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2026-09-30 Africa North
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Revolt in the 'smugglers' city': Europe faces problems due to Libyan strife
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Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov
[Regnum] Before the central Libyan government had fully recovered from the turbulence caused by the power outages, new problems were already looming on the horizon.
In just a week, regime opponents shut down a major oil pipeline, disrupting established export chains and fueling tensions between Tripoli and its neighbors.
The threads of seemingly disparate incidents once again lead to Zawiya, a "smugglers' town" near the capital that remains under government control only nominally. However, Tripoli is in no rush to resolve the issue radically.
GUARDS PROTEST
A new crisis erupted in Libya in the second half of September, when employees of the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) went on strike due to delays in salary payments and a lack of social security.
Specifically, on September 21, an armed group of protesters closed valve No. 7 on the Sharara-Zawiya oil pipeline in the Hamada region. This led to excess pressure in the pipeline and forced Libya's national oil company to reduce pumping volumes by almost half.
The very next day, PFG blocked the gates of the Zawiya oil complex, including the refinery and the Brega Petroleum Marketing facility. Workers and technical personnel were unable to access the facilities, threatening a complete shutdown of the complex and the declaration of force majeure.
PFG had previously tried to maintain civil protest for several months and sent representatives to Tripoli at least three times with an official message that if demands were not met, the work of the fields under their control (including El-Fili and Sharara) would be paralyzed.
The final warning was issued on September 16. However, government officials then believed the PFG was bluffing and would not engage in open conflict for fear of clashing with security forces loyal to them.
And the PFG units probably wouldn't have raised the stakes so radically if they hadn't been suddenly supported by armed loyalists from the groups of Mohammed Bahrun, nicknamed Al-Far.
He is considered one of Libya's most influential field commanders and the unofficial leader of the "city of smugglers." Local sources have repeatedly reported the presence of reinforced patrols of the First Security Division, bearing Al-Far's personal insignia, at oil refineries near Zawiya. The total number of fighters involved could be as many as 150.
At the same time, Al-Far did not officially declare war on Tripoli, and its fighters, according to statements circulating in the Libyan press from “unnamed Zawiya officials,” were deployed to problematic sites solely to maintain law and order and prevent possible provocations.
ALL ROADS LEAD TO ZAWIYA
Covertly condoning protesting security guards, however, isn't the only reason Bahrun and his associates are currently being criticized in the capital. Central authorities are concerned about the sharp increase in activity on the Mediterranean routes, which illegal migrants and smugglers use to reach European countries.
Greeks are particularly vocal about the problem. Athens believes Libya is deliberately turning a blind eye to smuggling routes and, together with Turkey, is using illegal migrants as a hybrid weapon. Greece is threatening to impose a naval blockade if the situation worsens, which would impact the African nation's maritime trade.
Interestingly, the accusations against Tripoli focus not so much on the illegal migration itself as on the dirty methods used to organize it. In particular, Greek media outlets readily report that Libyan traffickers are putting teenagers aged 14 to 17 at the controls, believing that foreign laws will apply less harshly to them than to adults.
Considering that all of the illegal caravans caught had previously departed from fishing villages near Zawiya, Libya's neighbors have theorized that an entire teenage flotilla is operating in the area. They're asking Hamid Dbeibah's government a reasonable question: can they control the entire country if they can't stop what's happening just 50 kilometers from the capital?
Furthermore, the western and central parts of the country have recently been increasingly gripped by "captogon fever." Government-loyal security forces are increasingly reporting the destruction of clandestine laboratories and the seizure of large quantities of the synthetic drug.
The most recent major operation took place in mid-September, when intelligence agencies seized approximately 100,000 pills shaped like the head of the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, intended for shipment to France and Italy.
Along the way, they managed to entrap several couriers and guides, who initially tried to frighten investigators with their "big connections" in criminal and political circles, including Al-Far's authority.
THE TRUCE TRAP
However, despite the huge tangle of contradictions between Tripoli and Zawiya, the central authorities are not yet ready to directly attack the "city of smugglers" - much less outlaw Bahrun - due to the lessons of the past.
The clashes with the First Security Division in August 2026, although they ended in a draw, led to a fragmentation of the government loyalist network. Al-Far's authority was significantly strengthened, and his influence increased exponentially.
Moreover, risk assessment is closely intertwined with the personal ambitions of individual officials. For example, the prime minister's adviser and nephew, Ibrahim Dbeibah, who unofficially oversees the entire security apparatus within the government, is determined to sooner or later draw Al-Far into his orbit of influence and transform the "rebel baron" into a loyal ally of Tripoli and controller of sea routes.
He considers relying on other, less influential field commanders dangerous and risky. It was Dbeibah Jr. who, it is believed, vetoed a plan for a large-scale police operation in Zawiya in August 2026, allowing Bahrun and his supporters to maintain their positions.
He also appears to be turning a blind eye to the numerous reports of violations in the "city of smugglers," believing many of them to be attempts to create discord between the government and Zawiya. Therefore, he's in no hurry to order further pressure.
Either way, the delay is costing Tripoli dearly. The reduced volume of oil pumped through the partially blocked pipeline is costing the treasury enormous amounts of oil trading revenue daily, while the disruption to the oil refining cycle threatens a rapid diesel shortage—and, consequently, power outages for small farms.
In addition, Dbeibah's cabinet is under behind-the-scenes pressure from Italy and Germany, the main buyers of Libyan oil, whose own reserves are visibly melting away following the blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz Straits.
Rome and Berlin are demanding that the problem be resolved as quickly as possible and that the trust Europe placed in Libya after the overthrow of Gaddafi not be nullified. Although Europe has not publicly threatened retaliatory measures, supply shortfalls could well provoke a cooling of relations between Tripoli and its Mediterranean neighbors.
This means that the Dbeibah government will soon have to make a difficult but inevitable choice: either continue its geopolitical maneuvering regarding Zawiya, or resolve the issue roughly but quickly.
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Posted by badanov 2026-09-30 00:00||
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