Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kirill Semenov
[REGNUM] On February 27, 2026, Pakistan launched airstrikes on the Afghan capital, Kabul, as well as Kandahar and Paktia province, while Afghan Taliban forces used drone strikes on Pakistani territory for the first time in the conflict.
Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif officially declared "open war" on the Taliban government, declaring that Islamabad's patience has finally run out. "We will now wage open war against you," the defense minister wrote in a social media post, confirming that diplomatic means have been exhausted.
Since the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in 2021, relations between the two countries have fluctuated between cautious diplomacy and outright hostility. Clashes occurred in both October 2025 and January 2026, but the current escalation is the most serious.
This is the first time since the Taliban's return that Pakistan has struck directly at Afghan government targets, rather than just at Afghan-based positions of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which Islamabad considers its main enemy.
This fact indicates a new stage of escalation: previously, Islamabad tried to avoid attacking official structures in Kabul, limiting itself to “preemptive strikes” against TTP militants.
FIGHTS AND ATTACKS ON CAPITALS
Full-scale fighting along the Durand Line (a disputed 2,600-kilometer border) began on the evening of February 26. Afghan government spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid announced the start of "large-scale offensive operations" against Pakistani forces.
According to him, the Afghan army is conducting large-scale offensive operations along the Durand Line in retaliation for the airstrikes carried out by Islamabad on February 21-22 on the eastern provinces of Nangarhar and Paktika.
According to the Taliban, they managed to capture 15 Pakistani border posts in the first hours of the offensive. Fighting engulfed the provinces of Khost, Kunar, and Nangarhar on the Afghan side, and the Khyber Pass and Bajaur regions on the Pakistani side.
Islamabad's response was immediate. Late that night, Pakistani air forces launched strikes. Residents of the Afghan capital reported a series of powerful explosions and the sound of aircraft overhead, followed by anti-aircraft fire. The shelling hit not only border provinces but also major cities deep in the country.
WAR OF NUMBERS
Both sides claim heavy enemy losses, but the figures differ dramatically. The situation is complicated by the fact that neither report has yet been independently confirmed, and the battlefields remain closed to international observers.
Pakistani Information Minister Attaullah Tarar gave a detailed report on the military operations. He stated that Pakistani forces killed 228 Afghan Taliban fighters during clashes and airstrikes. According to Pakistani military officials, two key headquarters complexes, over 80 pieces of equipment, and 27 enemy firing positions were destroyed. Tarar estimated his side's losses as minimal: only two service members were killed.
Afghans cite completely different statistics. The official spokesman for the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Zabihullah Mujahid, reported the deaths of 55 Pakistani soldiers. However, he estimates the Taliban's losses at only eight. Furthermore, Kabul claims to have captured 23 bodies of enemy soldiers and several prisoners, as well as a significant amount of weapons. Islamabad categorically denies any reports of prisoners.
In addition, Afghanistan claims to have carried out successful drone strikes against military targets on Pakistani territory.
Islamabad denies this claim. Tarar stated that Taliban militants did attempt to use drones against Pakistani targets, but all the drones were shot down by countermeasures and "there were no casualties." In addition to the military, civilians are also suffering. The Afghan Red Crescent has already reported the deaths of 18 civilians as a result of the bombings. Dozens have been injured. Panic is spreading in border areas on both sides: local residents are fleeing their homes, fearing being caught in the crossfire.
The past few weeks have also been bloody: both sides admit that dozens of people have died in border clashes in recent weeks, but exact figures are difficult to provide.
TERRORISM AND THE INDIAN FACTOR
The formal pretext for the current round of violence was the devastating terrorist attack on a Shiite mosque in Islamabad on February 6, which claimed the lives of 31 people.
ISIS* claimed responsibility, but Pakistani authorities traditionally placed the blame on groups hiding behind the Afghan border, in particular the Pakistani Taliban, that is, the TTP.
On February 21, Islamabad launched airstrikes on seven militant camps in Afghanistan. Kabul then announced the deaths of 18 civilians and promised retaliation, which followed on February 26.
However, Afghans insist that Islamabad is using the TTP issue as a pretext to destabilize their country. They emphasize that they will respond to "every evil act by Pakistan."
Meanwhile, the terrorist threat is just the tip of the iceberg. The main strategic irritant for Pakistan at the current stage is the sharp rapprochement between Kabul and New Delhi, after Pakistan and India entered a state of war last year. Against this backdrop, Islamabad openly declares that Afghanistan is becoming an "Indian colony," which is using Afghan territory for a proxy war against it.
In 2025, India upgraded its diplomatic mission in Kabul to an embassy, and in February 2026, it allocated a new tranche of aid to Afghanistan in the amount of $18 million. This is very little, but for Islamabad, which for decades has viewed Afghanistan as its zone of influence and “strategic depth,” this state of affairs is unacceptable.
