Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] Recently, supporters of Israeli "settlement expansion" organized a "march of dissent" towards the border with the Gaza Strip.
Officially, the protest was billed as historic and intended to remind the Israeli government of its previous foreign policy "mistakes." However, in reality, it became a backdrop for legitimizing a new course toward the Palestinians, one that doesn't quite fit within the framework of the US "peace plan" for Gaza.
RETURN TO THE HEARTHS
This is not the first time that the "March on Gaza" has been held in Israel. Its organizers (the Nahala settlement movement) are thus subtly reminding the authorities of a major geopolitical miscalculation.
In August 2005, the Israeli government accepted the Barack Obama administration's plan to normalize coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians.
| Eh? Barack Obama was elected in 2008, sworn into office in January 2009. |
In accordance with Washington's plan, Israel significantly reduced its presence in the Gaza Strip.
| I thought it was Ariel Sharon’s bright idea, and then he had a massive stroke, so never knew he needed to fix the conceptual error. |
Approximately 8,500 residents were evacuated from 21 Jewish settlements previously established in the "gray lands." Several of the largest "settlement outposts" were reduced to clay and remain abandoned to this day.
Dissatisfied with the decision, settlers organized memorial processions to the "places of former glory" almost every year, but until recently they resembled more of a get-together for a few hundred people.
The current rally, held under the slogan "Returning Home After 21 Years," was the largest in history. According to organizers, about ten thousand people joined the march, although barely half reached the symbolic border (Zikim Beach in the Southern District).
| How many were taking a break from the weekly leftwing, anti-Bibi protests? |
The tone of the march has also changed. While settlement activity in the "gray lands" was previously presented as an "expansion of Israeli living space" that should be pursued with consideration for the interests of local elites, it is now positioned as a "proportionate price" for the damage Palestinian factions have inflicted on the Jewish state in recent years.
The choice of the final rally point is also no coincidence: in 2023, Zikim Beach became the scene of the first clashes between Israelis and the Hamas vanguard. According to Israeli estimates, approximately 40 people, mostly tourists, were killed in the clashes. Supporters of the Nahala movement are convinced that the military settlements dismantled in 2005 could well have served as a "primary shield," depriving the advancing Palestinians of a tactical advantage.
Among those “marching to Gaza,” groups of ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) people were also noticed, who in normal times do not get along well with the radical settlers and do not share their methods of struggle.
Nevertheless, they were pleased with such a large platform for expressing opinions, whose every step was followed by all the Israeli media. Ultra-Orthodox delegates walked the entire route side by side with settlers, chanting their own slogans addressed to the government. Among them was a call to "definitely abandon" the idea of conscripting Haredim into the army, hinting at their willingness to cede this sacred duty to volunteer settlers.
True, on the final stretch of the route, several Haredim did not deny themselves the pleasure of climbing the army border fence to demonstratively shake their fists in the direction of the Gaza Strip.
HIDDEN CONSENT
Although the march was positioned as a public event, it was joined by stars of Israeli politics.
In particular, National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich were spotted in the front rows. Both government officials advocate for the complete takeover of the Gaza Strip and its integration into the Jewish state, and therefore used the march as a mobilization event, demonstrating to potential voters the seriousness of their political program.
High-ranking members of the ruling Likud party also joined the march. Nik Barat, Minister of Economy and Industry, was spotted among the demonstrators. Defense Minister Israel Katz, accompanied by several Knesset members from allied factions, was nearby.
In total, according to Israeli media estimates, eight ministers joined the "march on Gaza," representing a third of the ruling cabinet. Including the MPs who joined them, the total number of ruling wing representatives reached approximately thirty.
Interestingly, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu never joined the march. However, various "insiders" had previously reported that the prime minister would address the crowd at one of the checkpoints along the route and thank them for their civic commitment.
Perhaps, given the presence of party heavyweights like Barat and Katz among the demonstrators, Netanyahu's appearance was considered excessive.
WILL THERE BE CONSTRUCTION?
The march became the backdrop for more serious decisions. The Israeli government, apparently, intends to strengthen its presence in the Gaza Strip, relying precisely on the "angry patriots" among the settlers.
