on the residents of Hama: as punishment for the rebellion, Damascus allegedly seriously cut funding for the municipality, and was also slow to invest in the restoration of neighborhoods destroyed by the army. And although the Syrian authorities deny any oppression, the opposition has been eager to fuel revanchist sentiments in the “rebellious city.” It is not surprising that when the anti-government protests of 2011 began, Hama was again among the first to flare up. Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad was reminded of both the political mistakes of his father and the excessive harshness of his uncle, Rifaat al-Assad (the commander of the 1982 operation in Hama). And although Syrian troops managed to fully regain control over the province in 2017 and hold the rebellious city, it retained the unofficial status of an “anti-Assad stronghold,” and many sympathizers of the armed opposition remained among the population. In 2024, Hama found itself in a semi-circle of advancing militants. And although Assad's supporters fought desperately, after breaking through the front from several sides at once, government troops did not stay in the city for too long, fearing, among other things, guerrilla attacks from the rear. OUTLINES OF THE THREAT After the anti-government forces take Hama, it is easy to predict where the radicals will move next. The spearhead of the militants' attack is directed along the M5 highway - first to Al-Rastan, and then to Homs, from where Damascus is less than 200 km away. By taking control of these cities, the militants will not only be able to raise their sword over the capital (which HTS* propagandists never miss an opportunity to boast about), but also almost completely cut off the coastal regions of Syria, disrupting logistics and forcing government garrisons to go into a state of siege. A certain threat in this case also arises for the Russian contingent in Syria - the Khmeimim airbase and the port of Tartus fall into the "cut-off zone". In addition, the risk of targeted strikes on Russian facilities on the territory of the republic increases - the militants are looking for ways to increase their own fleet of drones in order to more effectively hinder the work of Russian aviation. However, Russian forces already had experience fighting terrorists in a “semi-siege” situation and are prepared for a possible deterioration of the situation. In addition, the Russian Aerospace Forces are actively working on bridges connecting Hama with other major cities, which should slow the advance of anti-government forces and give Syrian troops time to regroup. Finally, a secondary objective for anti-government forces in Syria is the destruction of Kurdish enclaves – a task that Turkish intelligence services have been setting for the “Idlib freebooters” for several years now. After the capitulation of Tel Rifaat, pro-Turkish militants increased pressure on the "Kurdish strongholds" - the cities of Sheikh Maksoud and Manbij, and Kobani (also known as Ain al-Arab) came under fire. And although the US is behind the Kurdish militias, Ankara is trying to squeeze the Kurds out of their entrenched places as much as possible. ISRAEL IS RIGHT HERE The news of Hama's fall has stirred up the ranks of Moscow and Damascus's ill-wishers - many saw in what was happening an opportunity to solve their own geopolitical problems with someone else's hands. And we are not talking about Turkey, in whose interests the "northern adventure" was de facto unleashed. One of the first to come to life was Israel, which had long been looking for ways to create a permanent “pressure point” on Iran in Syria. Tel Aviv is convinced that Tehran will not abandon Assad in trouble and will be forced to intervene in the conflict directly. Especially since Hezbollah and other pro-Iranian forces were seriously battered as a result of the conflict in Gaza and Lebanon and are not yet able to take on the mission of containing the militants. And although the Israelis reject any public contacts with HTS*, the willingness of the group's leader, Muhammad al-Julani, to engage in dialogue with Israel after Assad's overthrow is perceived positively by them. Britain has also seen its own advantage in the Syrian army's plight. British think tanks close to the Ministry of Defense and the intelligence services are drawing up "road maps" on how to lure the Russian fleet out of Tartus and, with Turkey's assistance, "lock" the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits. And although most of these proposals sound more like science fiction, they should not be completely discounted. As for the US, Washington is much more focused on protecting the interests of the Kurds and has no plans to make life difficult for Moscow. On the other hand, tribal militias loyal to Washington have already tried to probe the positions of government forces in Deir ez-Zor province several times, so more decisive actions aimed at depleting the reserves of the Syrian army cannot be ruled out. However, the listed actions are still more of a tactical nature. External actors in the Syrian conflict understand that their combinations remain unnoticed only as long as the anti-government forces retain their offensive potential, which is quite problematic to calculate (given the squabbles in the ranks of the advancing militants).
