Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] The United States and Saudi Arabia have agreed to jointly develop the kingdom's nuclear program. The landmark nuclear cooperation agreement, developed over the past several years and repeatedly on the brink of being cancelled, was signed in Washington on July 22 and now awaits congressional approval.
The deal has generated considerable controversy. It leaves numerous loopholes, including the right to independently enrich uranium, which could, in theory, push Riyadh to develop a covert military nuclear program. Although the kingdom, of course, vehemently denies any such plans.
Washington, however, believes there's nothing wrong with the deal. And by compromising its principles, it's supposedly saving the region from more serious problems. This raises doubts.
THE HARD WAY TO A DEAL
Despite strong allied relations and its status as the "US's greatest friend" in the Persian Gulf, Riyadh's path to the 2026 deal has proven thorny and confusing.
The first discussions about cooperation in the nuclear sector began back in 2008, when the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
At the same time, the kingdom announced its intention to rely on the international nuclear fuel market rather than develop its own uranium enrichment.
Before the full launch of the Saudi nuclear program with Washington's support, only one symbolic step remained: the signing of a standard agreement (the "123 Agreement"), which would enshrine the renunciation of independent nuclear fuel production.
These commitments were part of the so-called “gold standard,” which embodied the formula for US nuclear cooperation with its allies: “supplies and technology in exchange for the renunciation of uranium ambitions.”
Nevertheless, the agreement process dragged on for nearly 15 years. The Saudis refused to agree to the "gold standard," even after the UAE signed a similar agreement in 2009, arguing that it would place them in a "colonialist dependence" on Washington and deprive them of the opportunity to independently explore and exploit the kingdom's uranium reserves.
Riyadh even tried to defend its rights by relying on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which recognizes the right of states to develop peaceful nuclear energy (a right consistently supported by Russia), including fuel cycle technologies. However, it was not very successful.
Washington was reluctant to take the statement at its word. After all, the Saudis had previously been caught secretly purchasing technology from Pakistan, developing dual-use infrastructure, and expanding their nuclear-capable delivery systems.
Riyadh also avoided signing an additional protocol with the IAEA that would have provided for stricter inspections of nuclear power plants, which also hinted at its ulterior motives in the nuclear field.
Neither Barack Obama's flexible Middle East policy nor Joe Biden's attempts to restructure Saudi Arabia's nuclear program in exchange for normalizing the kingdom's relations with Israel helped matters.
Even Donald Trump, the leading advocate of rapprochement with the Arabian monarchies, has already received a slap on the wrist for being too active in Saudi Arabia. In 2019, the American corporation IP3 International, through his family, tried to lobby for the accelerated transfer of sensitive technologies to Riyadh. And was quite successful in this regard.
However, the resulting uproar in the expert community attracted the attention of the IAEA, and then the US Congress. The matter was hushed up, but the negative aura from the story haunted Trump for several years. And during his second term, he became suspicious of the Saudis.
So much so that, to be on the safe side, he surrounded himself with people wary of the kingdom. Current Secretary of State Marco Rubio received his portfolio partly because, as a senator, he authored a "step-down bill" that imposed additional bureaucratic restrictions on cooperation between American nuclear companies and Riyadh.
However, two years later, Trump suddenly changed his anger to mercy and gave the go-ahead for the development of Saudi “peaceful nuclear energy.”
On July 22, Saudi and American delegations signed a package of two documents in Washington: a nuclear cooperation agreement and a bilateral safeguards agreement. The agreement was signed by Energy Secretary Chris Wright on the American side, and by Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman Al Saud on the Saudi side.
The agreement envisages the construction of nuclear power plants in the Kingdom based on the American model and using advanced US technology. Furthermore, Washington agreed to the transfer of technology and equipment for peaceful nuclear power generation to Riyadh and established the initial legal framework for the participation of American companies in the development of the Saudi nuclear program. The agreement is for 30 years, with the possibility of extension by mutual agreement.
Behind the dry wording of the document lies a diplomatic somersault that the Republicans prefer not to focus on.
The final deal is based on the same promises made to the Kingdom during Biden's presidency—the only difference being that Washington ultimately decided to abandon the counter-conditions. Trump had previously repeatedly promised to "comprehensively rethink" the provisions to ensure they would serve only the interests of the American people.
However, the head of the White House soon made it clear that he was once again selling the Democrats' legacy, but this time under the guise of his own initiative.
"The Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement between the US Department of Energy and Saudi Arabia, which concerns exclusively the civilian use of nuclear energy... will be approved, but its implementation is entirely dependent on Saudi Arabia joining the respected and successful Abraham Accords," he wrote on the social network Truth Social.
