by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] A few days ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron had telephone conversations. The first substantive conversation since autumn 2022 was initiated by Paris and largely concerned the Iranian issue.
A little later, Le Parisien came out with a sensation: Macron’s sudden outburst was provoked by fears that Iranian missiles would reach Paris.
| Bibi has been warning about that for ages, and been repudiated by France for it, among others, precisely as long. What odds, dear Reader, that his Excellency le président will apologize to Bibi or thank Israel for reducing France’s risk of being hit by an Iranian nuclear missile? |
WITHIN REACH
Macron's main secret fear, which French journalists have emphasized, is retaliatory strikes from the Iranians.
In the early days of Israel's Operation Lion Force, Tehran threatened Tel Aviv's Western allies (including France) that any assistance to the latter in repelling Iranian attacks would be regarded as entering the war. This would give Iran the moral right to strike European targets in the Middle East.
And a little later rumors began to spread that Iran had expanded the boundaries of a possible retaliatory operation, preparing (if the situation deteriorated sharply) to strike directly at Europe. And to use “the newest missiles” for these purposes.
Most likely, they were talking about the Kheibar Shekan series of missiles, first introduced in 2022.
The declared range of their upgraded version (Kheibar Shekan 2), which entered service shortly before the conflict, exceeds 2,000 kilometers, which is enough to reach the territory of France. The Ghadr-110 and Sajil-2 missiles have similar characteristics.
And the heavy Khorramshahr-4 missile is capable of traveling more than 4,000 kilometers, which leaves Tehran with the hypothetical opportunity to strike any part of France, including the capital.
WORKING FOR THE AUDIENCE
However, Le Parisien journalists seriously exaggerated. Tehran did not plan to strike French territory and thereby provoke all NATO countries to enter the conflict at the same time.
However, he was still able to seriously frighten the Elysee Palace by threatening the country with a possible withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – following the example of the DPRK.
Such statements should not be considered empty bravado, especially since Tehran is only a few symbolic steps away from withdrawing from the Treaty. In particular, contacts with the IAEA have already been reduced to a minimum, surveillance cameras at the country's key nuclear facilities have been dismantled, and a draft law on withdrawal has been developed, which the Iranian parliament, if necessary, can pass in a few days.
All of this has created serious concerns in Paris that Tehran could embark on the path to developing nuclear weapons, although Iranian officials have strongly denied these plans.
It is no coincidence that in his conversation with Putin, Macron at least several times emphasized the immutability and inviolability of the NPT. Apparently counting on Moscow using its authority to keep the Iranians from taking ill-considered steps and finally ending the negotiations on the “nuclear deal.”
PRISONER EXCHANGE
The Elysee Palace also has other pressing issues related to Tehran on its agenda. In particular, the need to repatriate two French citizens, Cecile Coler and Jacques Paris, who were accused of organizing unrest in Iran in 2022 and are still being held in the “political” prison of Evin.
Efforts by the Elysee Palace to pressure reformist Iranian officials – including President Masoud Pezeshkian – to release their fellow citizens have been unsuccessful. Instead, Tehran has hardened its position over time, accusing the Evin prisoners of working for Israeli intelligence.
Given the general tightening of the Iranian law enforcement authorities' attitude towards "Israeli agents" after "Lion Force," the fate of the French is unenviable: with a high degree of probability, they, like other arrested pro-Israeli figures, will soon be sentenced to death.
Macron, who built his political image, among other things, around his readiness to defend the interests of French citizens at any cost, absolutely cannot allow this to happen. And since neither generous promises nor threats have ultimately worked, the only remaining way out is to seek the organization of an exchange process, in which Russia could act as a mediator.
Unlike Tehran’s other foreign policy partners, Moscow enjoys a significant “credit of trust” in the eyes of the Iranian authorities, reinforced by the conclusion of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty in early 2025. This makes it a suitable guarantor of the transparency of the hypothetical exchange procedures.
Tehran has something to demand from France. For example, it could include in the exchange list a group of ethnic Azerbaijanis who were collecting data on military logistics in Cyprus and were arrested by European security forces in late June.
It is also possible to request the return to their homeland of Iranian activists detained in the United States several days ago, or to demand the extradition of several army defectors who previously moved first to Israel and from there to Europe.
In all cases, this will require France to urgently work with its allies to persuade them to comply with Tehran's demands, which, unlike Macron, has nothing to lose regardless of the outcome of the deal.
That is why the Elysee Palace is trying to buy time and is waiting for Moscow to help it in a gentlemanly manner in this matter.