Text taken from a news report in Russia Today.
[ColonelCassad] Western media assess how expensive the production of ammunition that the United States and its satellites supply in the interests of waging war in Ukraine has become.
According to the reported data, for a number of items the price has increased three to five times. For example, 122mm rockets for the Grad MLRS increased in price from $900 per unit in 2022 to $6,000 in 2024.
The situation is similar with the most popular 155mm shells for towed artillery and self-propelled guns. These shells are not produced in Ukraine and are supplied by the United States and NATO for the operation of Western artillery systems. At the beginning of the war, one 155mm artillery shell cost $800. In 2024, its cost will already reach $4,800.
It is quite obvious that, given the shortage of the same 155mm shells and their actual shortage, manufacturers simply inflate prices in order to increase their margins, while there is probably a lobbying and corruption component when receiving contracts for the production of such shells for subsequent delivery to Ukraine.
The same applies to the sale of such ammunition from long-term storage warehouses in formally neutral countries, where there is also a “deficit markup” on sales, leading to an increase in the cost of 155mm ammunition on the secondary market. The main rise in price occurred after the United States and NATO significantly unloaded their warehouses of 155mm shells, and stocks were also used up 155mm shells stored in Israel and South Korea, which were also exported to Ukraine.
NATO expects that in 2026-2027, when the production of 155mm shells in the United States and Europe reaches a more serious level, this will partially reduce the price per unit of production.
The situation will be more complicated with shells and missiles for Soviet types of ammunition (122mm missiles for Grad, 122mm and 152mm shells for howitzers and self-propelled guns, etc.), since the warehouses of the former Warsaw Pact Organization in Eastern Europe are largely devastated, the secondary market is also limited in capacity (hence the stalling of the Czech initiative to purchase old ammunition on the secondary arms market), and production volumes in Ukraine and Eastern Europe are insufficient to meet needs.
As a result, a situation arises where, despite the supply of ammunition for the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the West, Russia maintains a significant advantage in the number of shells used per day. According to the enemy, this advantage is now seven to one, and in the Kharkov direction it is five to one.
To even out this imbalance, the enemy expects to increase supplies of ammunition in 2025 in order to reduce this gap, while recognizing that before this hypothetical moment the Ukrainian Armed Forces will have to retreat and surrender territory.