Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov
[Regnum] The new Syrian authorities staged a show trial of members of the former ruling dynasty. Among those in the dock was Wassim al-Assad, a cousin of the ousted Bashar al-Assad and, according to official Damascus, one of the organizers of the "old regime terror."

Wasim faces a full range of charges, from drug trafficking to attempting to organize a counter-revolution.
Damascus is presenting the process as planned and predicting a "noose and a bullet" for Bashar himself. However, this is intended not so much to frighten the former president as to convince his supporters of the futility of further resistance.
SHADOW FROM KARDAHI
Wassim al-Assad's biography differs from the biographies of other distant relatives of the ex-president in its paucity of facts.
It is known that he is a native of Qardaha, a small town in Latakia province considered the historical birthplace of the Assad dynasty. He also spent most of his life there.
Unlike other relatives of the former president, Wasim clearly did not aspire to a high public position in the Syrian nomenklatura. However, he had every chance of making a good career in the capital—his older brother, Ammar al-Assad, held a seat in the Syrian parliament and was considered a political heavyweight.
At the same time, witnesses testified that Wassim's behind-the-scenes influence in Latakia and other coastal provinces was comparable to that of the president. Relying on a network of loyal commanders, local benefactors, and merchants, Assad's cousin built a system of informants and controllers in these areas.
Over time, he reinforced them with rapid response teams of patriotic local residents. These forces were positioned as "people's militias" and used to maintain public order. Wasim, through trusted confidants, constantly reported to Damascus on the life and death of Latakia, earning him the telling nickname "The Shadow of Qardahi" in the presidential palace.
However, Wasim became a truly indispensable figure after the outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011. Together with his half-brothers Numeir and Ammar, he quickly formed a vast network of pro-government militias and police forces in the province, and suppressed the growing street protests.
Thanks to his intervention, Damascus was able to maintain control of the coastal zone at the beginning of the conflict and avoid being isolated from the sea. Subsequently, the "Latak Brigades" repeatedly appeared in the most difficult sections of the front, where they effectively held back the advance of Damascus's opponents.
THE LAST BASTION
Following the armed opposition's sudden offensive and the subsequent collapse of the front in early December 2026, Wasim, unlike a number of high-ranking commanders and officials, did not flee abroad. Moreover, he intended to turn Latakia and his native Qardaha into the last bastion of resistance.
Already on the second day of the crisis, Wassim publicly announced the formation of "support and defense groups" under his command for Latakia and the surrounding areas and called on local residents to fulfill their civic duty to their homeland—even though by that time entire provinces had come under the control of the armed opposition with virtually no resistance, and their advance units had already entered the suburbs of Damascus.
The "Last Guard" was promised various support measures—monthly payments of 3 million Syrian pounds (around $300 at the exchange rate at the time), a comprehensive amnesty, and large tracts of land in the coastal area of Latakia province.
Assad's cousin not only rallied loyalists but also promised to personally lead them to the barricades if the situation required it. And, according to local reports, he even managed to secure several armored vehicles, mortars, and an old tank for the "support and protection groups."
However, there were still few willing to join a war that had already been lost: by mid-December 2024, when the new government's forces approached Qardaha, they were met by only a few dozen militiamen, who quickly laid down their arms. By that time, Wasim was no longer in the city.
His name, however, was briefly forgotten in these parts. As early as March 2025, large-scale unrest broke out in Latakia, quickly escalating into clashes with the new regime's security forces.
In some cases, such as in the Jabla region, the resistance was coordinated and well-organized. As a result, the country's new leadership, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, was forced to deploy large forces to the province and suppress the unrest with the utmost severity and uncompromising force. According to the UN, up to 1,500 people, mostly civilians, were killed or seriously injured.
Damascus blamed the excesses on "old-regime revanchists" who attempted to pit the neutral population of Latakia against the new authorities. Wassim was secretly held primarily responsible for the incident. Although his name was not publicly mentioned, the Syrian authorities declared the Shadow of Qardaha a priority target.