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Syria's Civil War Puts Israel in a Bind: ‘Devil We Know' or Islamist Rebels |
2024-12-05 |
[MSN - WSJ] The surprising advance by opposition forces in Syria’s civil war poses a conundrum for Israel and the West: Victory by either side presents risks. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is allied with Israel’s enemy, Iran. The resurgence of the war threatens to invigorate that relationship, undermining Israel’s effort to weaken Iran’s web of allied countries and militias throughout the region. The rebel group now challenging Assad’s rule, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, is a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that Israel sees as dangerous to its interests. “The best option for Israel now is a mutual weakening of those forces, not a decisive victory of any of them,” said Harel Chorev, a senior researcher at Tel Aviv University. Rebel forces from HTS are holding Aleppo after a lightning offensive to reclaim Syria’s second city late last month, a move that exploited the distraction among Assad’s allies—Iran, Russia and Hezbollah—while they engage in other conflicts. In recent years, Israel has preferred “the devil we know” in Assad, over instability and insecurity created by the Islamist rebel groups, said Eyal Zisser, who follows Syria at Tel Aviv University. Indeed, before the rebel offensive, Israel had nurtured hopes that Assad could be lured away from Iran through funding and closer ties to more Western-friendly Gulf states, according to Israeli and Arab officials. The Arab league had readmitted Syria after expelling it from the group for its alliance with Iran and Hezbollah. Assad’s forces were lukewarm in support for Hezbollah in its war with Israel, permitting weapons transfers but not committing troops. With Assad’s regime now facing its greatest challenge in years, Israel worries that those gains are at risk. The rapid rebel advance has also created fresh instability and threatens to upend the regional order. Also, U.S. officials fear that America, which has roughly 900 troops in eastern Syria, might get dragged deeper into the conflict. For over a decade, Syria has been a crucible for a great-power contest that has drawn in an array of state actors. On Assad’s side, Iran and Russia, along with Hezbollah, have propped up the regime with weapons and fighters. Turkey supports some Syrian opposition groups, as part of its own fight against Kurdish separatists. The U.S. partners with Kurdish-led militias in Syria’s northeast in a campaign against Islamic State extremists. Israel took a back seat at the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, but as Iran’s presence in that conflict deepened, and the war drew in Hezbollah, that stance changed. By 2014, Israel had begun what it termed “the war between the wars” in Syria, mostly focused on disrupting the flow of arms and other illicit supplies to its enemy Hezbollah in Lebanon. Since fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon intensified in recent months, Israel has stepped up the pace of its strikes in Syria, including an audacious special forces raid to destroy an alleged Iranian missile factory producing weapons for Hezbollah. “We’re constantly monitoring what is happening in Syria,” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Sunday after rebels swept into Aleppo. In recent years, Assad had attempted to mend ties with Arab states that opposed his alliance with Iran and Hezbollah. The Arab League voted in 2023 to normalize ties with Syria and reinstate it as a member. The decision was contingent on Syria engaging with Arab states to find a political solution to the civil war, something it hasn’t so far done in any meaningful way. There were signs, too, that the Syrian regime was reluctant to throw its forces behind Hezbollah in its war with Israel in the past year. Assad didn’t send the group military aid or troops, and his forces refrained from retaliating for the killing of Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah. But the Syrian leader did allow the flow of Iranian weapons to Hezbollah to continue through his country’s borders. Israel in the past funded the Free Syrian Army opposition forces as they took territory close to its border. It also offered medical treatment in its hospitals to injured fighters from the Nusra Front, an Islamist rebel group that was the precursor to HTS. But that rebel group’s blend of nationalism and Islamism, which echoes the ideology of Afghanistan’s Taliban and Palestinian Hamas, is regarded by Israel as a dangerous threat, particularly were it to come to power in neighboring Syria. The fighting in Syria also risks Israel’s cease-fire in Lebanon, which is already strained by exchanges of fire between Israel and Hezbollah. Israel’s military has significantly degraded Hezbollah’s leadership and military capabilities in the past months of intensive fighting, but hasn’t uprooted the group. Israeli strikes to prevent Hezbollah rearming risk straying into cease-fire violations. Netanyahu said that Israel would act to prevent Hezbollah rearmament through Syria’s territory. “We are committed to defending the critical interests of the State of Israel, and also to preserving the war’s achievements,” Netanyahu said Sunday. Israel’s military launched an airstrike on Damascus on Tuesday, saying it was targeting Hezbollah’s representative to the Syrian military. |
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Syria-Lebanon-Iran | ||||||
Day3 RUMINT and reports: Assad has fallen and stayed in Moscow, HTS blitzkrieg continues, backed by Turkey, 255 toes up | ||||||
2024-11-30 | ||||||
See Day 1 here, Day 2 here and here. [X] See today’s posts, including this one here, here, here, and here.
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Russian aircraft flying in support of the Assad regime have responded in the most Russian way possible. They are bombing population centers held by the "Free Syrian Army."
Video and imagery of dead Russian troops, both special forces and private military corporations, are appearing.
The situation is very unclear, but it appears that Assad's army has evaporated in the area of the offensive. It remains to be seen if those troops can be rallied and a defensive line reestablished or if Assad will soon be heading for exile in some place that doesn't have an extradition treaty with France.
