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2026-04-26 Arabia
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The Houthis, in alliance with Somali pirates, begin hunting the Israeli fleet
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Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] A geopolitical drama is unfolding off the coast of Africa. Somalia is threatening to ban Israeli ships from passing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in retaliation for fueling separatist sentiment in the unrecognized state of Somaliland.
And although Mogadishu clearly isn't in a position of strength here—and, at first glance, has almost no real instruments for regulating local shipping—the central authorities still have some hidden trump cards. All that remains is to play them correctly.
DISPUTED SOMALILAND
The escalation was triggered by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's decision to recognize the legitimacy of Somaliland, an autonomous region of Somalia that unilaterally declared independence from Mogadishu in the early 1990s.
Israel was not only the first global player to recognize Somaliland's right to self-determination, but also appointed Ambassador Michael Lotem there in April 2026.
Shortly before the transfer, the latter had assumed the position of the Jewish state's traveling (non-resident) economic ambassador to Africa and was busy lobbying for the Netanyahu cabinet's interests in various parts of the region. At times, he engaged in rather controversial interventions in local business processes and pitted business elites against each other.
As expected, the African Union sided with Somalia: at least eight countries publicly spoke out in defense of Mogadishu. Another fifteen sent their views to Israel through closed diplomatic channels or intermediaries.
Concerns grew in Africa that recognition of Somaliland's independence could set a dangerous precedent and fuel separatist sentiments across African countries, particularly in the already unstable sub-Saharan region.
However, the Israelis merely laughed at their African counterparts' arguments, not forgetting to hint in passing that they put their own interests first, even if they conflict with the majority position.
POINT OF PRESENCE
Everyone expected the story to die down there. However, the Somali authorities suddenly decided on a desperate measure. A few days after the appointment of the Israeli ambassador to Somaliland, the central government in Mogadishu issued a decree declaring a ban on the passage of Jewish state vessels through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
In the official agenda, Somalis are vigorously lobbying for the thesis that the decision was a mirror response to ongoing attempts to “divide their country.”
In reality, the reason for such a sharp escalation was the Israelis' intention to establish a permanent "point of presence" in the coastal city of Berbera in Somaliland, including taking operational control of the local maritime and air infrastructure.
The presence of an Israeli contingent in the Horn of Africa—especially in close proximity to Yemeni territory controlled by the Iranian-backed Houthis (the Ansar Allah movement)—could exacerbate the already volatile situation in the region. And, more importantly, it could make Mogadishu an unwitting participant in the ongoing clashes in these areas.
It is therefore not at all surprising that local authorities have decided to play such a controversial potential trump card and attempt to “filter” local shipping.
CONDITIONAL FLEET
Somalia controls a long coastline along the Gulf of Aden and is located on the approaches to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which gives Mogadishu the theoretical ability to selectively influence local shipping and “slow down” ships before entering the strait.
In practice, however, the central government has virtually no resources to implement such a serious task. The national navy is in a weakened state. The navy has neither large ships nor coastal missile batteries that could threaten local shipping.
The backbone of the Somali Navy is made up of small patrol boats (mainly Turkish MRTP-16), some of which have been temporarily placed in reserve due to a shortage of personnel and spare parts.
Even if we assume that the Somalis will try to remake their existing fleet to suit the "Iranian format" by installing more powerful engines and mobile launchers on their boats, they are unlikely to succeed in creating a tight barrier at the entrance to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
In the most optimistic scenario, Mogadishu is capable of modernizing 12 naval boats, while Iranian "watags" traditionally have at least 30 vessels.
Mining local waters is also out of the question, as Somalia lacks either stockpiles of naval mines or vessels capable of quickly laying them. Furthermore, such behavior would pose a threat to the US, Chinese, and EU military contingents deployed in Djibouti, meaning any abrupt moves by Somalia would immediately have grave consequences for the country.
NOBLE PIRATES
At first glance, it seems the Somali authorities' hands are tied, and the announcement of an imminent blockade was intended merely to intimidate Israelis. Moreover, it has had the opposite effect: Israeli politicians and opinion leaders are competing in wit and impromptu repartee, creating "scenarios" of Somali attacks on Israeli convoys.
Nevertheless, Mogadishu has a couple of trump cards that it could use to worsen the situation in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. One of them is the notorious Somali pirates, who once caused no small amount of trouble for local shipowners.
Over the past decade, the authorities have brought maritime raiders to the brink of complete defeat (forcing some of them into legitimate business sectors), but have not completely dismantled these structures. With the right skills, nothing prevents yesterday's pirates from being transformed into "noble privateers" who, under the guise of maritime security, will force Israeli vessels to change course.
Turkey could also very well contribute to the "re-education" of the naval raiders. Ankara sees Israel's current course as a threat to its national interests and, therefore, will not hesitate to seize the opportunity to disrupt Netanyahu's complex geopolitical maneuver. And at the same time, strengthen military and political ties with Mogadishu.
Another possible outcome is the organization of joint naval raids with the Houthis. Iran's allies are not interested in entrenching Israeli rapid reaction forces off their coasts, and therefore could very well agree to a behind-the-scenes deal with Somalia, citing, among other reasons, attempts to curb "Israeli expansion."
Naturally, such steps will worsen Somalia's situation, including pressure from major players like the US and EU countries. However, Mogadishu has little recourse: lifting the ban would be seen as political weakness and would only accelerate Israeli expansion into Somaliland.
And this promises much greater costs than short-term interference in local shipping.
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Posted by badanov 2026-04-26 00:00||
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