A BOUQUET OF ACCUSATIONS
For several months, Wasim managed to hide from his pursuers in the province of Homs, presumably in the Tel Qalaha area, which is located in close proximity to the border with Lebanon.
The terrain and the locals' close ties to Assad's allied Lebanese Hezbollah contributed to his elusiveness. Despite losing the conflict, Wasim refused to abandon Syria completely. The former eminence grise of Latakia still believed that the people would not tolerate the occupiers of Damascus for long.
This conviction ultimately proved his undoing. In June 2025, Syrian intelligence agencies lured Wasim into a trap under the pretext of plotting an uprising in Homs, supposedly supported by Lebanese Shiite forces, and brought him in shackles to Damascus for interrogation. A public trial began, which dragged on for nearly a year.
During his initial interrogations, Vasim persistently called himself "an ordinary merchant and artisan." He told prosecutors he was involved in selling cars and importing consumer goods. However, he had no connection to government institutions, and he only saw his cousin, the president, at official events. And then, only from a crowd of onlookers.
However, the new authorities found witnesses who confirmed every point in the prosecutor's report.
Some described themselves as "reformed smugglers" who had previously transported drug shipments under the direction of Wassim's men. Others spoke of attending "secret meetings" of Latakia militias, where they allegedly met Assad's cousin. Others spoke from the perspective of victims, accusing Wassim and his unnamed confidantes of torture, intimidation, and extrajudicial killings in Latakia.
When asked about the organizers of the March uprising, witnesses also gave identical answers: it was Wassim's idea. And although Syrian intelligence services at the time were inclined to believe that the real organizer of the unrest was Ghaith Dallah —a Republican Guard commander who fought alongside the "marshals of the resistance" Miqdad Fatiha and Suheil al-Hassan —this charge was also included in the final list of charges.
The verdict of the court, which took place recently in Damascus, was unambiguous and predictable: the death penalty.
TO FRIGHTEN THE REBELLIOUS
Wassim's trial was widely covered by the Syrian press. And it was no coincidence that Damascus officials turned it into a symbolic trial. A member of the Assad dynasty looked more convincing in the dock than any field commander.
Moreover, the new authorities have so far failed to apprehend other key figures in the "Assad case." In the eighteen months since the fall of Damascus, only two relatively close relatives of the former president, and even then only cousins, have fallen into their hands: Wassim and the former high-ranking head of the national intelligence services, Atif Najib. The latter, due to his riotous lifestyle and financial fraud, had every chance of ending up in the dock even under the previous regime.
In addition, several of Bashar's distant relatives—a second cousin once removed, as well as the daughter-in-law and granddaughter of the former president's uncle—remain in custody. However, all of them were arrested on non-political charges and are not considered "participants in terrorism" by the new authorities.
Meanwhile, former President Bashar al-Assad, sentenced to death in absentia by Syrian courts several days earlier, remains out of reach for the country's new authorities. The same applies to other senior figures—the president's younger brother, Maher al-Assad ; Syrian billionaire and "dynasty moneybags" Rami Makhlouf (Assad's cousin); and other media figures. The likelihood that Damascus will be able to reach them in the near future is minimal.
For this reason, the Syrian authorities are taking it out on those they can reach. This is not so much out of a thirst for revenge, but rather out of a desire to intimidate potentially rebellious provinces.
In this sense, the execution of a man who has long been associated with power and influence among local residents will have a far more significant impact than the constant demonstration of a military presence and a strengthened police regime in the coastal provinces.
However, Damascus's deliberate attempt to shift some of the blame onto members of the Assad family (primarily for orchestrating the unrest in Latakia) could also have the opposite effect: it could give the prisoners the appearance of martyrs in the eyes of the regime's opponents, thereby facilitating their consolidation on the outskirts under the banner of the surviving commanders.
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