[IsraelTimes] Alliance led by Al-Qaeda’s former Syria branch take control of some 50 towns and villages in Assad regime’s biggest loss of territory in years Jihadists and their Ottoman Turkish-backed allies reached Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city, on Friday, as they pressed a lightning offensive against forces of the Iranian- and Russian-backed government. The fighting is some of the deadliest in years, with 255 people killed, according to the Britannia-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Most of the dead have been combatants but the toll also includes 24 civilians, most killed in Russian air strikes. SOHR, which relies on a network of sources inside Syria and is of unclear funding, has been accused in the past of inflating regime losses. The offensive began on Wednesday, the same day that a fragile ceasefire took effect in neighboring Leb ![]() between Israel and Iran-backed terror group Hezbollah. By Friday, the jihadists and their allies had wrested control of more than 50 towns and villages in the north, according to the Britannia-based Observatory, in the government’s biggest loss of territory in years. They then entered western districts of Aleppo, a city of some two million people that was Syria’s pre-war manufacturing hub. "Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, formerly al-Nusra, before that it was called something else ...al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, from which sprang the Islamic State... (HTS) and allied factions... were able to enter the outskirts of the al-Hamdaniya and New Aleppo neighborhoods... after carrying out twin suicide kabooms with two booby-trapped cars," the war monitor said. HTS, a jihadist alliance led by al-Qaeda’s former Syria branch, shelled a student residence in the city, killing four civilians, state media reported. Syrian and Russian warplanes launched intense air strikes on the rebel enclave around Idlib, where the jihadists are based, carrying out 23 raids, according to the Observatory. Army reinforcements have arrived in Aleppo, a Syrian security official told AFP, requesting anonymity to discuss sensitive matters. An army statement said troops had repelled the assault on the city and retaken some positions. The United Nations ...an organization conceived in the belief that we're just one big happy world, with the sort of results you'd expect from such nonsense... Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said "more than 14,000 people —- nearly half are children — have been displaced" by the violence. Aleppo resident Sarmad, 51, told AFP he could hear "the sounds of missiles and artillery shelling around the clock." On Thursday, the jihadists and their allies cut the highway linking Aleppo to the capital Damascus, some 300 kilometers (185 miles) south, the Observatory said. INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS Kremlin front man Dmitry Peskov on Friday described the situation in Aleppo as "an infringement on the illusory sovereignty of Syria." He expressed support for "the government of Syria to quickly restore order in this district." Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi pledged "continued support for the government, nation and army of Syria," in a phone call with his Syrian counterpart Bassam al-Sabbagh, according to a statement. The Idlib area has been subject to a Ottoman Turkish- and Russian-brokered truce since 2020. The ceasefire has been repeatedly violated but had largely held. An AFP correspondent in the rebel enclave saw jihadists advancing in tanks as intense exchanges of fire took place in an area just seven kilometers (a little over four miles) from Aleppo. AFP images showed abandoned army tanks and other military vehicles. The correspondent said the jihadists and their ...just another cheapjack Moslem dictatorship, brought to you by the Moslem Brüderbund... -backed allies took orders from a joint operations command. Analyst Nick Heras, of the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, said the fighters were "trying to preempt the possibility of a Syrian military campaign in the region of Aleppo." According to Heras, the Syrian government and its key backer Russia had been preparing for such a campaign. Russia intervened in Syria in 2015, turning the tide of the civil war that broke out four years earlier in favor of the government, whose forces at the time had lost control of most of the country. ’TOTALLY UNPREPARED’ Other interests are also at stake. As well as Russia, Syrian President Bashir al-Assad has been propped up by Iran ...a theocratic Shiite state divided among the Medes, the Persians, and the (Arab) Elamites. Formerly a fairly civilized nation ruled by a Shah, it became a victim of Islamic revolution in 1979. The nation is today noted for spontaneouslytaking over other countries' embassies, maintaining whorehouses run by clergymen, involvement in international drug trafficking, and financing sock puppet militiasto extend the regime's influence. The word Iranis a cognate form of Aryan.The abbreviation IRGCis the same idea as Stürmabteilung (or SA).The term Supreme Guideis a the modern version form of either Duceor Führeror maybe both. They hate and allied groups, including Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Iran-backed militias have a heavy presence in the Aleppo region after providing crucial ground support to the army in its recapture of rebel-held areas of the city in 2016. Heras said anti-government forces are "in a better position to take and seize villages than Russian-backed Syrian government forces, while the Iranians are focused on Lebanon." Observatory director Rami Abdel Rahman said government forces "were totally unprepared" for the attack. "It is strange to see regime forces being dealt such big blows despite Russian air cover and early signs that HTS was going to launch this operation," Abdel Rahman said. "Were they depending on Hezbollah, which is now busy in Lebanon?"
Syrian authorities close Aleppo airport, cancel all flights — military source [IsraelTimes] Syrian authorities have closed Aleppo airport and canceled all flights, a military source tells Reuters, as Syrian rebels opposed to President Bashar Assad say they reached the heart of the northern city of Aleppo.
"Inshallah, the liberators will enter Aleppo," Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, formerly al-Nusra, before that it was called something else ![]() (HTS) leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani said in a video published by opposition media outlets on Friday evening. He issued directives to his fighters before entering the city, including asking them not to enter people’s houses or commit violations. The jihadist HTS are leading rebel forces in a surprise offensive launched on Wednesday, seizing territory from government troops for the first time in years. They entered the city of Aleppo on Friday afternoon after taking several villages, according to Syrian opposition media. The Syrian army said in a statement that they continue to "confront the large-scale attack launched by the armed terrorist organizations" and claimed that the rebel groups have used heavy and medium weaponry as well as drones. It also said that a large number of imported muscle are among them. "Our armed forces have inflicted heavy losses on the attacking organizations, resulting in hundreds of dead and injured terrorists. Dozens of vehicles and armored carriers have been destroyed, and 17 drones have been shot down and destroyed," the army claimed. As of Friday, the festivities have claimed the lives of 255 people: 144 rebels, 87 Syrian soldiers and pro-government militia, and 24 civilians, according to a tally by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. HTS, a former branch of al-Qaeda, is the prominent force among dozens of rebel factions in the northwest. The group, which has been internationally recognized as a terror organization, controls large swathes of Idlib as well as parts of Aleppo, Hama, and Latakia provinces. The festivities have driven large numbers of people from their homes. Kurdish authorities in northeast Syria (Rojava) called on their institutions to "facilitate the passage of people" fleeing the conflict. Farhad Shami, spokesperson for the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), told Ronahi TV that they are following the developments and said their arch-enemy ...just another cheapjack Moslem dictatorship, brought to you by the Moslem Brüderbund... is behind the HTS-led offensive. "Our mission is to protect our people and territories... The SDF will act as needed," he added. Kurdish forces of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) control one neighbourhood in Aleppo as well as Tal Rifaat north of the city, located within a small region of Afrin. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds who fled Turkey’s 2018 military offensive in Afrin are still living in camps in Tal Rifaat. Rudaw English asked a senior Rojava official about the possibility of a Ottoman Turkish attack on Tal Rifaat. "Everything is possible now. Tal Rifaat is under threat," said the official, who did not want to be named due to the sensitivity of the matter. Rebel commander in the Jaish al-Izza rebel brigade
