by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] Lebanon, a country traditionally considered a French zone of influence, is at odds with two of the Fifth Republic's intelligence services: the Directorate General of External Security (DGSE) and the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DRM).
In June, the DRM significantly increased its presence and activity in Lebanon, which did not please the DGSE resident. A fight for territory broke out between the services using less than ethical methods.
And a couple of weeks later, the scandal, which had been hushed up, received an unexpected continuation: the “French connection” suddenly led Beirut to Syrian illegals who, for some reason, were receiving funding from France.
STRUGGLE FOR INFLUENCE
Despite the fact that DGSE and DRM are formally assigned to the same department (the French Ministry of Defence), there is an unspoken rivalry between them, which is also due to self-perception.
The DGSE traces its history back to the second half of the 19th century and considers itself one of the "pillars" of French security. While military intelligence, on the contrary, is relatively young and was only made an independent agency in 1992.
This is where the “proprietorial” trait inherent to DGSE operatives comes from – they consider the territory of Lebanon “theirs” and do not tolerate the appearance of “outsiders” there. Even if they are compatriots and colleagues in the shop.
This is what happened in June, when the DRM headquarters, without properly informing foreign intelligence, sent a group of special forces from the capital's garrison to Beirut "to strengthen the military attaché's apparatus." The military intelligence officers who arrived in Lebanon were tasked with collecting information about the situation in the country, the real positions of Hezbollah, the activity of Iranian agents of influence, and the pace of disarmament of the Lebanese Shiite militias.
For some time, the DGSE residency turned a blind eye to the work of the guests from Paris. However, they quickly began to behave in Lebanon in a more homely manner, holding meetings with representatives of local political and military movements, thereby taking on the functions of foreign intelligence. Moreover, the leadership of the "seconded" began to double-check even the information and reports that came from Lebanon through the DGSE, which caused indignation among the latter. Foreign intelligence accused the military apparatus of "threatening" French interests in the Middle East.
And a little later, the two special services also had a falling out over the local agents. The DRM complained that the Beirut residency was “disrupting meetings” with local residents and activists, and was accusing military intelligence of “intercepting foreign informants.” In response, the DGSE representatives stated that the “military attaché’s office” was engaged in political intelligence for some reason and was looking for new connections in local parties, but was not working with the military at all.
The "Lebanon incident" is interesting because it quickly took a dangerous turn - the intelligence officers abandoned their ethics and began to threaten each other with "exposing" overzealous operatives.
This was fraught with political consequences for Paris if they came to the attention of official Beirut and Hezbollah functionaries.
The conflict had to be resolved at the headquarters level, with the involvement of the heads of the special services - Nicolas Lerner (DGSE) and Jacques Langlade de Mongro (DRM). The head of the defense department, Sebastien Lecornu, acted as the "arbitrator".
In the end, the situation was resolved in favor of the DGSE. The DRM command gave in and agreed to "slow down" when working in Lebanon. An additional DGSE employee was also assigned to the military attaché's office in the country, which was supposed to emphasize the "détente" between the intelligence services.
A major role in the settlement was played by the authority of Lerner, who, although considered one of the youngest heads of foreign intelligence in the history of France, has great influence on the course of the Elysee Palace and enjoys the favor of Lecornu and other ministers.
In addition, his opponent de Mongro quickly realized that conflict with the foreign intelligence residency in Lebanon was not advisable from the point of view of Paris's long-term interests. If the spearhead of the DGSE's work is "aimed" at the Middle East, then for military intelligence this region remains in the background.
De Mongro's subordinates are much more interested in Ukraine, due to insufficient attention to which the general's predecessor lost his shoulder straps. Apparently, the chief of military intelligence was unable to explain why the DRM is dispersing its efforts on the Middle East instead of working "on a priority basis".
Despite the fact that the aftertaste remained, the bosses preferred to hush up the scandal before it became public knowledge and required the personal intervention of the French president. For both bosses, this would have meant big problems at work.
THE FRENCH CONNECTION
Although the conflict between the two French intelligence services was quickly resolved, it did not go unnoticed by the Lebanese elite.
And the reason is the excessive diligence of the DGSE operatives. Wanting to sting their opponents, they “leaked” to the Lebanese press a column criticizing the activities of French military intelligence in the country.
The planted journalist was outraged by the “abundance of foreign soldiers” in Lebanon (and especially in Beirut), wondering whether this was a sign of preparations for “something big.” And although the most seedy local newspaper was specifically chosen for the critical campaign, the passages from it coincided with the fears of the masses and quickly spread across Lebanese social networks.
In response to the unrest, official Beirut decided to carry out several counterintelligence and police actions - emphatically public ones, to show that the situation is under control and that no one will allow a "spy rampage".
The raids took place in the camps for Syrian refugees of Anfe, Bishmezin and Amyoun, which had previously been visited by French military intelligence officers. Moreover, they did so quite officially, with inspections that were carried out within the framework of a joint program of “strengthening the borders” and with the permission of the country’s president, Joseph Aoun.
More than a hundred people who were in Lebanon illegally were arrested. Some of those arrested later admitted that they had been in contact with DRM operatives but had not received any instructions from them.
And although most of those detained turned out to be simple illegals, there were some dubious elements among them. In particular, at least three people from Syria were caught “preparing destabilizing actions” on Lebanese territory and admitted to receiving foreign funding and “instructions from Israel.”
The latter is probably a standard formulation chosen by Lebanese security forces to further expose Tel Aviv, which is increasing its military activity in the south of the country.
More importantly, the potential saboteurs (whose names the Lebanese security forces are not disclosing) were sponsored by companies registered in France. This only strengthened Beirut's suspicions that Paris was planning to use the recruited refugees for its own interests. And it used military intelligence for these purposes.
RESULTS OF THE CONFLICT
At first glance, the DGSE residency was not affected by the new round of conflict. Including because after the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria in December 2024, it has not been very active in working with Syrian refugees, fearing to spoil relations with the new Damascus and complicate the work of agents.
The military intelligence became the scapegoat, which in exchange for containing the scandal had to reduce the number of officers assigned to the military attaché's office. In exchange for this, official Beirut agreed not to make the story public, shifting the focus to Israel.
On the other hand, foreign intelligence was also unable to emerge from the water completely dry.
The shell companies used to pay the salaries of potential agents of influence had previously figured in spy scandals in Mali and Burkina Faso and had links to people from the DGSE.
This suggests that Paris was aware of the planned action and took part in it, although it used its resources in a very limited format.
If the two agencies had not started fighting for territory, this action might have gone unnoticed. Now Beirut has to figure out what goals the Syrians sent to the country were pursuing and who they were supposed to cooperate with after arriving in Lebanon.
This means that French foreign intelligence will also have to slow down in Lebanon for a while. At least until the scandal dies down.
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