Mujahid himself commented on this issue in his statement, making it clear that the Afghan authorities do indeed have good relations with India, but these relations are not directed against Pakistan. Judging by the rhetoric of officials, Islamabad categorically disagrees with this thesis and views Indian-Afghan cooperation as a direct threat to its national security.
It should be noted that India and Afghanistan began to draw closer after Islamabad began increasing pressure on Kabul and launching strikes on Afghan territory, demanding decisive action against the TTP.
Clearly, any stable alliance between New Delhi and Kabul is unlikely. The Hindu ideology of Narendra Modi's government is becoming increasingly anti-Islamic, while the Taliban adhere to the most conservative Islamic views.
While pragmatism may compel them to engage in temporary dialogue, the cultural and ideological gulf between them is unbridgeable. The attempt to exploit the visit of Acting Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to the Deoband religious seminary in India as a tool of "religious diplomacy" only underscores how unnatural and contrived this alliance is, devoid of organic public support. Deoband itself is under increasing pressure from Hindu radicals within the ruling party.
Thus, the current rapprochement between India and the Taliban is based almost entirely on a single factor: their conflict with Pakistan. Relations between Islamabad and Kabul have indeed reached a historic low, escalating into border clashes. And New Delhi has decided to seize the moment to antagonize its age-old enemy and increase its strategic costs.
Building long-term policy on other people's quarrels is extremely dangerous. Despite the current hostility, Pakistan and the Taliban are linked by religious and blood ties, ethnic affinity (the Pashtuns are not only the cause of the conflict but also a factor of unity), and an interdependence that will never exist with India.
Afghanistan remains a poor, landlocked country, economically dependent on transit through Pakistani territory. Once Islamabad and Kabul resolve their differences (and negotiations mediated by Turkey and Qatar are already underway),
| …I find it hard to believe they will ever reconcile. Pakistan wants a subservient Afghanistan ready at any moment to house and support a Pakistan retreat in the face of an overwhelming Indian attack, from whence Pakistan will come roaring out to conquer the rest of the Indian subcontinent. The Taliban emirate considers itself an independent polity, absolutely not in fealty to those whisky-drinking Pakistani heretics. |
the main incentive for Indo-Taliban friendship will disappear. In the long term, geographic, ethnic, and religious proximity will inevitably outweigh the tactical benefits of cooperation with distant India, no matter how generous its investments.
THE CURSE OF THE DURAND LINE
The real bone of contention between Kabul and Islamabad isn't India, but the Durand Line itself—an arbitrary border drawn by Britain back in 1893. It divided the lands of the Pashtun tribes, and Afghanistan still refuses to officially recognize it. For decades, militants have been based along this line, launching attacks into Pakistan. And the Pakistani territory adjacent to it, known as the "tribal areas," has never been fully controlled by Islamabad.
In fact, TTP militants were based in this "tribal zone," fighting since 2007 to establish their own strict Islamic state there, with subsequent expansion throughout Pakistan. However, under pressure from the army, they began establishing bases on Afghan territory and attacking Pakistan from there, which naturally prompted a retaliatory response from Islamabad and demands that the Afghan Taliban stop such actions.
The Afghan Taliban and the TTP are fundamentally different movements with distinct ideologies. The latter are more oriented toward the radical ideology of jihadist Salafism, while the Afghan Taliban are Hanafi-Maturidis, who adhere to Islamic views that are, albeit quite strict, traditional to the region. However, beyond their similar names, these groups are also linked by their shared Pashtun identity.
Both the Taliban and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, despite their Islamist rhetoric, are primarily Pashtun national movements. Many members of the same tribes, clans, and families live on both sides of the border, and some ended up with the Afghan Taliban, while others joined the TTP. Therefore, Kabul avoided open combat with a group that posed no threat. A conflict would have erupted within the ranks of the Pashtuns themselves. And that could have been costly for the regime in Kabul.
This position is unacceptable for Pakistan. Islamabad now considers Kabul complicit in the TTP's subversive activities against Pakistan.
Moreover, the Pakistanis, who had supported the Taliban for years during difficult times, felt entitled to demand that Afghanistan "pay its dues" and support the eradication of the TTP. But the Taliban's Pashtun nationalism prevailed over its partnership with Pakistan, turning Kabul and Islamabad into enemies.
The current escalation has negated the October ceasefire agreements brokered by Qatar and Turkey, which had halted the clashes. Negotiations since then have failed to produce a lasting agreement.
It's too early to talk about the conflict being irreversible or escalating into a major war. Only India is interested in such a war, but Pakistan and Afghanistan are too interdependent to afford a protracted standoff. However, nothing can be ruled out now.
Text:
Pakistan Army’s Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry:
“So far, 274 Taliban and Khwarij fighters have been killed and over 400 wounded. We’ve destroyed 73 enemy posts along the Pak-Afghan border, captured 18, and knocked out at least 115 tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery. Key Taliban and terrorist positions were targeted across 22 sites in Kabul, Kandahar, Paktia, Nangarhar, Khost, and Paktika.”
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