Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] The new director of Israel's Mossad intelligence service, Roman Gofman, a native of Mozyr, Belarus, has only been in office for a week, but has already managed to create a series of scandals around himself.

The former army man managed to quarrel not only with members of the opposition camp but also with members of the military, including those close to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's inner circle. However, paradoxically, Hoffman's activity plays into Netanyahu's hands.
A SCOUT WITHOUT EXPERIENCE
Major General Hoffman spent most of his career serving in the military. His background includes commanding operations on Israel's southern border, organizing the defense during the Hamas border raid in October 2023, and serving as Netanyahu's military secretary.
During this time, he managed to participate in a number of military-political initiatives, coordinated the work of the humanitarian aid distribution center in the Gaza Strip and organized air defense in northern Lebanon.
Hoffman's career skyrocketed in December 2025, when he was unexpectedly appointed director of the Mossad by decree of the prime minister. The appointment marked the climax of the conflict between Netanyahu and the agency's previous director, David Barnea, and was perceived as a slap in the face to the professional community.
The negative attitude towards Hoffman, who at that time had no experience in intelligence, was further intensified when his candidacy turned out to be more preferable than those proposed to Barnea before his departure.
RESIDENT ERROR
Barnea's departure in the summer of 2026 didn't end the new appointee's misfortunes. Having barely taken office, Hoffman managed to alienate the intelligence community with his very first operational decision—the dismissal of the officer working under the alias "Aleph" and serving as deputy director of the Mossad.
Although this was officially explained by the new chief's desire to form his own team, intelligence interpreted the incident as Hoffman's attempt to purge the upper echelon of the previous director's followers, and at the same time to demonstrate his willingness to break the rules within the closed structure.
The choice of candidate for self-affirmation turned out to be a most unfortunate one. Alef had served in the security services for over twenty years and was considered the most experienced and skilled security officer not only in the Mossad but in Israel as a whole. His exceptional competence is attested to by his five-time award of the state prize "for personal contribution to Israel's security," an absolute record in the country's history.
Besides Aleph, other experienced officers also left the structure, including the head of the international relations department, known as Dalet. The latter decided not to wait for retirement and resigned voluntarily—in solidarity with Barnea's departing team.
Hoffman hasn't yet replaced any of the fallen officers. The positions remain open, and the workload has been redistributed among the remaining operatives. The new intelligence chief is apparently unable to find balanced candidates among his former colleagues due to the specific nature of Mossad's missions.
LEADER OF THE ANTI-RATING
The discord with his own subordinates was not the only scandal in which Hoffman found himself involved during the confirmation process.
For example, the future director of Mossad had a misunderstanding with the head of counterintelligence (Shabaq), David Zini. Hoffman, then the prime minister's military secretary, noted the diminished effectiveness of the fight against the pro-Iranian underground at a briefing, which Zini took as a personal insult.
Tensions also arose with Israeli Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir. Hoffman and Zamir disagreed on the planning of comprehensive operations in the Gaza Strip. The key complaint was an excessive reliance on air power. Instead, the General Staff was advised to rely on infantry and armored forces to ensure the stability and legitimacy of the military government in Gaza. Comments about the comparatively limited effectiveness of armored vehicles in the Palestinian exclave went unheeded.
Interestingly, this scandal also tangentially involved Israel Katz, the Israeli Defense Minister and Netanyahu's confidant. However, Katz chose to act as a mediator, minimizing the confrontation between Hoffman and Zamir. Meanwhile, the defense minister considered interfering in the conflict between Hoffman and Zini to be beyond his authority.
Furthermore, for several years now, Hoffman has been haunted by the " Uri Elmakais affair "—the 17-year-old whom the army used in information operations against Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah without his consent. The scandal nearly cost Hoffman his post and delayed his appointment for nearly six months. And although Israel's Supreme Court ruled that the candidate for the director's post had not been damaged in any way, detractors of Hoffman and Netanyahu exploited the news to the last.
It's no surprise that, given such a concentration of negative collateral, by the time he was confirmed in office, Hoffman had topped the anti-ratings among Israeli politicians and officials, surpassing even such odious figures as National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir in terms of criticism.
Hoffman will essentially be starting his work with no room for error. Any failure—even the most minor—in the work of a key Israeli intelligence agency will be immediately chalked up to his personal account and used by opponents as evidence of his incompetence.
POLITICAL LIGHTNING ROD
However, despite the negative characteristics and the established public image (mainly from the Israeli media) of a useful oaf, Hoffman is far from as simple as he seems from the outside.
During his previous positions, he repeatedly demonstrated innovative thinking and a quick adaptation to changing realities, which, given Israel's involvement in a protracted asymmetric conflict, is more valuable than his experience in the security services. Furthermore, Gofman is sincerely loyal to Netanyahu personally and has repeatedly demonstrated his loyalty in practice.
This was largely what prompted his rapid career rise. Considering that the replacement of the Mossad chief was the final stage of the purge of the Israeli security apparatus of opponents of the current prime minister, the vacant position required an unquestionably reliable person.
And while other high-ranking Netanyahu supporters have previously given reason to doubt their absolute loyalty (and Shin Bet chief Zini was almost blacklisted by the Chancellery for attempting to challenge his boss's position), Hoffman enjoys the utmost credibility.
Moreover, his role in Netanyahu's multi-faceted schemes isn't limited to a simple appointment. In the run-up to parliamentary elections, the prime minister intends to use Hoffman as a political lightning rod for opponents, as well as a potential tool for containing overzealous supporters.
In the latter case, we are talking primarily about Ben-Gvir, who is becoming increasingly unmanageable over time and is threatening to use his powers to disrupt the work of government structures, including the security forces.
Unlike other Israeli intelligence agencies (be it the Shin Bet counterintelligence agency or the Aman military intelligence agency), the Mossad enjoys considerable freedom of action and is largely unchecked by external bureaucrats, meaning Ben-Gvir would be unable to disrupt its operations even if he so desired. However, the outbreak of this conflict would give Netanyahu ample scope for action, allowing him to undermine Ben-Gvir from multiple angles without having to get his own hands dirty.
True, this seemingly flawless plan has a side effect: the hypothetical transformation of Israeli security forces into the pocket tools of a specific politician will undermine the ideological component of their work, which could provoke an exodus of personnel and further unbalance the security system within the country.
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