Opposition sources in touch with Turkish intelligence said Turkey had given a green light to the offensive. But Turkish foreign ministry spokesperson Oncu Keceli said Turkey sought to avoid greater instability in the region and had warned that recent attacks undermined de-escalation agreements. David Carden, UN Deputy Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Syria Crisis, said: “Relentless attacks over the past three days have claimed the lives of at least 27 civilians, including children as young as eight years old,” he told Reuters. “Civilians and civilian infrastructure are not targets and must be protected under International Humanitarian Law.” Syrian state news agency SANA said four civilians including two students were killed on Friday in Aleppo by insurgent shelling of university student dormitories. It was not clear if they were among the 27 dead reported by the UN official. Russian and Syrian warplanes bombed the area near the border with Turkey on Thursday to try to push back the insurgent offensive. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said “more than 14,000 people –- nearly half are children — have been displaced” by the violence. Related: Jaish al-Izza: 2023-06-09 Turkish military movements in NW Syria spark speculation Jaish al-Izza: 2022-09-18 Turkey-Syria Border: Turkish Forces and Catspaws Continue Breaching Ceasefire Agreement In NE Syria versus Kurds and Syrian army Jaish al-Izza: 2022-08-12 Opposition Factions Refuse Damascus-Ankara Convergence | ||||||
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Syria-Lebanon-Iran | |
Brigadier General Amar Al-Wawi, Chief of Staff of the Free Syrian Army, Issues Ultimatum to Hezbollah and Iranian Proxies to Leave Syria | |
2024-10-11 | |
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Related: Free Syrian Army: 2023-12-29 A resident of Dagestan receives a suspended sentence for connections with militants in Syria Free Syrian Army: 2023-09-10 Breaking the blockade of the heroic Deir ez-Zor Free Syrian Army: 2023-08-15 US uses Syrian terrorists to deplete Russia | |
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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia | |||
A resident of Dagestan receives a suspended sentence for connections with militants in Syria | |||
2023-12-29 | |||
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. [KavkazUzel] The Kizilyurt district court in Dagestan sentenced local resident Batyr Aliyev, deported from Egypt after participating in militant activities in Syria, to three years of suspended imprisonment. The sentence to a resident of Dagestan, whom the court recognized as a member of an illegal armed group abroad, was reported on December 27 by the press service of the republican FSB. According to the investigation, the man “shared extremist ideology” and deliberately arrived in Syria to join the militants there. “Later, through Turkey, the man left for Egypt, from where he was deported in August 2023 and upon arrival in Russia he was detained by law enforcement agencies,” Interfax-South quotes an FSB representative as saying. A resident of Dagestan was charged with participation in an armed formation not provided for by federal law (Part 2 of Article 208 of the Criminal Code of Russia). This article provides for from eight to fifteen years of imprisonment, but the court imposed a much milder sentence on the resident of Dagestan - three years of suspended imprisonment. According to the file of the Kizilyurt District Court, the last case considered under this article was brought against Batyr Aliyev. He was sentenced on November 16, it came into force on December 4, and on December 27 the case was archived, according to the information on the court’s website. From the verdict, also published on the court’s website, it follows that Batyr Aliyev had no previous convictions, was not officially married, although he previously had two wives, and did not work anywhere at the time the case was considered. “About the beginning of 2013,” a resident of Dagestan, “sharing a religious ideology of an extremist nature,” decided to move to Syria and join the militants there. On November 10, 2013, he left Dagestan for Azerbaijan through the Yarag-Kazmalyar checkpoint, then arrived in Baku, from there on November 15 he flew to Istanbul, and on November 18 he went with a certain Samir to the Turkish-Syrian border, the text of the verdict says. As the court found, by November 20, 2013, Aliyev had already arrived in the Syrian city of Bab al-Hawa, “which was controlled by illegal armed groups operating as a united front against government forces.” There he voluntarily joined one of these groups, but performed the duties of its member less than a month, until approximately December 10, 2013.
Regarding himself, Batyr Aliyev said that he spent only two weeks among the militants, without having time to understand the activities of the unit. He then went to Turkey, and a month later he moved to Cairo and lived there for more than a year until he was detained by local law enforcement officers. After being in custody for about a month, he was deported to Russia. Batyr Aliyev was in custody during the consideration of the case, from August 3 to November 16, 2023. As mitigating circumstances, the court took into account the admission of guilt, repentance, the presence of Aliyev’s young children and positive characteristics from his place of residence, and as a result, sentenced him to three years of suspended imprisonment with a probationary period of two years. The "Caucasian Knot" also wrote that in April 2023, the cassation court returned for review to the prosecutor's office the case of Khanumkyz Kulibekova, whom the court in Khasavyurt sentenced to five years in prison on charges of intending to join an illegal armed group in Syria. The court recommended that the charges be reclassified under a more stringent article.
Related: Bab al-Hawa: 2023-10-13 Turkey deports 13,000 Syrians in September Bab al-Hawa: 2023-10-01 Turkey deports over 16,000 individuals to Syria within month Bab al-Hawa: 2023-09-29 Turkish authorities deport 700 Syrian refugees to northern Syria Related: Makhachkala: 2023-12-28 More than 140 people have challenged the arrest in the case of riots at Makhachkala airport Makhachkala: 2023-12-26 Riot participant at Makhachkala airport charged with attempted murder of a security officer Makhachkala: 2023-12-24 In Dagestan, Palestinian refugees are being issued Russian Passports Related: Islamic Front.: 2016-05-19 Ahrar al-Sham, Zenki say will not take part in 'North Army' Islamic Front.: 2015-02-23 Secret Phone Taps Reveal Turkish Military Aiding ISIS In Northern Iraq and Syria Islamic Front.: 2014-02-08 U.S. training Free Syrian Army in Jordan -- a group that violently targets Christians | |||
