Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] Recently, US President Donald Trump's Senior Advisor for Africa, Massad Boulos, held a working meeting in Libya with Saddam Haftar, the son and deputy commander of the Eastern Libyan Armed Forces. The Americans invited Haftar and his fighters to join the large-scale Flintlock 26 exercises, scheduled for spring 2026 and held near the city of Sirte.
The visit to Libya of a high-ranking State Department official (who also happens to be the American leader's in-law) sparked considerable controversy. And not just because Washington played a decisive role in starting the country's civil war. Far more concerning were the personal motives of the distinguished guest, who sought to turn the African country into a "family business."
A BUSINESSMAN WITHOUT A BRIEFCASE
| Is that like a minister without portfolio? |
Although Boulos had been actively involved in the Republican camp since the time of George W. Bush, he only entered big politics in 2024, after being invited to join Trump's team.
Moreover, unlike many of the "transitional period" appointees, the president's matchmaker arrived at the White House with established communication channels. Boulos retained significant connections in Lebanon, where his family has been actively involved for several generations. The American envoy's ancestors sat in the local parliament and held leadership positions, actively influencing public opinion in the country. Boulos himself maintained active contacts with representatives of many Lebanese parties, including Suleiman Frangieh, the leader of the conservative centrist Marada Party (a tactical ally of Hezbollah).
With such a "portfolio," many observers were confident that his rise to a leading position in resolving the conflict between Lebanon and Israel was only a matter of time. However, Boulos's potential was not fully utilized; the Hezbollah disarmament negotiations were completely dominated by Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Turkey and the White House special representative for Syria. He also doubles as the "Saudi group's" confidant within the US administration. Replacing Barrack with Boulos would have complicated the White House's already difficult dialogue with the Arabian monarchies and would have harmed the interests of Trump's son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who traded Barrack's participation in the negotiations for support for US projects in Saudi Arabia.
Similarly, the former businessman failed to integrate into the Gaza negotiations, even though Boulos helped the Republicans establish a stable channel of communication between Trump and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. However, the "Qatar-Turkish" group, led by Steve Witkoff, resisted. Unwilling to upset the fragile balance of elite groups around the White House, Trump decided not to play this card either.
Moreover, the idea of pressuring Hezbollah through semi-loyal Christian parties or negotiating Gaza's future with the unpopular Abbas seemed a foregone conclusion to the Republican. So, in both processes, Boulos played a largely technical role.
AFRICAN SUCCESSES
Trump's matchmaker achieved far greater success in Africa. Boulos participated in a mediation mission between the warring Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, ultimately convincing both sides to sign a ceasefire on Washington's terms.
He also managed to extricate three Americans from DRC prisons who participated in the failed anti-government coup of May 2024. This required first winning over the country's president, Félix Tshisekedi, whom the accused had previously attempted to assassinate. However, the State Department's expenses were more than repaid: Kinshasa not only complied with Washington's request but also expressed a willingness to become more actively involved in US diplomatic and economic projects on the continent.
Boulos has even been jokingly nicknamed "Trump's chamberlain" in Africa, as the savvy businessman has had a hand in most of the key deals on the continent concluded in 2025, from a massive American investment program in Nigeria to a joint rare earths mining plan with the DRC.
The US-Africa mini-summit, held at the White House in the summer of 2025, was also partly the brainchild of Boulos and his staff.
FRIENDSHIP AND SERVICE
But let's return to Libya. Boulos made his first attempt to "make inroads" into the country back in April 2025, in the first days after his appointment as Senior Advisor for Africa. He proposed a "comprehensive plan" for reconciling the warring parties, but it failed to gain much support. It was consistently rejected by both East and West Libya, with each side complaining that Washington was "trying to play along" with its opponent instead of addressing real problems.
Trump's matchmaker's attempts to impose his vision of a settlement on individual Libyan politicians at closed meetings (sometimes through persuasion, sometimes through threats) also failed, which caused irritation in the White House.
Boulos then moved on to targeted "cultivation" of key figures in the Libyan political scene, with an emphasis on future faction leaders. Saddam Haftar was among the first figures the Trump adviser met with in Libya after a nearly six-month hiatus.
In preparing for the meeting with him, Boulos took into account previous mistakes and played his trump card, essentially offering the East a “roof” for the duration of joint exercises in Sirte, as well as guarantees that the Tripolitanians (also involved in these exercises) would not use them as cover for preparing a military campaign.
It's worth noting that the Americans' increased activity in the East is no coincidence. In early February, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, one of the sons of the former Libyan leader and a presidential contender, was assassinated in northwestern Libya. His death rocked the country, with warring factions accusing each other of "political assassination" and looking for signs that their counterparts were preparing for a "military revenge." Moreover, it was the East that rattled its sabres most vigorously, seeing the crisis as an opportunity to unite under its banner the younger Gaddafi's former supporters—all those who disagreed with Tripoli's policies.
Here, Boulos partly decided to play on his ambitions: inviting the eastern forces to participate in exercises under the auspices of AFRICOM strengthened their legitimacy in the eyes of other factions, and speaking on equal terms with Haftar Jr. only fueled rumors of an imminent transfer of the eastern commander's position from father to son. Haftar Sr. himself indirectly supports this transfer: in August 2025, he appointed Saddam as his deputy, entrusting him with the most sensitive negotiations, including those related to the possible creation of a unified Libyan armed forces.
Interestingly, this meeting did not provoke a wave of indignation in the other camps. This was largely due to the fact that Boulos's lieutenants had carried out a serious "diplomatic barrage": they organized meetings with Libyan Prime Minister Hamid Dbeibah and other influential Western Libyan officials, and, according to leaks, held talks with General Osama Juwaili, the "governor" of the city of Ez-Zintan (where Gaddafi Jr. had long been hiding) and an "equidistant" force between East and West.
HIDDEN INTEREST
However, when establishing ties with Libyan elites from different camps, Boulos is guided not so much by Washington's foreign policy aspirations as by his own business interests.
Numerous relatives and friends of the adviser have already set their sights on Libya's war-ravaged (but still attractive) oil and industrial sectors. Among the first to be considered is his own son, the young billionaire and Trump's son-in-law, Michael Boulos.
In September 2025, Boulos was already trying to play the role of "good uncle" in negotiations with Libyan bigwigs. At a closed meeting in Doha, he promised his interlocutors to press the Republican administration to unfreeze "tens of billions of dollars" frozen since the overthrow of Gaddafi in 2011. But only on the condition that some of these funds be returned as kickbacks to American companies entering the market.
By a “strange coincidence,” most of the firms named were either connected to relatives of the elder Boulos or had permanent contracts with companies of Turkish billionaire Ercument Bayeganu, the “oil king” of the local market.
Given that Trump's aide's initiative was in stark contrast to UN sanctions imposed on Tripoli, Boulos was accused of conflict of interest and violation of international law. Combined with his dubious connections, this could have spelled the end of his political career.
At that time, the active adviser was saved from consequences not so much by his relationship with the president as by the intercession of Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who highly praised Boulos's contribution to advancing US interests on the African continent and saw him, among other things, as a strong counterweight to the "Turkish-Qatari group" led by Witkoff. With great difficulty, the errant politician was saved.
Boulos learned his lesson and, during his current foray into Libya, disguised his business interests as much as possible, shifting the focus to seeking agreement between Libya's "military camps." However, the very next day, numerous economic representatives and businessmen associated with the "Boulos group" rushed in the wake of Trump's advisor. This means that a new conflict of interest is just around the corner.
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