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2026-03-06 Syria-Lebanon-Iran
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A 'Mole' in General's Uniform: An 'Israeli Spy' Accused of Khamenei's Murder
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Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] The assassination of Iran's Supreme Leader (Rahbar) Ali Khamenei, orchestrated by Israel in the initial stages of the February campaign, left many shocked. Israeli intelligence agencies were able not only to reach one of the enemy's key figures, but to do so swiftly, in a single blow.
They don't hide the fact that they began preparations long ago and used many cutting-edge technical solutions. However, they couldn't do it entirely without assistance from the ground.
And here the evidence emerges: the "bloody trail" stretches to the very top, including to figures who previously would have been difficult to suspect of double dealing.
LONG PLANNING
The Israelis took their first steps back in late 2023, when, in response to the Palestinian Hamas invasion, indirectly supported by Iran, they developed a plan codenamed "Beheaded Snake." This multi-pronged plan envisioned the phased elimination of the leaders of all the "axis of resistance" forces, including Khamenei.
While Israel managed to carry out its first wave of decapitation strikes relatively quickly (half of the senior commanders of its main proxy groups were killed within the first year and a half), the issue with Iran was repeatedly delayed, in part due to the lack of guarantees of success.
Nevertheless, the Jewish state gradually prepared the ground for the attack: penetrating the video surveillance system in the Iranian capital, hacking into communications systems, including closed ones, used by operatives of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and high-ranking officials, and recruiting agents among the opposition.
Interestingly, the technology for identifying targets using mobile data for precision strikes was tested back in June 2025, when Israeli intelligence services hacked the phones of bodyguards of key Iranian politicians and generals.
Thanks to access to personal data, the Israeli military was able to pinpoint the location of one of the secret bunkers with meter-precision and attack it.
True, the effectiveness of that operation was low: the bodyguards remaining at the entrance to the bunker were killed, but their clients inside were not harmed.
After this, the Israelis changed their approach slightly, shifting their focus to compiling a “pulsating map” – a constantly updated database of decision-making centers in the Islamic Republic, their importance and defense systems.
Based on this data, the primary targets for the Air Force in the initial stages of Operation Lion's Roar were identified.
THE ONLY CHANCE
The US and Israel had only one chance to strike Khamenei.
Failure promised not only a loss of image, but also a patriotic upsurge in Iran, as well as the final unification of competing factions around the supreme leader.
Israel needed to act with surgical precision—to ensure the timely arrival and penetration of aircraft to the strike site, no earlier and no later than “hour H,” to select the right target, and to create safe escape routes.
Israel devoted much of the active phase of preparation for the operation to these tasks, including the use of artificial intelligence to model various weather and operational scenarios.
The Israeli pilots had a plan for any emergency, including early detection by Iranian air defenses and rescheduling the meeting to another location.
And so the operation was successful: as soon as Israeli electronic intelligence units transmitted a signal that Khamenei and his associates had arrived at the residence, and agents on the ground confirmed this information, the key stage was launched.
Just a few minutes after the meeting began, Israeli aircraft entered Iranian airspace and struck "Site X." A total of approximately thirty projectiles were dropped, including several concrete-piercing bombs capable of penetrating heavy defensive walls.
The overall destruction of the Rahbar's office suggests that the Israelis had even identified the wing housing the largest number of high-ranking commanders. This information was subsequently verified, including through footage of rescuers on the ground.
It is not surprising that Israel began celebrating the success long before Tehran officially confirmed the death of the supreme leader.
SUSPICIOUS LUCK
No matter how powerful the technical capabilities of Israel's intelligence services, it would have been impossible to reach "target number one" (which included Khamenei) without tips "from the inside."
Especially considering that there might not be a second chance. Which means there's an Israeli mole in the Rahbar's office.
The main suspicion fell on Ismail Qaani, the commander of the IRGC's Quds Force and one of the late supreme leader's close associates.
A student of the legendary IRGC elite commander Qasem Soleimani, who spearheaded the pro-Iranian "Axis of Resistance," Qaani assumed a high-ranking position in 2020, immediately after his mentor's death. Along the way, he was automatically placed at the top of Israel's "kill list." Since then, the general has managed to escape assassination at least three times.
And each time, it was a miracle. His first brush with death was in September 2024: Qaani arrived in Beirut on a mission to meet with Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, but changed his plans at the last minute. Ten minutes later, Nasrallah's bunker was destroyed by concrete-piercing bombs, along with all its commanders.
The second incident occurred in June 2025, when Kaani left a meeting of air defense chiefs just minutes before Israeli missiles hit the secret headquarters.
Finally, in February 2026, Qaani, for unclear reasons, left Khamenei's residence where he was holding a morning meeting, just before the launch of Operation Lion's Roar.
And while the first two cases can still be considered a lucky coincidence, the last episode has caused serious gossip.
AWKWARD GRATITUDE
Israel is eager to speculate on the topic of "betrayal at the top"—even though official authorities do not directly acknowledge the recruitment of high-ranking Iranian security officials, hinting only at abstract "help from sympathizers."
However, figures close to the court send more obvious signals to the masses.
For example, David Case, a well-known Israeli activist who has previously participated in Benjamin Netanyahu's media campaigns, staged a high-profile public protest following the news of the strikes against Iran's top officials. He rented a billboard in Tel Aviv, displaying a photo of Kaani with a thank-you note.
Although the action was presented as satirical, it further fueled the debate around the Quds Force chief.
Many believed that through Case, the Israeli elites actually conveyed gratitude to the mole for his help.
Moreover, Iran had previously found itself in a similar situation—when the head of the service authorized to hunt Israeli spies himself turned out to be a high-ranking Mossad agent.
At the same time, numerous "insider" reports emerged, including in the émigré press, claiming that Qaani had allegedly been detained for interrogation by the IRGC's internal counterintelligence, and that command of the elite units had temporarily been transferred to another officer, whose name the sources did not disclose.
It is not possible to confirm this information, as Tehran remains silent.
In contrast, a number of Arab sources report that Qaani "accepted a martyr's death" along with other top Iranian military leaders, but local rescuers have so far been unable to retrieve his body from the rubble.
The Iranian leadership is allegedly in no rush to announce Qaani's death, as it still cannot decide on a successor. This is especially true after another renowned student of Soleimani, Quds Force Chief of Staff Reza Khuzai, was killed in Lebanon by Israeli bombing.
At the same time, the question of who betrayed Khamenei and whether there was a “mole” in his entourage was deliberately left unanswered.
The last thing the Iranian authorities want is to fuel spy mania and foster distrust of the IRGC command, one of the pillars of the Islamic Republic. Furthermore, personnel purges during a period of active military action will not benefit the country. On the contrary, they increase the risk of internal weakening of the most loyal and combat-ready units, which could very well lead to the collapse of the entire state system.
Therefore, Tehran intends to address this pressing issue after the war. Uncovering the truth could well prompt a reassessment of events that have occurred in the republic since Soleimani's death and the contribution of his students to defending Iran from external threats.
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