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Syria-Lebanon-Iran |
Breaking the blockade of the heroic Deir ez-Zor |
2023-09-10 |
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. Text taken from a variety of sources including memoirs by Kirill Romanovsky. Text is ncopyrighted by (c) Commissioner Yarrick. Commentary by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin is in italics. Excellent material dedicated to the 6th anniversary of breaking the blockade of the heroic Deir ez-Zor. Memorable events, in 2017 I had a lot of materials on this topic. Walking through the desert. How the Wagner PMC broke the blockade of Deir ez-Zor. ![]() The fall of 2017 for the Syrian Arab Republic and its allies was marked by several important successes in the campaign against the terrorist group Islamic State (IS)*. Thanks to the Russian assault detachments of the Wagner PMC, the Syrians managed to liberate vast territories of the Syrian desert, gain a foothold in Central Syria and begin an operation to regain control over the eastern part of the country. The beginning of a major military operation was the advance to the city of Deir ez-Zor, a key administrative center in eastern Syria. At that time, the city was under siege by IS militants for more than three and a half years: the defenders of Deir ez-Zor constantly experienced supply problems, fought close positional battles, but confidently held out against the forces of the terrorist group. After gaining a foothold in Central Syria and eliminating the terrorist threat in the Akerbat area in Eastern Hama, the Wagner PMC assault squads were finally able to break through the encirclement and release Deir ez-Zor. The breakthrough of the “musician” detachments to help the defenders of the city was predetermined by the subsequent military defeat of the main ISIS forces at the end of 2017. On the anniversary of the breaking of the siege of Syrian Deir ez-Zor, the head of the military-political Telegram channel Astra Militarum recalls the events of August-September 2017, during which the Wagner PMC and the Syrian army came to the rescue of the blocked garrison of the city and consolidated successes in the war against Islamic State. state"*, reaching the banks of the Euphrates River. Massacre on the banks of the Euphrates The Syrian Deir ez-Zor became the scene of bloody battles between the Syrian army and groups of anti-government forces back in 2013. In 2014, the situation in the province of Deir ez-Zor took a threatening turn after ISIS gangs broke through the Syrian-Iraqi border into the area of the village of Al Bu Kemal in April. By the summer, the forces of the terrorist group controlled the area of the Syrian desert near the T2 pumping station, the territory north of the Euphrates and the western part of the province. Realizing that the pace of advance of troops from Iraq could no longer be stopped, the militants of other groups for the most part either fled from the occupied territories or voluntarily went over to the side of the Islamic State. As a result, on July 3, the forces of the self-proclaimed “caliphate” established full control over the province of Deir ez-Zor, taking Al-Mayadeen and Al-Shuheil, as well as the largest oil field Al-Omar, without firing a shot. Only Deir ez-Zor itself remained uncontrolled by the militants: IS forces besieged the city and the surrounding areas from all sides. In addition, by the fall of 2014, areas of the city previously captured by Jabhat al-Nusra* and the Free Syrian Army (FSA), as well as large islands in the delta of the Euphrates River - Huweyja Katya and Huweyja Sakr - were under the control of militants. However, despite dense urban and rural positional battles, the defenders of Deir ez-Zor managed to hold back the first offensive impulses of the Islamic State and prevent the complete capture of the city. From that moment on, a protracted blockade of Deir ez-Zor began, which would last a total of three years and two months. The Guard is dying, but does not surrender By the summer of 2017, the situation in besieged Deir ez-Zor had become extremely complex and dangerous. In the city there were forces of the 104th Airborne Brigade of the Republican Guard of the SAR under the command of Major General Issam Zahreddin and armored vehicles of the 137th Mechanized Brigade of General Mohammad Khaddour. In addition, support for the Deir ez-Zor garrison was provided by local militias of the Syrian National Defense Forces (NDF). However, the main defense forces of the city were considered to be the troops of Issam Zahreddin, whose strategic genius and zeal made it possible to competently organize the defense of Deir ez-Zor. In a strategic sense, the coalition attack on the defenders of Deir ez-Zor significantly bled the besieged garrison and led to catastrophic consequences on the front around the city. The massive IS offensive and continuous attacks, starting in September 2016 and ending in the spring of 2017, led to the fact that the line of combat contact around Deir ez-Zor moved close to the gates of the airbase, the airport runway and the Panorama interchange, considered the gateway to residential part of the city. De facto, the zone of control of the Syrian army and allies was divided into two loosely connected enclaves: the only place that the troops used for communication and supplies was the area of the city cemetery, which was under continuous fire. In parallel with the military difficulties, a humanitarian catastrophe was growing in Deir ez-Zor itself. According to official data as of February 2016, about 200 thousand people lived in the city, while the siege led to permanent hunger among the civilian population and the military. For some time, an air bridge was operated by the Syrian Air Force and the Russian Aerospace Forces, which dropped humanitarian aid from the UN into the city. However, in January 2017, air deliveries were stopped due to too close proximity to militant firing positions. As a result, mortality in Deir ez-Zor increased markedly, and by the summer of 2017 there were already 90 thousand people left in the city. Memoirs of a participant in the events from Kirill Romanovsky’s book “Eight Years with Wagner”: “They (the Syrians - Ed.) have been fighting with the spirits there for a long time. They have a gray zone between the positions of the parties - only 100-150 meters. Both sides are dug into the ground up to the nostrils, as in the First World War - somewhere there is a mirror sticking out, somewhere there is a window, somewhere a pipe is poured into the parapet. On both sides." Through hardship to the stars The deterioration of the situation in Deir ez-Zor required the Syrian command and the Russian military to carefully study the operation to restore control over the region. However, it took the Syrian army and its allies a year to break the siege of Deir ez-Zor and drive ISIS militants out of key areas of Eastern Syria. During this time, pro-government forces achieved significant success and stabilized the situation in Central Syria, not least thanks to the active work of the assault units of the Wagner PMC. To continue the counter-terrorism operation against the Islamic State, it was necessary to regain control of Palmyra, which the militants recaptured as a result of the offensive on December 11, 2016. Having retreated again to the T4 airbase (in common parlance “Tifor”) in the vicinity of the city of Tiyas, the Russian military command hastily called in detachments of the Wagner PMC to Syria - a few months before this, the