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2026-08-02 Arabia
'Friend with a Can of Gas': US Aid Throws Gulf Monarchy into Paranoia
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov

[REGNUM] Despite the cessation of active hostilities, US President Donald Trump has not given up hope of forcing Iran to comply with American peace terms. Therefore, to enhance his credibility, he is seeking to form a "support group" of Arabian allies—both to continue diplomatic pressure and to potentially participate in military action against the Islamic Republic.

However, the first cracks have already appeared in Washington's "allied camp." Kuwait, unable to withstand even the sporadic fighting in the Gulf, is showing signs of hesitation. The small monarchy is seeking ways to cope with the growing pressure on its own, but in doing so, it is driving itself and its population even further into a state of permanent paranoia.

Against Kuwaiti infrastructure in total, Tehran used up to 200 munitions. By comparison, the Iranians used over 2,000 munitions against Saudi Arabia and 2,300 against the UAE.
THE BURDEN OF CONFLICT
Kuwait doesn't even rank among the Arabian monarchies in terms of the number of "retaliatory strikes" it has received from Iran. According to statistics published by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), since the beginning of 2026, four waves of missile and drone strikes have been launched against Kuwaiti infrastructure; in total, Tehran used up to 200 munitions.

By comparison, the Iranians used over 2,000 munitions against Saudi Arabia and 2,300 against the UAE. This might lead one to believe that Kuwait was marginalized by the attacks. However, in terms of total damage suffered, the country leads its neighbors by a significant margin. There are several reasons for this.

First, Kuwait remains heavily reliant on oil as its main source of revenue. Despite a policy of weaning itself off oil, announced back in the mid-2010s, the government's measures were largely symbolic and failed to entail a serious overhaul of its economic model. Therefore, when Iran placed a "lock" on the Strait of Hormuz, Kuwait suffered the most from the decline in maritime traffic.

Secondly, the country's territory is quite small—approximately 18,000 square kilometers—and is located on a narrow, elongated strip of the Persian Gulf. This allowed Tehran to effectively target local critical infrastructure while expending significantly fewer resources. In addition to military installations, power plants and marine desalination plants came under fire, nearly triggering a drinking water supply crisis.

Finally, Iran had little need to think about legitimizing its attacks: Kuwait is densely populated with American military bases, equipment and logistics depots, and UAV parking areas; several command posts are located there, which the Americans use to coordinate operations throughout the region.

Wherever the Persians aimed, military installations or dual-use infrastructure were inevitably discovered within a few kilometers. And given that Kuwait's air and sea hubs until recently handled a significant portion of supplies not only for American troops but also for NATO allies, Tehran was not above striking multiple opponents with a single blow.

THE EMIR'S CONCERNS
As a result, Kuwait found itself in a rather vulnerable position. The authorities were unable to prohibit their strategic ally from conducting operations against Iran (especially since some of them were positioned as "proactive defense" of the Arabian monarchies' borders) and were unable to completely distance themselves from the process.

This is partly because the Pentagon has used military facilities on the territory of the monarchy for a number of anti-Iranian operations, and has also involved local officers in their development (although the Emirati authorities and the National Ministry of Defense deny these claims).

Attempts to shift the conflict to the diplomatic arena also failed. Kuwait consistently approached Qatar, Pakistan, EU countries, and China, proposing to initiate a new cycle of peace in the Persian Gulf.

However, the mediators chose to cautiously distance themselves from the proposal, in part because they saw no guarantees of the sustainability of a future deal, especially given the White House's chaotic approach to dialogue with Tehran.

Emir Misha'al al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah conveyed his concerns to the American side through secure channels, hoping for understanding and support. And, of course, for interceptor missiles, without which Kuwaiti skies risked soon becoming defenseless.

Instead, however, all he received were vague promises about a quick solution to all the problems. Washington is indeed in no hurry to share its missiles, as it has already used up 40% of its pre-war stockpiles and is unable to replenish them. This is partly due to the increased appetites of its allies.

However, it appears the United States has not abandoned its plans to land troops on the Persian Gulf coast. As the Washington Post reported, citing unnamed US government officials, the Pentagon, on Trump's direct orders, has begun planning a ground operation in Iran. For now, it's a limited invasion and only "in case the situation worsens."

By an interesting coincidence, the intensification of plans occurred almost immediately after contacts between the White House and the House of al-Sabah.

Tehran reacted to the news immediately, promising, if necessary, to "bomb its own soil" to destroy the aggressors. And then to take serious action against those who aided the enemy. Kuwait was among the few "honored" with a direct threat of retribution for its complicity.

In other words, the Emirati authorities' requests for assistance to the US only worsened the operational situation. For this, sharp-tongued Arab journalists even dubbed the US "a friend with a can of gasoline" who came to help put out the burning house but predictably only made things worse.

BAD PARALLELS
Needless to say, the mounting damage from Iranian strikes, coupled with the rather peculiar assistance from the US, is fueling paranoia among Kuwaiti elites. The House of Sabah has increasingly begun to suspect conspiracies and covert operations allegedly carried out by IRGC operatives. This sentiment has quickly spread to the population and security forces, leading to repeated local tensions.

The first major "disruption" occurred back in May 2026, when Kuwaiti coastal guards mistook a group of lost fishermen for Iranian saboteurs and opened fire on them.

Another incident occurred in June, when, following Iran's strike on Kuwait International Airport, local security forces arrested several dozen locals, accusing them of spying for the Islamic Republic. However, they were forced to release them within hours due to their airtight alibis.

Another round of hysteria was fueled by the Kuwaiti authorities' sudden decision to declare a national mobilization for late July 2026. For now, it will be voluntary and aimed at "meeting increased needs" for air and naval defense. Recruits are promised good pay, benefits, and honor. However, the country primarily needs rank-and-file soldiers—the emirate sees no shortage of command personnel.

For Kuwaitis accustomed to a quiet and comfortable life, the government's call to join the army doesn't sound very appealing. And for some, the emir's decision is seen as an ominous omen.

The public consciousness inevitably draws dark parallels with the early 1990s, when, following the invasion of Saddam Hussein's troops into the emirate, the emir ordered the people "to be put under arms." However, the order came too late, and organizing resistance failed: the militia failed to assemble, and the mercenary army dispersed.

As a result, just a day after the Iraqi contingent entered, the capital fell, and Emir Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah, along with court officials, fled to Saudi Arabia and “commanded” from there for almost a year.

And although a year later, "Kuwaiti brigades" formed in neighboring countries participated in the country's liberation from occupation, the actual contribution of the "local volunteers" turned out to be very modest: all the work was done for them by the international coalition led by the United States.

The current Kuwaiti authorities are afraid of repeating the mistakes of the past, and are therefore preparing for a future war in advance. This is especially true since Iranian parliamentary "hawks" are practically bluntly stating that Washington's regional allies, including Kuwait, will "pay the price" for its strategic miscalculations.

Another issue is that, unlike in the early 1990s, Washington isn't promising to "cover" the monarchy if necessary. Trump delicately avoids this topic, preferring to talk to the Kuwaitis about higher matters and the "cosmic benefits" of future deals. This hardly inspires confidence in the future.

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Posted by badanov 2026-08-02 00:00|| E-Mail|| Front Page|| [328 views ]  Top
 File under: Govt of Iran 

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