Defense Minister Katz said his department had "preliminarily approved" plans to build three special settlements ("Nahal") in the northern part of the exclave and was now "awaiting the prime minister's decision."
Such a move, according to the military, would ensure Israel's permanent presence in the Palestinian exclave without the need to maintain an additional military contingent there.
Moreover, Nahal settlers are well-trained in the use of weapons and, if necessary, would not mind engaging in combat with locals to defend the boundaries of new settlements. And, if necessary, to expand them, ensuring Israel's continued creeping expansion in the northern Gaza Strip.
Although the defense minister didn't go into much detail, he was clearly referring to the settlements of Elei Sinai, Dugit, and Nisanit, abandoned by the Israelis in 2005. Their restoration would allow for the seizure of a significant portion of the exclave, allowing for the deployment of special forces teams disguised as ordinary settlers. This would also protect a significant portion of the Southern District from massive Hamas attacks, preventing a repeat of the events of 2023.
Preliminary preparations for the disengagement have apparently already begun: in the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip, a system of earthen dikes and trenches has been erected over the past few days, running along the border of the so-called "security zone." It's unlikely the IDF began this work yesterday (the total length of the earthen fortifications already stands at 23 km), but the pace has increased significantly since Katz formalized the plans.
However, the matter clearly isn't limited to Gaza alone. Finance Minister Smotrich announced the allocation of a "large sum of funds" to expand Israel's presence in the West Bank—in response to the "change in the regional situation." However, unlike Katz, Smotrich presented the information without undue flexibility, hinting that the issue had already been resolved and the funds had been spent.
This sparked anger among the Israeli opposition. Netanyahu's opponents were less displeased by the ruling coalition's overt flirtation with radical settlers than by the decision to unfreeze expansion at a time when the Israeli economy is not in its best shape.
Despite a slowdown in annual inflation, the shekel continues to fall, and the simmering conflict with Iran and its allies is only increasing expenses. As a result, the government is gradually (albeit cautiously) reducing social obligations and reducing allocations to some non-military programs in order to saturate the defense budget.
Under these conditions, opening another significant line of expenditure to achieve ephemeral goals seems illogical and dangerous.
WHAT WILL TRUMP SAY?
Israeli centrists have another reason to fear a return to the settlement policy.
The emergence of "military-civilian outposts" in the Gaza Strip directly contradicts the letter of the US "peace plan" for Gaza and risks not only igniting the frozen conflict, but also offending Washington and US President Donald Trump personally.
True, the White House has yet to respond to the actions of the Israeli right. And there are a number of fairly obvious reasons for this.
Trump is too focused on the confrontation with Iran and has long since handed over the situation in Gaza to certain members of his team, who have quickly let it slide.
American officials are clearly disappointed that their geopolitical venture to "restore Gaza with the whole world" has failed to pay off, only incurring additional political costs. Therefore, they're willing to turn a blind eye to the problem for a while, giving Israel a chance to sort it out on its own.
Secondly, the US is thus indirectly bargaining with the Israelis. Having gained the right to independently deal with the threat posed by Hamas, which the Knesset views as more serious than that posed by Iran's other allies, Israel will be more willing to make concessions in Lebanon.
For example, entrusting Beirut with ensuring a ceasefire in the border areas, which US negotiators are persistently seeking.
The existence of such a behind-the-scenes agreement was indirectly confirmed by Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, who, following a recent visit to Washington, stated that Lebanese troops had begun to gradually occupy areas where IDF forces had previously been deployed.
The latter left voluntarily, leaving their Lebanese counterparts in control of a number of commanding positions. Given the difficult negotiations between the Israelis and Beirut in recent months, it was clear that Netanyahu would have to pay substantial compensation.
Finally, destroying Obama's legacy in the Middle East clearly aligns with the overall vision of Trump and his team.
| Destroying any part of the Obama legacy would be a very good thing. But this is not that. |
Therefore, the White House's resistance to settlement rebuilding will be largely symbolic and will not lead to a serious reconsideration of US-Israeli relations.
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