head of the “orchestra” Yevgeny Prigozhin was given an order from Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu about the disbandment of the unit. Throughout January 2017, the “orchestra” has been recruiting volunteers and amassing forces to attack IS positions – again, in the same way as in March 2016. As sources note, as a result, an offensive group with a total number of seven thousand people was assembled to advance towards Palmyra. It included separate units of the Syrian army and militia, pro-Iranian units and Hezbollah units - and the key striking force was the soldiers of the 1st assault detachment of the Wagner PMC under the command of Alexander Kuznetsov (Ratibor), who were in the vanguard. "Orchestra" is a reference to Wagner operators, as in Musicians of Mars, a phrase used in the US Army Artillery School in Fort Sill. In mid-January 2017, a widespread counter-offensive began along the entire front line. By the end of the month, fighters from the Wagner PMC advanced 15 km from the T4 airbase in Tiyas and created a bridgehead for returning to Palmyra. As a result of persistent fighting, by the end of February 2017, the “musicians” liberated part of the oil and gas fields northwest of Palmyra and came close to the ancient city. After the 1st SHO "Ratibora" took Palmyra by storm for the second time, on March 2, Sergei Shoigu reported to Russian President Vladimir Putin that Palmyra was again under the control of the Syrian army. In order to gain a strategic advantage before the global advance into eastern Syria, government forces needed to gain a foothold in the desert and mountainous areas of Homs province, which were still under IS control. As a result of three months of fighting, units of the Wagner PMC liberated the Al-Shair gas fields north of Palmyra from the Islamic State, and pro-Iranian militias occupied the Khneifis phosphate deposits south of the ancient city. As a result, Palmyra was freed from strategic encirclement from the south, while free access to the city from Damascus was again opened. And the Syrian army had a serious chance to clear the Syrian desert. On May 30, the Syrian army, together with the National Defense Forces and Iraqi paramilitary forces, occupied the Helba area in the southeastern part of Homs province, thus approaching the border with Iraq at a distance of 50 kilometers. Prolonged fighting around Palmyra led to the fact that the Islamic State militants were forced to regroup and leave part of the territory in order to unite all their units in the Es-Sukhne area and thereby prevent Syrian government forces along the highway to Deir ez-Zor. On June 13, Liwa Fatimiyoun troops occupied the city of Arak and nearby gas fields almost without a fight; the next day, the Syrian army reached the T3 pumping station and occupied the At-Talila intersection, which has long been considered the main line of defense of the Islamic State. As a result of the retreat and regrouping of the Islamic State, by June 23, pro-government forces occupied the first points in the Syrian desert - Ard Al-Washash, the Al-Wair Dam and large areas within 25 kilometers of the T2 pumping station. After clearing the entire province of Aleppo from Islamic State militants and regaining control over the section of the highway to Raqqa from Itria to Ar-Rasafa, the Syrian army faced the need to liberate significant territories in the south of Raqqa province in order to reach directly into the vicinity of Deir ez-Zor. On July 14, 2017, the combined forces of the Syrian army, led by the Tiger Forces of Suheil al-Hassan, launched an offensive in the south of Raqqa province, moving south from Ar-Rasafa with the support of Russian aircraft. Over the next few days, a number of oil and gas fields in the south of the province, in particular the large Dbeisan field, came under the control of government troops. By July 18, government forces had driven IS out of the western and southwestern parts of Raqqa province, while simultaneously reaching the outskirts of the Jabal al-Bishri mountains, which contained secret routes and communications between IS fighters between Deir ez-Zor, Sukhneh and Akerbat. By July 21, the Syrian army had advanced 30-35 km east of Ar-Rasafa and intensified its offensive on the west bank of the Euphrates River. The key target of the advancing combined forces was the city of Maadan, beyond which passed the administrative borders of the province of Deir ez-Zor. On July 27, Syrian army troops advanced within four kilometers of Maadan and, having blocked the small IS garrison in the city, crossed the border of Deir ez-Zor province from the west for the first time. In the summer of 2017, the Syrian army was faced with a difficult situation at the front, during which it was necessary to eliminate significant forces of militants in Eastern Hama in order to continue the offensive on Deir ez-Zor. The center of the IS fortified area became the settlement of Akerbat - the westernmost point of control of the militants, which over the course of several years was turned into an impregnable citadel. Taking advantage of the difficult terrain and numerous desert shelters, IS militants continued to travel between Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, attacking gas fields in the Palmyra area. Up to one and a half thousand militants with heavy weapons and military equipment, tanks, artillery and “shahid mobiles” with explosives, as well as foreign terrorists and saboteurs equipped with the latest military equipment, have accumulated in the city. The first two attempts to encircle the fortified area of Akerbat and stop the threat of IS advance in Eastern Hama were unsuccessful: despite high-quality support from the Russian Federation, which destroyed the routes for the transfer of militants, the Syrian army for a long time could not break through the defenses of the forces of the terrorist group. Only after fighters of the Russian Special Operations Forces and assault units of the Wagner PMC were involved in the task, was it possible to cut off the Akerbat area from communications. After which the fighters of the “orchestra” began an operation to liberate the enclave - and as a result, by September 2, Akerbat was completely liberated by the forces of the Wagner PMC and the Syrian special forces unit “ISIS Hunters” trained by “musicians”. At the beginning of August 2017, it became known that terrorists were beginning to flee from areas of Eastern Homs, which were the most strategically important points. Amid the loss of Mosul and the tight siege of Raqqa by pro-American forces, significant IS forces were withdrawn from Akerbat and Es-Sukhneh east of Palmyra along mountain routes and trails towards besieged Deir ez-Zor. Pro-government forces took advantage of the consolidation of IS militants to form a springboard for an attack on Deir ez-Zor. On July 23, the forces of the 5th Volunteer Assault Corps besieged Es Sukhne, which at that time was defended by a small but extremely fanatical garrison of militants. Despite the fact that the troops managed to take up the first defensive formations in the immediate vicinity of the populated area, the density of fire and flank counterattacks of the Islamic State forced the transfer of additional army forces to Sukhna. By August 2, after prolonged fighting, the militants began to withdraw from the city in order to preserve some units in the upcoming battle for Deir ez-Zor. The next day, government forces took control of 20% of the city, and Sukhne was completely