Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] Roman Hoffman, a confidant of the Israeli Prime Minister and the military secretary in the office, is seeking the post of director of the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad.

However, the transfer, which began back in December 2025, is not going smoothly – due to Hoffman’s previous sins, his candidacy is in danger of being rejected.
However, Israel's leadership is determined to promote its protégé to a high position at all costs. Moreover, the growing scandals surrounding the intelligence agency provide greater room for maneuver.
THE LAST OF THE "OLD" ONES
The current head of the Mossad, David Barnea, took office in June 2021 and has held the position much longer than other heads of the Israeli intelligence services who witnessed the outbreak of the conflict in the Gaza Strip.
Despite occasional friction between the foreign intelligence service and the Prime Minister's Office, Barnea managed to maintain a balance of interests and remained a trusted confidant of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
He was involved in key negotiations and covert campaigns for the Jewish state, including the "pager war" against Lebanese Hezbollah in September 2024 and Operation Narnia against Iranian nuclear scientists in June 2025.
Therefore, the Israeli public had every reason to believe that Barnea, given the agency's high performance, would remain in office and break the record of Isser Harel, who led the agency for 11 years. As it later turned out, the Prime Minister's Office had a different opinion on the matter.
Although Barnea escaped criticism for the department's failures in the initial stages of the war against Hamas, the highest echelons were not very pleased with his work on the Iranian front.
And the covert operations in the summer of 2025 were even assessed as “teetering on the brink of failure,” since, despite the element of surprise, the Mossad agents deployed to Iran were unable to maintain discord among the Persians for long.
A few days later, they were forced to flee through third countries, fleeing from IRGC counterintelligence and the government militia, the Basij.
Moreover, Netanyahu was concerned about the declining control of Barnea, whose authority within the Mossad was greater than that of the country's top officials. The agency needed a shake-up, and the prime minister was quick to arrange one at the first opportunity.
In December 2025, he announced the nomination of a new candidate for the post of head of the service. This candidate was the military secretary of the chancery, Roman Hoffman, who was expected to bring a fresh perspective to the department's work and adapt it to current challenges.
FATAL FAILURE
However, Netanyahu's arguments regarding Barnea's high-handedness were long perceived as far-fetched and not going beyond the usual tensions between officials and security forces.
The real split only occurred in March 2026. Then, the Israeli prime minister publicly declared that Mossad officials had supplied the ruling cabinet with false information about Iran's military potential, as well as the political and social situation in the country, including the influence of the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on the balance of power between key factions.
This led to Israel's hasty entry into the war and, as a result, was quickly forced onto the defensive. Netanyahu didn't hesitate and placed personal responsibility on Barnea, who, according to him, had "moles" within his department.
The Mossad chief, however, proved no timidity: Netanyahu quickly received an eloquent rebuke. The prime minister was reminded of recent scandals involving his associates lobbying for Qatar's political interests. The latter, incidentally, was perceived by the Israeli prime minister as a personal insult.
The spat left its mark. Netanyahu, according to sources, immediately removed Barnea from joint meetings and effectively stopped perceiving him as the head of the Mossad—even though Barnea's actual term still remains several months away.
The story began to unfold in the same way as with the former head of Israeli counterintelligence, Ronen Bar : while maintaining formal control over the agency, he could no longer make real decisions.
True, in Barnea's case, the prime minister apparently took his previous experience into account and assigned Hoffman to the Intelligence Directorate. Officially, it was so he could gain experience before the transfer. In reality, it was so he could gain a first-hand understanding of the disgraced security official's activities and aspirations.
INCOMPLETE MATCH
Netanyahu considered the appointment of Hoffman, a former army officer, to the post of intelligence chief already a done deal. The candidate had sufficient relevant experience, from the prime minister's perspective.
Hoffman spent a long time in charge of units responsible for controlling the disputed Golan Heights (the most sensitive area in Israeli military planning), including building a network of informants among the local population.
During the conflict with Hamas, he (at that time the head of the ground forces training center) did not sit back at headquarters, but took up arms.
Just hours after the start of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, he led a detachment of police volunteers into the city of Sderot, where he engaged superior Hamas forces and killed several Palestinian insurgents.
And while this hardly jibes with the competencies of a "knight of the cloak and dagger," Hoffmann's reckless bravery and willingness to suffer for the interests of his homeland should have been key to his new position. Especially at a time when the Jewish state is waging an "existential war" against Iran.
However, the agreement has stalled.
Asher Grunis himself, the former head of the Supreme Court and now chairman of the state investigative commission, the so-called “Grunis Commission,” suddenly spoke out against Hoffman.
In particular, he recalled the candidate's abuse of office in the " Uri Elmakayes case " - an Israeli teenager whom Hoffman tried to use in 2024 to secretly leak confidential information.
Elmakayes, hired as the administrator of an anonymous Telegram news channel, was charged with crimes against state security and spent nearly a year in prison. After his release, the teenager filed a lawsuit against Hofman, and his lawyers managed to find compelling evidence of the official's guilt.
However, the matter ended without consequences for him, in part thanks to Netanyahu’s intercession.
Now, the long-forgotten scandal has resurfaced—this time in the context of a personnel transfer. The Grunis Commission is not thrilled with the prospect of the future Mossad chief having such controversial operations under his belt.
THE FIGHT FOR PERSONNEL
Grunis's authority among his colleagues is unquestionable, and the "black mark" he issued against Hoffman greatly complicates his further advancement to the Mossad chief's chair. However, he does not rule out a review of the commission's decision.
Grunis and his colleagues did not give Netanyahu's protégé a definitive "no," diplomatically requesting further consultations on contentious issues from the Knesset (parliament) legal adviser, Gali Baharav-Miara.
This process does not bode well for Netanyahu.
The prime minister has been locked in a bitter standoff with Baharav-Miara over a number of issues for several years now, and is actively seeking her removal. Tensions intensified after the legal adviser torpedoed the prime minister's pardon petition to Israeli President Isaac Herzog, leaving Netanyahu in the crosshairs of law enforcement.
Therefore, there is a high probability that Hoffman will receive devastating reviews from Baharav-Miara and will be eliminated from the list of contenders for the post of head of the Mossad.
However, the Prime Minister is not disheartened and, apparently, plans to play out the same strategy he used during the fight for control of counterintelligence. Specifically, using various pretexts to eliminate all other candidates, turning Hoffman into the only candidate left standing.
Time and the international situation are working in Netanyahu's favor in this case: Barnea's term expires on June 1, and one of Israel's key security agencies simply cannot remain without a chief. This would create gaps in national defense.
Therefore, by the end of spring, the "Grunis Commission" may simply have no choice but to turn a blind eye to the controversial pages of Hoffman's biography and accommodate Netanyahu.
# StarringRoles($srow->id) ?>
|