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2026-01-06 Syria-Lebanon-Iran
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While Iranian authorities are suppressing protests, America is deploying helicopters to the region
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Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] Unrest in Iran, fueled by government economic miscalculations, has been ongoing for over a week.
Due to the sharp depreciation of the national currency and accelerating inflation, prices for essential goods soared. This, in turn, put local businesses, especially bazaar traders and shopkeepers, at risk. In less than 24 hours, the Tehran strike spread to a dozen major cities.
And although the authorities have managed to more or less stabilize dialogue with the streets, the risk of the protests spiraling out of control remains, especially if someone from the outside tries to interfere.
"THE OFFICIAL OF UNFULFILLED HOPES"
At first, official Tehran tried to suppress the protests using the same approach as before—isolating hotbeds of tension and overriding the agenda with positive news, as was done, for example, during the "gasoline protests" of 2018.
However, this time the plan failed. Within 24 hours, the number of strikers had grown more than fivefold, to 2,500 people: students and local intellectuals joined the shopkeepers, and the crowd's slogans took on a negative political tone.
Following this, the authorities moved on to more concrete measures. For example, on December 29, Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin, who had held the position since 2022, was dismissed.
Farzin, a conservative whom President Masoud Pezeshkian inherited from his predecessor, was considered a supporter of a tough line on curbing inflation and often clashed with the presidential office, especially on matters of monetary policy.
He also opposed any deal with the US to ease sanctions, rightly believing that Washington was only looking for weaknesses in the Iranian economic system and was not aiming to lift restrictions.
The protests gave the reformists a chance to get rid of an inconvenient figure gracefully and without any reputational damage.
However, Farzin's replacement, Abdolnasser Hemmati, an economist from the reformist bloc (who had already headed the Central Bank from 2018 to 2021), was received rather coldly by the Iranian street.
This is partly because he made many mistakes as Minister of Economy last year, becoming not only the first member of Pezeschkian's government to be removed from office as a result of impeachment, but also a scapegoat for the conservatives and the security forces.
The protesters simply didn't believe that the "official of dashed hopes" (as Hemmati was dubbed on Iranian social media) could correct the economic course. Especially since the number of negative factors weighing on the national economy this time is an order of magnitude greater than during his first term.
KNIGHT'S MOVE
Over the next few days, protests in Iran teetered on the brink of full-scale unrest.
Despite the relatively successful work of law enforcement agencies, who managed to bring the people under control in most provinces, including the capital region, it was not possible to completely avoid casualties.
At least six people were killed in street clashes with police, something US President Donald Trump immediately informed the world about, predicting "serious retribution" for Tehran.
And in early January, protesters acquired firearms, which became an alarming signal for local authorities, especially in border provinces, where there was already a noticeable rise in crime.
There was a risk that petty criminals would try to stage a provocation and further pit the security forces and the street against each other.
The central authorities needed to make a "knight's move" to seize the initiative. And Tehran didn't keep them waiting long.
On January 3, Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei held a major press conference, declaring that the protests by "shopkeepers and market traders" were not a matter of chance, but rather reflected real problems in the Iranian economy that the government acknowledged and was prepared to find solutions to.
This statement had a far more powerful effect on the masses than the controversial change of the Central Bank governor. The number of protesters declined after January 3, falling below 1,500 people—almost half the number on the day of Hemmati's appointment.
At the same time, the supreme leader did not bow too much to the demonstrators, declaring in passing that law enforcement agencies would “harshly suppress” any attempts to destabilize the country from within and fight the “fifth column” (especially armed ones) that discredits peaceful demonstrators.
He did not forget to mention the “special interest” of the United States and Israel in weakening Iran, against which the Iranians have several trump cards.
THE HEIR TO THE THRONE WAS RIDICULED
Khamenei's statements apparently came as a surprise to Tehran's opponents, who by that point had already managed to expand protests to all of Iran's provinces and, using persuasive language, predict the "imminent collapse" of the central government—even to the point of Iranian elites fleeing to other countries.
After official Tehran publicly declared its desire to resolve the problem bloodlessly (but with a reasonable use of force), the “shaky regime” theory no longer seemed indisputable.
An attempt by the fugitive monarchist leader Shahzade Reza Pahlavi to once again incite protesters and call on them to "overthrow the regime" in the name of future prosperity has backfired.
The exiled heir to the Shah's throne was ridiculed not only in Iran but also in the émigré community. This was done by the same figures who criticized his intention to restore the monarchy through Israel and the United States during their June conflict with Iran.
Numerous supportive statements by Israeli ministers addressed to the "suffering Persian people" were also met with little enthusiasm on the street.
Moreover, there were several recorded cases where the crowd independently identified pro-Israeli provocateurs and handed them over to the police, thereby regulating the level of confrontation.
ISRAEL'S "DEMONSTRATION FIST"
Despite the relative stabilization of the situation, it's too early to talk about overcoming the crisis. The trust the authorities gained through the Supreme Leader's intervention is not unlimited.
The street is expecting the Pezeshkian government to take measures to stabilize the economy, while the Iranian rial continues to depreciate (by approximately another 6% compared to the exchange rate at the start of the protests), and the Central Bank is asking for time to develop a strategy.
If the protesters' patience runs out sooner, Khamenei's repeated intervention will no longer help.
In parallel with the Iranian protests, another transfer of American forces to the Middle East is taking place.
Over the past few days, Washington has deployed more than a dozen C-17 and KC-135 transport aircraft near the Iranian border and sent Chinook and Seahawk helicopters to bases in neighboring countries. The total number of combat aircraft deployed to Iran exceeds 50.
Changes are also noticeable in Israeli official rhetoric. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whenever the situation in Iran comes up, either avoids comment or gives vague answers.
Meanwhile, the Israeli General Staff has studied with interest the American kidnapping of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and is not averse to attempting a similar ploy against Tehran. Especially since the unstable situation favors such moves.
However, these conversations remain at the level of speculation, while official Tel Aviv says it has no plans to clash with the Iranians on the battlefield.
Experts following the developments are inevitably drawing parallels with the events of June. Back then, Tehran's opponents were similarly building up their "demonstrative fist" near Iran's borders, but suddenly switched to peaceful rhetoric. This, however, did not prevent them from striking soon after.
True, unlike the events of June, Tehran has far fewer trump cards (which then allowed it to effectively withstand attacks and even retaliate against its attackers). The same cannot be said of its opponents, for whom internal Iranian strife offers virtually limitless scope for operational combinations.
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Posted by badanov 2026-01-06 00:00||
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