liberated by August 5. The Syrian army fighters were accompanied by fighters and instructors from the Russian Special Forces and the Wagner PMC, who closely monitored their charges. At the same time, the Syrian army gathering for an attack on Deir ez-Zor remained extremely vulnerable all the way from Palmyra to Es-Sukhne, where the enemy carried out flank counterattacks. Thus, on August 9, IS militants carried out a large-scale offensive in the east of Homs province near the T-2 pumping station. After an hour of intense fighting, the attack was eventually repulsed, with army commanders reporting that more than 80 IS militants were killed and army casualties amounted to 22 soldiers. Memoirs of a “Wagnerite” from the book by Kirill Romanovsky “Eight Years with Wagner” “One day we are given a task - during the offensive, to reach the front line of the Syrians and understand where they have gained a foothold after their advance. I rode along the left flank with our colonel, the military adviser to the Syrians. We look at the left flank - everything seems to be fine, the Syrians have completed their tasks. We look at the right flank and see that to the right of the road the cars were moving straight towards the enemy. Well, we think - well done, Syrians, they are advancing straight in a column. Moreover, there were a lot of cars - I counted about a dozen pickup trucks. To protect the flanks from ongoing attacks, the Syrian army conducted two military operations on August 11. As a result of the landing at the junction of the borders of the provinces of Homs, Hama and Raqqa north of Sukhneh, Tiger Forces troops occupied Al-Qadir and 12 kilometers of the territory around the Al-Qom oasis, thereby cutting off the main communications of IS militants between the three provinces and securing the approaches to the highway to Es-Sukhnah. After the main forces of the Syrian army arrived at the landing site on August 23-24, government forces liberated more than 2 thousand square kilometers of territory and blocked IS forces in the province of Deir ez-Zor. In parallel with the successes north of the highway, the Syrian army managed to pin down the IS forces in the area of the village of Humeima in the Syrian desert, from which there was also access to the province of Deir ez-Zor. After ten days of fighting, IS forces abandoned Humeimah, thereby, after four years of war, the oil pipeline line stretching from Iraq to the Mediterranean coast completely came under the control of government forces. Along the highway Starting from the end of August 2017, the Syrian army, Russian military and assault units of the Wagner PMC began planning an operation to relieve Deir ez-Zor. On August 25, the head of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy, announced that the city on the Euphrates will be the next target for the advance of the Syrian army with the support of the Russian Aerospace Forces. According to his statement, units of the Syrian army and people's militia, with the support of the Russian Aerospace Forces, are rapidly developing an offensive on Deir ez-Zor from three directions: “Now the main efforts of government troops and the Russian Armed Forces are focused on defeating the last stronghold of IS armed forces in the Deir ez-Zor area. With the release of this city, the defeat of the most combat-ready formations of the IS terrorist group in Syria will be completed. It is there that the IS terrorists are gathering their remaining forces: militants from Mosul and most of the most combat-ready terrorist units from Raqqa have moved there.” The capture of Es-Sukhne and the liberation of Akerbat allowed the Syrian side and the assault troops of the Wagner PMC to intensify operations in the direction of Deir ez-Zor. On August 27, the Syrian army began advancing along the Homs-Palmyra highway, advancing by August 29 to a position near the village of Ghanem Ali, 66 km from the city of Deir ez-Zor. The Syrian troops and Wagner attack aircraft were helped to advance by the Russian Aerospace Forces, which destroyed 26 pieces of equipment and two IS fortified areas in the vicinity of the besieged city within 24 hours. Memoirs of a “musician” from Kirill Romanovsky’s book “Eight Years with Wagner”: “The offensive took place near Es-Sukhne towards Deir ez-Zor along the road. We advanced along the route from left and right. On the left side was the combined Syrian corps, in my opinion, the 101st corps. And on the right flank there was, it seems, the first corps. In both corps, the command was replenished by our officers from the Ministry of Defense - they were competent and commanded normally. We advanced as if in waves: on the first day the Syrians advanced, reached the planned line, the next day, starting from their positions, our units advanced.” The entry of the Syrian army into the province of Deir ez-Zor caused massive movements in the territories of the Islamic State: according to the Russian Ministry of Defense, militants began transporting heavy equipment, including tanks and off-road vehicles with large-caliber weapons and mortars. The consolidation of IS equipment in the area of Deir ez-Zor itself was interrupted by the Russian Aerospace Forces, which on September 1 destroyed concentrations of militants in the Jebel al-Sarda area, in the Ar-Rashidiya area, near the Panorama roundabout, and also near military warehouses in Ayash. After active fighting on the approaches to Deir ez-Zor, the Wagner PMC, which was at the forefront of the offensive, was able to get within 8-10 km of the city. Participants in the events in Kirill Romanovsky’s book “Eight Years with Wagner” recall: the fighters covered the path from Palmyra to the outskirts of Deir ez-Zor through the desert almost on their own two feet: “In 2017, when we walked towards the Euphrates, we really walked a lot and for a long time . We covered a huge amount of mileage during the day. Later, a couple of years later, I had to drive there by car - I was so tired of driving. I think to myself: “Epera Theatre, have we walked that much?” The support of Russian aviation during these days did not stop even for a day: ammunition depots, armored vehicles, trucks and IS artillery firing points came under attack from the Russian Aerospace Forces. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, in the first days of September 2017, the Russian Aerospace Forces carried out more than 80 sorties to support the offensive on Deir ez-Zor. Thanks to the coordinated actions of all advancing units of the Wagner PMC, they were able to break through the militants’ defenses in the most important strategic directions. Breakthrough In parallel with the strikes of the Russian Aerospace Forces, the forces of the elite Tiger Force brigade Suheil al-Hassan were advancing towards the city. On August 31, government forces established full control of the Jebel al-Bishri mountain range west of Deir ez-Zor. By September 2, the Tiger Forces, together with detachments of the 5th Volunteer Assault Corps and the Afghan militia Liwa Fatimiyun, advanced from the mountain range towards the hills of Jebel Nazyrat al-Bishri, Jebel Azman and Jebel Adima, which covered the route to Deir ez-Zor. The siege of Deir ez-Zor was broken on September 5, 2017. At night, the Russian Aerospace Forces destroyed more than 100 ISIS militants on the outskirts of the city, but the Russian military reserved the main blow for the morning. From the frigate Admiral Essen of the Black Sea Fleet, sea-based cruise missiles "Caliber" were