Thus, the US President expects Riyadh to normalize relations with Israel within the framework of agreements to which he already pushed a number of Arab countries, including the UAE and Bahrain, to participate during his first presidential term.
The deal differs from previous versions in that it has already been formally set in motion, but the Saudis will only be able to reap the benefits after they accept Washington's counter-demand.
RECONSIDER YOUR VIEWS
There are several reasons for the sudden change in mood in the White House.
The most obvious is Trump's fear of losing the Persian Gulf's largest market. Despite difficulties in reaching agreements, Riyadh had not squandered its geopolitical ambitions and intended not only to build nearly two dozen nuclear power plants across the country, becoming the Arab world's most nuclear-intensive power, but also to export mined uranium to neighboring countries, including as finished nuclear fuel.
And other nuclear market giants—Russia and China—could well help them realize their plans. Both competitors have clearly demonstrated their willingness to participate in the development of the Saudi nuclear project. For example, China previously assisted the kingdom in conducting geological surveys in areas of potential natural uranium deposits in the desert and also participated in the creation of infrastructure for producing concentrated uranium oxide (so-called "yellowcake").
Russia, on the other hand, boasted extensive experience building nuclear power plants in the Middle East (Iran, Turkey, Egypt), as well as a well-established system for collecting spent nuclear fuel. The latter was particularly appealing to Riyadh and IAEA monitors, as it reduced the risk of misuse of raw materials and technologies.
This meant that it allowed the kingdom to begin developing a national nuclear program without signing a stack of binding agreements that the US insisted on and that were not linked to the international nuclear regulatory regime.
The second reason, indirectly related to the first, is the Saudis' accelerated drift away from the United States. Over the past few years, Riyadh has increasingly expressed disillusionment with American involvement in regional affairs and has attempted to develop a multi-vector foreign policy.
The Saudis have been clinching with American officials, questioning their strategy in the Middle East.
The White House needed a compelling anchor to keep the House of Saud within the American orbit of influence. And the nuclear deal, concluded without preconditions, proved to be just that.
Finally, in the face of uncertainty surrounding the Iranian nuclear program, the United States chose to play a preemptive role and impose on the Kingdom at least the general framework of a deal, without strictly adhering to the “gold standard.”
In theory, this should deter Riyadh from taking some ill-considered steps—for example, from attempting to secretly obtain nuclear weapons from Pakistan, with which the kingdom has had a defense pact in place since the fall of 2025.
STIMULATE DISTRUST
The White House makes no secret of the fact that it considers the deal with Saudi Arabia a major diplomatic victory, comparable to the Obama administration's signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran in 2015. Republicans, however, view the criticism as background noise intended to "denigrate their triumph."
Meanwhile, the long-term consequences of the deal are alarming. Primarily because its verification framework is significantly weakened compared to other standard 123 agreements. In many matters, Washington is taking the Saudis at their word—in particular, their promises to keep their national nuclear program on a peaceful course.
At the same time, the deal preserves the Kingdom's hypothetical ability to increase uranium enrichment levels. Furthermore, the US did not require Saudi Arabia to join the IAEA's Additional Protocol, significantly reducing the transparency of the country's nuclear program.
This, of course, does not mean that the Saudis will immediately begin enriching uranium to weapons-grade levels, but the lack of strict frameworks creates significant room for shady maneuvering.
Concern about abrupt concessions is also evident within the US Republican Party, particularly among senators and members of Congress who have worked closely with the Middle East. Alarmists fear that if Saudi Arabia ever changes course, it will already possess dual-use technologies.
Moreover, the United States has already had negative experiences with Iran. Although the nuclear component wasn't mentioned, the parallels are quite clear. Regardless, most Republicans chose not to oppose the president's initiative and instead allowed the document to pass through Congress.
In the Middle East, news of the US-Saudi deal was also met with mixed reactions. Iran, whose nuclear program had previously been a target for the US and triggered several military campaigns, was the first to react.
Tehran views the deal as an example of double standards and a potential strengthening of its regional rival. However, for now, it prefers not to criticize Riyadh, so as not to provoke the Saudis into a new round of conflict.
Trump's decision was not well received by US allies either. As former Israeli Defense Minister and Knesset Member Avigdor Lieberman stated, the Kingdom's civilian nuclear program, even without a military component, will not add stability to the Middle East and will provoke a new arms race.
After all, other major players (Turkey, Egypt, the UAE) are unlikely to sit idly by as yet another nuclear program with a potential double meaning emerges in the region. Everyone remembers all too well Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's public promise : "If Iran gets nuclear weapons, we will too."
Riyadh may well begin to work ahead of the curve, while outwardly remaining within the framework of the “simplified gold standard” that the United States kindly provided it with.
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