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2026-03-14 Syria-Lebanon-Iran
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Iran's enemies are suffering from the Strait of Hormuz blockade, but are afraid to violate it
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Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has lasted for about two weeks. During this time, traffic through the Strait has dropped to near-zero levels, triggering a record surge in oil prices.
Although Tehran does not impede the movement of sea convoys from some countries, it is far from loyal to all. Even those who have not joined the conflict but try to stay close to the West are being turned away.
Iran's opponents are actively seeking ways to "break" or at least bypass the barriers put in place—and in some places, even with some success—but the Persians are reacting philosophically: they still have aces up their sleeve.
WE STRIVE FOR ZERO
The Strait of Hormuz is considered one of the planet's key energy arteries: every fifth barrel of oil and every third cubic meter of gas shipped to global markets passes through it. Unsurprisingly, before the February conflict, average daily traffic through the strait exceeded 120 vessels, and during peak periods, this figure reached 140–150.
The situation began to change when, with the outbreak of hostilities in the Persian Gulf, Iran imposed "preliminary restrictive measures" off its coast, advising foreign merchant vessels not to enter the danger zone, and by March 3, it had strengthened these measures, effectively closing the strait.
Daily transit has dropped to 3-6 vessels, which can be considered almost zero for a usually busy artery.
Although Iran avoids using the word “blockade” in its official rhetoric (using the more flexible term “closure” instead), placing primary responsibility for transit problems on the United States, real control over the situation in the strait remains with Tehran.
At the narrowest points (where the width is no more than 39 km), the Iranians have foreign merchant ships in full view.
Attempts by opportunistic captains to break through the barriers usually end disastrously. In the two weeks of the conflict, the number of ships attacked in the Strait of Hormuz has approached ten. Six of these were damaged in the past 48 hours.
HOPES WERE NOT FULFILLED
Interestingly, Iran's Western opponents initially did not take the threat to close the strait seriously.
In Washington's eyes, Tehran's announcement that it had cut off a key transport artery was needed to demonstrate that the country was still capable of resisting and had not allowed its armed forces to collapse.
The United States did not anticipate a real and systematic "shooting down of tankers," although they did allow for "isolated provocations." Therefore, they did not take active action in the area.
Apparently expecting that after the election of the supreme leader, Iran will use the issue of the Strait of Hormuz as a pretext to begin negotiations.
However, time passed, and the Iranians showed no signs of readiness to make an exchange. Moreover, even those figures from whom the Americans expected peaceable steps—in particular, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi —invoked belligerent rhetoric.
Iran's new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has finally dashed Washington's hopes.
In a public appeal to the people, he stated that the Iranian authorities do not intend to lift the closure of the strait; in fact, they will strengthen it if the “enemies of the republic” continue the escalation.
As compensation, Khamenei demanded that its neighbors "neutralize the American-Israeli threat," including the closure of all US bases in the region, as well as "compensation for the costs incurred in the war." This was a price Tehran's opponents were a priori unwilling to accept.
And since there is almost no room left for negotiations between Iran and the United States, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has come to be perceived as a “permanent variable” in the conflict.
A LOOPHOLE FOR FRIENDS
At the same time, even taking into account the emphatically bellicose rhetoric, Iran did not close the strait completely.
And he even made exceptions for some partners. For example, for vessels linked to China—at least a dozen of which, according to tracking services, have passed through during the conflict.
Tehran has no interest in antagonizing Beijing—China remains a vital trading partner and the primary buyer of Iranian resources. Unofficial reports suggest that Iran may even be sharing satellite reconnaissance data with Tehran, increasing the effectiveness of "retaliatory attacks" against the United States. So, the Iranian armed forces are not only guiding Chinese tankers through the strait but also protecting them from potential provocations.
The situation with India is a little more complicated.
Despite recent claims by Indian officials that New Delhi has negotiated unimpeded passage through the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran has not confirmed this news. Meanwhile, it points out that India has grown significantly closer to Israel in recent years, strengthening ties in the defense and technology sectors.
Moreover, India is a military ally of the United States. This means it could very well be considered an accomplice to aggression against the Republic, and its ships a legitimate target for the Iranian military.
However, the facts suggest otherwise. Over the past 24 hours, at least two tankers chartered by New Delhi received the green light from Tehran and passed through the "dead zone" unimpeded.
And this figure, apparently, will grow over time. Public criticism of the Indian side is needed to proactively outline "red lines" and discourage New Delhi from exporting oil to the US and Israel under the guise of national shipments.
