Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov
| Meh. President Mahmoud Abbas looks first to his own self interest not to be driven out by the much more popular Hamas. The minute he allows West Bankers to vote, he and the entire PA will be gone, according to years of polls. Israel has nothing to do with it. |
[Regnum] In November 2026, Palestine was scheduled to hold its first parliamentary elections in two decades. Given the recent war in the Gaza Strip and other dramatic changes the Middle East has experienced in recent years, these elections were expected to serve as a benchmark for the Palestinian factions' readiness to overcome divisions and achieve a long-term settlement to the conflict.
However, even during the preliminary preparations, it became clear that there would be no elections in the near future. However, key players weren't too upset by this news.
THE FIRST IN 20 YEARS
The last full parliamentary elections in Palestine were held in 2006 and resulted in a triumph for Hamas. In that election, the movement won 74 seats, primarily due to an effective and aggressive campaign in single-member constituencies.
This was a painful blow for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, elected the previous year. His Fatah political movement won only 45 seats and effectively lost control of parliament.
The situation was complicated by the fact that Fatah and Hamas held opposing views on resolving the conflict with Israel. Abbas's supporters were engaged in peace negotiations and were generally open to the idea of a gradual disengagement, while Hamas demanded a more forceful approach and was prepared to defend its interests by force.
Unsurprisingly, by 2007 a split had occurred between the two key factions, and Hamas expelled Fatah representatives from the Gaza Strip, turning it into its permanent fiefdom.
In the years that followed, Palestine remained fragmented. Fatah and Hamas held periodic negotiations but were unable to reach a lasting compromise. Attempts to hold new parliamentary elections (for example, in 2021) ended in failure, in part due to a lack of confidence that Israel would not obstruct voting.
Negotiations might have dragged on further if not for the 2023 war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. The long and arduous campaign exhausted both sides, and a long-term settlement (even with American guarantees) was impossible without stabilizing the governing apparatus.
Therefore, in early October 2026, Palestinian representatives officially announced their intention to hold elections at the end of November and form a new parliament.
LET'S WAIT AGAIN?
In just one week since the election date was approved, at least a dozen electoral lists have been submitted to the Palestinian Central Election Commission.
Those who put forward were predominantly socialist, centrist and conservative parties and movements, as well as two coalition platforms (the Coalition for the Future of Palestine and Justice and Construction), composed primarily of technocratic politicians.
However, neither Fatah nor Hamas made it into the top ten, although observers expected that the irreconcilable opponents would be among the first to appear in the Central Election Commission.
The parties offered different justifications for the decision. Fatah explained the delay by "the need for a thorough review of candidates"—out of a desire to regain its status as a major player in Palestinian politics.
Hamas cited ongoing negotiations with "friendly forces": the movement intends to run for parliament as part of a coalition list and secure representation through individual heavyweight politicians. However, both parties stated their readiness to fight for the future of Palestine in the upcoming parliament.
As expected, the Israelis quickly intervened in the election process. On October 7, it became known that Israel had refused to allow Palestinian election officials into Gaza and East Jerusalem, casting doubt on the possibility of holding voting in all the declared territories.
Moreover, Israeli politicians began to exert behind-the-scenes pressure on Ramallah, demanding that Hamas candidates not be allowed to participate in the elections, threatening to completely derail them if they did not.
Against this backdrop, unpleasant rumors began to circulate throughout Palestine. Among the first to publicly discuss the possible postponement of the elections were representatives of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a movement allied with Hamas.
Moreover, the main blame for this was placed not on Israel, but on political forces from the West Bank – the latter were allegedly afraid of a parliamentary defeat and saw Israeli discontent as a pretext for curtailing electoral procedures.
Representatives of the faction called on opponents to exercise prudence and not fall for the Israelis' tricks.
Fatah and other political factions then denied the news of the election disruption, calling it "dangerous fabrications" designed to destabilize the situation in Palestine. However, just two days later, on October 10, the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization approved the postponement of the parliamentary elections "under the weight of insurmountable obstacles."
The new date was set for September 11, 2027, but with an important caveat: at the appointed hour, not only members of parliament but also the Palestinian president would be elected.
Abbas called on all Palestinians – both supporters and opponents – not to look for blame and to use the pause to better prepare for the elections.
A PROFITABLE SPLIT
Although both Fatah and Hamas were the loudest in lamenting the freezing of election campaigns, the electoral pause turned out to be beneficial to both of them.
In particular, Fatah (and especially Abbas) was given the opportunity to retain its status as the "voice of Palestine" for about another year. This also gave them time to find a way to dampen the sharply increased support for Hamas among Palestinian youth not only in Gaza but also in the West Bank.
In the case of Hamas, the key gain from the situation is maintaining formal control over the Gaza Strip without having to transfer powers to the official Palestinian governing institutions.
The lack of a unified decision-making center in Palestine also benefits Israel, primarily because of the Gaza Strip's suspended status. Until elections are held, the Strip is still considered lost to the Ramallah government and is controlled by Hamas, with whom Israel is at war.
This gives the Israelis the opportunity to covertly expand their presence in coastal areas under the pretext of proactive defense, as well as to build a parallel system of loyal institutions in Gaza.
By postponing the elections until 2027, the Palestinians have created additional complications for themselves. The simultaneous renewal of two key governing institutions (the presidency and parliament) greatly increases the political stakes.
And at the same time, it creates temptations for various forces to reshape the political landscape of Palestine at their own discretion, making local structures more dependent on external control.
Given that the Palestinian factions approached the 2026 elections in a state of fragmentation and disarray, it is not worth expecting them to quickly consolidate.
Quite the contrary, 2027 threatens the Palestinians with intensifying contradictions and the emergence of new tensions. This will not only prevent the formation of a consensus government but also risk a plunge into new military and political squabbles.
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