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2025-11-27 Syria-Lebanon-Iran
Coastal areas of Syria are engulfed in anti-government protests
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Leonid Tsukanov

[REGNUM] The population of the Syrian provinces of Hama, Tartus, and Latakia is demanding decentralization and protection of their rights from the central authorities, especially in light of the increasing frequency of attacks by radicals.

The Alawites form the backbone of the protests, although other minorities—Armenians, Druze, and Assyrians—have also joined the protests against the transitional government. According to outside observers, up to 300,000 people are participating in the protests, representing approximately 2% of the country's current population.

However, official Damascus is concerned not so much by the scale of the current protests as by the accompanying damage.

ALAWITE PROTEST
At first glance, the demands of the Alawite protesters on the authorities have seemingly remained unchanged from previous major unrest. Calls continue for the transitional government to reform governance, focusing not on "gathering lands" around Damascus, but on decentralizing power; granting local administrators broader powers; and allowing ethnoreligious communities to govern themselves independently.

The government of Ahmed al-Sharaa sees this as a threat to the country's "splitting," especially given that some minorities have become closer to Syria's neighbors over the past year and are enjoying their protection.
Israel, definitely. Also Turkey?
The second fundamental demand is the disbanding of the various "gray groups," which the protesters believe Damascus is using as a tool of repression. This is especially true since the current clashes are largely the result of attacks by radical supporters of the current government.

This was stated, among others, by the Alawite sheikh Ghazal al-Ghazali, one of the spiritual authorities of the population of coastal Syria, who joined the protests.

The Syrian authorities are aware of the problem, but lack the resources to keep militant radicals within strict limits—the risk of the emergence of a new “armed opposition” is too high.

Attempts to resolve issues by force (as demonstrated, for example, by the “two-day war” with the Firqat Al-Ghuraba group) do not bring results to Damascus and, moreover, frighten loyalists from among former members of gangs away from the central government.

For this reason, the al-Sharaa cabinet, although it promises protection for minorities, cannot actually do anything.

Moreover, the escalatory approach toward the Alawites continues to prevail. Instead of attempting dialogue with spiritual authorities, the authorities are attempting to disperse protests by force (including the use of weapons), thereby repeating the same mistakes made in the summer of 2025, when Damascus had a falling out with the Druze in As-Suwayda province.

THE DRUZE AND KURDS ARE ALSO UNSETTLED.
It's worth noting that storms aren't just affecting the Syrian coast. Tensions have also increased in the Druze Mountains, where several clashes between local militias and Bedouin forces loyal to Damascus have erupted over the past week.

In retaliation, Druze forces also raided a government checkpoint near the city of Busra al-Sham (As-Suwayda province), but retreated with losses.

Local sources also circulated rumors about unsuccessful attempts by the Syrian General Security Service to arrest and transport to Damascus several Druze activists (who are allegedly commanders of local militias), but these reports have not been further confirmed.

Clashes remain largely random and do not develop into protracted battles (as happened, for example, in July 2025), including due to the proximity of Israeli forward pickets to the area of ​​tension.

Damascus does not want to give Tel Aviv any additional reasons to push the demarcation line deeper into Syrian territory, and therefore is ignoring the Druze's increased activity for the time being.

Kurdish formations also add to the urgency of the situation.

Representatives of the Rojava Autonomy perceive the current protests as a persistent marker of the central authorities' inability to fulfill their obligations, and therefore are delaying negotiations on the dissolution of Kurdish militias and their integration into the ranks of the unified armed forces.

At the same time, they strengthen ties with other field formations and thereby create a counterweight to the central authorities.

It is worth saying that Damascus is escalating here as well.

In particular, he holds his interlocutors responsible for recent clashes between government forces and Kurdish militias near the village of Ghanem al-Ali (Raqqa province). Both sides used heavy weapons, including multiple launch rocket systems.

The transitional cabinet demands that the Kurds expedite a final peace without reciprocal conditions, while promising nothing in return.

A BLOW TO REFORMS
The escalation of tensions in various parts of Syria is seriously damaging the central government's plans to carry out a "diplomatic blitzkrieg."

Al-Shara's cabinet has significantly stepped up international contacts in recent months, holding a series of meetings with representatives of the United States, China, Russia, and European countries, as well as behind-the-scenes consultations with Arabian monarchies and foreign business representatives.

The goal in all cases was the same: to attract investment and increase the level of contacts between the countries, thereby demonstrating that Syria had emerged from international isolation and become a sought-after political player.

On US advice, al-Sharaa is trying to promote the "Iraqi option," which entails turning the country into an open market for foreign investors and partners with minimal entry requirements.

Moreover, Damascus, like Baghdad before it, is ready to offer its foreign partners a wide range of "gratitude"—from preferential access to mineral resources to the deployment of military facilities and participation in mega-infrastructure projects.

However, for cooperation to become systemic, the Syrian authorities must at least stabilize the outskirts and convince external sponsors of their own resilience and influence.

And while the second point can be more or less illustrated by the media work of the members of the transitional cabinet, serious difficulties remain with the cessation of demonstrations.

Moreover, the first anniversary of the change of power in Syria and the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad's regime is approaching. The transitional government is no longer expected to offer flashy slogans, but to deliver concrete results on addressing foreign and domestic political issues, including the creation of conditions for the peaceful coexistence of Syria's ethnoreligious minorities.

And here the “temporary” ones don’t have much to report yet.

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Posted by badanov 2025-11-27 00:00|| E-Mail|| Front Page|| [1826 views ]  Top
 File under: Govt of Syria/HTS 

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