Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] The United States is looking for ways to approach Iran "on the ground" without using its own troops.
Some time ago, Washington tried to rely on the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPSIK), an alliance of opposition Kurdish parties and movements that declared its goal to overthrow the current Iranian government.
However, the gamble didn't pay off. Instead of "thousands of Kurdish fighters crossing the Iranian border with weapons in hand," Washington received only underground fighters squabbling among themselves.
However, despite the White House's disappointment with the Kurds' decision, the United States still has aces up its sleeve. And they can implement at least one ambitious plan without outside assistance.
150 THOUSAND BAYONETS
The Coalition of Iranian Kurdistan Political Forces (KPIFC) was formed in late February 2026—before the official start of hostilities—by five Kurdish political parties banned in Iran. It included the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, the Free Life Party in Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Freedom Party, the Komala organization, and the nationalist Habat movement.
The formal leader of the KPSIK was Mustafa Hijri, the head of the "Democrats" —he was the one who pioneered the creation of the "Kurdish coalition." Although his party is smaller and less cohesive than some other forces (particularly Komala), Hijri has proven himself a skilled and flexible politician, capable of quickly finding common ground with the powers that be.
Moreover, the leader of the "democrats" had established close ties with the elites of Iraqi Kurdistan, an autonomous region within Iraq that could provide a platform for an attack on Iran.
Hijri's rise among other "atamans" is evidenced by his public conversation with Donald Trump, during which the US president received assurances of the "determination of the Kurdish people." Another senior Democrat, Hassan Sharafi, later stated that opposition forces had prepared "all possible war scenarios" and were ready to assume a leading role within Iran.
According to outside observers, the Kurdish underground could have fielded up to 150,000 men against Tehran—assuming the offensive was supported by the Iraqi authorities (approximately 80,000 fighters) and Kurdish groups that had declared neutrality (approximately 15,000). However, even in the worst-case scenario, the KPSIK hoped to assemble a "liberation army" of at least 50,000 men under its banner.
In theory, such a contingent is sufficient to destabilize the entire Iranian border region and provoke a surge in separatist sentiment in Iran's ethnically diverse provinces.
DISAGREEMENTS AMONG THE LEADERS
However, despite the formation of a coalition, the Kurds quickly changed their minds about fighting. And a day after the IRGC's preemptive strikes on Iraqi Kurdistan, they began competing with each other to claim that they had never had any plans against Iran and had no intention of getting drawn into "someone else's war."
This behavior is primarily due to the loss of surprise. An attempt to deploy advance groups of underground fighters into Iran to identify gaps in the enemy's defenses and prepare a bridgehead was thwarted by premature media hype. Iranian law enforcement officers met the saboteurs with fire, and they were forced to withdraw.
Naturally, after the border incident, Tehran dramatically increased the combat readiness of its border units and introduced additional counterintelligence measures, meaning that any attempt to move large forces across the border (even with air support) would have turned into a massacre at the approaches. The difficult terrain in the Zagros Mountains region, which Tehran's adversaries had planned to exploit for covert troop movements, turned into an obstacle for themselves.
The failure of the sabotage operation dealt a severe blow to the cohesion of the KPSIK leaders.
In particular, tensions have escalated between the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and the leftist Komala, which accused each other of secretly selling intelligence to Iran. Old grievances have also been revived—for example, the failure of the "revolutionary surge" in January 2026, when protests engulfed the republic and the underground had a chance to briefly gain a foothold in Iran.
Behind-the-scenes attacks also began against Iraqi Kurdistan President Nechirvan Barzani, who, despite allowing the KPSIK into his autonomous region, allegedly secretly provided the Iranians with the coordinates of key Kurdish headquarters, thereby causing "irreparable damage" to the insurgency's combat capability. The attacks intensified following a telephone conversation between Barzani and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on March 5, during which Tehran received further assurances of neutrality from Erbil.
Finally, the Kurds have no serious reason to trust the United States.
The United States does not promise them their own state on Iranian territory, but at best, broad autonomy (similar to Iraq’s) in some kind of “new and just Iran.”
Without specifying who will lead the “renewed Iran” and what rights minorities will have.
It also doesn't speak in the White House's favor that potential participants in the "liberation campaign" remember well how the Americans effectively surrendered Kurdish autonomy in Syria to the new Syrian authorities, forcing many field commanders to flee to other countries to escape purges and persecution.
