Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] Following an ambitious but poorly organized coup by southern Yemeni elites backed by the UAE, Saudi Arabia struck back.
Together with local loyalists, the Saudis have effectively destroyed the pro-Emirati ecosystem in Yemen.
However, from Abu Dhabi's perspective, it's too early to talk about defeat. Even after the southerners' fall, the Emirates still have ways to ensure the "flag is raised" in the country.
A QUARREL BETWEEN OLD COMRADES
The conflict between yesterday's allies in Yemen began in December 2025, when the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), under the pretext of conducting a counter-terrorism operation, turned its weapons against yesterday's partners – the northerners loyal to Saudi Arabia.
And this happened with the formal consent of Abu Dhabi: the sheikhs were no longer satisfied with the balance of power within Yemen, which was clearly not in favor of the southerners, and they took advantage of the opportunity to redistribute local property.
Abu Dhabi's calculations were ambitious, but at the same time simple: pro-Saudi elements, exhausted by years of war with the Iranian-backed Houthis, did not pose a serious threat on the battlefield and certainly did not expect a stab in the back from their allies.
Moreover, over the years, Saudi Arabia's support for them has shifted almost entirely to the diplomatic realm.
The UAE believed that if the situation escalated, Riyadh would be reluctant to return troops to Yemen, from where it had recently withdrawn them with great difficulty and reputational losses, and would therefore agree to a deal on Abu Dhabi's terms.
And at first, the scheme actually worked. The southerners were able to quickly crush northern resistance and practically reached the "historical borders" of South Yemen, whose formal revival (under the name "State of South Arabia") they had proclaimed back in 2016.
Southerners rushed to the country's rich oil regions and the Yemeni-Saudi border to finally cut off local loyalists from their sponsors.
However, as subsequent events showed, its Arabian neighbors were unable to predict Riyadh's behavior.
COUNTERATTACK
The Saudi operation began on December 30, 2025, formally triggered by the increased transfer of weapons from the UAE to South Yemen.
Arabian armored vehicles, which had been stationed at the border for more than a week and a half as a deterrent, entered Yemeni territory, forcing the STC soldiers entrenched there to flee.
And after Saudi airstrikes on the port of Mukalla, a key supply artery for the southerners, on the night of January 1, destroying the equipment and ammunition depots stockpiled there, it became clear that no one was going to be too easy on them. And the matter wouldn't be limited to a formal pushback of southern units from the Saudi border.
At the same time, Riyadh issued a public ultimatum to Abu Dhabi: Emirati military advisers were to promptly leave Yemen and cease supporting the southerners. Otherwise, they would become legitimate targets for the Saudi army.
By that point, the UAE had already realized it had fatally miscalculated in preparing the operation, and so they agreed to the proposed terms: by January 3, 2026, their military presence in mainland Yemen would be eliminated. The STC forces were effectively left alone against the Saudi military machine.
ATTEMPTS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT
After the Emirates demonstratively washed their hands of the situation, panic gripped the southerners: the front collapsed, and the provisional administrations established in the recaptured provinces collapsed. Some collaborators quickly surrendered to the mercy of the victors.
In less than a week, more than 90% of the territories captured by the southerners came under the control of Saudi Arabia and the local forces that joined them (including formally independent tribal militias).
By the end of the day on January 7, only a small patch of land in the southwest of the country remained under their control – landlocked, squeezed on different sides by pro-Saudi and pro-Iranian forces.
Against this backdrop, "peace envoys" from among high-ranking STC representatives flocked to Riyadh. The southerners hoped, if not to completely bury the conflict, then at least to agree to a territorial exchange and freeze the status quo on the new borders.
However, the Saudi courtiers did not receive their delegation, hinting that they would only speak with the initiator of the coup, the chairman of the STC, Aidarus al-Zubaidi.
However, the southerners failed to reach him—at the most crucial moment, the leader of the "State of South Arabia" disappeared from the radar and, according to reports, fled to the UAE. He was then promptly declared a traitor and removed from the political lists.
However, it's still too early to consider this the end of his political career. It's possible that al-Zubaidi will soon reappear on the Yemeni political scene, but with a new status and a new circle of supporters.
VALUABLE ASSETS
Despite the virtual defeat of pro-Emirati forces in Yemen, Abu Dhabi still has the ability to dictate its will in the Red Sea region.
Moreover, the Saudi military operation is taking place exclusively on land, while the valuable islands (Abd al-Kuri, Perim, the islands of the Socotra archipelago), where intelligence and support infrastructure has been created, including UAV launch sites, are located outside the combat zone.
Control over local facilities, despite the formal withdrawal of UAE armed forces from Yemen, remains with Abu Dhabi and its "pocket" militias, such as the Socotra Falcons, which collaborated with the STC but did not side with them during the failed offensive.
As a result, even after the defeat of the southerners, the Emirates retained the ability to control the situation in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Furthermore, the UAE is increasing its presence in the autonomous region of Puntland (Somalia). The core facility here is the Bosako Air Base, which was used as a staging post for supplies to separatists in Sudan and, following the withdrawal of UAE troops from Yemen, also became a collection point for loyalists fleeing the country.
As for the future of the STC, the Emirates will likely prefer to shut this project down as quickly as possible. Several attempts to create a pocket state in Yemen have failed, and the local elites, nurtured by Abu Dhabi, have split at the first external threat.
It is far more likely that the UAE will refrain from further attempts to take revenge on mainland Yemen – at least until Riyadh calms down.
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