Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kamran Gasanov
[Regnum] The confrontation between Turkey and Israel, which has been ongoing since the 2023 Gaza War, has entered a new phase over the past month.
 Oh no, Mr. Gasanov — Turkey has been confronting Israel for much, much longer than that.
There is no sign of a new escalation similar to the IDF strike on Abu Duhur, Syria, where Turkish troops were expected to arrive in August. However, the balance of power is shifting.
And now it could shift to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's disadvantage. Turkey is simultaneously facing problems in two areas that are crucial to containing Israel.
| “Containing” Israel?? What Muslim country is capable of containing Israel? |
AZERBAIJANI BALANCE
Azerbaijan is one of the rare Eurasian states that manages to balance between Turkey and Israel. Baku and Ankara are allies under the Shusha Declaration and enjoy close ties across a wide range of areas. These include oil pipelines, gas pipelines, railways, cooperation through the Organization of Turkic States, trade, investment…
The harsher rhetoric between the Turks and Israelis following the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the risks of direct war following the change of regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria have not forced Ilham Aliyev to abandon his equidistant position.
Azerbaijan did not curtail its military-technical cooperation with Israel, which was particularly valuable during the Second Karabakh War, nor did it curtail oil supplies to Israel, particularly through the Turkish port of Ceyhan.
Moreover, Baku provided a platform for Turkish and Israeli security forces when the two armies were about to clash in Syria. Three rounds of negotiations were held in the Azerbaijani capital last spring and summer.
But maintaining this balance is becoming difficult. And it's not Baku's fault. Turkish activists previously staged spontaneous protests outside the Azerbaijani embassy in Ankara demanding an end to gasoline supplies to Israel. But now, opinion leaders have joined the criticism.
The war in Gaza was already bad enough, but Aliyev remained steadfast. Earlier this year, he reminded those who demanded an immediate boycott of Israel and those who wanted to involve Azerbaijani troops in peacekeeping operations in Gaza, thereby exposing them to IDF attack, that Palestine had not particularly supported Baku in its standoff with Yerevan.
And at the beginning of October, Ilham Aliyev, quite tired of statements that Karabakh had allegedly been returned to Azerbaijan by Turkey, said: “We don’t need anyone’s help, nor anyone’s patronage.”
Criticism erupted from the highest levels of Turkish government. Seizing on the news, Turkish politicians and journalists, with or without reason, recalled Azerbaijan's ties to the "Zionist regime," to which it sells oil (without specifying that it goes through Turkey), and demanded gratitude "for Karabakh."
Baku tried to respond firmly and prevent external interference. The ruling New Azerbaijan Party stated that the "One People, Two States" formula does not give one state the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another or impose political or ideological approaches.
While Baku continues to make reservations about its "brotherly ties" with Turkey, they didn't stand on ceremony with Celal Çiftçi, a columnist for the Turkish newspaper Şanlıurfa Olay, who insulted the head of state. The Azerbaijani Prosecutor General's Office placed Çiftçi on an international wanted list. Although he eventually apologized to Aliyev and his country and deleted the post, it left a bad taste in everyone's mouth.
The situation was intervened by 78-year-old Devlet Bahçeli, who has become a true "godfather" of modern Turkish politics, distinguished himself by initiating a dialogue between the authorities and the Kurds and reconciling Turkey's mafia clans.
On October 14, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (a secular party) and Erdoğan's coalition ally emphasized the need to respect the sovereignty, independence, and domestic legislation of each Turkic state. Bahçeli also called for preventing actions that could harm Turkish-Azerbaijani brotherhood.
INVISIBLE PACT
While Turkish media was playing a mild "cold war" on Azerbaijan, Ankara had problems in the south. And more serious ones. Just recently, it, along with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, signed the Mecca Agreement. The pact calls for a collective response to an attack on one of the signatories.
In early October, amid increasing Houthi attacks on Saudi infrastructure, Ankara and Islamabad reached an agreement with Riyadh to deploy forces to ensure the kingdom's security.
Saudi Arabia's Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif attend the signing ceremony in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.
On October 6, the Houthis reported strikes on Riyadh Airport, an oil refinery, and other facilities. Operations at the capital's airport were temporarily suspended, and Saudi authorities reported three wounded in attacks on two other airports. Further strikes followed on King Khalid International Airport.
For the new alliance, the challenge isn't just the number of missiles intercepted. Its political value depends on whether Saudi Arabia feels more secure after its partners join. If attacks continue and civilian infrastructure remains vulnerable, a gap will emerge between stated collective commitments and visible results.
POSSIBLE WINNER
Taking these two examples together, it becomes clear that Turkey's influence over its closest partners is currently being tested. Of course, a few statements from MPs and journalists won't destroy the alliance between Baku and Ankara overnight, but at this rate, Azerbaijan will seek to diversify its foreign policy, not relying solely on Turkey for support. And this, willy-nilly, will inevitably erode the alliance's cohesion.
And this is already being felt. As if in response to complaints about cooperation with Israel, Azerbaijani media accused Turkey of failing to synchronize the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations with Azerbaijan in accordance with the old agreements.
Regarding the situation in the Persian Gulf, the more actively the Houthis attack Saudi Arabia, the more they provoke Turkish intervention. Erdogan, of course, is currently maintaining that the Mecca Pact does not oblige Ankara to declare war on the Houthis, but predicting the course of events in the region is extremely difficult.
Turkey's potential involvement in Saudi Arabia's defense will cool its relations with Iran. Iran, incidentally, is far from benefiting from the escalating conflict between the Houthis and the Arabs, and is instead becoming even more isolated in the Arab world.
The undermining of Turkey's influence in Azerbaijan, the failure of the "Mecca Pact" to demonstrate its strength against the Houthis, and the escalation of Sunni-Shiite tensions in the Middle East play into Israel's hands.
He could offer Azerbaijan, if not an alternative to the Shusha Agreement, then a strengthening of bilateral ties in defense and beyond. The clash between Iran and the Houthis on one side, and the Saudis, Egyptians, and Turks on the other (i.e., a split in the Islamic world) could prompt Donald Trump to revive attempts to expand the Abrahamic Accords.
Israel, despite Turkey's reluctance, will again be perceived by the KSA and other countries in the region as a natural ally against Iran and its proxies.
But even a strengthened Israel is unlikely to be able to end Turkey's growing influence in the Middle East. But it could significantly reduce Ankara's room for maneuver.
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