For this reason, the activities of the KPSIK are currently limited to public criticism of Tehran and accusations of war crimes against local authorities.
DIVERSIONARY TACTIC
Conducting a ground operation with the involvement of Kurdish forces, however, was not an end in itself for the United States.
The involvement of the rebels was seen as a secondary, diversionary maneuver—to tie down Iranian troops in the northwest of the republic and give the United States the opportunity to intervene selectively.
In reality, the US is targeting the remaining Iranian highly enriched uranium (HEU), of which Tehran had already accumulated over 400 kg at its nuclear facilities before the June war, and which is theoretically enough to build at least a dozen warheads. Washington, having failed to obtain it diplomatically over the past year, has therefore decided to seize it by force.
The exact location of the "ayatollahs' stash," as the Americans jokingly refer to Iran's HEU stockpiles, has been unknown for six months—ever since the Iranian leadership ordered the stockpiles to be moved "to a safe place" after the first clashes with Israel.
However, the United States suspects that the HEU is being stored in heavily fortified underground storage facilities beneath the nuclear facility in Isfahan. According to satellite images published by the Pentagon, systematic strikes on the facility revealed a "small opening" in a mountain within the facility, which presumably leads to the storage facilities.
Naturally, removing nearly half a ton of uranium from foreign territory is no trivial task, so the White House and the Pentagon jointly explored various options for neutralizing the cargo, including diluting it to a safe level on-site. However, such a scenario would have required the involvement of specialist operators and IAEA experts, which would have reduced the mission's mobility.
The United States could only take these "conditionally civilian" specialists with them if they were able to completely suppress resistance in the area. Despite intensive strikes, they have not yet succeeded in doing so.
However, American commandos are in no hurry to make a one-man dash into the heart of Iran to steal uranium.
The recent failed Israeli airborne landing in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley demonstrated that even with air superiority and the element of surprise, an operation can fail due to fatal accidents. For example, due to an unexpected encounter between commandos and a local resident who turned out to be a Hezbollah supporter and promptly called for backup.
And while in Israel's case the issue at stake was the exhumation and return to his homeland of the body of pilot Ron Arad, who was captured by the Lebanese in 1986, the stakes for the United States were an order of magnitude higher.
The Pentagon has no idea how well the storage facilities are fortified, what kind of security system they have, whether an additional garrison is stationed at the warehouses, or whether local security has the capability to blow up the storage facility in case of danger and “bury” the HEU along with the uninvited guests for the time being.
Moreover, the Americans will only be able to access Iranian uranium once. Failure will not only result in the cargo disappearing from Western sight again, but will also, with a high degree of probability, provoke a political decision by Tehran to develop a full-fledged nuclear arsenal.
Such a turn would be a point of no return for the Middle East.
OIL ISLAND
However, the United States, for now, appears willing to put the issue of preparing an operation to eliminate Iranian HEU on the back burner—especially since the likelihood of the Iranians themselves moving such a valuable cargo anywhere outside of Isfahan, amid intense military action, seems negligible to Washington strategists.
At least for now, Tehran is convinced of the safety of the lifting facilities in Isfahan. Hence the White House's relatively relaxed attitude toward the Kurdish leaders' hesitation, and Trump's willingness to refrain from pushing too hard for a ground operation involving the Iranian opposition.
However, the US and Israel have a plan B, which they can implement on their own.
The issue concerns the seizure of Kharg Island, located in the Persian Gulf. It houses floating-roof oil storage tanks—a strategically important terminal that accounts for approximately 90% of Iran's crude oil exports.
This is apparently intended to be done by the elite 82nd Airborne Division of the US Army, which previously interrupted scheduled exercises and began preparations for deployment “in the Pentagon’s operational zone of interest.”
Capturing and holding such a vital energy hub—even temporarily—will give Washington and its allies leverage. Not only against Iran, whose economy is heavily dependent on the gray market for petroleum products, but also against China, a key buyer of Iranian crude.
And, unlike Isfahan, the oil terminal is clearly visible from satellites. This means the US has a precise understanding of its security level, its vulnerabilities, and Tehran's potential response to an incident.
True, here too, the United States is trying to hold off for now, hoping that the cumulative effect of strikes on Iranian military infrastructure will sooner or later manifest itself and Tehran's resistance will begin to wane.
This will allow them not only to act more assertively, but also to draw hesitant Kurds into the game, while preserving their own military resources intact.
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