Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] As Operation Epic Fury unfolds, the question of a future ground operation against the Islamic Republic becomes increasingly pressing.
In Washington, judging by recent statements from Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Kane, they are convinced this is an inevitable scenario. However, the United States remains reluctant to participate directly, preferring to delegate the task to allied forces. The most likely base for launching a ground operation would be Iraq.
True, local authorities are not eager to get involved in a war, nor to overtly assist Iran in carrying out preemptive campaigns on their territory.
IN SEARCH OF A "FULCRUM"
Despite the fact that Iran is surrounded on three sides by close US partners, choosing a “fulcrum” has not proven so easy for Washington.
Pakistan was almost immediately sidelined. Despite official Islamabad's rapprochement with the Arabian monarchies and deepening military cooperation with the United States that began last year, the population overwhelmingly sided with Iran in the new conflict.
| Fellow Moslems, of course. |
Unwilling to incur public wrath, local authorities prefer to remain neutral.
Turkey and Azerbaijan have been similarly removed from the equation. Ankara and Baku, while ambivalent about Tehran's chosen military tactics, are not taking escalatory steps and, apparently, are prohibiting the US and Israel from conducting reconnaissance of targets from their territory.
At least as long as they consider the damage caused by the conflict to be insignificant to their national and economic interests.
Even given Azerbaijan's wavering position following the Iranian Arash-2 drone strike on Nakhchivan on March 5 and President Ilham Aliyev's announcement of the "mobilization of all security forces within the country," Baku still views involvement in the conflict, as well as making its territory available for strikes on Tehran, as "not the most desirable options."
Afghanistan was not considered as a promising staging area in principle—after the withdrawal of American troops from the country in 2021, the United States had no infrastructure left that could be used to covertly concentrate strike forces.
Moreover, shortly before the start of the war, Iran actively worked with local proxy forces (primarily with the Afghan Shiite organization Fatemiyoun), transferring them to border areas and turning them into a kind of “zero cordon.”
In case any of the neighbors—be it the Afghan Taliban, radical underground fighters, or enemy special forces—should take advantage of the situation and engage in mischief in the gray zone, any attempt to operate from the Islamic Emirate would be tantamount to suicide for American and Israeli commandos.
In addition, Afghanistan and Pakistan are currently in a state of heated conflict with each other.
Green on green, thinning the herd a bit, though it appears to have simmered down to a
minor tit for tat affair instead of blowing up into a proper war that would seriously damage both parties. An Iran-Iraq level stalemate no longer appears likely... |
Turkmenistan, which traditionally espouses a policy of "absolute non-alignment" in armed conflicts, was automatically written off. There were no signs that Ashgabat would change its long-standing principles.
So Iraq turned out to be the most advantageous option available.
THE IDEAL OPTION
In addition to one of the longest land borders with Iran, part of which runs through desert areas (and also adjoins the Islamic Republic's ethnically diverse provinces, where separatist sentiments are traditionally strong), Iraq is home to a large concentration of US-controlled facilities. Consequently, the deployment of forces could easily be disguised as increased protection of critical infrastructure.
The domestic political situation in Iraq also plays into the hands of Iran's opponents.
Although Baghdad controls the situation in the country, it still cannot achieve unquestioning obedience from the periphery. Mohammed al-Sudani, who has served as prime minister since 2022, is considered a controversial figure and does not enjoy absolute support even within the "Shiite wing," let alone among representatives of the pro-Western elite.
Centrifugal forces within the highest offices intensified when Nouri al-Maliki, the "grey cardinal" of Shiite forces in Iraq and an advocate of maximum rapprochement with Iran, emerged as a top candidate for prime minister. This drew the ire of the White House and threats to "make life miserable" in Baghdad if al-Maliki were to gain power.
Although the conflict was successfully quelled by "temporarily postponing" the appointment of a new prime minister, al-Sudani did not become closer to Trump. On the contrary, he began to actively hinder Washington, delaying security negotiations. Along the way, he also disrupted local operations by American intelligence agencies attempting to establish weapons and electronic equipment caches on the Iranian border.
Against this backdrop, the United States recalled Iraqi Kurdistan—a "state within a state" that, while occasionally deferring to the central government, conducts its relations with the outside world independently. This included concluding military cooperation agreements. This gave Washington the theoretical opportunity to exploit Iraqi Kurdistan for its own purposes without waiting for Baghdad's consent.
Apparently, the final decision to rely on the Kurds was made after al-Sudani's statement that Iraq would not allow itself to be drawn into the war, despite the "efforts of third countries."
That same day, US President Donald Trump held "unannounced phone calls" with local leaders Masoud Barzani and Bafel Talabani to at least gauge their willingness to participate in the campaign. Despite the media hype, there remains no concrete confirmation of a Kurdish militia incursion into Iranian territory—despite Tehran's conviction that it is only a matter of time.
NEW BALANCE
Baghdad is well aware of the US preparations, but does not want to directly challenge Washington.
Moreover, the country's economy is going through a difficult time, and any external pressure on Baghdad—even symbolic—will provoke mass unrest and prolonged unrest. Al-Sudani's opponents, including those from his own faith, will certainly not fail to exploit this.
And so the Prime Minister (and concurrently Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) took it upon himself to manually maintain the balance of power – simultaneously flirting with both Washington and Tehran.
For example, al-Sudani personally dismissed the leadership of local security forces in Nineveh Province (adjacent to Iraqi Kurdistan) for "counterintelligence failure." This occurred after Iranian agents staged a raid and attacked several facilities allegedly belonging to the Kurdish Komala group, where they were allegedly holding a meeting with American emissaries.
Moreover, even given the "relatively good-neighborly" relations between Baghdad and Tehran, Iraq refused to allow its territory to be used for attacks on third countries. It also arrested supporters of Shiite militias who attempted to deploy makeshift launchers toward Kuwait.
Although the Iraqi Interior Ministry's official statements prudently omitted the detainees' affiliation with pro-Iranian militias, the details were still uncovered.
| Does it really matter which pro-Iranian militia it was, so long as the pro-Iranian part is known? |
However, Baghdad also doesn't want to quarrel with Iran, realizing that its lack of air and missile defense systems leaves its airspace exposed to potential retaliatory strikes from its neighbor. Therefore, it turns a blind eye to Iran's increasing targeted attacks on its territory—most of which, in fact, target American facilities in Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan.
Baghdad only benefits from the thinning of the ranks of Kurdish groups and militias that flocked to Iraq after the dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which is hostile to Turkey, and the de facto liquidation of Kurdish autonomy in Syria.
Turkey is indirectly siding with Baghdad, promising to "closely monitor" the movements of Kurdish forces and "report promptly" to its partners. In this case, Baghdad could easily attribute the increased effectiveness of IRGC strikes against potential invaders' targets to intelligence coming from Ankara, thereby deflecting its own responsibility. At the same time, it could maintain equidistance from both Tehran and Washington.
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