Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov
[Regnum] Less than a week after the civil war in Yemen thawed, the balance of power in the conflict has shifted dramatically. Saudi Arabian-backed forces, based in Aden, suffered a crushing defeat in western Yemen after a brief period of tactical success.
The Ansar Allah movement (the Houthis) managed not only to recapture previously lost territories but also to completely clear the coast of the enemy and seal the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This, in turn, created a strategic threat for Riyadh, which had expected a completely different outcome from this "small victorious" operation.
BREAK THE GOLDEN ARROW
The operation, which the Houthis dubbed "Popular Strike," lasted about a week. After repelling attacks by central government forces east of the capital, Sana'a (under Ansar Allah control since 2015), the Houthis launched a counteroffensive. However, they moved not inland or northeast (toward the Saudi border), as their opponents had clearly intended, but along the coast.
In a short time, they managed to take major cities—including Mokha (the key maritime hub of the government camp in the Red Sea), Zubab, and Murad—as well as several dozen smaller settlements.
In total, since the beginning of the escalation, Ansar Allah units have taken control of six districts covering a total area of approximately 5,400 square kilometers, increasing their overall zone of presence to 180,000 square kilometers. Thus, by mid-September 2026, the Houthis controlled a third of the country.
Although the government coalition was able to advance northwest in response (for example, deepening its zone of control in Al-Jawf province), from a strategic point of view the campaign proved a failure for Aden.
It's worth noting that the fighting this time wasn't limited to land. Ansar Allah launched an amphibious assault on key islands in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Sana'a gained control of the islands of al-Zuqar, Greater Hanish, and Lesser Hanish, as well as Perim (Mayoun) Island, which was used by international coalition forces as a "sea outpost."
The garrison of the Red Sea islands (up to 2 thousand people) capitulated after short battles under guarantees of safety.
The successes of the autumn of 2026 allowed Ansar Allah not only to reverse the results of the government's previous offensive operations in Aden (primarily Operation Golden Arrow in 2017, which nearly brought the movement to the brink of defeat), but also to establish full control over maritime logistics through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, eliminating the "blind spots" that had previously been exploited by enterprising shipowners.
Furthermore, Ansar Allah obtained large quantities of weapons and equipment from pro-Saudi forces (including heavy armored vehicles), command maps and plans, and other classified materials. Hundreds of defectors and former inmates of local political prisons swelled their ranks.
EVERYONE CAN, BUT NOT THE SAUDIS
After clearing the coastal towns, Ansar Allah's leadership declared the end of the "Popular Offensive" and the stabilization of the front. Although fighting with the central Yemeni government had not subsided by that point (and pro-Saudi forces, along with the Saudi Air Force, continued to strike the outskirts of Mokha), Houthi armed forces spokesman Yahya Sari publicly declared the resistance victorious in the new war.
The official "voice of the Houthis" did not miss the chance to comment on the changes that Ansar Allah's seizure of the entire Red Sea coast has brought to the region.
The overall message of Sari's speech was that with the victory of the Popular Strike, the Houthis have become a key force in Yemen and, with the capture of strategic islands, are able to completely control traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Sana'a now intends to apply the Iranian-proven "Hormuz Mechanism" to this zone, including imposing a voluntary-compulsory toll on vessels operating in these areas. In exchange, it will ensure safe civilian navigation.
However, the Houthi favor, as expected, does not extend to Saudi Arabia. The "Red Sea Gate" has been sealed for them, in retaliation for the earlier blockade of Yemeni ports.
"The Yemeni Armed Forces confirm that maritime navigation is safe for all companies, but not for Saudi vessels, which are already subject to a blockade," Sari emphasized.
However, for official Riyadh, the de facto closure of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait was not the only problem. Following the damage and partial disabling of the East-West oil pipeline infrastructure, which the kingdom used to transport petroleum products from ports in the Strait of Hormuz to the Red Sea and back, the Saudis lost the ability to quickly redistribute flows between the two routes, which had previously allowed them to accommodate short periods of unblocked sea routes.
Combined with the tightened blockade of the Red Sea, Riyadh will be forced to seek new, more expensive and longer routes, which will inevitably impact the kingdom's economy, which is still heavily dependent on energy exports.
HELP FROM FRIENDS
After the active phase of hostilities ended, the war shifted to the political realm. Seeking to explain the Houthi rebels' sudden success, the US accused Iran of "orchestrating" Operation Popular Push. The House of Saud also echoed this accusation, though, to be on the safe side, it chose to channel these accusations into the mouths of pro-government bloggers and experts.
Washington and Riyadh are confident that military advisers were involved – the Houthis acted with too much confidence and atypical effectiveness in areas where they had previously been unable to advance even a hundred meters for years.
Moreover, in the first days of Ansar Allah's counteroffensive, the infantry suddenly acquired a large number of drones (including FPV drones), reconnaissance, and communications equipment; the strategic forces' range of ballistic missiles expanded, and their accuracy increased exponentially. And the Houthi "fleet" somehow managed to approach strategically important islands undetected.
There were rumors that Tehran sent about twenty high-ranking IRGC commanders to Yemen, but Iranian authorities denied this information.
However, while criticizing Tehran, Washington is delicately silent about its own attempts to secretly help its Arabian ally and its Yemeni protégé.
Thus, since the beginning of September, the United States—despite Donald Trump's publicly stated refusal to interfere in "someone else's war"—has significantly expanded the scope of its intelligence support for Riyadh, including supplying the Saudi General Staff with data on identified targets.
This data was subsequently used by the Saudis to launch airstrikes, and by Yemeni central government units to adjust artillery fire. According to various estimates, between 100 and 200 American troops coordinated the strikes.
However, Saudi Arabia apparently also counted on naval and air support, especially when the situation spiraled out of control.
Envoys from the House of Saud spent the entire week harassing American military officials and making discreet visits to the White House and the Pentagon, but were unable to persuade them to intervene. European naval forces deployed in the region also chose not to participate in the fighting, due to their busy battling Somali pirates.
Interestingly, Riyadh's newfound allies in the Mecca Pact, Turkey and Pakistan, also ultimately avoided intervening in the Yemeni war under various pretexts.
From the perspective of Ankara and Islamabad, the escalation effectively began with the House of Saud's attempts to shift the balance of power within Yemen in its favor, meaning that the costs of the consequences should be borne not by the entire alliance, but only by a specific country.
However, this prioritization did not add any appeal to the “Mecca Pact,” which had previously been positioned as a local analogue of NATO.
These developments are driving Saudi Arabia into a strategic trap. In recent years, Riyadh has been trying its best to avoid a direct return to the Yemeni war. However, following the Houthi triumph on the coast and the threat to the national economy, a new "Decision Storm" is more a matter of time—and the "war party" within the Saudi elite is actively hinting at such an outcome.
However, technocrats close to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have not given up hope of resolving the issue without launching a new operation. For example, by seeking compromise with Iran or concluding a separate peace with Ansar Allah, or at least a truce similar to the 2022 inter-Yemeni consultations.
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