launched at IS positions near Deir ez-Zor. As a result of the precise strike, command and control facilities and a communications center, weapons warehouses, as well as an enterprise for the repair of militant armored vehicles were eliminated. The strike of Russian cruise missiles predetermined the fall of the blockade of Deir ez-Zor: at about 14:00 local time, the advancing units of the Tiger Forces met with Issam Zahreddin and soldiers of the 104th and 137th brigades. The defenders of the city could not hide their emotions: finally, the three-year siege of the city was over. Few people, however, paid attention then to what was happening southwest of the place where the blockade of Deir ez-Zor was broken, described in the media. While Syrian troops were trying to break through from the north-west to connect with the first part of the defenders of Deir ez-Zor, fighters of the Wagner PMC fought their way to the territory of the Deir ez-Zor airport along the M-20 highway. The Wagnerites needed to clear the entrances and key roads leading to the once besieged city from Islamic State militants. And while the Tigers were fraternizing with the garrison of Deir ez-Zor, Russian fighters had to wrest strategically important communications from the clutches of the militants. At the beginning of September, the route was practically cleared of militants everywhere except one position. Located 30 km from Deir ez-Zor, the village of Ash-Shola was the only section of the road that remained with IS militants after breaking the blockade of the city. The first attempts to take the village by the combined forces of the Wagner PMC and Syrian soldiers ran into fierce resistance from IS militants who tried to encircle the advancing formations. The words of a fighter from the PMC “Wagner” in the book by Kirill Romanovsky “Eight Years with Wagner”: “The spirits cut us off then. One fine morning they blow up an ammunition depot in our rear. There was a long distance between our posts - a kilometer and a half. In general, they somehow got through between the posts - not because of our oversight or negligence, but because it was not clear where the Syrians were standing. Because of this confusion, the militants insolently drove up, worked and settled down along the embankment. We remained against them as part of one squad: we threw grenades, a quadcopter dropped NATO mines on us. We had two “three-hundredth” lungs. But in the end we fought them off.” By September 6, additional Wagner forces were deployed near Ash-Shola, who were supposed to gain a foothold in the populated area and provide full access to the highway. On September 7, the offensive continued. The forces of the “Islamic State” tried several times to attack the advancing column of Russian soldiers, but were unable to contain the advance of the Wagner PMC and were forced to retreat. A breach in the ISIS defenses forced militant groups to retreat along the M-20 highway. As a result of the offensive along the road, the forces of the “orchestra” reached the southern outskirts of Deir ez-Zor - the area of the airport, cut off from the rest of the city’s defenders. Memoirs of a “musician” from Kirill Romanovsky’s book “Eight Years with Wagner”: “We broke through the ring of ISIS fighters who kept the airfield surrounded, and our platoon was the very first to go there. We go out to the airfield - everyone is dirty, we have walked through all the quarries, we have squeezed the spirits out of their holes. We look like fighting homeless people. I'm wearing a helmet and holding two ATGMs. And a Syrian comes out from this gang that ran the airport there, he saw us and said: - Inshallah! “Praise be to Allah, reinforcements have arrived.” Having encountered the massive advance of the Wagner PMC detachments, IS militants were forced to hastily flee from their positions near the airport, abandoning weapons, ammunition and ammunition, including NATO-style ones. As it later became clear, the leaders of the Islamic State ordered the Islamists to go beyond the Euphrates River, where the militants had full-fledged strongholds. Using the area of the Deir ez-Zor airfield as a springboard for the offensive, the forces of the Wagner PMC began clearing the IS stronghold on the territory of the gas processing plant. The fighting in the area of the “Gas Plant,” as Russian soldiers nicknamed this area, was accompanied by numerous attacks by suicide bombers, which were launched in order to slow down the offensive and cover the withdrawal of IS forces beyond the Euphrates. Words of the “orchestra” stormtrooper from Kirill Romanovsky’s book “Eight Years with Wagner”: “We went to the Dukhovsky stronghold and, when we were already moving the front, martyrs attacked the airport,” says an eyewitness to one of these attacks. “There was an old fire station there, and two suicide bombers blew themselves up there.” I don’t know what kind of explosive charge there was, but when these two suicide bombers exploded, they were completely scattered across the territory. I then walked through these fragments of equipment, scraps of suicide bombers - the largest fragment that I saw was the size of a palm, a piece of the spine and ribs.” The fight continues... The breaking of the blockade of Deir ez-Zor was an important milestone in the Syrian conflict - but the story of the war against the Islamic State does not end there. In order to stop the expansion of terror, it was necessary to inflict a crushing military defeat on the group, after which ISIS militants would not be able to carry out such extensive activities as they carried out three years ago. And first of all, to drive out the militants of the terrorist group from the occupied areas of Deir ez-Zor and the surrounding area. Its main defender, Issam Zahreddin, did not wait for the complete liberation of Deir ez-Zor. After a short vacation and meeting with his family in Es-Suwayda, the Syrian general returned to the city with the intention of continuing the battle with terrorists. However, on October 18, 2017, two weeks before the liberation of the city, Zahreddin was killed in a mine explosion on the island of Huwayja Saqr in the Euphrates Delta. However, the work of the “Lion of the Republican Guard” was continued by his comrades. The next stage of fighting in Deir ez-Zor lasted for two months: the Islamic State militants were not going to give up positions in the captured city neighborhoods. On September 14, 2017, the Syrian army launched an offensive to recapture the remaining IS-controlled areas of the city of Deir ez-Zor, occupying the Al-Bagiliya area. While the Syrians were diverting the attention of the militants to themselves, detachments of the Wagner PMC began the legendary operation to cross the Euphrates: on September 18, the fighters of the “orchestra” carried out a landing on the eastern bank of the river, cutting off the militants remaining in Deir ez-Zor from supplies and assistance. Finding themselves completely surrounded, without the opportunity to cross the river and go to other combatants, the remaining militants surrendered block by block and were destroyed by pro-government forces. On November 3, 2017, the Syrian army completely recaptured the city of Deir ez-Zor and its environs from IS, and on November 17, the Wagnerites cleared the militants’ last stronghold of defense – the island of Huwayja Katya, where a group of several dozen militants was completely destroyed. (c) Commissioner Yarrick |
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