As for Russia, it is not on the "white list" for passage through the Strait of Hormuz. However, this is simply because the Russian tanker fleet has a minimal presence in the region and uses other logistics channels. Therefore, neither Moscow nor Tehran publicly raised the issue during the negotiations.
However, even here the United States is complaining: at least several ships flying the flags of supposedly neutral countries (the Marshall Islands and Palau), which the Pentagon had intended to seize under the pretext of fighting Moscow's "shadow fleet," escaped unhindered into the Strait of Hormuz and, thanks to this, escaped their pursuers.
DIFFERENT WAYS OF HACKING
News of the tightening blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has sparked anger in the White House.
US President Donald Trump threatened Iran with "dire consequences" and promised that traffic in the Persian Gulf would soon be restored.
In practice, the situation is different: American naval sailors refuse to escort civilian ships in the Strait of Hormuz due to the high risk of attacks from Iran.
The Pentagon fears encounters with Iranian surface drones, to which large US naval vessels are particularly vulnerable.
Therefore, the US is relying on detonating mines and booms in the chokepoints of the closed zone, calling it a "thorough cleanup," but still recommending that captains break out solely at their own risk. The militant fervor of French President Emmanuel Macron, who, along with Trump, had previously threatened to deploy a "defensive mission" off the Iranian coast and even dispatched a dozen ships for this purpose, also didn't last long.
The very next day after the grandiose announcements, the Élysée Palace hastened to clarify that the plan concerned only patrolling allied waters and only after active hostilities in the region ceased. The group's flagship, the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, would remain in the Eastern Mediterranean and "conduct deterrent operations" against Iran from there.
In effect, Macron is attempting to structure the French naval operations in the Persian Gulf along the same lines as during the Aspides mission, which France and other EU countries deployed off the coast of Yemen two years earlier. That is, with minimal contact with the enemy, but with a strong display of the flag. Paris remains reluctant to engage in direct conflict with Iran.
Pakistan was the most successful, with its navy managing to escort several foreign tankers destined for Islamabad through the restricted areas. This was widely perceived as remarkable courage.
However, in this case, it wasn't the might of Pakistani weapons that played a role, but a gentleman's bargain. Following the blockade of the strait, fuel prices in Pakistan skyrocketed, which did little to improve the stability of the stagnant local economy. There was a risk that the country would slide into spontaneous protests, for which Iran would inevitably be blamed.
Not wanting to undermine the republic's standing in the eyes of the Pakistani population, Iranian officials themselves offered Islamabad a "green corridor." But on the condition that Islamabad take only the tankers it had chartered and use the resulting oil to stabilize the domestic market, which is what was ultimately done.
Although the Pakistani Navy remains deployed near the Strait of Hormuz, it has shown no intention of breaking through.
ANOTHER TRUMP CARD
The Persian Gulf countries, most of whose oil trade is heavily tied to the Hormuz pipeline, are meanwhile seeking ways to independently extricate themselves from the trap orchestrated by Tehran.
Saudi Arabia was among the first to resort to trickery, rerouting most of its maritime traffic to Western ports facing the Red Sea.
Despite Riyadh's years of investing in the "eastern gateway" to the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea route has proven largely ready for a shift in focus. The Saudis have already established logistics routes for receiving containers and cargo redirected from Gulf ports, and the alternative route will be fully operational in the coming weeks.
This will partly offset the kingdom's losses from the two-week blockade: the freed-up oil will go to markets in the US and European countries, as well as to Asia, where strategic reserves have already begun to be slowly tapped.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia, like Oman, is counting on generous profits from the transfer of oil cargo through its territory from its less fortunate neighbors.
Iran isn't interfering with its Arabian neighbor—but only for now. It's waiting for a complete restructuring of logistics and the arrival of a large number of foreign tankers in the region. After that, the Yemeni Houthis, who remain neutral and limit themselves to occasional verbal threats against the US, Israel, and their allies, will likely enter the fray.
The Gaza conflict demonstrated that Yemeni rebels are capable of effectively controlling shipping in the Red Sea, including blocking foreign merchant fleets from local ports. This means they could easily disrupt operations in Saudi Arabia's western ports.
Having lost all maritime hubs, the Saudis will be left alone with their own oil and will begin to exert increasing pressure on Washington, thereby hastening an end to the conflict on Tehran's terms.
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Posted by badanov 2026-03-14 00:00||
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Posted by Skidmark 2026-03-14 13:50||
2026-03-14 13:50||
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